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**Political Influence in Transportation Planning:
The San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation
Commission's Regional Transportation Plan**

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James Houston Banks

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POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING:
THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION'S REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION PLAN

James Houston Banks

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Engineering,
University of California

University of California
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POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING:
THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSION'S REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN

James Houston Banks

Abstract

This dissertation is a case study of the role of political influence in major decisions concerning the development and implementation of a Regional Transportation Plan by the San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) in the period between MTC's creation in September, 1970 and the end of 1974.

Two approaches to the study of political influence in routine technically-oriented governmental activities are explored. The first, based on statistical analysis of isolated decisions, is rejected on the grounds that an insufficient number of decisions can be observed and that an inordinate amount of judgment would be required for the classification and/or quantification of variables. The second is a model of the evolution of a new governmental organization in an environment of ongoing governmental activity.

This model, which is tested in detail, focuses on the establishment and defense of organizational domain and the evolution of the internal structure and political procedures of the new organization. It is hypothesized that new governmental agencies are created as the result of the activity of some group (the agency's constituency) which hopes to use the agency as an instrument for influencing events, but

that such influence can take place only if the agency is both effective (that is, it has, and is willing to use, sufficient power to maintain a wide organizational domain) and open to its constituents in its political procedures.

The dissertation includes detailed case studies of MTC's creation, its initial organization and staffing, the development of its initial plan in 1973, and major decisions in the eighteen months following the adoption of the plan, including a revision of the Plan in 1974, adoption of an Environmental Impact Report for the Plan, development of a Transportation Control Plan as required by the Clean Air Act of 1970, resolution of several institutional conflicts, and three major project reviews involving controversial highway projects.

Major conclusions include the following: (1) transportation implementing agencies (the California Department of Transportation, transit operators, and local public works departments) and local governments continue to dominate Bay Area Transportation politics, as they did prior to MTC's creation; and (2) the other major faction attempting to influence Bay Area transportation planning - environmentally-conscious, regional-scale citizen's groups - failed to achieve significant influence partly because MTC lacked the organizational effectiveness to fulfil the role these groups envisioned for it and partly because MTC's political procedures, while more open than most encountered in transportation planning, were not sufficiently open to allow control of MTC by its natural constituency.

Factors contributing to MTC's lack of effectiveness included insufficient formal power, a selection procedure for Commission members which insured that local elected officials would dominate MTC, MTC's unwillingness to confront rival agencies in defense of its organizational domain, and MTC's inability to carry out successful co-optation and negotiation strategies from a position of weakness.

Factors contributing to a lack of openness (particularly to the regional-scale citizens groups) included a conflict in political style between the Commission and these groups; failure (in some cases) to disclose dissenting staff opinions, details of staff deliberations, and details of inter-staff negotiations; and the effect of time pressure, particularly in the development of the initial Plan in 1973.

Norman Kennedy
Committee Chairman

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I am also deeply indebted to the many MTC commissioners and staff members and members of other organizations involved in MTC's planning activities who cooperated in this study - even though in some cases they may have felt that the whole project was not in their best interests. Space precludes my mentioning here all those who participated in interviews (see Appendix A for a complete list). I am also indebted to the MTC Community Affairs Office and to several other MTC staff members (particularly MTC Librarian Dian Gillmar) for their assistance in providing me with documents.

Finally, I would like to thank my students this past year and the Chairman of the Civil Engineering Department, Professor Carl Monismith, for their patience while this project competed for my time and attention with my teaching duties.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A. Introduction

"Influence," according to Edward C. Banfield, is the "ability to get others to act, think, and feel as one intends."¹ This dissertation is a case study of the ways in which political influence is exercised in transportation planning at the level of the metropolitan region - specifically, of the role of political influence in the San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan Transportation Commission's regional transportation planning activities during the period from its founding in September, 1970 through the end of 1974. The question of political influence in transportation planning is of interest from the standpoints of both political science and transportation planning. From the standpoint of political science, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) case offers an opportunity to observe the workings of political influence in the context of a routine governmental function, in which an established technical bureaucracy was confronted by shifting external circumstances, changing public attitudes, and institutional upheavals. From the standpoint of transportation planning, it offers an opportunity to assess the value of technical information and technical expertise in a decision-making process which is highly politicized.

The Metropolitan Transportation Commission was created by the California Legislature in 1970 and given a mandate to produce a regional transportation plan by June 30, 1973. In contrast to pre-

vious transportation planning agencies in the Bay Area, MTC was to have extensive powers over the allocation of transportation funds in the region. Also, MTC was to have the power to review and approve specified types of transportation projects; shortly after its creation, this power was extended to virtually all major projects through an interagency agreement which gave MTC "A-95" review powers over all Bay Area transportation projects involving federal funds.*

The one thing the legislature neglected to provide MTC at the outset was an assured source of funding. The Commission was given the power to "negotiate contracts or agreements" for planning services with the State Business and Transportation Agency, the Federal Government, and the local transit operators, but it was provided with no funds for its own independent use. It was not until the passage of the California Transportation Development Act (SB 325) in late 1971 that MTC had an assured source of funding, and not until 1972 that it hired a full staff and began serious work on the regional transportation plan that it was supposed to complete by mid-1973.

Despite the extremely tight schedule, the Regional Transportation Plan² (RTP) was completed on time in June, 1973. This document represented a considerable departure from traditional methods of transportation planning. Instead of concentrating on the devel-


*"A-95" review powers are those exercised over federal projects by a regional planning agency in each metropolitan region. The planning agency designated to perform this function is called the "Metropolitan Clearinghouse." In the Bay Area, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) is the metropolitan clearinghouse. ABAG delegated its powers over transportation development to MTC. The designation "A-95" refers to circular A-95 of the Office of Management and Budget, which governs exercise of these review powers.

opment of methodology and the prediction of future transportation demand, as had the major transportation studies of the 1960's, the MTC plan was to be an "issue-oriented plan." What this meant was that MTC would make an inventory of transportation proposals which had been developed to some degree but were not yet ready for implementation (or proposals which might be made during the planning process), expose them to intense public scrutiny, try to evaluate them, and then make up a schedule of priorities for implementation and a financial plan based on the results of these evaluations. The resulting plan would be divided into two sections: one which the MTC staff dubbed the "Constitution," consisting of broad policy statements; and one translating these policies into specific proposals for action, which the staff referred to as the "Statutes." The organization of the RTP, as it was finally written, was as follows:

- Section I - Issues and Goals
- Section II - Objectives and Policies
- Section III - The Regional Transportation System
- Section IV - Financial Plan and Priorities Program
- Section V - Proposals for Action
- Section VI - Plan Administration.

In terms of the scheme outlined above, Sections I and II are the "Constitution" and Sections III through VI are the "Statutes."

Late in the process of writing the plan, MTC was confronted with the necessity for producing an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the plan. Since there was insufficient time to complete



MAP 1.

THE NINE-COUNTY
BAY AREA

this document prior to the deadline for Plan adoption, and since there were still major unresolved conflicts over Sections III, IV, and VI, the 1973 version of the plan was adopted with the understanding that it would be extensively revised in 1974. As it turned out, Sections III and IV were extensively rewritten and Section VI mostly deleted.³ For this reason, the 1974 revisions must be considered an integral part of MTC's basic Plan, with the 1973 versions of Sections III, IV, and VI serving as intermediate stages in the development of this Plan.

In addition to the Plan and the EIR covering it, this study examines the development of a key addition added to the Plan in 1974 - a Traffic Control Plan (TCP) undertaken in response to the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970 - and three major implementation decisions which set important precedents for the interpretation of the Plan.

B. The Setting: The San Francisco Bay Area

1. Physical Features

The San Francisco Bay Area, as defined for planning purposes by the State of California, consists of the nine counties surrounding San Francisco Bay. These include the City and County of San Francisco and the counties of San Mateo, Santa Clara, Alameda, Contra Costa, Solano, Napa, Sonoma, and Marin. This region covers an area of about 7000 square miles and had a population of 4.6 million in 1970 (see map).

The Bay Area is very strongly influenced by its major physical features. These include San Francisco and San Pablo Bays, the Golden Gate, Carquinez Strait (through which the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers empty), small parts of the Central Valley and the

Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, and branches of the Coast Range which run along either side of San Francisco Bay and which are breached by the Golden Gate and Carquinez Strait. Political boundaries, the location of population concentrations, the location and types of transportation facilities, and the relationship between the transportation system and the natural environment are perhaps more affected by sheer topography in the Bay Area than in any other major U. S. metropolitan region. Other important features of the natural environment include (1) strong earthquake activity along the San Andreas and Hayward Faults; (2) important agricultural resources in the form of vineyards and orchards in the Northern Counties of Solano, Napa, and Sonoma (especially the Napa Valley vineyards) and parts of the Santa Clara Valley; and (3) important recreation areas, including the beaches and mountain areas of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, State beaches in San Mateo County, the Russian River area in Sonoma County, and the Santa Cruz Mountains.

2. Economic Structure

Downtown San Francisco is the dominant retail, financial, managerial, communications, and distribution center of Northern California. Secondary business centers are located in Oakland and San Jose; otherwise, employment is fairly well dispersed, with major industrial activity concentrated in bands running along Carquinez Strait and the Bay from Antioch in Eastern Contra Costa County to San Jose and, thence, along the Bay from San Jose to San Francisco. Major industries include petroleum refining, shipping, electronics

and aerospace technology, and diversified light manufacturing. In addition, agriculture is of importance, especially in the Northern Counties and in parts of the Santa Clara Valley; and entertainment and tourism are of significance especially to San Francisco. Recent trends in the location of residential areas and economic activity have resulted in the expansion of housing in outlying suburban areas without a corresponding increase in jobs; this has resulted in a pattern of increased commuting.

3. Political Structure

The local governmental structure in the region is characterized by a lack of any single dominant jurisdiction. Although the combined City and County of San Francisco continues to be the single most important governmental entity in the region, its small (and declining) population relative to the region as a whole, the status of Oakland and San Jose as competing centers of regional activity, and the relatively large size of even the suburban communities make it impossible for San Francisco to really dominate the region. Alameda and Santa Clara Counties have substantially larger populations than San Francisco; and while San Francisco still has the largest population of any city in the region, there were no less than 18 communities with over 50,000 population in 1970, and 5 of over 100,000.

This lack of a dominant political jurisdiction poses problems in dealing with issues of regional significance. The effect of the fragmentation resulting from local political boundaries is increased by the sheer size of the state of California and its strong tradi-

tion of home rule: the State is normally neither willing nor able to take on the role of coordinating action at the regional level, as in some eastern states.* The situation is further complicated by the free use of special districts at both the regional and sub-regional levels; besides MTC, regional and subregional agencies include the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC), which is responsible for planning and control of development involving the Bay and its shoreline; the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District; the Bay Area Water Quality Control Board; the Bay Area Sewage Services Agency; the North and Central Coastal Commissions (which perform functions similar to those of BCDC with respect to the oceanfront); the East Bay Municipal Utility District; the East Bay Regional Parks District; the Golden Gate Bridge, Highway, and Transportation District (GGBHTD); the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BARTD); and the Alameda Contra Costa Transit District (AS Transit). In addition to these special-purpose agencies, there is a metropolitan council of governments, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), which is responsible for overall regional planning. ABAG, which dates back to 1961, is hampered by the fact that participation in it by local governments is voluntary; consequently, it has found it difficult to take strong stands on controversial issues and impossible to enforce its positions. (Indeed, there is reason to believe that ABAG was originally founded

*For example, Massachusetts. This feature of the California political system provides a marked contrast between MTC and the Boston Restudy.

by the local governments in an effort to head off more effective regional government.) By the late 1960's ABAG had come to favor some sort of multi-purpose regional planning agency with substantial powers of enforcement. So far, however, proposals for such a multi-purpose regional planning agency have met with repeated failures in the legislature, primarily because proponents have not been able to agree among themselves about the details of the agency. Meanwhile, there has been a trend toward the proliferation of single-purpose agencies such as MTC. Many proponents of regional government in the Bay Area hope these will eventually be assembled into a multi-purpose regional government, but meanwhile, any cooperation among them is voluntary.

In the absence of either an effective multi-purpose regional government or a dominant local political jurisdiction, much of the leadership in regional affairs has been assumed by the Bay Area legislative delegation. Most members of the delegation are secure in their seats and are reasonably well-informed about issues of regional significance - in the past, they have often shown more awareness of public opinion on such issues than have the local governments. Consequently, the delegation has often played the role of arbiter in matters of regional policy and has involved itself at a level of detail greater than is perhaps desirable. Of course, the delegation does not always achieve a regional perspective - there are always the competing interests of individual districts, and these sometimes take precedence.

The non-governmental political structure of the Bay Area is also quite diverse: in addition to the regular party organizations, there are numerous political and quasi-political organizations representing the entire political spectrum. Among these - especially among those of the liberal and radical left - there is a strong tradition of activism.

Of particular concern in transportation planning is the environmental movement, which is well-established, active, and in some respects quite powerful in the Bay Area. In the past, this loose coalition of groups has played a key role in the establishment of several regional agencies, including the Coastal Commissions and BCDC. At the time MTC was developing its plan, the local environmentalists were primarily concerned with the issues of limiting growth and development, preserving the region's remaining open space, and protecting its "unique environmental resources" such as the Bay, the coast and mountain recreation areas, the Napa Vineyards, and the region's remaining wilderness areas. Their interest in air and water quality remained quite strong, but after 1970, some of the initiative in these areas had passed to the state and federal governments.

Other important quasi-political organizations in the Bay Area which have shown an interest in transportation planning include a host of well-organized neighborhood and homeowners associations, the League of Women Voters, Chambers of Commerce and industrial leagues, and the Bay Area Council, a region-wide organization of leaders of major corporations.

4. Transportation System

The Bay Area's transportation system is heavily influenced by the region's topography. The hills and the Bay create barriers to land transportation; as a result major highway and rail facilities tend either to circle the Bay or to link access points to the region (the gaps in the hills) to a limited number of Bay crossings. Despite these natural limitations on access to the core areas (particularly San Francisco) there is considerable commuting from outlying suburbs to the city centers; consequently, existing highway and mass transit systems are mostly geared to commute trips. The critical bottlenecks in the system tend to occur where commute trips must cross natural hill and water barriers. In addition to these natural bottlenecks, the rapid expansion of suburban population since World War II has created chronic congestion on highways in certain areas, most notably, Santa Clara County.

At the time of MTC's inception, the Bay Area transportation system consisted of the following important elements:

1. Street and Highway Systems. The Bay Area street and highway system consists of elements of the Interstate, other Federal Aid, and State highway systems, as well as streets and roads maintained by the region's cities and counties. Major access routes to the area include I-80 from Sacramento, I-580 from Stockton, U. S. 101 from both the north and south, and State Route 17 from Santa Cruz. In addition to these major access routes, most of the routes of regional significance are incorporated in the state highway system.

In urbanized parts of the region, conversion of major highways to freeway status began comparatively early. Parts of such key routes as the Bayshore, Nimitz, and Eastshore Freeways, which provide access to downtown San Francisco and Oakland from the East Bay and San Mateo County, were constructed in the late 1940's and early 1950's. By 1972, practically all of the major routes in the densely-populated parts of the region had been built to freeway standards. Future highway plans mostly involved the closing of a few remaining "gaps" in the regional freeway system, capacity increases on existing freeways, and extensions of freeways into areas which were either still experiencing rapid suburban growth or were expected to experience it. In some areas, there were also active proposals for highway capacity increases to deal with heavy flows of recreational traffic.

In addition to the regional freeway network, the Bay Area highway system includes eight major bridges: the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, the Richmond-San Rafael Bridge, the San Mateo-Hayward Bay Bridge, and the Dumbarton Bridge, all crossing the San Francisco Bay; the Carquinez Bridge and the Benicia-Martinez Bridge across Carquinez Strait; the Golden Gate Bridge; and the Antioch Bridge across the San Joaquin River. Of these, all except the Golden Gate Bridge are under the jurisdiction of the California Toll Bridge Administration (formerly known as the

Division of Bay Toll Crossings). The Golden Gate Bridge is operated by GGBHTD.

2. Mass Transit. Although the bulk of the passenger travel in the Bay Area moves by automobile, mass transit is an increasingly important element in the regional transportation system. Major public transit agencies include BARTD, which in 1972 was in the process of implementing service on its 75-mile rail rapid transit system in San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa Counties; the San Francisco Municipal Railway, (Muni) which operates bus, trolley, streetcar, and cablecar service in the City of San Francisco; AC Transit, which operates bus service in portions of the East Bay and between the East Bay and downtown San Francisco; the newly-formed Santa Clara County Transit District, which operates bus service in Santa Clara County; and GGBHTD, which operates local bus service in Marin and Sonoma Counties and ferry and express buses between these areas and downtown San Francisco. Minor bus systems also exist in Daly City, Redwood City, Palo Alto, Pacifica, Vallejo, Fairfield, and Santa Rosa. Private firms involved in transit service include the Southern Pacific Transportation Company, which operates commuter rail services between San Francisco and San Jose, Greyhound Bus Lines, which offers commute service in several parts of the area, including the San Mateo Peninsula, Solano and Napa Counties, and Central Contra Costa County, and Peerless Stages, which

operates commute service between San Jose and Oakland. In 1972, several major areas still lacked local transit service. These included Central Contra Costa County, the Fremont-Newark-Union City Area in southern Alameda County, the Livermore-Amador-San Ramon Valley, and large parts of San Mateo County.

3. Airports. The final major component of the Bay Area passenger transportation system is the regional airport system. San Francisco International Airport is the region's major airport, handling about 79 percent of the region's scheduled air service in 1972. San Francisco International is a major focal point for both the national and international air networks and is the major access point to the region for long distance flights. Oakland International Airport, with about 12 percent of the traffic, also handles some long distance service and is expected to take an increasing share of the traffic as San Francisco International approaches capacity. The third major regional airport for scheduled service is San Jose Municipal Airport, which handles about 10 percent of the total passenger volume. The Bay Area Regional Airport System Study, which was completed by ABAG in 1973, projected passenger volumes beyond the capacities of these three facilities and recommended the development of Travis Air Force Base in Solano County as a fourth major regional airport. In addition to these airports serving scheduled flights, there are a number of

facilities serving general aviation only.

4. Seaports. San Francisco Bay is one of the world's major natural harbors. Important ports located on the Bay include Oakland, San Francisco, Richmond, and Redwood City. Of these, the Port of Oakland is the largest, with a high percentage of containerized cargo.
5. Railroads. Railroads play an important role in freight movement in the region. In addition, rail passenger service maintained by AMTRAK is beginning to regain some of the intercity passenger market. Major lines operating in the region include the Southern Pacific, Western Pacific, and Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe. Aside from some involvement with the Southern Pacific's commute service, MTC has no jurisdiction over rail operations.
6. Other Transportation Systems. Other transportation systems, such as trucking, pipelines, intercity buses, and the like are also outside MTC's jurisdiction.

C. MTC's Political Environment

1. Bay Area Transportation Planning and Politics⁴

The history of transportation planning and politics in the Bay Area has been marked by bold initiatives, bitter rivalries, and institutional turbulence. Important elements in the historical situation which set the stage for MTC include the San Francisco freeway revolt, the evolution of the area's mass transit agencies, the evolution of state and local transportation planning institutions, and

the evolution of the state and federal systems of transportation finance. These events are highly interrelated; taken together, they provided a fairly obvious set of political issues which served as a starting point for MTC.

Because of the formidable obstacles posed by the Bay and the surrounding hills, use of the automobile for commuting came late to the Bay Area. But with the construction of the Golden Gate and San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridges in the late 1930's, a dramatic shift occurred. Despite the fact that the Bay Bridge provided improved rail transit access to downtown San Francisco, there was a massive shift toward auto travel in the more densely-populated parts of the region. This, coupled with a large influx of population during and immediately after World War II, resulted in rapid suburbanization, an equally rapid decline in the financial position and quality of service of the region's mass transit operations, and chronic congestion on streets and highways, particularly the Bay Bridge itself. The immediate post-War period thus saw the region plagued by both a serious problem of congestion on its internal circulation system and a sense of disorganization due to its political fragmentation, which was made more pronounced by the rapid growth of the suburban areas and the resulting loss of influence by the established regional business centers of San Francisco and Oakland.

These trends were viewed by the major economic interests of the region as threats to the region's prosperity; they were especially concerned about their impact on the Bay Area's competitive position among the nation's large metropolitan areas. Those representing

downtown San Francisco and Oakland were doubly alarmed, since they not only felt that the region's national position was threatened by the inadequate transportation system and the lack of cooperation among local governments, but also that their position of dominance within the region was in serious jeopardy.

The initial response to these threats took the form of calls for increased freeway building, proposals for additional transbay crossings, serious interest in a regional rapid transit system, and tentative proposals for consolidation of regional planning -- particularly regional transportation planning. In the immediate post-War period, the state of California undertook an ambitious highway program, and a number of local governments (including San Francisco) responded with plans for extensive construction of freeways. At the same time, the rapid transit proposal was being put forward seriously in the state legislature, with the result that a Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission (BARTC) was formed in 1951 to study the problem. Also during this period, the Bay Area Council (the "citizens" planning organization representing the region's major economic interests) began to put forward a series of proposals calling for immediate operational improvements on the Bay Bridge, additional transbay crossings, and increased coordination in planning and operation of the regional transportation system (with special emphasis on coordinating freeway and land use planning and consolidation of operation of seaports and airports).

The 1950's were marked by a fairly straight forward development of these initiatives. The highway system was improved by construc-

tion of freeways in major regional travel corridors and by new bridges across Carquinez Strait and the Bay (the Richmond-San Rafael Bridge). The Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission undertook a major planning effort between 1953 and 1955 and published a report in January 1956 recommending a nine-county rail rapid transit system with a proposed first stage serving five counties and a small part of a sixth⁵ (San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, and a small portion of Santa Clara). In 1957, the Commission was abolished and replaced by the Bay Area Transit District, which included five counties (Santa Clara was excluded at its request from the enabling legislation); BARTD took over the Commission's planning role and began more detailed design and financial planning for the proposed rapid transit system. Meanwhile, the private local transit operator in the East Bay (the Key System) failed and was replaced by the AC Transit District in 1956. The Bay Area Council continued to push for consolidation of planning efforts and joint operation of the region's seaports, airports, and bridges; this effort culminated in 1958 in a proposal for a Golden Gate Authority, modeled after the Port of New York Authority, which would have consolidated planning, construction, and operation of these three types of facilities under a single, locally-controlled agency.

This period of relatively straightforward response to the developments of the post-War period came to an end in the late 1950's in a series of conflicts which in many ways prefigured those encountered by MTC fifteen years later. These involved, first of all, a series of clashes implicit in the earlier initiatives that finally came to a head as proposals such as BART and the Golden

Gate Authority became more specific. Perhaps more important for the long run, however, was the emergence of a major new constituency in regional transportation politics: the anti-highway faction.

Many of the region's well-educated and well-to-do citizens had long been alarmed by the trends toward suburbanization and increased use of automobiles for reasons that were more than economic. Even during the 1950's, there was widespread concern among this element with what they saw as a decline in the quality of life in the region; this involved alarm over suburban "sprawl" and declining urban esthetics and an increasing realization that the Bay Area, in spite of supposedly favorable climatic conditions, was faced with a serious automobile-related air pollution problem. One expression of this climate of opinion was support for BARTD; and BARTD, in turn, cultivated this element by making extravagant promises concerning the ability of the proposed system to combat the menace of overdependence on the automobile. A far more concrete expression of anti-highway sentiment emerged, however, when proposed freeway construction began to encroach on well-organized and affluent San Francisco residential neighborhoods and on urban amenities such as parks.

The so-called San Francisco freeway revolt came to a head in 1959 with the rejection of the city's entire Trafficways Plan by the Board of Supervisors. The immediate sources of dissatisfaction were the proposed Western Freeway, which would have traversed residential neighborhoods and Golden Gate Park, and the recently-completed Embarcadero Freeway, whose massive double-decked design was not only held to be an esthetic atrocity but also the cause of abandonment

by the State Parks Commission of plans for a State Historical Park at the old Ferry Building. Even more serious conflicts loomed in the form of proposals to construct freeways linking the Bay Bridge with the Golden Gate Bridge; there were two such proposals (the Golden Gate and Panhandle Freeways), both designated as parts of the Interstate System, and both having a serious impact on powerful residential neighborhoods and valuable recreational and environmental resources. Following the tentative rejection of the Trafficways Plan in 1959, the attention of the State Division of Highways and local freeway proponents focused on attempts to get the city (which has a virtual veto power over freeways in its territory) to approve at least one of these Interstate links and thus "save" the federal funds designated for the Interstate System in San Francisco.

Other conflicts in transportation politics which emerged in the late 1950's and early 1960's were the result of tensions among the economic interests and governmental agencies involved in the promotion of transportation development. Perhaps the most serious of them was the collision between the "regionalists" -- in this period, primarily the Bay Area Council and the large industrial and commercial firms that support it -- and the local governments. This conflict came to a head in the controversy over the Golden Gate Authority. One of the basic motives behind the proposal for the authority was to remove control of the airports and seaports from the local governments, especially Oakland and San Francisco. The official reasons given for this were that the city agencies involved in running the

facilities were engaging in cutthroat competition and were providing duplicate facilities and services in an attempt to undermine their rivals. The Bay Area Council argued that it was in the interests of efficiency to consolidate operations. The Council also seems to have felt that such a consolidation would encourage cooperation in efforts to promote business in the region rather than competition among the local jurisdictions; this, in turn, would improve the Bay Area's competitive position vis-a-vis other major metropolitan areas. The backers of the authority left little doubt of their lack of confidence in the ability of local governments to handle "business-like" operations, and the local governments responded by working to defeat the proposal. One result of this conflict was the formulation of ABAG, which was originally an attempt by the local governments to give the appearance of cooperation while retaining their independence. They thus hoped to head off any further proposals for regional agencies with broad powers.

The Golden Gate Authority proposals also encountered opposition from special districts such as BARTD and the Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Districts; again, such opposition by independent agencies to consolidation and "tampering" by regional agencies has been a continuing theme in Bay Area transportation politics. The Golden Gate Bridge District was unhappy with the idea of the Authority because it faced extinction; BARTD, on the other hand, was concerned about the disposition of surplus toll bridge revenue.

The Golden Gate Authority had carefully excluded the proposed rapid transit system as a potential activity because the backers felt

that it was a sure money-loser which would require government subsidies; with such subsidies, they felt, would come government control of the Authority, and this they wished to avoid. Thus they were perfectly happy with the idea of an independent rapid transit district -- if there was to be a rapid transit district at all.

Some BARTD directors seem to have felt that the Bay Area Council preferred expansion of the highway and toll bridge system to the rapid transit system and were therefore trying to kill the whole rapid transit proposal by providing extra highway capacity across the Bay. More certain is the fact that BARTD wanted to use Bay Bridge tolls to finance its transbay tube. And, with the collapse of the Golden Gate Authority proposal, this is what happened.

The early 1960's saw a struggle by BARTD to establish itself and secure financing for the first stage of its rail rapid transit system. At first, BARTD was only authorized to draw up more detailed plans, based on the BARTC report. By the time these plans were complete and the bond issue election at hand, the proposed system had been considerably altered. In 1961, BARTD deleted plans to construct a line to Marin County because the Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District refused to allow use of the Golden Gate Bridge by BARTD's trains. Officially, the reason was that the live loads caused by trains on the bridge would endanger it structurally; more cynical observers suspected that the Bridge District wanted to add a second automobile deck in order to avoid going out of business when its bonds were retired in 1971, or that BARTD was deliberately proposing unrealistic minimum speeds for operation on the bridge

because the Marin line, while politically attractive, was financially unattractive.

Also in 1961, San Mateo County withdrew from BARTD. A prominent land developer named David Bohannon led a campaign in opposition to the San Mateo BART line. Bohannon, whose holdings included suburban shopping centers, believed that his enterprises would be damaged by easier access to San Francisco. Others in San Mateo County argued that the existing Southern Pacific commute service met the needs of the county better than BART could, since Southern Pacific could provide service to Santa Clara County, a destination of growing importance to San Mateo commuters. Finally, there was a question of money: Southern Pacific financed its own deficits; but if San Mateo County remained in BARTD, it would face a large debt for construction of the system plus the prospect of having to provide operating subsidies. Moreover, the cost of proposed construction in San Mateo County would have been a smaller percentage of BART's total construction cost than San Mateo's percentage of the property tax supporting BARTD's bonds. Consequently, there were some in San Mateo County who thought that if San Mateo waited until after the construction of the rest of the system, it could join the District for the additional cost of constructing the San Mateo line, and thus save money. This issue of whether San Mateo County should have to "buy in" to the system (by contributing some amount toward the construction of parts of the system outside the county) has continued to complicate the issue of a possible San Mateo County BART extension.

In 1962, BARTD barely escaped the defection of another county. In San Francisco and Alameda County, the Boards of Supervisors had readily voted to join the District, but in Contra Costa County it was known that, as the vote approached, two Supervisors favored joining the District, two were opposed, and one was uncertain. At the last moment, Alameda County and San Francisco officials paid the undecided Supervisor a visit, and he was persuaded to vote in favor of joining.

BARTD's bond issue was finally approved by the voters in November, 1962. Passage of the issue was greatly facilitated by the legislature, which in 1961 reduced the vote requirement for passage of the bond issue from the normal two-thirds majority to 60 percent.

Despite the major efforts to develop freeways, transbay bridges, and the rapid transit system, up until the 1960's there had never been a comprehensive transportation plan for the Bay Area nor an agency to produce one. After the defeat of the Golden Gate Authority proposal, Bay Area regionalists turned to the concept of a regional transportation planning study as a substitute. The success of this proposal was virtually assured in 1962 when Congress passed a Federal Highway Act requiring that every metropolitan area containing a city of over 50,000 population engage in a "continuing comprehensive (transportation) planning process carried on cooperatively" between state and local communities in order to receive federal aid for highways. The California Legislature responded by creating the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission (BATSC) in 1963.

The period between 1965 and 1970 saw a consolidation of the trends which had begun in the early 1960's. The struggle over the

San Francisco freeways ended in a narrow victory by their opponents in 1966, when the Board of Supervisors refused to approve either the Golden Gate or the Panhandle Freeway. At about this same time, opposition to urban freeways began to spread to other parts of the nation, culminating in a wave of protests areound 1968. Also, opposition to freeways began to shift from concern with the immediate impacts of particular projects to concern with the overall impact of an automobile-oriented urban transportation system on air quality, energy consumption, and urban form. In the face of this increasingly hostile climate of public opinion, the California Division of Highways began to take more conciliatory positions than in the past, but these did little to dampen opposition to the highway program.

Meanwhile, BARTD was having problems of its own. Immediately after the bond election, it had faced a taxpayers' suit which had delayed construction; also, there were numerous disputes with local governments over matters of location and design. The most serious of these was settled in 1966 when the city of Berkeley agreed to pay the extra cost of constructing the entire line through Berkeley as a subway instead of the combination subway-elevated structure proposed by BARTD.

The most important problem, however, was financial. By 1968, the District had exhausted its construction funds, but was still in the midst of construction. At this point, BARTD turned to the legislature for more funding. Initially, a majority of the Bay Area legislative delegation favored use of tolls from the San Francisco-

Oakland Bay Bridge to finance completion of the system. This measure, however, got involved in a dispute over diversion of highway funds to mass transit, and failed to pass after the Governor threatened to veto it. When the legislature went back into session in 1969, the Bay Area delegation decided to compromise with the Governor, and pushed through a bill calling for a special half-cent sales tax increase in the three-county district to finance completion of the system. This tax was to expire in 1974.

BATSC began its active planning effort about 1964 and released its final report in 1969. The study was similar to transportation planning studies carried out in other large metropolitan areas in the 1950's and 1960's: it featured elaborate data-gathering and development of mathematical models of land use and transportation. The final report recommended large-scale expansion of the region's freeway and mass transit systems as well as creation of either a Bay Area Regional Organization or a permanent regional transportation agency with extensive planning and implementation powers.⁶ BATSC did not ask for an extension of its enabling legislation and was allowed to lapse in 1969. BATSC functions were taken over by ABAG's Regional Transportation Planning Committee (RTPC) as an interim measure. Meanwhile, the BATSC report's emphasis on expansion of the freeway network got a cool reception.

The late 1960's were also significant for developments in transit finance. Locally, transit initiatives in San Mateo County and the Fremont-Newark-Union City area failed to pass in 1968. On the national scene, the Urban Mass Transit Administration was created

and began administering funds under the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964; later, in 1970, Congress authorized the first large-scale federal capital grants for mass transit.

Finally, the movement toward a multipurpose Bay Area regional government gained some impetus during the late 1960's. Initially, ABAG had been opposed to any sort of non-voluntary regional planning agency, but in 1966 it changed its position. Since that time, Bay Area regional government bills have been an annual affair in the legislature. So far, none has passed, largely because supporters among local governments have never been able to get together with other proponents, such as the environmental groups, the Bay Area Council, and the League of Women Voters, on the issues of the exact composition and method of selection of the governing body. Instead, the legislature has created special purpose agencies, such as BCDC and MTC, as the need has arisen.

The trends of the 1960's culminated in a number of major institutional changes in the early 1970's. On the local scene, MTC was created in 1970, partly as a result of pressure from the Urban Mass Transit Administration, which felt that RTPC would be ineffective because it lacked powers of enforcement.* At about the same time, major state and national environmental legislation was passed and the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was set up to administer national environmental laws. In 1972, the

*See Chapter 4, Pages 183-6 for an account of UMTA's role in the establishment of MTC.

California Legislature created a multi-modal State Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and instructed it and the State Transportation Board to prepare a State Transportation Plan by 1976. Caltrans was officially activated July 1, 1973.

Major changes in transportation finance also took place in the early 1970's. In California, there was an abortive attempt to amend Article 26 of the State Constitution to allow expenditure of state highway funds on mass transit. After this measure (Proposition 18) failed at the polls in November, 1970, the California Legislature passed a compromise measure (SB 325) which extended the state sales tax to gasoline and provided an equivalent amount from the sales tax for mass transit aid. In 1973, Congress passed a Federal Highway Act permitting discretionary use of Federal Aid to Urban Systems (FAU) funds for highways or mass transit. Finally, in June, 1974, the voters of California approved a ballot measure (Proposition 5) amending Article 26 to allow expenditure of some state fuel tax revenues on "fixed guideway" transit systems.

Regional general planning in the Bay Area took more definite form in 1970 with the publication of a Regional Plan by ABAG. The land use element of ABAG's Plan was organized around what it called a "city-centered" concept of regional development which emphasized reasonably high-density concentrations of population and economic activities in and around the existing "community centers" of the region. The ABAG Plan set forth six regional goals:

1. To protect and enhance San Francisco Bay and the major environmental qualities of the region.

2. To provide the opportunity for all persons in the Bay Area to obtain adequate shelter convenient to other activities and facilities, in neighborhoods that are satisfying to them.
3. To designate ample land and facilities for the economic growth of the region in order to provide opportunities for all citizens and communities to improve their economic wellbeing.
4. To provide a transportation system that is integrated with land use and consistent with the city-centered concept of regional development.
5. To provide a permanent regional open space system that makes possible the range of activities essential to the city-centered concept of regional development
6. To create a sense of regional identity, responsibility, and cooperation among citizens, organizations, and governments in the Bay Area.⁷

The ABAG Plan also contained a transportation element, which was largely based on the BATSC Plan.

The early 1970's also saw some expansion of local transit service in the Bay Area. In 1971, the Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District acquired and expanded Greyhound's service between San Francisco and Marin and Sonoma Counties. The District also undertook to provide local service in Marin and Sonoma Counties and ferry service between San Francisco and Marin County. Following the passage of SB 325, a number of small bus systems were formed, principally in the North Bay Counties and San Mateo County; also, in 1972, the Santa Clara County Transit District was formed to take over and extend to other parts of the county bus services formerly operated by National City Lines in San Jose.

While these institutional changes were taking place, the controversies surrounding BART and the regional highway system

intensified. BART began service (several years behind schedule) in 1972, and immediately experienced severe technical difficulties with its train control system and its vehicles. Meanwhile, there was serious public criticism of the BARTD management's handling of these technical problems and the legal issues arising out of them; this eventually led to a loss of public confidence in BARTD's management, which, in turn, led to the resignation of BARTD's General Manager and replacement of the appointed BARTD Board of Directors with an elected one.

Meanwhile, Bay Area highway officials were also having difficulties. The state and national environmental protection laws passed in 1969 and 1970 required Environmental Impact Reports (EIR's) or Environmental Impact Statements (EIS's)* for all governmental activities likely to have a negative impact on the environment. These reports are required for practically all highway projects. When highway officials tried to go ahead with projects which were near implementation when the laws were passed without writing EIR's or EIS's, they found themselves in court. A number of major projects were halted by injunction until the reports were written. Similar problems arose in the urban areas as a result of provisions in the 1968 Federal Highway Act requiring that replacement housing be provided for those dislocated by highway projects.

Perhaps the largest local defeat suffered by highway proponents in the Bay Area during the early 1970's however, was the rejection

*Environmental assessments performed under federal law are called "Environmental Impact Statements." Those performed under California law are called "Environmental Impact Reports."

of the Southern Crossing in 1972. The Southern Crossing was a proposed bridge crossing San Francisco Bay about four miles south of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, connecting the city of Alameda with the Hunters Point area of San Francisco. The project, which dated back many years, had been approved for construction by the State Toll Bridge Authority and was in the final design stage when the San Francisco Board of Supervisors decided to oppose it in February, 1971. There was some question as to whether San Francisco had the legal right to stop the project: the city's victory in the "freeway revolt" had hinged on a provision in state law which prohibited freeway ramp connections or street closures without the consent of the local governments involved; these provisions did not apply to the Southern Crossing since it was to be connected directly to the freeway network and involved no street closures. When it was finally decided that the city could not stop the project unilaterally, the Bay Area legislative delegation pushed a bill through the legislature halting it. Governor Reagan vetoed this bill, insisting that a plebescite be held to decide the fate of the project. The project's opponents tried to override the veto but failed and reluctantly agreed to a plebescite involving San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Alameda, Contra Costa, and Marin Counties to be held in June, 1972. As the election approached, support for the project evaporated, and it was eventually defeated by a 3-1 margin. By the time of the election, the project was opposed by ABAG, BCDC, the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, and MTC but retained the support of a number of local governments.

2. The Funding System

A major feature of MTC's political environment is the transportation funding system. In California, this system is very complex, involving numerous legal restrictions on the use of funds and essentially incompatible financial arrangements for highways and mass transit.

The highway finance system at both the state and federal levels has grown up over the years by a very complex incremental process. The federal role has traditionally been to supply policy guidance and matching funds for specified systems for highways, but to avoid involvement in day-to-day decision-making. The lead role in the Federal Aid System has always been with the state highway departments: each state is authorized to spend a fixed proportion of the funds for each federal system (determined by formula); the states undertake projects on these systems and are reimbursed for a percentage of the costs of each project, up to the limit for funds for that state for that system. Federal Aid funds are due upon satisfactory completion of projects, but states normally receive advances for partially completed work. Funds within a state's limit which are not "obligated" within a particular budgetary period are returned to the federal government and reallocated in the next budgetary period; consequently, there is considerable incentive for the states to obligate as much work as possible in each budgetary period.

There are a number of federal highway systems which have been designated at various times in the past. These do not all have

the same federal-state matching rate, although there has been a movement in recent years to make the matching rates more nearly equal. At present, the major federal highway systems are the Interstate, Federal Aid to Primary, Federal Aid to Secondary, Federal Aid to Urban Extensions (of the Primary and Secondary Systems), and Federal Aid to Urban Systems.

Although some federal highway funds are derived from general funds, most are a part of the Highway Trust Fund. This fund was set up in 1956 to provide "user financing" for federal highways and is financed mainly by a nationwide gasoline tax of four cents per gallon. Until the passage of the 1973 Federal Highway Act, expenditures from the Highway Trust Fund were restricted by law to highways.

California derives state highway funds from federal subventions, vehicle registration and weight fees for commercial vehicles, fuel taxes (state gasoline tax amounts to seven cents per gallon), and registration, drivers license, and miscellaneous fees. These are allocated by extremely complex formulas. Top priority goes to administrative expenses and allocations to the California Highway Patrol and Department of Motor Vehicles. Next come direct allocations to cities and counties (about 30 percent of the total). The remainder makes up the State Highway Account. A specified proportion of the gasoline tax revenue in the State Highway Account is set aside for administration and maintenance of the state highway system; most of the rest is used for right-of-way acquisition and construction on the state highway system. The allocation

of construction funds from the State Highway Account is further constrained by law. First of all, fixed percentages must be spent in two county groups, one including the 13 counties of Southern California and the other the 45 counties of Northern California; currently, this "North-South split" is 60 percent South and 40 percent North. Within each county group, 70 percent of the funds must be spent in such a way as to satisfy what are known as county and district minima. The district minima are based on estimates of "highway needs" as determined by the California Highway Commission (actually, by the California Division of Highways or, more recently, by Caltrans); the county minima are fixed amounts (\$4 million, except in two mountain counties, which have minima of \$3 million); both must be satisfied over a four-year period. The remaining thirty percent of the State Highway Account within each county group is allocated at the discretion of the Highway Commission.⁸ Until 1974, Article 26 of the California Constitution restricted expenditures from the State Highway Fund to highways.

Public transit finance is somewhat simpler. Originally, each transit operator had its own source of funds; at one time, practically all the systems in the Bay Area were privately operated and supported themselves from fare box revenues. As the private operators failed or were acquired by the public for other reasons, a variety of sources of local funds were made available to supplement fare box revenues. Muni is supported by the City and County of San Francisco from general funds, AC Transit is

supported by special property taxes, BARTD is supported by a combination of special property and sales taxes and by surplus toll bridge revenue (which was used to finance the transbay tube), the GGBHTD's transit operations are supported by tolls from the Golden Gate Bridge.

More recently, the federal and state governments have become involved in transit finance. Federal involvement began in 1964 with the passage of the Urban Mass Transit Act and was greatly increased in 1970. Federal transit aid under the 1964 and 1970 Urban Mass Transit Acts is restricted to capital expenditures. It is provided from general funds and is allocated by UMTA directly to the transit operators. The only restriction is on the total amount which may be spent in any one state. More recently, the federal government has undertaken to subsidize transit operations to a limited extent; also, the 1973 Federal Highway Act allows funds derived from the Highway Trust Fund and designated for Federal Aid to Urban Systems to be used for mass transit capital expenses. The administration of FAU funds is still subject to dispute within the U. S. Department of Transportation; in California, the counties are temporary lead agencies for their allocation. In 1974, Congress passed an act making some funds available for mass transit operating expenses.

California provides mass transit funding under the Transportation Development Act of 1971 (SB 325). SB 325 extended the state sales tax to gasoline, and simultaneously provided that an equivalent amount of sales tax revenue be returned to the counties

for expenditure on mass transit systems in counties which had unfilled mass transit needs. More recently, Article 26 of the State Constitution has been amended to allow expenditure of some State Highway funds on "fixed guideway" mass transit systems.

3. Transportation Decision-Making in the Bay Area Prior to MTC

Prior to the creation of MTC, transportation decision-making in the Bay Area was quite fragmented. Each transit operator was essentially independent of the others, but not necessarily independent of the local governments. At one extreme was AC Transit, with a directly elected Board of Directors and independent taxing power; only slightly less independent was Golden Gate, with appointed directors but an independent source of funds. BARTD, up until 1974, had an appointed Board of Directors; its independence was also somewhat circumscribed by the inflexibility of its commitment to construction of its first-stage system, its delegation of technical decision-making to its engineering consultants, and its inflexible sources of funding: whenever BARTD ran out of money, it had to go to the legislature for relief; this has meant that the legislature has had considerable influence over BARTD. Also, in its efforts to solve technical and financial problems, BARTD has had to deal with the Legislative Analyst and with the State Public Utilities Commission, which must certify the system's safety. Muni was the least independent of the region's major transit operators: it is under the control of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission and is dependent on San Francisco general fund revenues, which means that the San Francisco Board of

Supervisors is also involved in its affairs.

Highway decision-making was somewhat more complicated. Officially, the California Highway Commission made major decisions about the State Highway System within the financial constraints imposed by law. Actually, most decisions were made by the Division of Highways at the District level in collaboration with local officials and economic interests. Between the state geographical allocations and the federal restrictions of funding sources to particular systems, little discretion remained even at this level: the state had an implicit policy of matching all available federal funds; to do this while still respecting the county and district minima took a considerable percentage of the "discretionary" 30 percent of the Highway Account. Within individual counties, however, there was a certain amount of flexibility. The initiative for project priorities within counties traditionally rested with certain economic interests, particularly county development associations and chambers of commerce; these groups would determine priorities in cooperation with local officials, and the Division of Highways would normally respect these priorities. where there were conflicts, the District Engineer normally had the final say. In some instances, it would appear that in reality, the District Engineers developed their own priorities, "sold them" to the local interests, and got rubberstamp approval from local governments and economic interests.

Questions of location and design were normally worked out between the Highway District and the local public works departments.

With the advent of urban freeways, however, this function became increasingly controversial and tended to move out of bureaucratic circles. The existence of laws requiring freeway agreements gave the local governments a veto power over freeways; this, in turn, meant that controversial location and design decisions were increasingly made with the participation of local elected officials and were increasingly subject to public debate.

D. References

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CHAPTER 2

A MODEL OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN TRANSPORTATION PLANNINGA. Introduction: The Question of Influence

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for discussing the role of political influence in MTC's decision-making. In accordance with the Banfieldian definition of influence - that influence is the "ability to get others to act, think, and feel as one intends" - this model should provide a theoretical answer to the following interrelated questions: (1) Who is likely to be able to influence an agency such as MTC? (2) Why should these political actors (and not others) be able to influence the agency on particular types of decisions? (4) How is influence exerted? and (5) How do the answers to these questions change over time - specifically, how do they change during the critical period in which a new agency develops from a mere concept to a relatively stable operation?

Such a model should address the following peculiarities of the MTC situation:

1. The provision of transportation services is not a new governmental service; rather, it has long since developed into a routine governmental function with a fairly stable institutional structure. By the early 1970's, however, this routine field was in a state of crisis in which the established technical skills and institutional arrangements were being called into question. MTC was created in response to

that sense of crisis. Consequently, the central substantive problem faced by MTC was not that of creating something from nothing, but rather that of changing (or not changing) the policy direction of ongoing programs.

2. Transportation planning is a relatively narrow functional field. Although transportation is of vital importance to governments at all levels, transportation politics often seems far from the mainstream of political activity. In the past, the field has been largely dominated by transportation professionals in the civil service - most particularly, by officials of the state highway departments and the federal government. Since transportation planning is a political arena which has received only intermittent attention from the most powerful elected officials at all levels of government, we should not expect that the patterns and processes of influence in this arena will necessarily parallel those of more visible arenas. Because the scope of this study is limited to regional transportation planning, the model will not address the overall distribution of influence in the community, nor will it attempt to model the process by which influence is accumulated and "transferred" from one functional arena to another.
3. Partly because it has been of little concern to the most powerful elected officials, the most important political actors in transportation planning seem to be organizations rather than individuals - or else, individuals acting as leaders of organizations. Consequently, the model should address itself

more to the motives and methods or organizational actors than to those of individuals.

4. The time span covered by this study is relatively short. This factor, like the focus on a narrow functional field, precludes any real examination of the ways in which individuals or organizations accumulate influence over long periods of time. On the other hand, the particular period covered by the study was a critical one for MTC. The focus of the model, then, will be more on how a political mechanism evolves from concept to reality rather than on how influence--or political resources--are accumulated.

These limitations on the scope of the study and peculiarities of the situation make it necessary to depart somewhat from the approach found in much of the literature on political influence. This will involve a shift in emphasis away from such concerns as the overall distribution of influence as well as incorporation of ideas from such areas as organization theory, which have not normally been emphasized in discussions of political influence.

Perhaps the most important issue in the literature of political influence has been that of the breadth of the distribution of influence. This question, which was the essence of the Hunter-

Dahl debate,* is beyond the scope of this study. The literature of the debate is of some interest to us, however, in that Dahl and his followers realized that in order to answer the question "Who governs?" they also had to address the question of how influence works. An even sharper focus on that issue may be found in Banfield's Political Influence,¹ a collection of case studies of political decision-making in the Chicago metropolitan area which was published the same year (1961) as Robert A. Dahl's Who Governs?²

One major presupposition of both the Dahl School and Banfield seems to be that the basic political problem--at least at the metropolitan level--is that of overcoming the tendency toward inaction. In the words of Dahl's associate Raymond E. Wolfinger:

Like war, politics in an arena in which even the simplest actions become difficult. This seems particularly true in the United States, where political organizations and processes are notoriously biased against innovations.

*The Hunter-Dahl debate involves both the breadth of the distribution of influence (or power) in local politics in the United States and methodological questions. Floyd Hunter, in Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953) advanced the thesis that social and economic elites possess most of the power in U. S. metropolitan areas. Dahl, in Who Governs? held that U. S. urban political systems are basically pluralistic. The methodology debate involved the relative merits of reputational surveys (favored by the Hunter School) and the eclectic methods of Dahl School which include case studies of specific decisions and analysis of socio-economic data about participants and non-participants in particular decisions.

Fragmentation of formal authority, weakness of the instrumentalities to mobilize effective policy-making power, diffusion of accountability, and the consequent bafflement of popular control all protect the status quo and impede the development of major new policies that require widespread coordination or protracted steadiness of purpose.³

Banfield, likewise, seems to assume that the primary function of political influence is to "concert action"--that is, to "get things done." According to Banfield, the formal political system of the Chicaco area disperses power to such an extent that paralysis would result if an informal concentration of power and influence did not take place. To the extent that Wolfinger and Banfield are saying that change is difficult, their assertions are quite pertinent to the case at hand. To the extent that they are saying that there is a tendency for governments to do nothing and that this tendency must be overcome by an accumulation of influence, however, this orientation would appear to be inappropriate for a study of regional transportation planning. Both Wolfinger and Banfield were concentrating on non-routine governmental functions (Banfield on a series of one-shot issues and Wolfinger on a major innovative program); consequently, the problem of overcoming inaction may have been central to the political processes they were describing. Transportation, on the other hand, has been a field in which things--requiring both coordination and steadiness of purpose--have manifestly been done--and done with what their opponents regard as ruthless efficiency. One point at which this study departs from the Dahl-Wolfinger-Banfield approach will be a shift in emphasis from the emphasis from the question of "how does something (as opposed to nothing) get done?" to "what gets done?"

Closely akin to the neglect of the question "what gets done?" in the Dahl-Wolfinger-Banfield literature is the assumption that power (or influence) is an end unto itself. Banfield assumes that all actors always act to increase (or "invest") their power. This assumption might be supported by findings such as Dahl and Wolfinger's conclusion that Mayor Richard Lee was the central figure in New Haven's Urban Renewal program, and that his primary motivation was to build a political base which would enable him to run for higher office. The assumption that power is an end unto itself may well be justified where non-routine decisions and highly-ambitious political figures are involved. Since this is normally not the case in transportation planning,* we should like at least to explore the possibility that power may be either a means to substantive ends or a means to ends such as organizational survival and stability, which are identified by James D. Thompson as primary determinants of organizational behavior.⁴ In a functional political arena such as regional transportation planning, we might expect to find three essentially different orientations toward power: that of the professional politician, who is trying to build a political career, and thus seeks power for its own sake; that of the amateur politician, who is usually very absorbed in some cause and thus seeks power to advance that cause; and that of the bureaucrat, who seeks power as a means to the ends of organizational survival and stability.

*This is not to say that it is never the case. There are indeed a few "heroic figures" in the MTC story, such as State Senator Randolph Collier. (See pages 337-50 for a description of Collier's role.)

Similarly, Banfield's distinction between "public-regarding" and "private-regarding" power may inadequately describe motivations in the political milieu of transportation planning. In the first place, "public" and "private" are relative terms. Most individuals feel allegiance to some sort of group, and hence could be considered to be public-regarding. But in the context of any level of social aggregation, the individual's allegiance to any sub-group of which he is a member would be considered to be private-regarding. For instance, Banfield would apparently regard a vote by a poor man for an improved county hospital to be a private-regarding action--even if this particular individual were in the best of health and never expected to benefit personally from the hospital. The action is private-regarding in the context of the entire metropolitan population because the individual's allegiance is to his social class rather than to the entire population; but it is public-regarding in the context of his social class. The second inadequacy in Banfield's distinction is that it is not always possible to distinguish public-regarding motives from private-regarding ones. In any particular case, there are four (not two) possible combinations of public and private interest:

Effect of Action of Perceived Private Interest

		Good	Bad
Effect of Action on Perceived Public Interest	Good	1	2
	Bad	3	4

Public-regarding behavior can be distinguished from private-regarding behavior only in the cases of boxes 2 and 3. There is reason to believe that both these objections are significant in the context of regional transportation planning. There seems to be very little perceived conflict between public and private interests in the minds of most individuals in the field.* Nevertheless, there seem to be different systems of motivation and reward present among the actors involved in transportation planning, and there are certainly allegiances to different levels of social aggregation. The differences in motivation appear to be particularly important in explaining differences in behavior between members of the functional political system (that is, the technical bureaucracy) and the general political system. G. Ross Stephens has suggested that

The professional bureaucrat at the local level may be more responsive to the wishes and demand of professional bureaucrats at the state and national levels than to locally elected political leaders. This characteristic of "vertical functional autocracy" is a concomitant of the professionalization of the bureaucracy. . . The city is at best a polyarchy.⁵

If this is so--and studies of transportation planning in the 1950's and 1960's indeed concluded that transportation planners were more responsive to state and federal bureaucracies than to local political forces--it may indicate that particular types of political resources have very different values depending on whether they are employed in intra-professional politics or the general political arena. If this

*How this comes about and whether it involved self-deception is another question. It is entirely possible that perception of public interest is dependent on (perhaps unperceived) private interest.

is so, then the role of the transportation planning bureaucracy should itself be a matter of controversy among the various actors, since some would be in a better position than others to influence decisions made by professional bureaucrats.

A final point at which the classical literature on political influence may be inadequate to deal with the MTC political process is in its relative neglect of the subject of political resources. A more recent tendency has been to regard political resources and political influence as virtually synonymous.⁷ Political resources are of various sorts and have different degrees of utility depending on the exact nature of the political arena and the issues to be decided. We will attempt to develop in some detail the relationships between the resources possessed by various actors, their preferences concerning political arenas and mechanisms, and the ways in which they employ their resources.

There would appear to be two fundamental approaches to the problem of developing a model of political influence in regional transportation planning. The first of these would be to regard isolated decisions as independent events. In this type of model, it would be hypothesized that the outcome of each issue is determined by some set of circumstances pertaining to the issue itself, the positions and political resources of actors attempting to influence the decision, and the political mechanism by which the decision is made. This type of model would seek to discover an invariant relationship among sets of circumstances and sets of outcomes; if this relationship can be discovered and the proper set of circumstances described,

In its simplest form, such a model would assert that actors employ their political resources within a given political mechanism in an attempt to secure decisions corresponding to their positions on issues, and that those actors with the most effective political resources prevail. At this level of abstraction, the isolated-decision model appears to be completely determinate--and, consequently, trivial. It should not be assumed, however, that the actors will have complete knowledge of the state of the system with respect to any given decision. Consequently, the system is not closed in Thompson's sense--that is, the actors are not assumed to act with perfect knowledge and hence perfect "rationality." In the case of any given decision, there will be several major uncertainties at the outset concerning the state the system will assume. These include:

1. Uncertainty as to which actors will take positions
2. Uncertainty as to exactly what positions given actors will take, and consequently, uncertainty as to the degree and pattern of conflict which will result
3. Uncertainty as to the exact distribution of political resources
4. Uncertainty as to whether given actors will actually commit their resources in any given case
5. Uncertainty as to the exact state of the political mechanism, which, in turn, implies uncertainty as to the effective distribution of resources, since the political mechanism itself may alter the relative importance of given types of

past decisions can be explained and future outcomes predicted without reference to decisions on other issues. Much of the literature of the politics of planning involves (at least implicitly) this sort of model: the authors seek to identify some set of characteristics, relating to issues, actors, or political mechanisms, which determine the relationships between these characteristics and the outcomes of the decision making-process.

The second approach to modeling political influence in regional transportation planning would begin with the assumption that decisions are not independent of one another and that, indeed, they can be "isolated" from one another only by arbitrary means. This model would regard each outcome as a manifestation of a process of development; if the logic of this process of development could be discovered, it would be found that outcomes follow a logical sequence and, consequently, could be predicted.

B. An Isolated-Decision Model

1. Elements of the Model

The major elements of an isolated-decision model would be:

1. An issue or proposal to be decided
2. A set of actors who seek to influence the decision
3. The actors' positions on the issues
4. The actors' political resources
5. A political mechanism
6. The decision, which consists of a formal outcome corresponding to a substantive outcome.

resources.

A more detailed description of the elements of the isolated-decision model follows:

Issues

Issues are questions to be decided by some political mechanism. Put another way, they are occasions for decisions. One basic difficulty with any isolated-decision model is the identification of issues: in the real world it is not always clear just what an "issue" is. This is in part due to the fact that issues are almost infinitely divisible--almost any issue can be broken down into subissues--so that the level of issue aggregation involved in any decision is a matter of some concern. In some cases, it may happen that the issues appear to have "natural" boundaries, so that there will be a consensus as to what the issues are; in other cases, issues in an isolated-decision model may be defined as such, more for convenience in analysis, than because they are recognized as such by the actors.

The political system we are considering centers on a single organization--MTC. In such cases, the nature of the issues encountered is largely a function of what Thompson refers to as the organization's domain--that is, the set of functions which it claims for itself.* In the case of MTC, we might identify the following major types of issues:

*The establishment and defense of domains is discussed below. See page 72 .

1. The wording of policy declarations
2. The evaluation of transportation proposals
3. The assignment of financial priorities to transportation projects
4. Grant review actions
5. Formal evaluations (particularly environmental evaluations) of MTC's own planning.

Actors

Actors may be either individuals or organizations, although at the level of issue-aggregation we are discussing, organizational actors may be expected to predominate. The set of actors making up the sort of political system we are considering corresponds roughly to what Thompson (after William R. Dill) calls the task environment of the central organization (in this case, MTC). The task environment is defined as "those parts of the [organization's] environment which are relevant or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment."⁸ The amount of interaction between the central organization and the various elements of its task environment varies greatly, ranging from daily interaction on a full range of issues to occasional interaction on isolated issues or even to potential interaction which is anticipated but never occurs. We shall make a rough distinction between actors within the central agency's immediate sphere of activity and those outside of it, based on the degree of interaction.

One further definitional difficulty remains: we have perhaps left the impression that the political mechanism referred to in our

first sketch of the isolated-decision model is identical with the "central organization." Then (going back to the original characterization of the model) it might appear that this "central organization" is acted upon but is not an actor. This would be incorrect--influence is a mutual affair, so we should expect that the central organization would attempt to influence its task environment, just as the task environment attempts to influence it. The central organization is central only because it is the focus of our analysis. Moreover, we should not assume that the central organization is monolithic, but rather that it may be composed of individuals and factions who sometimes function as political actors in their own right. Consequently, we wish to maintain a sharp distinction between the political mechanism, which is conceived of as a set of structural features and procedures, and the organization with which it is associated. We shall refer to actors who are a part of the central organization as internal actors and to all others as external actors.

Over the past several years, transportation planning at the regional level has attracted a wide variety of actors. External organizational actors who might be expected to participate include:

1. Federal agencies dealing with transportation and related matters
2. The state legislature (and individual legislators)
3. State administrative agencies dealing with transportation and related matters
4. "Implementing agencies"--the state highway department, local departments of public works, transit operators, air- and

seaport authorities, and so forth

5. Other regional agencies
6. Local governments
7. The press
8. Civic organizations.
9. Environmental organizations
10. The so called "highway lobby"--auto clubs, trucking associations, contractors, materials suppliers, and oil and automobile companies
11. Labor unions
12. Business associations
13. Neighborhood associations
14. Groups organized around social issues (civil rights, poverty, senior citizens, handicapped, and the like)
15. Groups advocating particular transportation modes
16. Ad hoc groups organized around specific transportation issues.

Positions

Actors are assumed to have positions on issues, although not every actor is expected to have a position on every issue. It is possible to map positions on some fairly simple scale, such as (for instance) for the proposal, against the proposal, and for modification of the proposal, but such scales tend to obscure the true variety of possible positions. For instance, there can be an almost infinite variety of ways to modify a proposal. Consequently, it is far more profitable to discuss positions in concrete rather than

abstract terms.

In an isolated-decision model, we would not assume that the positions of all actors on any given issue can be known a priori. We would assume, however, that they are related to policy orientations* of actors, which are stable in the short run. The relationship between the policy orientations of actors and their positions on given issues is not wholly determinate, however, because it may not be clear to the actors how a given issue relates to their policy concerns or because actors may take positions on specific issues for strategic reasons which can be understood only by disregarding our assumption that decisions are independent of one another.

Resources

For purposes of isolated-decision model, a political resource will be defined as anything that helps an actor influence a decision; still, it would appear that there are several types of political resource which should be of particular importance in regional transportation planning. These may be grouped in three main categories--economic, technical, and "pure" political resources.

1. Economic Resources. Economic resources of importance in the political arena include the ability to raise funds for political purposes, control over the expenditure of public funds, and control over jobs. In transportation decision-

*These policy orientations can be most simply represented as expressing an actor's feelings about the substantive and institutional status quo in a given political system. See pages 72 - 75 for further discussion of this concept.

making, the control by various governmental agencies of the expenditure of public transportation funds would seem to be the key economic resource. Economic resources are also of some importance to private actors in the transportation planning process, but normally only to the extent that they can be used to finance increases in other resources, such as the ability to command favorable publicity, or to hire professional staff and thus increase the actor's technical resources.

2. Technical Resources. Technical resources are of considerable importance in the political processes involving transportation planning. Although the ultimate decisions are often made on non-technical grounds, technical ability (or a reputation for it) and access to technical information can play a critical role in establishing an actor's credibility and self-confidence. Technical resources consist of control over technical information, knowledge of methods of analysis, the expertise and experience needed to effectively apply these methods of analysis, and the reputation for technical competence, or technical legitimacy. To these should be added one quasi-technical resource--experience with and ability to understand the institutional arrangements (particularly the funding system) imposed by the state and federal governments.
3. "Pure" Political Resources. Pure political resources may be thought of as those which relate directly to the ability

to manipulate political processes. They include, on the one hand, what we might call the "resources of the smoke-filled room" and, on the other, what we might call the "resources of the open forum." Included in the first classification are such things as political IOU's, pre-existing channels of communication with important people, intimate knowledge of the structure and functioning of political organizations, and pre-existing Banfieldian "control structures." In the second category fall such skills as rhetorical ability, ability to command publicity, efficient political organization, an existing stock of public goodwill, and (perhaps most important) the ability to deliver ideologically committed blocks of votes at elections.

The Political Mechanism

The important features of a regional transportation planning agency as a mechanism are its structure and its decision-making procedures.

The structure of the organization refers to the geographical basis of representation of its governing body, the method by which the governing body is selected, the internal organization of the governing body, and the composition and organization of the staff. The geographical basis of representation and the method of selection of the governing body will determine who controls the governing body and what its pattern of political loyalties is likely to be. The

most important feature of the basis of representation is whether governing body representatives are selected from the region at large or from subregional jurisdictions. The most important feature of the method of selection is whether governing body members are directly elected or appointed. If directly elected, their personal constituencies are likely to be identical with that of the agency as a whole; if appointed, there is a possibility that there will be a conflict between the personal constituencies of governing body members and the agency's overall constituency. The most important feature of the structure of both the governing body and the staff is the degree of integration which is maintained among the agency's various functions. Overspecialization within the agency can lead to a situation in which the agency's policies are self-contradictory, or stated policies are not implemented because they are not supported by staff or governing body units responsible for their implementation.

The agency's political procedures may be classified as either open or closed. Open decision-making procedures conform to an ideal of democracy in which all participants act in relatively complete knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships and of one another's values. The ideal is that the decision-maker is "responsible"--that is, that the individual or group making the decisions serves at the pleasure of the majority; that the decision-maker acts with full knowledge of the positions of all actors; and that all actors trying to influence the decision maker act with full knowledge of the positions of all other actors. Specific means to these ends include such devices as formal citizen-participation programs, decision-making by

responsible officials in open sessions, direct access to the staff, and careful adherence to rules of "due process" appropriate to the decision-making processes at hand. To the degree that procedures are "closed," they depart from these ideals by blocking certain information flows and encouraging others.

On the surface, the existence of a formal citizen participation program, a decision-making process emphasizing open debate and the making of decisions by the agency governing body in open session, and provision of direct public access to the staff would all seem to contribute to the openness of the planning process. In practice, this may not be the case; such devices may provide only the illusion of openness, thus hiding more effectively the real workings of the system. This possibility has been especially raised in the literature on citizen participation programs. Edmund M. Burke, for instance, suggests that citizen participation programs be viewed as "strategies," and identifies three possible roles for such programs as strategies: (1) an administrative technique to protect the stability or existence of an organization; (2) an educational or therapeutic tool for changing attitudes; or (3) a means of assisting the organization in defining goals and objectives. He then identifies five possible strategies which might be adopted in support of these roles: education-therapy, behavioral change, staff supplement, co-optation, and community power.⁹ In a similar vein, Sherry Arnstein proposed a "ladder of citizen participation," ranging from manipulation to citizen control.¹⁰ In either case, the point is the same: a citizen participation program is a two-way street. It may be a mechanism to

allow the agency to be influenced by those who otherwise would be shut out of the political process, or it may be a mechanism to allow the agency to manipulate a public it could not otherwise reach. The same may be said for purportedly open decision-making by a politically-responsible governing body: this may be a device for giving the "public" a first-hand view of the considerations being weighed by the governing body, or it may be a side-show dealing in trivial issues, designed to divert attention from really important decisions which are being made elsewhere or simply "allowed to happen." Likewise, access to the agency staff can work both ways: on the one hand, it can allow the "public" to influence the staff at an early stage in the planning process; on the other, it can facilitate staff efforts to co-opt or disarm hostile elements of the public.

Outcomes

Substantive outcomes, like actors' positions on issues, can best be discussed in concrete terms. What gets done is obviously a function of what gets proposed;* consequently, the set of substantive outcomes of interest to use closely parallels the set of issues to be examined in testing the isolated-decision model. In the case of MTC, the substantive outcomes considered might include:

1. The contents of the commission's policy declarations
2. The organization's conclusions concerning the transportation proposals it evaluated, and any overall pattern these

*This is not to say that there are no unintended consequences. But even particular unintended consequences are a result of what was intended.

conclusions might form

3. The order of financial priorities assigned to various transportation projects (or types of projects) and, where this was in fact decided, the exact amounts programmed for specific time periods
4. Grant review actions (which include approval, disapproval, and modification)
5. The conclusion of the organization in self-evaluations of its planning.

At another level of abstraction, we may view these specific outcomes as examples of certain general methods of disposing of issues in the face of conflict. We shall refer to these abstract ways of settling disputes as formal outcomes. They include dominance, which occurs when one party to a conflict secures action despite the continued objections of other parties; agreement, which occurs when the action which takes place is satisfactory to all parties to the conflict; and avoidance, which takes place when an issue is left deliberately unresolved (at least within the boundaries of a given political system); this last state of affairs may or may not be satisfactory to the parties to the conflict. Each of these types of formal outcome may be further subdivided. A more complete description of them follows.

Dominance. The most common form of dominance applicable to isolated decisions is the defeat of one actor by another. This may come about through either surrender, in which an actor abandons a goal as a practical objective (while continuing to regard it as desirable) or through arbitration, in which the contending parties agree to accept the decision of a third party as binding. For the

most part, formal political bodies are intended to provide arbitration-resolutions to public disputes, but sometimes they fail to do so. The extent to which they fulfill this responsibility is a key issue for those who attempt to influence them.

Avoidance. Conflict avoidance in the case of isolated decisions normally involves the selection by decision-makers of the issues they will resolve; resolution of other issues is avoided by either delaying decisions (postponement) or by leaving them to other decision-makers (buck-passing). To some extent, the selection of issues to resolve is a matter of allocating scarce resources--no political body has the time or resources to resolve all possible conflicts. Since the decision to resolve specific conflicts is a matter of judgment on the part of any decision maker, actors will try to get the "proper" decision maker to claim jurisdiction. Also, the actors will try to influence the timing of the decision: in general, delay means a continuation of the status quo, so that actors favoring the status quo will seek delay when they cannot secure outright in action; actors attacking the status quo will normally favor immediate action.

Agreement. Conflicts may also be resolved by a number of types of agreement. In some cases, an actor may successfully employ persuasion--that is, he may cause another actor to abandon a goal because he regards it as no longer desirable. Such a reversal of opinion about the desirability of a goal may result from the actor's being confronted with information or rational arguments by another actor, in which case the persuasion is rational (that is, it employs facts and logic that both actors would regard as valid); or it may involve some form of selling, bribery, or intimidation, in which case it

would be considered irrational. Probably a more common form of agreement than persuasion is compromise. In a compromise, the actors their faith in the validity of their goals, but agree to give up these goals to some extent in order to partially realize them.

Where the issue to be compromised involves something measurable and more-or-less infinitely divisible, a scalar compromise may result; in such a compromise, some value between those favored by the contending parties is agreed upon. Where decisions are of an all-or-nothing variety, outcomes may be bartered: a decision favorable to Actor A on one matter may be traded for one favorable to Actor B on another.

2. Propositions Concerning Isolated Decisions

The basic premises of an isolated-decision model are that actors employ their resources within a political mechanism in an attempt to secure decisions corresponding to their positions on issues and that those actors with the most effective resources prevail. We should now like to offer some specific propositions regarding the way in which the nature of the issues, the nature of the actors' positions, and the nature of the political mechanism alters the effectiveness of political resources and thus modifies the outcomes of the political process.

Issue Characteristics and Outcomes

A number of authors have speculated on the effects of planning-issue characteristics on the outcomes of the political process. This literature, which derives in part from the debate over comprehensive

versus incremental models of planning, tends to associate issue characteristics with the propensity to take action. In terms of our scheme of formal outcomes, the distinction is between issues apt to lead to the avoidance of resolutions and those apt to lead to either dominance or agreements. One attempt to synthesize this literature is that of Richard S. Bolan. The following propositions are adaptations of his propositions about the effects of what he calls "agenda characteristics."

- 1.1 Issues which are of limited scope or which involve limited distribution of cost and benefits are more apt to be resolved than those of wide scope and/or wide distribution of costs and benefits.
- 1.2 Proposals which may be modified over time are more apt to be resolved than those which are inflexible over time.
- 1.3 Issues whose resolution requires little coordination are more apt to be resolved than those whose resolution requires much coordination.
- 1.4 Issues involving readily-predictable consequences are more likely to be resolved than those with more uncertain consequences.

Proposition 1.4 is somewhat controversial. Bolan would apparently hold that issues involving readily-predictable consequences should be easily resolved because action on them poses relatively low risks. Decision makers are assumed to be risk-avoiders, and thus would hesitate to take action where the consequences are uncertain. Other authors (Victor Firkiss,¹² for example) argue that great accuracy in predicting consequences of actions tends to focus debate on the ultimate ends of public actions, thus making them more controversial. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for a decision maker to act. Likewise, Braybrooke and Lindblom make the point that consensus can

often be obtained among actors who favor proposals for different reasons. The more certain they are of the consequences, the less likely they are to support a proposal for different reasons; and, consequently, the less likely it is that action will occur. We might, then, make a counterproposition:

- 1.4a Counterproposition: As issues involve more predictable consequences, debate shifts from means to ends, making resolutions to conflicts less likely.
- 1.5 Issues which involve debates over ends or values are less likely to be resolved than issues which involve debates over means.

Finally, we might add one proposition to those put forward by Bolan:

- 1.6 Issues which involve "zero-sum-game"* situations are less likely to be resolved than those involving "non-zero-sum-game" situations.

Actors' Positions and Outcomes

The propensity to adopt particular types of conflict-resolutions should be a function of not only the intrinsic characteristics of the issues, but also of the particular pattern formed by the actors'

*The terms of the "zero-sum-game" and "non-zero-sum-game" are derived from Game Theory Literature. A zero-sum-game is one which involves the distribution of a fixed stock of something of value to the players. Players may change the size of their "piece of pie" but not the size of the pie as a whole. In non-zero-sum-games the size of the pie is in part dependent on the actions of the players, so that in some sense, it may be possible for "everybody to win." However, this is not necessarily the case. Situations in which it is impossible to make anyone better off without making someone worse off are known as pareto optimal (in the strict sense) although they may still be non-zero-sum-games, since it may be possible to increase the total amount of something of value, but only at the expense of making someone worse off. In welfare economics, this difficulty is often circumvented by assuming that "losers" will be compensated by "side payments." Thus, in the non-strict sense, pareto optimal solutions and zero-sum-games are synonymous. In reality, of course, side-payments rarely occur.

positions on them. Two features of the actors' positions would seem to define the degree of conflict associated with any particular issue. These are: (1) the perceived significance of the issue and (2) the relationship of the actors' substantive positions to one another. The following diagram illustrates the possible combinations of issue significance and position relationships.

		<u>Issue Significance</u>	
		High	Low
Relationship of Substantive Positions	Close Together		
	Far Apart		

The following propositions relate these combinations of issue significance and position relationship to the formal outcomes of the political process.

- 2.1 When actors' positions are relatively close together substantively, and the issue is regarded as being relatively important, resolutions by agreement will tend to predominate.
- 2.2 When actors' substantive positions are relatively close together, but the issue is regarded as being relatively unimportant, resolutions by agreement may predominate; however, such issues may have relatively low decision-priorities, so that resolutions are avoided.
- 2.3 When actor's substantive positions are far apart, and the issue is regarded as being relatively important, there will be a tendency to avoid resolution; if resolutions do occur in such cases, they will tend to involve dominance.
- 2.4 When actors' substantive positions are far apart, and the issue is regarded as being relatively unimportant, there will be a tendency to avoid resolutions; however, such issues may provide the occasion for resolutions by agreement, in which outcomes on issues are bartered.

Political Mechanisms and Outcomes

The following propositions relate formal outcomes to the characteristics of the political mechanism. Some are derived from Bolan's propositions concerning what he calls "decision-unit characteristics;" others have been derived independently, based on the following assumptions (which would appear to be consistent with Bolan's): (1) decision makers act to reduce their risks; (2) the smaller the number of people whose consent is necessary, the more likely it is that action will take place; and (3) the more homogeneous a group of people is in terms of their beliefs, the more likely its members are to agree and, hence, to take action.

- 3.1 Political bodies with strong formal powers will be more likely to act decisively than those with weak formal powers.
- 3.2 Organizations with clear lines of authority and hierarchical structure are more likely to act decisively than those with uncertain lines of authority.
- 3.3 Organizations which are homogeneous in terms of their members' values, role-perceptions, and technological beliefs are more likely to act decisively than those which are not.
- 3.4 Organizations whose membership is stable (long terms of office, "safe" seats, etc.) are more likely to act decisively than those whose membership is unstable.
- 3.5 Organizations whose functional parts are highly integrated are less likely to act decisively than those that are less well-integrated, but are more likely to act consistently.
- 3.6 "Closed" political processes are more apt to lead to decisive action than "open" ones.

Resources, Political Mechanisms, and Outcomes

The following propositions relate to the way particular types of political mechanisms alter the effective distribution of political

resources and, hence, the outcomes of the political process.

- 4.1 Actors with superior technical resources will be more likely to prevail in "closed" political processes than in open ones.

This proposition is based on the fact that technical information and technical reputation are primarily effective when decisions are being made by professionals. Normally, these professionals will not be the responsible decision makers; thus decision-making by the politically-responsible actors in open session will detract from the value of technical resources. Besides this, technical reputations are often preserved by the device of mystifying laymen and by keeping technical information secret.

- 4.2 Actors with superior economic resources will be more likely to prevail in "closed" political processes than in "open" political processes.

Normally, actors with superior economic resources wish to leave other actors in as much uncertainty as possible as to how they will use these resources. Where influence is being wielded by the threat to withhold economic resources, the power so derived will be magnified by secrecy as to the exact criteria for granting or withholding economic aid. Where economic resources are being used to buy publicity, of course, they are more effective in conjunction with open political processes--so long as it is not too obvious whose money is being used to buy which publicity.

- 4.3 Actors whose political resources include political IOU's, channels of access to decision makers, political intelligence, and Banfieldian "control structures" are more likely to prevail in "closed" political processes than in "open" political processes.

- 4.4 Actors whose political resources include rhetorical ability, ability to command publicity, organizational ability, goodwill, legitimacy, and the ability to deliver ideologically-committed blocks of votes are more likely to prevail in "open" political processes than in "closed" political processes.

3. Application of Isolated-Decision Models to Case Studies

It appears that serious difficulties would be encountered in any attempt to apply an isolated-decision model such as the one outlined above to an individual case study. These difficulties would include the following:

1. The propositions of an isolated-decision model state, in effect, that certain characteristics of issues, actors' positions, actors' political resources, and political mechanisms tend to produce certain outcomes. In any given case there may be conflicting tendencies, so that the only really meaningful test of such a set of propositions would be to measure the strength of each tendency. This implies a statistical problem involving some sort of multivariate analysis. There are so many hypotheses to be tested, however, that it is unlikely that a large enough sample of decisions would result from a single case study.
2. In order to test an isolated-decision model, a number of characteristics of each decision must be measured--or at least classified. Such classifications are not always obvious; even the outcome of an issue may depend on when, and from what point of view, the issue is considered. The classification of the characteristics of

issues, positions, resources, and mechanisms poses similar problems. In the case of political resources, for example, most types of economic resources are potentially measurable--if the information is available--but technical and "pure" political resources can at best be ranked, and even then, a large measure of judgment is involved. While it may be possible to measure the strength and effectiveness of similar types of political resource--for example, to compare the technical competence of two agencies--it is virtually impossible to make meaningful comparisons among different types of resources. Any attempt to make such comparisons must be to some extent circular: actors with more effective resources are assumed to prevail in conflicts, and the fact that they prevail is taken as evidence that their resources are more effective. This is another instance in which only a very large sample of decisions could result in comparisons of any real validity.

3. The characteristics of decisions which are assumed to cause particular outcomes are not necessarily independent of one another, nor are they necessarily so autocorrelated that some can be eliminated. Consequently, even if objective measures (or classifications) of all the variables were possible, and even if there were a large enough sample to make statistical analysis worthwhile, there is a very good chance that no definite conclusions could be drawn.

Attempts to test the sorts of propositions outlined above against the MTC experience tended to confirm these reservations about the applicability of isolated-decision models to individual case studies. The sample of decisions was far too small to permit meaningful multivariate analysis (even if enough of the qualitative propositions listed above could have been quantified). At the same time, the results strongly suggested that none of the tendencies postulated above could be either absolutely accepted or absolutely ruled out; rather, the form of the problem was clearly one of measuring the relative truth of the various propositions. Even had it been possible to make the necessary simplifications in the form of the problem, difficulties in the classification of issues, outcomes, and resources would have seriously undermined the credibility of the results. To give only one example, there appeared to be serious ambiguity as to the classification of the outcome in at least half the MTC decisions considered. Consequently, no further attempt will be made to model MTC decision processes in terms of isolated decisions; instead, the rest of this chapter will be devoted to an attempt to construct a model of MTC's evolution as an organization.

C. An Organizational-Evolution Model

An organizational-evolution model attempts to describe the process by which a new governmental organization establishes itself in an ongoing functional field. In this case, the specific situation is the creation--or, more accurately, the reconstitution--of a

regional transportation planning agency. The organizational-evolution model proposed in this chapter is intended to describe the process of evolution and adjustment which takes place in the political system centering on the new organization from the time of its creation until the system returns to equilibrium. The organizational-evolution model is intended to be more dynamic than an isolated-decision model; it also assumes that actors have less certain knowledge than do isolated-decision models and thus is even more of an open-system model in Thompson's sense than are isolated-decision models.

The key concept of the organizational-evolution model is what Thompson calls the domain of the new agency--that is, the set of functions it undertakes to perform. The organizational-evolution model attempts to describe the process by which the new agency establishes its domain (and subsequently defends it) and the processes by which the various elements of the new agency's task environment defend their own domains from encroachment by the newcomer.

1. Domain Establishment

Governmental agencies (unlike some other organizations, such as corporations) in no sense establish themselves. Rather, they are themselves created by political processes, usually involving some sort of legislative action, and are endowed with a legally-defined formal domain. This formal domain, however, is not necessarily the domain which the agency will be able to stake out for itself in the long run; as Thompson puts it ". . .we need not assume

that the formal statement of goals found in charters. . .is in fact the criterion upon which rationality is judged and choices of action alternatives are made."¹³ According to Thompson, the real domain of the organization is the one defined by what he calls a domain consensus between the agency and the various elements of its task environment.¹⁴ A stable domain consensus is the steady-state condition the political system is assumed to reach at the end of the period covered by the organizational-evolution model. We shall refer to the domain which the organization is attempting to establish or defend at any given moment as its informal domain, whether or not there exists a consensus on this domain.

Since governmental organizations do not create themselves, the first critical point in the evolution of the new agency is the political process which establishes its formal domain. Normally, no new agency can come about unless someone perceives a need for it. The perception of the need for a new agency, in turn, almost always indicates that there is some group of actors who are dissatisfied with the substantive status quo; the fact that they succeed in persuading a legislature to upset the institutional status quo would normally indicate that where a new agency is founded, there is a powerful group of actors dissatisfied with the substantive status quo. At the same time, it is almost impossible to establish any new agency without infringing on the domains of existing agencies; and since existing agencies and their domains also serve the substantive ends of some actors, we might expect action on the part of established elements of the new agency's

task environment and their supporters to limit the domain of the new agency. Thus, there are actually two dimensions to the orientations which actors may take with respect to the new agency--one relating to the substantive status quo and the other relating to the institutional status quo. These may be represented as follows:

		<u>Institutional Orientation</u>	
		Pro-Status Quo	Anti-Status Quo
Substantive Orientation	Pro-Status Quo	1	2
	Anti-Status Quo	3	4

Actors whose orientations fall in the first box will be most likely to oppose the new agency; these we will refer to as the agency's anticonstituents. Actors whose orientations fall in the fourth box will be most likely to favor the new agency; these we will refer to as the agency's constituents. Actors whose orientations fall in the second and third boxes will be likely to display ambivalence toward the new agency, sometimes supporting it and sometimes opposing it. Since actors tend to support particular institutional arrangements because these support their substantive orientations (or perhaps vice versa), we should expect the constituents and anticonstituents to predominate. With respect to the attitudes of constituents and anticonstituents toward the new agency's domain, we might hypothesize:

- 5.1 Constituents will seek to expend an agency's informal domain at least to the limits of its formal domain and, if possible, beyond; anticonstituents will seek to limit an agency's informal domain as much as possible.

None of this should be taken to mean that a new agency will always fulfill the expectations of its constituents within the domain it successfully defends. Individual decisions may depend heavily on the current distribution of political resources and the current state of the agency's political mechanisms--and in the organizational-evolution model, both of these features are assumed to be subject to change over time. The implication of the hypothesis, rather, is that there is purpose involved in the creation of new agencies, and that those whose purposes are served by the existence of the agency will at least initially favor a large domain for the agency.

Domain Ideals

The specific agency domain favored by any given actor will be a function of that actor's substantive and institutional orientations. That is to say, the set of agency functions which we will refer to as some actor's domain ideal with respect to the new agency is dependent on that actor's concept of the purpose of the new agency. This concept, in turn, may be the result of broader philosophical and political beliefs, as well as questions or organizational or individual self-interest.

A number of more-or-less distinct philosophical and political approaches to transportation planning may be identified. Each approach supplies a different answer to the question "why plan?" and each provides the rationale for a peculiar distribution of responsibility for planning functions among levels of government and types of organizations. Thus each approach produces a different domain ideal for a transportation planning agency at the regional

level which is some subset of the set of functions which a transportation planning agency might undertake, or its potential domain.

The Potential Domain of a Regional Transportation Planning Agency

The potential domain of a regional transportation planning agency might include the following:

1. The establishment of the conceptual basis of the regional transportation system. This involves what is generally known as "systems-level planning"--the specification, at the transportation corridor level or above, of the types and magnitudes of the major subsystems of the regional transportation system. In other words, this involves deciding such things as (1) the relative emphasis to be placed on highways and mass transit and the decision to serve or not serve particular areas with mass transit systems; (2) setting general goals in terms of the levels of service to be provided; (3) and making broad policies regarding the operation, administration, and pricing of the system. In order to be really effective, such systems-level planning should also include responsibility for determining the magnitude of the overall financial effort involved in constructing and operating the regional transportation system, the relative amounts to be allocated to the major subsystems, and the economic and financial feasibility of the proposed system.
2. The translation of this conceptual system into specific projects and operating programs. For capital projects, this

might include the power to initiate projects, the power to set and enforce design standards for them, the power to set project priorities, the power to program funds for their accomplishment during specific budgetary periods, and, finally, the authority to review projects for compliance with the regional transportation plan and to make the final decision to implement them or not. For operating programs, the translation of systems concepts into specific actions might require power to review the operations of implementing agencies power to suggest operating procedures, and, perhaps, authority to regulate the routes, schedules, work rules, and pricing policies of transit operators.

3. The allocation of funds to the various implementing agencies in such a manner as to insure implementation of the agency's plan.
4. The education of the public concerning the issues involved in transportation decisions and the roles it might play in influencing those decisions and in making the proposed system work better.
5. The provision of advice to lawmakers and agencies at the state and federal level concerning the laws and policies needed at those levels to facilitate the implementation of the regional transportation plan.

Substantive Domain Ideals in Regional Transportation Planning

The main assumption underlying the following discussion of domain

ideals in regional transportation planning is that political actors support particular institutional arrangements because they think these will accomplish particular substantive tasks. To the extent that various actors disagree on the tasks to be performed, they disagree both as to the functions which ought to be undertaken by governmental agencies and as to the appropriate jurisdictional level for their accomplishment. From these different concepts as to what should be done and which jurisdictional level should do it arise the different actors' domain ideals for a transportation planning agency at the level of the metropolitan region.

The more-or-less stock answer to the question "why have a regional transportation planning agency?" is "to coordinate transportation activities at the regional level." But this answer begs the question: why coordinate activities which were previously uncoordinated? There seem to be three reasons why someone might want to coordinate activities involving previously-uncoordinated decision-making. These are:

1. Economies of scale may be present, so that governmental activities can be carried out more efficiently at a higher level of aggregation.
2. A "prisoners' dilemma" situation may exist--that is, a situation may exist in which all actors stand to gain if all cooperate, but in which individual actors may gain more by non-cooperation. In such a case, the actors may feel that they cannot trust one another to keep an informal agreement, but that establishment of a common

authority with powers of arbitration and enforcement would create a climate of trust and eliminate the source of conflict.

3. Someone may want to redistribute income from one system to another.

Conversely, there are three reasons why someone might want to prevent coordination or consolidation of previously uncoordinated activities or even to decentralize control of those which are already coordinated. These are:

1. Diseconomies of scale may be present as well as economies of scale. In particular, information and administration costs may increase more than proportionally with the scale of the activity.
2. When prisoners' dilemmas are not present, conflicts can be avoided and flexibility and diversity preserved by decentralized decision-making.
3. Someone may want to prevent redistribution of income from one part of a system to another.

Different substantive orientations emphasize different problems and thus alter actors' perceptions of the economies and diseconomies of scale, prisoners' dilemmas, and redistributive effects implied by particular institutional arrangements.

Looked at from another point of view, the various substantive orientations emphasize different purposes for planning. There is a considerable body of thought, of course, that would hold that all

the objectives of planning discussed below are to some degree valid, that all actors will to some extent recognize the validity of each of them, and that the real purpose of having a planning agency is to "balance" these objectives, making tradeoffs among those found to be in conflict. We might question whether any such balance can in fact occur. In the first place, the idea that the planning agency ought to try to balance conflicting objectives is itself a matter of political philosophy and is related to such concepts as comprehensiveness and optimization in planning; these concepts, we shall subsequently argue, do in fact underlie one of the substantive orientations we will discuss, but they are not universally accepted nor are they necessarily possible to put into practice. Moreover, even if such balancing is attempted, concepts of the proper balance may differ radically--even to the point at which we might say that some objectives are being completely ignored. Finally--and most importantly--we are arguing that the domain of the agency is altered--perhaps radically--as one or another concept of its purpose gains ascendancy. Thus it is not merely a matter of the agency emphasizing some considerations more than others in certain types of decisions, but rather one of whether the agency will make certain decisions at all. We would argue, then, that each substantive orientation emphasizes one objective of planning to the virtual exclusion of the others.

Substantive orientations toward transportation planning may be discussed in terms of the economic concepts of efficiency, equity, and externalities. Efficiency refers to a comparison of the output

(or benefit) of a system with its inputs (or costs). Equity refers to the distribution of the costs and benefits over society. Externalities are effects (either positive or negative) which can be attributed to the system in question, but which for some reason cannot be assigned to the system for purposes of pricing.*

Efficiency. Two types of efficiency are relevant to transportation planning. The first, technical efficiency, refers to the comparison of some measure of the output of a good with its cost of production. For instance, the number of lane-miles of highway built per dollar of construction cost might be a measure of the technical efficiency of highway construction. The other, allocational (or economic) efficiency, is a comparison of the value of the good with the cost of production. The concept of allocational efficiency takes into account the problem of matching the mix of goods produced to people's preferences. In a competitive market, allocational efficiency is supposed to be achieved automatically, but in

*The use of the term externality may pose some semantic difficulties. Strictly speaking, an externality is an economic effect which is not priced within a given economic system. By extension, in non-price economic calculations (such as benefit-cost analysis), it is any effect not included in the analysis. The externalities we will be discussing are mostly negative ones and are often called impacts. They might technically be referred to as disproducts--that is, unwanted results of economic activity. By externality we do not mean to imply that these effects are necessarily external to the political jurisdiction having ultimate responsibility for the decision (although they are almost always external to the functional agency actually making the decision) but rather that they have not been considered explicitly in any economic analyses that might be performed.

a non-market situation such as the public provision of transportation, maximization of economic efficiency requires a more explicit consideration of the demand for different types of transportation services and the costs of providing them.

Normally, technical efficiency is not really an issue in substantive discussions of transportation planning, although it is a primary consideration in the management of the internal affairs of transportation agencies. Only in cases where gross inefficiency is suspected is technical efficiency likely to become of any importance in the overt political debate. Different concepts of allocational efficiency, on the other hand, are central to several important concepts of the purposes of transportation planning.

In efficiency-oriented transportation planning concepts, the appropriate levels for various types of decision-making are largely determined by the bounds of the system over which the maximization of efficiency takes place. In practice, three concepts of the basic system are commonly encountered. In the first, the basic unit of analysis is the set of users of a particular type of transportation system--generally, of a particular mode. In this concept, the function of the government is to act as an agent for the users of the system in question; the government's objective is to maximize the "users' benefit-cost ratio"--the ratio of the value of the transportation service provided to the cost to the user of providing it. Since the most uncertain thing in these calculations (which are rarely explicit) is the value of the service to the user, the type of institutional arrangement most likely to produce alloca-

tional efficiency is that which is most likely to lead to control of particular facilities by their users. If a majority of the users of a particular type of facility come from a particular type of political jurisdiction, then this type of political jurisdiction should control this class of facility. In other words, if it is found that a majority of the trips on the urban freeway system are intra-county, then the county is the appropriate unit for making decisions about the freeway system; if, on the other hand, it is found that a majority of the trips are inter-county, then the appropriate unit must at least be the metropolitan region. In some cases, overriding considerations, such as economies of scale or problems of coordination at political boundaries, might make it necessary to vest the decision-making power at a higher jurisdictional level than would otherwise be appropriate. There will be differences among the modes in the extent to which these overriding considerations might come to play. Boundary problems, for instance, would seem to be much more severe between transit operators, who must coordinate routes, schedules, and fare-collection schemes, than among operators of highway systems, who need only insure that the roads meet at the political boundaries, and that capacities are roughly the same on both sides. This concept of allocational efficiency, which we will call "facility-oriented" efficiency, is implicit in the traditional methods of making decisions about the transportation system, particularly in the informal decision processes involving highway systems.

A second concept of allocational efficiency in the provision of transportation services expands the concept of the basic unit of

analysis from the users of a particular mode of transportation to the users of all modes of transportation. The maximization of efficiency is then conceived of as involving two stages: one which determines the allocation of resources to each of the modes and a second which determines the allocation of resources within each mode. The appropriate level for decisions about allocations among the modes depends primarily on which modal systems are seen as direct substitutes for one another. In practice, most demands for consideration of "mode-oriented" efficiency have actually depended on externality arguments, since mass transit can rarely compete with the highway system in efficiency calculations unless externality considerations are introduced. Most commonly, the systems which are viewed as being directly competitive with one another are urban freeways and rail rapid transit systems; since these are both regional-scale systems, most advocates of intermodal fund allocations favor decision-making at the regional level.

The concept of intermodal allocation of funds does not preclude a geographical distribution of funds based on considerations other than allocational efficiency. In other words, this concept would not really be violated if the marginal investments in different political jurisdictions yielded different "returns," assuming that the marginal investments for each mode within the jurisdiction were equally "profitable." Another concept of allocational efficiency, which we shall call "system-oriented" efficiency, would require a further expansion of the system so that the expected returns of all transportation projects would be compared regard-

less of mode or geographical location. In classical economic theory, which disregards the costs of information and administration, there would be no geographical limit to the size of the system over which returns to investment would be compared; in a more sophisticated version, the marginal costs of information and administration would be assumed to increase as the size of the system increases, and these costs would impose a "natural" upper limit on the size of the system. In practice, no one has any real idea what this limit might be, but most advocates of system-oriented efficiency believe that it is above the regional level. Since existing fund-allocation arrangements tend to deemphasize system-oriented efficiency because of conflicts with concepts of geographical equity, most advocates of this type of efficiency would prefer a regional role in fund-allocation and implementation decisions to the present system.

Equity. The concept of economic efficiency in transportation involves the maximization of returns from transportation investments without regard to the geographical or social distribution of the costs and benefits of the investments. Other perceptions of the purposes of urban transportation planning emphasize the issue of fairness, or equity, in these investments.

These are two types of equity which are of importance to transportation planning. The first of these, social equity, refers to the fairness of the "distribution of income" across social and economic groups. The second, geographical equity, refers to the geographical distribution of transportation costs and benefits.

In a hierarchical social or political structure, attitudes toward questions of equity depend heavily on actors' loyalties to particular

social groups or types of political jurisdictions. Kenneth Boulding has suggested hierarchical structures can largely be interpreted as devices for the resolution of conflicts, with each grade in the hierarchy specializing in resolving the conflicts of the grade beneath it.¹⁵ We might expect that in a hierarchical social or political structure where there are allocations to be made to units at a given level in the hierarchy, there will be conflicts between those units as to what is the "fair" share of each. In other words, in approaching allocations among units at their own level in the hierarchy, actors will be more concerned with the question "what is fair for us" rather than the more abstract question "what is fair for everybody?" When the allocation is to be made to a lower level in the hierarchy, however, these same actors will perceive their function as being one of resolving conflicts at the lower level, and will tend to believe that there is a rational solution to the problem "what is fair" for those at the lower level. In other cases, allocations will be made to a level higher than the actor's primary level of identification. In these cases, allocation among units at his level will no longer be a zero-sum game, and we might expect the actor to cooperate in advocacy with the representatives of other units on his own level.

This means that an equity-oriented actor's concept of the proper functions of a regional transportation planning agency will depend very heavily on the relationship between his primary level of social or political identification and the region as a political entity. Social and economic groups are not likely to correspond to the political structure of the region, which has a geographical

basis; rather, we would expect to find that major social and economic groups transcend all levels of geographical aggregation and see themselves in competition at all levels. There will be some individuals who will identify with "society as a whole" and will therefore regard social equity as a problem to be dealt with by rational means. This group, which would seem to be composed of those corresponding to Banfield's "public-regarding actors," will probably prefer to see the problems of social equity addressed at a national level; but in the absence of effective action at a higher level, they may regard regional transportation planning as a mean of achieving a higher level of social equity--if they believe that the distribution of transportation services is an effective means to this end. Actors who do think that a regional transportation planning agency can be an effective means of achieving social equity will want it to have powers over the detailed design of the regional transportation system and over resource allocation. Those who identify with particular social and economic groups will be concerned, first of all, with the question of whether regional transportation planning efforts can be an effective means of improving their position; if they conclude that such activities are unlikely to advance their objectives, they will probably be indifferent to the functions and even the existence of the regional transportation planning agency. If they conclude that the agency can have an important effect on their welfare, they will consider the amount of influence they are likely to be able to exert on a regional agency, as opposed

to one at some other jurisdictional level, and support or oppose the regional agency accordingly.

The metropolitan region does fit into a hierarchy of geographical-based political jurisdictions. It is not, however, a well-established unit of government in American political practice. Consequently, there are relatively few political actors who look upon the region as the primary focus of their loyalties. Those who do, and those who identify with higher levels of government, are apt to view equity questions within the region as being subject to rational discussion, and the regional transportation agency as being capable of making a just allocation of resources within the region. Those whose primary level of political identification is subregional are more apt to regard allocations within the region as matters of competition and to be skeptical of the regional transportation planning agency's ability to allocate resources fairly. If the governing body of the agency is composed of representatives of subregional jurisdictions, it is unlikely that the regional transportation planning agency will undertake to make explicit allocation of resources within the region; rather, the governing body will either avoid such decisions altogether by leaving them to other political bodies, or else resolve them by adopting fixed formulas designed to insure that no jurisdiction is cut off altogether. Needless to say, the existence of such formulas may interfere with what an efficiency-oriented actor would regard as optimal resource allocation.

Externalities. Two types of externalities, or transportation impacts, are important in transportation planning. The first vari-

ety includes what we shall call neighborhood impacts and makes its effects felt over small geographical areas, roughly corresponding to urban neighborhoods. Neighborhood impacts include such effects of transportation facilities (and their construction) as the disruption of neighborhood social structures, the unsightly appearance of some facilities, noise (except in the case of major airports, where it is an impact of at least sub-regional scope), dust, and the strains on the local housing supply that construction of major transportation facilities can create. Those actors who are mainly concerned with this type of transportation impact are likely to view the neighborhood or the municipality as the appropriate level for transportation planning.

A second type of transportation impact makes its effects felt at the level of the metropolitan region. Those who are particularly concerned with this type of transportation impact are likely to regard control of such impacts as the primary function of a regional transportation planning agency, and are apt to be among the strongest supporters of a regional transportation planning agency with a large organizational domain. In the case of the Bay Area, a major regional impacts of the transportation system are its effects on air quality and patterns of land use and development.

Air quality is an inherently regional problem because, within an air basin, there is little correspondence between the areas in which pollution is produced and those in which it is experienced. This creates a prisoners' dilemma for subregional jurisdictions: all are better off if air pollution is reduced, but, since polluted air spreads beyond their boundaries, the ideal situation for each is

for all others to control sources of air pollution while it does not. This (if it were possible) would reduce the damage suffered by an individual jurisdiction without imposing the costs of foregone transportation and industrial activity. The worst situation for an individual jurisdiction would be for it to attempt to control sources of pollution within its borders with no reciprocal action on the part of the others: this would subject it to the costs of pollution control, but would produce negligible improvement in air quality, since pollutants from other jurisdictions would be present. This situation is made even worse by the effect of the prevailing winds, which create a geographical bias in the prisoners' dilemma: not all jurisdictions suffer equally from the actions of others, and so some have greater incentives to favor a regional solution than others.

Since the severity of air pollution is affected by the nature of the region's transportation system (and, in particular, by the degree to which it is dependent on the automobile), it would appear that a regional transportation planning agency might be able to play a decisive long-run role in its control. Because of the need for a regional arbiter to encourage and enforce anti-pollution agreements among subregional jurisdictions, and because of the intimate relationship between air quality and the nature of the region's transportation system, actors who are conscious of air quality will normally favor a strong agency at the regional level with powers over all phases of transportation activity. Furthermore, such actors will normally have a strong bias against the

automobile, and will favor measures to discourage its use and to encourage the development of alternative transportation systems.

At first glance, the location of new land development and its reverse--the location of open space--may not appear to be regional problems: if the effects of air pollution are regional because they are especially mobile, then those of land development and open space would seem to be subregional because they are particularly immobile. Yet, in the context of the fragmented metropolitan political system, new land development does create prisoners' dilemmas which require at least regional arbitration. These prisoners' dilemmas arise because nearby open space enhances residential land values. The open space one can see, and the open space one can escape to readily, are marketable assets. But, in order to enhance the value of land in a given jurisdiction, the open space need not be located in that jurisdiction: the ideal situation for a subregional jurisdiction is for the open space to be in the next jurisdiction, so that property values in the first jurisdiction are enhanced while none of the economic benefits of land development are foregone. The worst situation exists where one jurisdiction provides all the open space and its neighbors provide none: not only does it suffer in comparison with them in terms of economic development, but it must also provide services for their residents when they come to use its recreational facilities. If everyone agrees that open space should be preserved (and in practice, almost everyone does endorse the concept, at least), the only practical solution would seem to be for each jurisdiction to provide about the same amount, or for some jurisdictions to compensate others for the

provision of open space.

This prisoners' dilemma, like that involving air pollution, has its geographical biases: not all open space is of equal quality; moreover, as the per capita demand for open space increases, citizens of already-urbanized jurisdictions may begin to demand the preservation of open space which must of necessity be located on the region's still-developing fringes. The older urbanized areas rarely reserved as much open space as their residents now desire, a circumstance which must establish an inherent inequality between old and new jurisdictions if current demands for open space are to be fulfilled. Finally, some problems will arise in areas with high-quality open space because of the lack of adequate means of compensation for land owners and local governments dependent on property taxes. As matters now stand, scenery, solitude, and feelings of oneness with nature cannot be marketed--but building lots can be. The normal result of these geographical biases will be to produce pressures for preservation of open space in the well-settled parts of the region and a strong defense of the freedom to develop in areas which are still developing.

Although the exact relationship between transportation and land development is not fully known, it is generally believed that adequate access is necessary for large-scale development. Thus, by locating planned transportation facilities in areas suitable for development and refusing to allow them in unsuitable areas, a regional transportation planning agency can influence development patterns and enforce land use plans. Actors who emphasize the impact

of the transportation system on patterns of land development will normally favor action on the part of the regional transportation planning agency to promote what they consider to be desirable patterns of land development; those who stand to lose from regional land use planning (due to the geographical biases in the prisoners' dilemma described above) will normally oppose such actions.

These substantive orientations can be reduced to three essential ones. The first, which most environmentalists would hold, regards the urban transportation problem as being that of the adverse impacts of the transportation system on the urban environment; in particular, the automobile is regarded as a destructive influence. Those with this substantive orientation would normally favor a strong transportation planning effort at the regional level in order to limit the expansion of the highway system and encourage the development of alternatives to it; they would normally regard the authority to make multi-modal resource allocations at the regional level as an essential means to this end. In general, such actors would favor inclusion in the agency's informal domain of practically all the functions listed in its potential domain.

A second substantive orientation is what we might call the traditional orientation. This orientation is held by many local officials and professionals in implementing agencies. These actors tend to regard the urban transportation problem as being one of efficient provision of transportation services from the point of view of their users and their equitable distribution on a geographical basis. From this point of view, very little regional

coordination may be necessary, and thus there may be little role for a regional transportation planning agency except in the encouragement of mass transit coordination and the provision of information and conceptual planning advice. To give a regional agency wide decision-making powers might, from this point of view, lead to a lack of sensitivity to the needs of the users of the transportation system and to undesirable redistributions of income. Actors sharing this substantive orientation would normally like to see the informal domain of the agency severely limited.

The third substantive orientation, held mainly by professionals, especially those on the staffs of multimodal planning agencies, is mainly derived from economic theory, and regards the urban transportation problem as being one of the optimum use of scarce resources, with some regard for social (but rarely geographical) equity. In most cases, those who share this substantive orientation would support a strong regional transportation planning agency and therefore a wide organizational domain for any such agency. The more specific substantive policies to be pursued by the agency are not clear from this substantive orientation: overall policy would emerge in a coherent fashion only in retrospect, since it would be the result of numerous efficiency-oriented decisions.

It is clear, then, that there will be considerable disagreement over the legitimate role of a regional transportation planning agency and, hence, over its domain and the specific courses of action it ought to take. The first and second orientations are in direct conflict with one another; to the extent that one of them prevails, the influence of its adherents should be obvious. But

the third orientation tends to cloud the picture: at its extremes, an efficiency-oriented actor's idea of the proper substantive policy for a regional transportation planning agency would approximate one of the other two viewpoints, depending on whether prominence is given to transportation service as a good or to the negative externalities of the transportation systems as evils.

Effects of Institutional Considerations

The domain ideals resulting from the substantive orientations of the various actors will be modified by the actors' institutional orientations. These institutional orientations, for the most part, arise out of the search by organizational actors for their own survival and stability, but may also arise from the philosophical convictions of individuals.* In order to understand how the institutional orientations of organizational actors arise, it will be necessary to examine organizational behavior more closely. According to Thompson, complex organizations may be conceived of as "indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to the criteria of rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty."¹⁶ Inasmuch as Thompson holds that "uncertainty appears as the fundamental problem for complex organizations. . .,"¹⁷ he builds his account of organizational behavior on a description of various strategies for coping with and, if possible, reducing uncertainty.

*As when an individual is opposed to "big government" or in favor of democracy, socialism, or some other abstract institutional arrangement which can be related to the status quo.

According to Thompson, there are two basic sources of uncertainty for complex organizations: (1) technologies--that is, knowledge of cause and effect relationships--and (2) environments.¹⁸ In order to deal with these two sources of uncertainty, Thompson says, organizations develop specialized components, specifically a technological core and a set of boundary-spanning components, whose task it is to protect the technological core from undue uncertainty arising from sources external to the organization. Implicit in this concept, of course, are the ideas that the organization exists for some purpose, that it has a domain (which may or may not be stable) and a major mission, and that it has some means of assessing its performance.

In discussing the institutional orientations of organizations, we are particularly concerned with uncertainty arising as a result of the action of other organizations. This uncertainty arises because organizations are dependent on inputs from their task environments. As Thompson puts it:

In the final analysis the results of organizational action rest not on a single technology but upon a technological matrix. A complicated technology incorporates the products or results of still other technologies. Although a particular organization may operate several core technologies, its domain always falls short of the total matrix. Hence the organization's domain identifies the points at which the organization is dependent on inputs from the environment. The composition of that environment, the location within it of capabilities, in turn determines upon whom the organization is dependent.¹⁹

The critical uncertainty from our point of view, then, is that which arises from unpredictability in the behavior of the task environment elements upon which an organization is dependent. However, we should

like to amend Thompson's account to recognize that uncertainty is not necessarily the "most fundamental problem for complex organizations": there may be cases in which an organization will find itself faced with the certainty of losing a critical input, and in these cases, uncertainty would undoubtedly be preferred to certainty.* Thompson defines power relationships in terms of dependency, declaring that:

...[A]n organization is dependent on some element in its task environment (1) in proportion to the organization's need for resources or performance which that element can provide and (2) in inverse proportion to the ability of other elements to provide the same resource or performance. . . Thus an organization has power, relative to an element in its task environment, to the extent that the organization has capacity to satisfy the needs of that element and to the extent that the organization monopolizes that capacity.²⁰

We now have the baiss for a theory of the institutional orientations of organizations. The basic premise is that organizations will resist changes in their task environments which increase their dependency on other organizations, and will promote changes in their task environments which decrease their dependency. Inasmuch as the creation of a new governmental agency will increase dependency for most of its task environment elements, we would expect most organizations having dealings with the new agency to prefer the institutional status quo to the institutional arrangements incorporating the new organizations. Attitudes toward specific aspects

*To make an analogy with individual behavior, one would presumably prefer to be uncertain that one is to be hanged than to be certain that one is to be hanged. It may readily be observed that condemned men frequently appeal their sentences.

of the new agency's proposed domain would depend on their tendency to involve other agencies in situations of increased dependency. On the other hand, there may be cases in which the existence of a new agency decreases the dependency of some organization by providing it with an alternative source of some key resource. In these cases, we would expect the organization to find the new institutional arrangements preferable to the status quo.

The concept of organizational dependency also provides a basis for incorporating the concept of political resources into the organizational-evolution model and for speculation concerning the evolution of both the agency's informal domain and its political mechanism.

In terms of the organizational-evolution model, political resources are seen to be such because they are related to organizational dependencies. These dependencies, in turn, arise out of key organizational needs. These include:

1. Economic security
2. Political legitimacy
3. Routine interorganizational cooperation
4. Technical information
5. Technical legitimacy.

Resources related to these needs include the following:

The need for economic security involves the need for (1) operating funds and (2) funds for implementing proposals. Practically all governmental agencies depend on publicly-provided operating funds; this means that all are dependent on legislative and executive

elements (such as appropriations committees and budget departments) which allocate such funds. In addition, the transportation implementing agencies are especially dependent on funds for specific proposals, since much of their technological core is devoted to the administration and expenditure of such funds.

The need for political legitimacy involves: (1) for elected officials and organizations headed by them, as well as organizations involved in referenda, the need for votes; and (2) the need for more generalized public recognition--for the "consent of the governed." Resources which may be used to produce political legitimacy include formal authority, ability to command publicity, rhetorical ability, existing public good will, and organizational ability. In cases in which issues actually come to a vote (or in which elected officials are involved) the ability to deliver votes is also a resource related to political legitimacy. To the extent that they can be used to generate favorable publicity, political funds can also be used to increase political legitimacy. To the extent that the press, some elected officials, and special interest groups control such resources, governmental organizations are dependent upon them.

The need for routine interorganizational cooperation--for the "concerting of action" on a day-to-day basis--creates the primary need for such resources as political IOU's, political intelligence, establishment channels of access, and Banfieldian control structures. These are the sorts of things which tend to smooth the process of coordination, and they fulfill a legitimate function in

the transaction of routine organizational business. In non-routine situations, these resources can also serve as crucial substitutes for other resources such as public goodwill, technical reputations, or formal authority.

The need for technical information means that most governmental organizations are dependent on one another, since none has complete control of the data sources it needs. In some cases, private organizations can increase their influence by hiring professional staffs to collect information which the governmental organizations do not have.

The need for technical legitimacy involves the need by technically-oriented organizations to be able to evaluate their performance and their need to be recognized as competent by other technical organizations. Where knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships is believed to be relatively certain, there may be intrinsic measures of performance. Where these exist, they will be relied upon. Where there is a technological consensus but no convenient intrinsic measures of performance, technical legitimacy will rest on adherence to recognized methods of analysis. Where there is neither technological consensus nor intrinsic measures of performance, technical legitimacy will be established by a more generalized technical reputation, which may, in turn, be founded on such extrinsic measures of competence as staff experience, educational backgrounds, and membership in professional societies. Technical organizations tend to be interdependent in this area, since each is dependent on the others for recognition of its technical competence.

Of these resources, some are more readily transferable than others. Control over funding sources and technical information, in particular, can be acquired; technical and political legitimacy and "closed system" political resources must be developed. Where possible, the organization will extend its formal boundaries to incorporate the source of its dependency; failing this, it will attempt to extend its informal domain so as to include the function creating the dependency. Where key resources cannot be acquired, the organization will strive to develop them. Where these courses are all impossible, Thompson holds that:

Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to minimize the power of task environment elements over them by maintaining alternatives.²¹

And where sources of dependency cannot be incorporated and no alternatives can be developed:

. . . [O]rganizations under norms of rationality seek power relative to those on whom they are dependent.²²

--in other words, they seek to create interdependencies.

In a political system involving regional transportation planning, we might expect some or all of the following strategies to be employed by organizations seeking to fulfill their key organizational needs:

1. Governmental organizations will probably seek control of funds; since this is ordinarily impossible, they will seek to create interdependencies with legislative and executive bodies responsible for appropriating operating funds.

2. Implementing agencies will try to incorporate allocations of funds to specific projects in either their formal or informal domains.
3. Governmental bodies will probably seek prestige and favorable publicity by creating interdependencies with those who can provide these things. Those headed by elected officials will be especially anxious to establish interdependencies with those who control blocks of votes.
4. All political actors will seek to develop "closed-system" political resources and to create interdependencies with those who possess them.
5. Technically-oriented organizations will seek to incorporate information-gathering activities in their formal or informal domains; where this is impossible (or uneconomical) they will seek to create interdependencies with key sources of data.
6. Technically-oriented organizations will seek to impress other technically-oriented organizations with their technical competence.
7. All organizations will seek to develop alternative sources of funding, information, and legitimacy, and will deal with those over whom they can gain the most power.

In general, then, we would expect organizations to act to reduce critical dependencies by acquiring or developing political resources

related to their needs. The pursuit of particular strategies for acquiring or developing these resources, however, would seem to be something of a problem in the investment of political resources (and other organizational resources); in deciding which resource-development strategies to follow, the leaders of any organization must consider (1) how critical given resources are to the organization, (2) how much obtaining them is likely to cost in terms of current resources, and (3) how much risk is involved in pursuing given types of resources. We might advance the proposition that:

- 5.2 Organizations will act to reduce critical dependencies by seeking to acquire or develop political resources related to their needs. The decision to seek particular kinds of resources will be based, in part, on the demands such activity places on current resources and on the risks involved.

The precise pattern of organizational dependencies involving a regional transportation planning agency will be a function of the agency's domain. We would expect evolution of a new agency's domain to result from a process in which the agency itself seeks to increase its power over other organizations and to limit their power over it and in which the other agencies respond in kind. The potential domain of a regional transportation planning agency creates some rather obvious potential organizational dependencies.

"Systems-level planning" establishes some interdependencies, but these are comparatively weak. On the one hand, the planning agency may be dependent on the implementing agencies for technical information; on the other, the implementing agencies and local

governments may be dependent on the planning agency for some of their political and technical legitimacy--if they depart too far from the planning agency's conceptual plan, they may be accused of being politically insubordinate or of following poor professional practices. If it is up to the implementing agencies to translate the conceptual plan into specific proposals, they will normally be able to interpret it in such a way as to secure their economic resources and insulate their technological cores from outside interference. Consequently, we would expect "systems-level" planning to be the least-controversial province of the new agency's domain. At even the conceptual level, however, inclusion of financial planning powers in the new agency's domain poses a direct threat to the economic security of the implementing agencies; consequently, they may be expected to oppose inclusion of the power to decide the size of the overall financial effort or the allocation of resources to major subsystems in the planning agency's domain.

Major dependency relationships will develop if the planning agency's domain contains the function of translating conceptual planning into specific proposals. The powers to initiate projects, to set design standards, to set project priorities, to rule on compliance with the plan, or to regulate operations all in some way leave the implementing agencies beholden to the planning agency for their project funds. In the cases of project priorities, fund programming, and compliance rulings (which are, in fact, grant review and approval actions) the effect on the supply of project funds is immediate and obvious. In the cases of project

initiations and the setting of design standards, the effects are more subtle, but nonetheless important: the power to initiate projects is ultimately the power to decide how many get done and the power to set design standards is the power to set the scope of projects. Both of these powers imply the power to control the implementing agencies' workloads and hence, their project funds. Beyond the obvious economic dependencies created by these powers, several of them also pose the possibility of direct intervention into the functioning of the implementing agencies' technological cores, with the resulting direct introduction of uncertainty into their operations. Against the formidable power these functions would give the planning agency over the implementing agencies, such functions would create for the planning agency a certain dependence of the implementing agencies for technical information and technical legitimacy. The interdependencies in this case would be by no means balanced: the dependence of the implementing agencies is immediate and overwhelming, whereas that of the planning agency is comparatively slight, and of importance only in the very long run. Consequently, we should expect implementing agencies to strongly oppose the inclusion of the power to translate conceptual plans into specific proposals in the domain of a planning agency.

The power to make fund allocations to implementing agencies would carry the economic dependency of the implementing agencies to an extreme; again, the only countervailing dependency would be an informational one, and the implementing agencies could only hurt themselves by withholding information. Consequently, we would

expect that the implementing agencies would also strongly oppose inclusion in the planning agency's domain of the power to allocate funds to implementing agencies.

The final two functions in the planning agency's potential domain--the power to "educate" the public and the power to make recommendations to the legislature and state and federal administrative agencies--provide the planning agency with an opportunity to create interdependencies. The planning agency is dependent on the "public," the legislature, and the agencies at higher governmental levels for its political legitimacy; it can make these actors depend on it for technical information and, in some sense, technical legitimacy: although the legislature and the public may remain laymen in the eyes of the technical actors, they gain some technical legitimacy by virtue of the fact that they receive advice from a supposedly competent source. These functions can also be used to attack the technical legitimacy of other technically-oriented actors such as the implementing agencies.

In summary, the organizational-evolution model holds that the domain ideals of various actors with respect to a new regional transportation planning agency are a function of their substantive and institutional orientations. These have been extensively discussed. In general, we would expect the actors whose substantive orientations center around the impacts of the transportation system on the environment to be the strongest constituents of the agency and to favor an informal domain as wide as or wider than the agency's formal domain. In addition to these impact-oriented actors, we would expect that those system-efficiency-oriented actors whose organiza-

tional goals are not threatened by the new agency to favor an extensive domain. Equity-oriented local governments and facility-efficiency-oriented elements in the implementing agencies we would expect to be the agency's anticonstituents. These would be in favor of limiting the agency's domain, especially in the areas of resource allocation and the translation of conceptual planning into specific proposals. In other cases, implementing agencies which feel they may gain by the substantive decisions of the new agency* or elements of implementing agencies whose substantive orientations are to system-oriented efficiency, but who nonetheless feel their independence threatened, may be expected to display ambivalence toward the new agency, supporting its domain-claims in some cases and opposing them in others.

2. The Evolution of Domain

We have previously surmised that the evolution of a new agency's domain results from a process in which the agency seeks to establish its own power and other agencies seek to resist this and establish their power over it. We shall now examine this process more closely, paying special attention to the stages in the life of the new agency which should be critical in the establishment of its domain and to the strategies by which the domain is defended.

Critical stages in the evolution of a new transportation planning agency might include:

*A case in point would be transit operators who might believe that planning agency control over resource allocation might lead to diversion of highway funds.

1. The creation of the agency. At this point, a formal domain is established.
2. Initial organization and staffing. At this point, the agency's political and technical resources are organized. Personalities of key staff members may play a decisive role in determining strategies of domain defense.
3. Initial planning process. At this stage, crucial decisions are made by the agency about which elements of its potential domain are to be claimed and which are not.
4. Initial plan implementation. At this stage, it begins to become clear whether the agency is willing or able to defend its claims to domain.

Domain Defense Strategies

Table 1 identifies six strategies for domain defense (or non-defense, as the case may be). These strategies are listed in decreasing order of risk, and also in decreasing order of the organizational strength needed to pursue them. These strategies may be described as follows:

Active defense of some area of organizational domain may be undertaken unilaterally. This involves an attempt to manipulate organizational dependencies in such a way as to defeat any rival claimant. This may either lead to the surrender of the rival or his defeat in arbitration--as, for instance, when contested powers are the subject of litigation. This strategy is the most risky, because the rival claimant may also attempt to apply sanctions, and

Required Organizational Strength and Risk Increase ↑ ↑	Unilateral	1. Active Defense - Manipulation of dependencies in such a way as to defeat rivals
		2. Defense by Contracts - Explicit agreements with rivals as to how to share disputed territory.
	Multilateral-Negotiation and Agreement Required	3. Defense by Cooptation - Inclusion of rival in organization's dominant coalition in exchange for an undisputed claim to territory.
		4. Defense by Coalescing - Merger of organizations to remove source of conflict.
	Unilateral	5. Non-Defense of Claim. Claim function but do not exercise in such a way as to alarm rivals.
		6. Abandonment - Open relinquishment of disputed territory in order to defend other claims.

Table 1 - Strategies for Defense of Organizational Domain

may be successful.

The next three strategies of domain defense are suggested by Thompson.²³ They are defense by contracts, in which rival claimants come to an explicit agreement as to how disputed functions are to be carried out; defense by co-optation, in which the agency allows members of a rival organization a place in its dominant coalition--and hence a place in its decision-making--in exchange for an undisputed claim to some function;* and defense by coalescing, in which the rival organizations merge and so eliminate the source of conflict. These strategies require negotiation and agreement among the rival organizations, and would seem to be most feasible when the rivals are of nearly equal strength. They impose a medium level of risk: too much may have to be given up to obtain an agreement, but the consequences of defeat are less dramatic than in the case of active defense.

Organizations in a position of relative weakness may attempt to carry out a strategy of non-defense of claims to areas of their potential domains--that is, they may claim the right to make certain decisions, but never exercise this right in such a way as to alarm their rivals. This action, of course, may be undertaken unilaterally. Finally, an organization may abandon an area of its

*It is important to understand just what Thompson means by co-optation. Burke identifies two kinds of co-optation: informal co-optation, in which an organization includes those actors vital to continuation of current policy at the policy-making level; and formal co-optation, in which power is not shared, but merely legitimized. Thompson means what Burke calls "informal co-optation." The dominant coalition of an organization is that group within the organization whose agreement is necessary in order for the organization to take action.

domain because it finds its defense too expensive or too risky, and concentrate on the defense of other areas. Again, this may be a unilateral action.

The extent of an organization's domain and its effectiveness in making substantive decisions within that domain will depend on the willingness and ability of its leaders to carry out active domain defense strategies. Their ability to carry out such strategies will depend on the extent to which they already possess political resources in some form, while their willingness to do so will depend on their perception of their organizational strength and on their risk propensity.

This raises a question of the degree to which we should expect the leaders of a regional transportation planning agency to display a high propensity to take risks. The conventional wisdom, as exemplified by Bolan and most of his sources, seems to be that the behavior of planning agencies (and similar political actors) is risk-avoiding. Whether this is true or not remains to be seen. Still, the mere assertion that planners are risk-avoiders--no matter how true--would seem to beg the question: if they avoid risk, then why?

We might suggest that, if planners avoid risk, they do so because they have few political resources; that is, that it is not their unwillingness to take risks that inhibits them (if, indeed, they are inhibited) but rather their pessimism about the outcome of risky political behavior. We might offer the proposition that:

- 5.3 The more an organization's leaders feel confidence in the strength of its resources, the more likely they are to pursue risky strategies of domain defense.

Yet this explanation, too, may beg the question. Even if an organizational leader's willingness to take specific risks depends on his perception of the organization's strength, his perception of its strength may just as well be affected by some innate propensity (or lack thereof) to take risks. In other words, the risk-avoider may simply be more prone to see political dangers than the risk-acceptor. Without delving into the psychological makeup of individual leaders--although this may well be the crucial factor--we should seek further explanations of the propensity to take risks.

One such explanation relates to the conditions under which decision-making takes place. Thompson presents the following classification of what he calls "decision issues":

		<u>Preferences Regarding Possible Outcomes</u>	
		Certainty	Uncertainty
Beliefs About Cause/Effect Relations	Certain	1	2
	Uncertain	3	4

For each type of decision issue, he proposed a decision-making strategy. He discusses all but that appropriate to the fourth box (that is, uncertainty-uncertainty) which he calls the "inspirational strategy." It is this decision-making strategy which interests us, since it would appear that both the values and the technology of regional transportation planning have been uncertain during MTC's formative period. In fact, this may be a case of reinforcing phenomena: an agency such as MTC would never have formed had not new types of actors, with new types of substantive orientations,

demand a voice in transportation planning; new substantive concerns, in turn, increase technical uncertainty, since technological development tends to follow, not precede, the substantive concerns of political leaders. Ernest R. Alexander has addressed the question of decision-making in changing environment, asking:

What kind of decision processes would be elicited in a context of change rather than stability, in environments which demand decisions which have been called "inspirational"...--though such decisions are made every day?

Alexander replies by developing an analytic framework for studying decision-making in an environment of change, and goes on to comment:

The more changeable the perceived environment, the more adaptable the decision unit needs to be--hence a breakdown of formal organizational patterns. A turbulent environment will also tend to produce more crises, increasing pressures for decisions and reducing the time available for planning and policymaking. Such crises are more likely to be perceived as information becomes scarce and the rate of obsolescence of existing data will be high. A rapid pace of environmental change is also not likely to enable the decision maker to develop as wide and detailed a range of action alternatives as a more leisurely study of the problem in more stable circumstances might allow though conceivably it might also weaken his sense of constraints and open up otherwise infeasible options. Finally, it is probable that a decisionmaker in a more changeable environment might develop a higher propensity to risk since few non-risky decisions will seem to be available anyway²⁸

If Alexander is correct, then, the leadership of a new agency whose very existence is an expression of changing issue-perceptions, values, and technical requirements should display a high propensity to take risks. Later on, as the political system moves toward a steady state, risk-propensity should decrease.

Alexander also discusses the effects of time pressure and issue salience on propensity to take risks, and comments:

Issue salience and pressure for decision (and this includes decision on inaction or deliberate delay) seem positively correlated. Increased pressure for decision will also limit the time for information gathering and thus increase uncertainty and limit the range of alternatives that can be considered. The need for rapid decision may also inhibit a more considered appreciation of probabilities and so encourage a higher risk propensity--though its effect might also possibly be the reverse. . . . Increased issue salience should lead to more intense motivation and might, because of the important values involved, reduce both the perceived range of alternatives and the decision-maker's risk propensity.²⁹

In other words, we should expect decisionmakers to display more caution when dealing with what they consider to be important issues than when dealing with what they consider to be less important, but greater propensity to take risks when acting under time pressures--maybe. We might offer the proposition that:

5.4 In periods of great uncertainty about goals and technologies, or in periods of great time pressure, organizational leaders will display high risk propensity.

A second explanation for risk propensity among the leaders of planning organizations might relate to their roles as professionals. Although not all decisions made by planning agencies are made by professionals, many, of necessity, must be. We have suggested that professionals may be more responsive to their fellow professionals than to local elected officials, and that the path to a successful career for the professional bureaucrat may involve the accumulation of professional reputation rather than political power of influence in the traditional sense. We have further suggested that such professionals, when they do seek power in the traditional sense, seek it not for itself but as a means of insuring organizational survival and stability. The implications of these considerations for the propensity to take risks may be contradictory. On the one hand, the orientation of professionals to their peers rather than to local

officials has been held by some authors to increase their propensity for innovation and risk. Wolfinger, for instance, suggests:

The consequences of such cosmopolitan expertise will be innovation and the expansion of public programs. This is not to say that the relevant professionals are necessarily progressive. . . But the incentive structure in these professions emphasizes not jealous defense of routine but rather a venturesome ambition. As is usually the case, these officials have a vested interest in maximizing the programs for which they are responsible and therefore want to expand their own domains, if necessary by appealing to their specialized constituents in the local community. The likelihood is that such expansion will be in the direction of more services for the poor, improvement of the social and physical environment, and attempts to impose a greater degree of rationality and coordination on market processes.³⁰

Thus we might expect such professionals to show a greater propensity for risk than local elected officials. On the other hand, if organizational survival is uppermost in the minds of such professionals, they may be inhibited from taking risks unless they perceive themselves to be in positions of organizational strength. We might offer the proposition that:

5.5 Cosmopolitan professionals (including transportation planners) will display high risk propensity and political aggressiveness as a result of their roles as professionals.

Thus we find ourselves with two arguments suggesting--contrary to the conventional wisdom--that staff elements of planning agencies will show a high propensity for risk, especially during the sort of chaos which is apt to accompany the initial planning efforts of a new agency.

Even so, there is no guarantee that the leaders of a regional transportation planning agency will be willing to pursue active

domain defense strategies. Staff leaders may not be the effective leaders of the agency; if the agency's governing body is in control of the staff, its attitude will also be important. Here the question is not so much one of risk propensity as one of whether the primary political loyalties of governing body members are to the transportation planning agency or to some other entity. This will probably depend on whether the governing body is directly elected or not; if so, it is likely that governing body members will consider those who appoint them to be their personal constituents. If the governing body is selected by the agency's anticonstituents, it is not likely that the agency will pursue very active domain defense strategies. We might advance the proposition that:

- 5.6 An agency will tend to take bold substantive stands and pursue active domain defense strategies only if (a) the governing body is directly elected or appointed by the agency's constituents or (b) the staff is in a position to ignore the governing body.

If we accept the possibility that the risk propensity of the agency's leaders may be independent of any objective measure of organizational strength, we are confronted by the following possibilities:

		<u>Risk Propensity</u>	
		High	Low
Organizational Strength	High	1	2
	Low	3	4

We might surmise that only the first and fourth combinations are

stable over an long period of time. The second box represents high strength but low risk propensity; any organization having this combination of characteristics would tend to move toward low strength and low risk propensity because its caution would erode its strength. The third combination, that of high risk propensity and low organizational strength, is of course likely to lead to disaster if pursued for any long period of time; if such an organization survived, one would expect the risk propensity of its leaders to decline rapidly. Of the more stable combinations, the first (high organizational strength and high risk propensity) represents a highly effective organization which is willing and able to expand and defend its organizational domain; and the fourth (low risk propensity and low organization strength), an ineffective organization which is both unwilling and unable to defend its organizational domain. Such an organization may nonetheless be tolerated because it poses no threat to anyone. Obviously, there is always the possibility that, over time, an effective organization will become ineffective; it is also conceivable that an ineffective organization could slowly accumulate organizational strength and, by using it with increasing boldness, eventually become effective.

The problem facing a new organization, then, is one of establishing as wide a domain as possible without overextending itself. Because some political resources, such as political and technical legitimacy, can only be developed over time, a new organization is unlikely to find itself in a position of overwhelming strength; consequently, if it is to succeed, it must use whatever political resources it does have with great skill. Overextension of its

domain can lead to disaster; but failure to act with boldness can be equally dangerous. If the agency allows a domain consensus to develop in which its actual domain is far less than its formal domain, it may never be able to regain what it has given up. Once the domain consensus occurs, any attempt on the agency's part to expand it is apt to be seen as a illegitimate, no matter what its formal domain may be.

3. Evolution of Political Mechanisms

The evolution of the agency's political mechanisms should be somewhat parallel to the evolution of its domain. If the evolution of domain is the process of evolution of the agency's external affairs, then the evolution of the agency as a political mechanism is the evolution of its internal affairs.

We have identified two principal features of the organization as constituting its political mechanism. These are its organizational structure and its decision-making procedures. Major structural features include the basis of representation and method of selection of the governing body and the organization of the governing body and staff into functional units. Of these structural features, the first two are normally determined at the creation of the agency and are not subject to change at its discretion; consequently, the basis of representation and method of selection of the governing body will normally remain fixed. The internal organization of staff and governing body, however, should evolve over time in response to changes in the agency's technology and environment.

The principal effect of the basis of representation should be to encourage or discourage action on a truly regional basis. If the

governing body is selected from the region at large, it will tend to adopt a specifically regional viewpoint; if, on the other hand, the governing body is selected from subregional districts, and there is no compelling substantive reason to make decisions on a regional basis, the governing body will tend to adopt an informal procedure in which individual members make decisions about matters within their districts. We have already pointed out that it is likely that a governing body composed of representatives of subregional jurisdictions will avoid making explicit resource allocations among such jurisdictions (see page 88). If no resource allocations to subregional jurisdictions are made, it is also probable that there will be no attempt to deal with conceptual planning, translation of concepts into specific proposals, or plan implementation decisions on a regional basis. We might hypothesize:

- 6.1 If the agency's governing body is made up of representatives of subregional jurisdictions, there will be a tendency to avoid conflicts within the governing body by decomposing regional issues into subregional issues.

The principal effect of the method of selection of the governing body will be to establish the governing body's basic constituency. We have already discussed the relationship which is likely to exist between specific methods of selection and the political loyalties of governing body members (see page 58). We might suspect that where personal constituencies of governing body members do not match the constituency of the agency, there will be conflicts within the agency between the governing body and the staff. Even

where the staff is attempting to pursue an independent course, staff members will probably feel constrained by the wishes of the agency's constituency, whereas governing body members will feel the need to please their personal constituencies. Where these conflicts are severe, they will probably center around the issue of the agency's fundamental role. Such conflicts, if they are not quickly resolved, may result in a situation in which the agency is unable to take a positive policy direction because of an inability to reach a consensus within its dominant coalition. We might offer the proposition that:

- 6.2 Where governing body selection procedures result in different constituencies for the agency as a whole and its individual governing body members, the agency will tend to avoid making decisions due to conflicts between staff and governing body members over its fundamental role.

The evolution of the less-fixed features of the agency's political mechanism will be influenced by both conscious political activities and the problems inherent in managing complex organizations. In discussing the factors influencing isolated decisions, we argued that the state of the political mechanism has a critical bearing on the effective distribution of political resources. To the extent that the value of technical and political information depends on the ability to withhold it, open procedures lessen the value of these resources. To the extent that technical legitimacy rests on pretense--on the ignorance of the non-professional rather than the knowledge of the professional--open procedures subject this resource to erosion. To the extent that universal access to decision-makers is maintained, special access is valueless. To the

extent that decisions actually reflect public opinion, the importance of the instruments of public persuasion is magnified. And to the extent that decision makers are actually dependent on the "consent of the governed"--which is in part a matter of the extent to which the governed are aware of what is going on--the importance of ideologically-oriented block voting is increased. Because the political mechanism affects the effective distribution of political resources so strongly, we would expect that the various actors would favor modifications in the political mechanism which would increase the effectiveness of their particular resources. We would therefore expect one major factor in the evolution of the agency's political mechanism to be the attempts of external actors to influence the agency's structure and procedures, and the agency's response to these attempts.

The evolution of structure and procedures, however, is not merely the result of attempts to make political resources effective. From the point of view of organizational behavior, maintenance of what we have called open procedures is a somewhat unnatural condition. It is very costly, especially in terms of manpower, and may not contribute to the survival and stability of the organization. Conduct of decision-making activities in an atmosphere of too much information tends not only to place too great a strain on the time of key members of the organization, but also to increase the amount of internal coordination required, to undermine lines of authority within the organization, and to interfere with the pursuit of a consistent strategy of domain establishment and defense. The maintenance of open procedures, however, may contribute to the agency's

political legitimacy; it may also represent an ideological commitment on the part of members of the organization. The second important factor in the evolution of the agency's political mechanism, then, is the tradeoff between the political legitimacy and personal satisfaction resulting from maintaining costly structures and procedures, and the cost of doing so.

Perhaps the most important barrier to the maintenance of open decision-making procedures is the strain they place on agency resources which are likely to be scarce. The heart of the open procedures is the rule that decisions are to be made by responsible officials meeting in open session and acting with complete knowledge of the facts of the issue, including the sentiments of all interested parties. This concept runs afoul of the fact that the time of the responsible officials is often the scarcest resource of all for the agency. In the case of MTC, for instance, the Commission serves on a part-time basis, and the fact that Commissioners have their private careers to consider severely limits the amount of time they can spend on Commission business. For such a governing body to decide every matter through full deliberation would be impossible even under normal circumstances and doubly impossible during periods of crisis. This problem can perhaps be ameliorated by careful control of the governing body's agenda, so that it only considers the most important questions, but to do so would raise the questions of who was to control the agenda and would clearly mark the beginning of a retreat from the ideal of open-decision-making.

Besides this critical demand on the agency's resources, open decision-making also necessitates the expense of maintaining a

citizen participation program and tends to increase the complexity of the agency's internal structure--and, hence, its need for coordination.

According to Thompson, the particular internal structure of organizations results from the need to deal with the interdependencies among functional units and the need to coordinate their activities. Thompson discusses the organizational structures stemming from various types of internal interdependence and its environment. We are particularly interested in what happens when the task environment is heterogeneous and subject to change--which it must be assumed to be under open decision-making procedures--and when the organization's technological characteristics are such that functional units are reciprocally interdependent--as we would venture to be the case in an activity like transportation planning, in which there must be mutual adjustment among conceptual plans, specific proposals, financial plans, and information-gathering activities.

In brief, Thompson holds that a heterogeneous and shifting task environment will result in a proliferation of boundary-spanning units to deal with the diverse elements in the task environment.³² If boundary-spanning units are specialized to deal with diverse task-environment elements, the requirements of the open decision-making ideal can be met only by a great deal of internal coordination and communication, so that all agency personnel are aware of all the information coming in. Likewise, reciprocal interdependence increases coordination and communication requirements, since coordination between reciprocally interdependent units generally involves coordination by mutual adjustment--which, according to Thompson, is the

most expensive type of coordination. The implication of all this is that a transportation planning agency will face large coordination and communication problems in any event and that these will be exacerbated by attempts to maintain open decision-making procedures. Two possible results are that the organization might find it necessary to block access for some task environment elements in order to keep coordination problems under control and that in periods of crisis, internal coordination and communications might break down under the overload.

Another possible problem stemming from open decision-making procedures might be a weakening of the organization's internal lines of authority. According to Thompson, one means of handling reciprocal interdependencies is the creation of a hierarchical structure in which each layer exists to resolve coordination problems of the next lower level. This principle of resolving conflicts at the lowest possible hierarchical level tends to reduce coordination costs, but is in conflict with the ideal of decision-making by responsible officials in full possession of all pertinent information. Once a hierarchical arrangement is instituted, there will be a tendency to try to enforce a chain of command, and this means that the location of the actual decision-making may shift downward in the organization, with a corresponding tendency to present the politically-responsible layer with ready-made decisions supported by favorable information rather than the full spectrum of staff opinion--which, in turn, more fully reflects the range of positions of external actors.

Finally, open decision-making procedures can frustrate attempts to pursue consistent strategies for establishment and defense of organ-

izational domain. Each substantive proposal publicly endorsed by some member of the agency may be seen as an assertion of domain. In order to maintain a consistent domain defense strategy, it will be necessary for someone in the organization to control expression of opinions by agency members, lest organizational rivals mistake suggested courses of action for claims to disputed domain provinces--when in fact the agency's leaders do not wish to press their claims. This will be an especially sensitive issue when areas of domain have been formally claimed but no active defense of them is planned. To control these expressions of opinion, of course, will result in diminished knowledge among external actors of the real basis for the agency's decisions and will consequently be in violation of the ideal of open decision-making procedures.

In summary, we might hypothesize:

- 6.3 Actors will attempt to influence decisions about political mechanisms so as to increase the effectiveness of their political resources.
- 6.4 The maintenance of open decision-making procedures being costly in terms of time, coordination, and internal communications, there will be a tendency to shift to closed decision-making procedures when other demands on these resources are at their greatest.
- 6.5 Whenever there are problems with maintenance of lines of authority or execution of domain-defense strategies, there will be a tendency to shift from open decision-making procedures to closed ones.

The evolution of a transportation planning agency's political mechanism would seem to occur in much the same stages as that of its domain. At the creation of the agency, the basis of representation and the method of selection of the governing body are set. Initial organization and staffing provides an initial structure which will

be modified as subsequent problems arise. The period of the initial planning process will probably present the greatest challenge in terms of resource-allocation and coordination problems. During this period, also, the various actors will be most active in trying to influence decisions about the political mechanism. This is a point at which a retreat from the open decision-making ideal is the most likely. Finally, the period of initial plan implementation is one in which the evolution of the political mechanism should slow down as the new agency approaches a stable operation. During this period, problems involving the maintenance of lines of authority and the pursuit of domain-defense strategies should be major factors in the evolution of the political mechanism.

4. Political Influence in an Evolving Institutional System

If we consider the problem of political influence in the context of an evolving institutional system, it is clear that we must look beyond individual decisions to seek for patterns of decision-making. Each substantive decision has significance not only in itself but also as an assertion of domain. The outcome of each decision must be evaluated in both its substantive and its institutional context, and can be understood only as a product of both. Meanwhile, the characteristics of the agency's political mechanism shift--and with them, the effective distribution of political resources--for reasons which may related to the deliberate exercise of influence, but may also relate to the internal problems of managing a complex organization. When substantive decisions are viewed in isolation, it is difficult to know just what extent they are made for their

own sake and to what extent they are a part of a series of actions in defense of an organizational domain; likewise, when shifts in organizational structure and procedures are observed in isolation, it is difficult to tell to what extent they are designed to give an edge to particular actors and to what extent they are designed to relieve problems of coordination and resource allocation. But viewing all these features simultaneously, we may be able to see patterns in which the agency moves in a definite direction over time, to become more like what some actor or actors want it to be. This is perhaps as far as we can go in answering the question "who has influence?" over a routine governmental function.

There is, in fact, good reason to believe that in their general directions, the agency's substantive and institutional decisions will reinforce one another in establishing the agency's relationship with each external actor. So long as the substantive and institutional orientations of the majority of the actors are themselves reinforcing--that is, to the extent that most actors are either constituents or anticonstituents--there will be a tendency for each decision by the agency to move it closer to the position of one camp or the other. This is true because most actions in defense of the substantive status quo will actually involve inaction, and inaction involves a failure to claim and defend organizational domain--and thus also supports the institutional status quo.

The emergence of a domain consensus and the complex forces tending to modify the political mechanism already give us ample reason to suspect that these reinforcing decisions provide the new agency's policy with an irreversible direction. This would appear even more

likely when we consider that the set of actors involved in the system will probably change over time and that such changes might reinforce any direction the agency's policy might follow. Where external actors have a choice--that is, where they are not in positions of serious organizational dependency upon the planning agency--we might suspect that those whose hopes are frustrated would tend to withdraw from the arena. All political actors have limited resources, and normally they will employ them where they think they will yield the most return. So long as the policy direction of a new agency is uncertain, it will attract a variety of political actors who hope to influence it. The more certain the direction of its policy becomes, the more likely it is that those who are frustrated will withdraw. This, in turn, reinforces the policy direction. Thus, we may identify some forms of domination which appear only in the long run--withdrawal, which is the long-run equivalent of surrender; exclusion, which occurs when access channels for a particular actor are blocked; and destruction, which may occur where the other two outcomes are impossible and the stakes are very high. We might hypothesize:

- 7.1 If an agency's substantive and institutional decisions tend to reinforce one another over time, those actors whose orientations are counter to those of the agency will tend to withdraw or be excluded from the agency's political system; in extreme cases, they may be destroyed.

In the long run, whether (and how) the existence of a new agency alters the patterns of influence in an ongoing functional field depends on its organizational effectiveness and the openness of its political procedures. In order to conclude that these patterns

have changed because some set of actors is exerting influence through the new agency, we must be able to show that the outcomes of public decision-making have changed, that these changes serve the interests of some set of actors, that the new agency is successfully participating in public decision-making, and that there is some casual connection between the agency's actions and the fact that they serve the interests of some group of actors. In other words, we must determine what sets of circumstances we would consider to be evidence of the exercise of political influence, bearing in mind Wolfinger's warning that "those who profit from governmental decisions often do not do so by virtue of their political activity or reputed political power."³³

The possible combinations of organizational effectiveness and political procedure may be represented as follows:

		<u>Effectiveness</u>	
		High	Low
Political Procedures	Open	1	2
	Closed	3	4

The first combination, that of high effectiveness and open political procedures, represents the ideal of democratic government. Under this set of conditions, we should expect the agency's constituents to prevail in its decision making. We should also expect to be able to show the connection between the constituents' attempts to influence the agency and the agency's actions.

Although this combination of open procedures and organizational effectiveness is theoretically appealing, it may be an unstable combination. If maintenance of open political procedures is costly and disruptive of the internal functioning of the agency, adherence to such procedures might eventually undermine the agency's effectiveness. Moreover, we might expect a certain instability in the agency's substantive policy stemming from the openness of its procedures. In a functional field such as transportation planning, where there is a great deal of confusion about the goals of public action, the desires of the agency's constituency may change with great frequency. If there are no buffers between the agency and its constituents, open political procedures may lead to ineffectiveness because the agency can never pursue any one goal long enough to accomplish anything.

The second combination--that of open political procedures and low effectiveness--would typically lead to a situation in which the agency's anticonstituents (or whoever was making decisions before it was founded) would retain control of effective decision making. The agency would be responsive to the desires of its constituents, but, since it would be ineffective, this responsiveness would only lead to frustration for both the agency and the constituents.

We would expect this combination to be unstable: the agency's lack of effectiveness would eventually make its openness meaningless, since its constituents would finally lose patience and "invest" their political resources elsewhere. In this case, we should expect the agency's constituents to be able to influence the agency--at least to the extent of getting it to express support for their concerns--

but we would not expect them to be able to use the agency to influence decisions of any real importance. Real power would remain in the hands of the anticonstituents, but they would not be said to have influence except to the extent that they were responsible for undermining the agency's effectiveness.

The third combination--that of high effectiveness and closed political procedures--would represent a situation in which the agency possessed dictatorial power. Under conditions of normal organizational development, we might expect this to be a highly stable combination, with the agency's closed political procedures contributing to its organizational strength and its strength aiding it in keeping its procedures closed. In this case, we should expect external actors to have no influence over the agency, but rather the agency to have influence over the external actors. Nevertheless, the interests of external actors might be served; these interests would not be served because the external actors had influence but simply because the interests of external actors happened to coincide with the interests of the agency's dominant coalition. In the long run, this combination of closed procedures and high effectiveness might not be stable, however: if the agency's dominant coalition's interests did not coincide with those of external actors often enough, the result might be intervention by some higher level of government.

The fourth combination--that of closed political procedures and low effectiveness--corresponds to the popular negative image of a bureaucracy--that of an organization neither responsive nor capable of doing anything. In this situation, we should expect the agency's anticonstituents to retain control of effective deci-

sion-making, and its constituents to be doubly frustrated. Again, however, we would not hold that this situation resulted from the influence of the anticonstituents unless we could show that the agency's lack of effectiveness stemmed from their activities.

This combination would appear to be stable under conditions of normal organizational development. Such an agency might be regarded as a waste of resources, but, since it would not really threaten anyone, it might well survive. If it did, there might be some possibility that it would in time develop either greater effectiveness or greater openness (or both); this, however, would appear to be unlikely.

It would seem that the only way the constituents of a new agency could have any real influence through it would be for the agency to be granted a great deal of formal power (thus giving it enough organizational strength to preserve its effectiveness in its early existence) and for the agency's leaders to possess both a willingness to take risks and a dedication to the ideals of open decision making. Although it is not impossible for such a combination to exist, it seems unlikely. A far more likely way for an external actor to protect his interests would be to arrange the creation of an effective, but closed, agency whose interests coincided with his own. Such an actor would exercise great care and diligence in trying to get the right kind of agency created, but would not subsequently try to influence its everyday affairs. We might offer the proposition that:

- 7.2 An agency's constituents can have real influence through it only if the agency is effective and its political procedures are open; nevertheless a lack

of direct influence need not preclude the possibility that an effective, but closed, agency will serve the interests of its constituents.

The position of an anticonstituent is somewhat different. Although it might be possible for an anticonstituent to influence an effective agency to take a policy direction counter to that desired by its original constituents, this would seem unlikely; rather, the interests of anticonstituents are served by the agency's ineffectiveness, and the resources of anticonstituents are most likely to be employed in either undermining the agency's political resources or in attempting to destroy the self-confidence of its leaders. We might offer the proposition that:

- 7.3 Since the interests of an agency's anticonstituents can be achieved if the agency is rendered ineffective, anticonstituents are more apt to try to undermine the agency's effectiveness than to try to influence its substantive policy.

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CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES

Chapter 2 presented a model of the workings of political influence in transportation planning. In that model, the substantive outcomes of the planning process were viewed as the result of a complex set of factors including the positions and political resources of actors participating in the planning process, the structure and procedures of the agency making the decisions (its "political mechanism"), and the behavior (both internal and external) of organizations faced with problems of survival and stability. Chapter 3 is intended as a bridge between the model and the case studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5. This chapter describes the set of political actors who participated in the MTC planning process, the initial distribution of political resources among these actors, MTC's formal domain, and the formal characteristics of its structure and procedures.

A. The Actors

Transportation planning in the recent past has attracted the political participation of a wide variety of individuals and groups. There has been considerable variation from time to time and place to place in the degree of participation by particular types of individuals and groups. In MTC's case, there was heavy involvement from individual state and local elected officials, implementing agencies, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the environmental movements, civic groups, neighborhood groups, and several other regional agencies. There was somewhat less involvement by the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, regional agencies which had little interest in transportation, and the state legislature. Types of private groups which have played a prominent role in transportation planning elsewhere, but which showed comparatively little interest in MTC, included civil-rights and anti-poverty groups, organized labor, the academic community, business associations such as chambers of commerce (except in isolated cases), and the non-governmental members of the so-called "highway lobby" (contractors, materials suppliers, auto clubs, trucking associations, auto and oil companies, and the like). Most of these groups had some direct involvement - and perhaps even more indirect involvement - but they either did not regard MTC's activities as being relevant to their interests or else were not geared to participate in politics at the regional level.

Actors may be classified as being either within MTC's immediate sphere of action or outside of it; those classified as being within the immediate sphere may be classified as either internal actors or external actors.*

1. Actors within MTC's Immediate Sphere of Activity

Internal Actors.

The internal actors include the Commission itself and the MTC staff. In terms of their substantive and institutional orientations, neither the Commission nor the staff was homogeneous. The bulk of the Commission is chosen by the local governments of the Bay Area by a process which will be described later (see page 163). This means that most commissioners are themselves local officials and share the

* See Chapter 2, page 53.

concerns of the local governments. Most commissioners tend to view transportation planning in terms of local impacts of transportation projects (both positive and negative) and geographical equity. This group of commissioners tends to be conservative in its institutional orientation - indeed, it is rumored that several members of the commission actually opposed its creation. On the other hand, several of the more active commissioners consider themselves to be "regionalists." Although this group advocates stronger regional government, its substantive orientations are rather conservative. In addition, its members sometimes vacillate between their belief that transportation planning is a regional problem and a tendency to protect the special interests of the districts they represent, so that the difference between them and the bulk of the Commission is one of degree rather than kind. In addition to these factions, there is a small group of commissioners who consider themselves environmentalists and who seem to be most interested in the local and regional impacts of the transportation system.

One MTC staff faction includes the Executive Staff and several other senior staff members who seem primarily interested in the problem of gradually changing the institutional status quo so that MTC can insert itself into - and perhaps eventually dominate - the Bay Area's transportation decision-making system. The substantive leanings of this faction are not completely clear, but seem to involve the same sort of caution as their institutional orientations. Other staff members are far more opposed to the institutional status quo, and advocate active defense of MTC's formal domain. These other staff factions appear to have stronger substantive orientations than the

Executive Staff, but differ among themselves on matters of substance. One group, including several former BATSC employees, seems to view transportation planning in terms of system-oriented efficiency; another group, which includes many of the younger staff members, seems most interested in the local and regional impacts of the regional transportation system.

External Actors.

The major external actors in MTC's immediate sphere of activity include the so-called implementing agencies - the California Department of Transportation and the major transit operators: BARTD, AC Transit, Muni, Golden Gate, and the Santa Clara County Transit District; local governments; other regional agencies; and the major citizens groups.

Implementing Agencies. The most important of the implementing agencies, in terms of interaction with MTC, was the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Caltrans was officially created on July 1, 1973. Its major component is the old California Division of Highways; in terms of personnel and substantive and institutional policies, there has been almost complete continuity between the two organizations.* Caltrans is a large and complex organization. It consists of a statewide headquarters in Sacramento and

* Since the name change occurred in the middle of the period covered by the case studies, it poses a problem in nomenclature. Normally, references to this organization will use its current official title at the time the events under discussion occurred - that is, in describing events prior to July 1, 1973, it will be referred to as the California Division of Highways; for events subsequent to July 1, 1973, it will be referred to as Caltrans. It should be borne in mind, however, that the organizations are virtually identical.

eleven districts. Traditionally, a great deal of authority was delegated to the Districts, so that the District Engineers (now called District Directors) were perhaps the most powerful figures in the organization - at least in terms of day-to-day decision-making and in terms of planning, resource allocation, and project development activities within their districts. By the early 1970's, however, there had been a number of developments which tended to upset the traditional structure of the Division of Highways/Caltrans organization. On the one hand, California had adopted a planning-programming-budgeting system in the late 1960's, and implementation of this within the Department of Public Works (the Division of Highway's parent organization prior to the creation of Caltrans) led to a move to centralize certain functions - particularly those relating to internal budgeting and to project programming - under a so-called Resources Management System.¹ Meanwhile, the move to regionalize transportation planning in California led to a countervailing tendency to decentralize decision-making and to move some type of decisions which had traditionally been made by the Districts out of Caltrans altogether. Consequently, the Caltrans Districts felt their organizational domains threatened by both the statewide organization and by the regions.

Nowhere does this threat seem to have been more significant than in the Bay Area. Caltrans District 4 roughly corresponds to MTC's jurisdiction. (It includes eight of the nine MTC Counties plus Santa Cruz County, but does not include Solano County.) Of all the Districts, its activities had been perhaps the most controversial, primarily because it had borne the brunt of the San Francisco freeway revolt. Furthermore, it has been faced with more formidable institu-

tional competition than the other districts: on paper at least, MTC is the strongest of the regional transportation planning agencies in California; besides this competition for planning and decision-making functions, District 4 in its role as an implementing agency has had to contend with the Bay Area's transit operators, which despite their fragmentation, play a larger role in urban transportation than those in other parts of the state. Meanwhile, District 4 also had to contend with the movement to centralize the planning and programming functions, with the rivalry (at both the state and District levels) between the units engaged in these functions, with what appears to have sometimes been contradictory guidance and information coming down from Sacramento, and with an organizational turbulence which resulted in numerous reorganizations of the Division of Highways and Caltrans during the transitional period. The atmosphere for District 4 has been one of almost constant crisis - the present District Engineer occupies a job which one newspaper quoted "other Division of Highways engineers" as saying "had literally killed two of his predecessors."²

Because of the extreme threats to its organizational stability, Caltrans' institutional orientations tend to overwhelm its substantive ones. District 4 has been rather strongly oriented toward maintaining the institutional status quo as much as possible - or at least moderating the pace of institutional change. According to Caltrans officials, all shades of substantive opinion may be found in the organization; however, it would appear that the traditional concern with facility-oriented efficiency and geographical equity predominates, with some elements of the organization (such as those involved in

setting up the Resources Management System) favoring system-oriented efficiency.

The major Bay Area mass transit operators also seem primarily concerned with institutional matters, but find themselves in a somewhat more ambiguous position than does Caltrans. On the one hand, MTC has adopted policies favorable to mass transit and the operators see this as a good thing which is likely to lead to increased funding; on the other hand, they wish to preserve their independence, and look on MTC's interest in coordination of mass transit operations as unwelcome interference.

Local Governments. For the most part, the local governments in the Bay Area are also interested in preserving the institutional status quo. The idea of regional government is a fairly old one in the Bay Area; but despite occasional lip service to it, the local governments have never accepted it. This means that among local officials there is a considerable undercurrent of hostility to any regional agency. MTC must constantly face criticism that it is infringing on "home rule"; in particular, local governments are very concerned with the distinction between local and regional transportation issues, and are constantly trying to exclude MTC from a role in decisions on the grounds that they involve local questions. On matters of substance, the local governments are divided. The majority still concern themselves with the local impacts of transportation projects, and tend to look on increased access and population growth as good things. They are also quite jealous of one another, and are consequently quite concerned with geographical equity. A minority of the local governments, however, is questioning the old attitude that growth at any price is

good. In some cases these local governments have actually tried to restrict land development and population growth. In its dealings with MTC, this minority among the local governments has tended to be concerned with the local and regional impacts of the transportation system.

Other Regional Agencies. MTC has dealt extensively with three other regional agencies: the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC), and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District.

Historically, a very close relationship had existed between ABAG and BATSC, and to a large extent, this relationship has carried over to MTC. Officially, ABAG holds one seat on the Commission; in practice, MTC commissioners and ABAG Executive Committee members are chosen by the same process (see page 163 for a description of this selection process) and many individuals are members of both bodies. A close working relationship also exists between the staffs of ABAG and MTC. Both organizations are headquartered in the same building, which facilitates informal contact. In addition, there is a formal joint-powers agreement between MTC and ABAG, and the two staffs engage in joint projects, particularly where land use modeling is concerned. In one notable instance (see Chapter 4, page 210) ABAG staff members were actually attached to MTC task forces during the development of the Regional Transportation Plan.

Because of the high degree of overlap in membership, the Commission and the ABAG Executive Committee tend to share the same substantive and institutional concerns. For the most part, the ABAG Executive Committee members are relatively conservative on institu-

tional questions, reflecting the Association's voluntary nature and the negative attitude of many of the local governments toward further regionalization. At the same time, ABAG has officially supported a multi-functional regional planning organization (which would not be voluntary) since 1966 and had occasionally opposed the actions of member governments. In terms of substantive concerns, the ABAG Executive Committee and the Commission reflect the same ideological splits between traditional orientations and concern for the environmental impacts of transportation. The ABAG staff, like the MTC staff, does not altogether share the orientations of its governing body. The ABAG staff members seem keenly aware of ABAG's relative impotence and apparently hoped at one time that MTC would take the lead in attempting to enforce ABAG's land use plan. Substantively, ABAG staff members seem to be strongly impact-oriented. At the time the initial MTC Plan was under consideration, their primary concerns were open space preservation and population growth control.

MTC had considerably less interaction with BCDC and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District than with ABAG. BCDC, like ABAG, is represented by a voting member on the Commission. In addition, interaction between BCDC and MTC is necessary whenever a transportation facility impinges on San Francisco Bay or its shoreline. For the most part, BCDC is concerned with the environmental impacts of the transportation system, but only within its narrow sphere, which includes the Bay and its shoreline. MTC comes in contact with the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District (and through it, the State Air Resources Board) in dealing with the environmental impact of transportation projects and in assessing the overall impact of the transporta-

tion system on air quality. In addition, MTC and the Air Pollution Control District have a joint project to develop mathematical models to relate air quality to transportation. Although these organizations are primarily interested in the impact of the regional transportation system on the regional environment, there was considerable question as to just how much they wanted to see done about it.*

Generally speaking, neither the state nor the regional agency has been as aggressive in seeking improved air quality as has the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

The Press. The Bay Area press was only marginally involved in MTC's planning process. The major metropolitan dailies tend to be only mildly interested in the politics of regional agencies and are not particularly knowledgeable about transportation issues. Coverage of MTC's activities has been sporadic and, in some cases, somewhat inaccurate. In some cases, suburban newspapers have been actively involved in the politics surrounding individual projects, but other than this, there has been little attempt by the press to influence MTC.

Citizens Groups. MTC has also dealt with a very large number of private organizations in the process of preparing and administering its regional transportation plan (over 100 are on record as having participated in the development of the 1973 plan). No more than a handful of these, however, had any appreciable impact on the development of the plan as a whole. Three which certainly did have some

* Indeed, some staff members of the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District have complained to the District Board that the staff management has frustrated them in the efforts to enforce the laws.

overall impact were the Sierra Club, the League of Women Voters, and the San Francisco Bay Area Council. In addition to these, neighborhood associations seem to have had significant impact on decisions about some specific projects.

The Sierra Club was the primary representative of the environmental movement in MTC's planning process. Liaison between the Club and MTC included attendance and presentation of statements by Sierra Club members at both Commission meetings and public hearings and close day-to-day contact between Club members and the MTC staff. Officially, this liaison was handled by the Regional Transportation Committee (RTC) of the Northern California Regional Conservation Committee (NCRCC). NCRCC is composed of representatives of individual Sierra Club chapters and is supposed to act as a policy coordinating group; however, it does not necessarily speak for the individual chapters, and there have been occasions when the two Chapters most concerned with MTC (the San Francisco Bay and Loma Prieta Chapters) have taken positions contrary to those of the NCRCC. In general, the Sierra Club was moderately radical in both its substantive and institutional orientations. It supported (at least initially) vigorous defense and even expansion of MTC's organizational domain, and its substantive policy emphasized the need to control the air pollution and land development impacts of the regional transportation system. The Sierra Club did not officially support stringent anti-automobile measures (although a primary goal of the Club was to reduce use of private automobiles) but did officially suggest a moratorium on freeway construction.

The League of Women Voters, like the Sierra Club, is a complex,

multi-purpose organization; like the Sierra Club, its major liaison with MTC was through a regional coordinating body representing individual chapters; but unlike the Sierra Club, its regional body must clear official positions with the individual chapters. The result is that League positions tend to be more consistent than Sierra Club positions, but are probably more cautious. The League was perhaps most interested in the institutional aspects of the planning process; it has strongly supported regional government and has pressed for vigorous defense of the MTC domain as well as for strict adherence to open decision-making procedures. Substantively, the League shares the Sierra Club's concern with transportation impacts, but has taken somewhat less detailed (and perhaps more moderate) positions on what should be done about them.

The Bay Area Council is composed of heads of major corporations in the Bay Area, but relies on its staff and on "task forces" recruited from outside the Council itself to carry out most of its functions. In its dealings with MTC, the Council has appointed at least three task forces - (1) a Regional Transportation Planning Task Force, which was concerned with the development of the 1973 plan; (2) a Transit Finance Task Force, which has worked with MTC on the development of a financial plan and transit finance legislation; and (3) a task force on maritime policy. The Bay Area Council's primary concern seems to be institutional: it has long been an advocate of a more effective regional government, and hoped that MTC would be a step in that direction. Although the Regional Transportation Planning Task Force did not make recommendations about specific projects, it did express a general interest in the regional impacts of the transportation system.

Other private organizations and individuals involved in the MTC planning process can not be said to have had a discernible impact on the Regional Transportation Plan as a whole. Nevertheless, some did have impact on isolated decisions, and the overall climate of opinion expressed by the participants in the MTC planning process formed an important backdrop for MTC decision-making. Although the opinions expressed were by no means unanimous, the majority were directed toward matters of broad substantive policy, and were concerned with transportation impacts. Considerable pro-transit sentiment was expressed, but attacks on the automobile were even more evident.

2. Actors Outside MTC's Immediate Sphere of Activity.

Major actors outside MTC's immediate sphere of activity included the state legislature, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

The California Legislature.

Although individual legislators have been quite interested in MTC, the legislature as a whole interacts with it only sporadically. Nevertheless, the legislature is a very important actor in the MTC political system, since MTC derives both its legal authority and some of its operating funds from it. In addition, MTC must go to the legislature from time to time for legislation to facilitate implementation of its plan.

The legislature, like MTC itself, is heterogeneous in its orientations toward transportation planning. Several MTC personnel have expressed the opinion that the major legislative attitude toward MTC has been one of indifference - that the legislature as a whole did not know what it was creating in MTC and has paid little attention to

it since. It seems certain that the authors of AB 363, on the other hand, did have definite purposes in mind. Assemblyman John Foran, the principal author of the bill, seems to have intended MTC as a step toward regional government, as an agency which could reorganize and coordinate mass transit operations in the Bay Area, and also as a means of insuring more consideration of the environmental impacts of the transportation system. There also seems to have been some hope that MTC would support attempts to amend Article 26 of the State Constitution to make highway funds available for mass transit, and would oversee the allocation of funds between the modes if such an amendment passed. Finally, some proponents may have hoped to deflect some of the special-district bills relating to transportation that were originating in the Bay Area. At the same time, the state was under pressure from the federal government - specifically UMTA - to replace the ABAG Regional Transportation Planning Committee with something more powerful.* Other legislators were - and are - diametrically opposed to the sorts of substantive and institutional changes implied by AB 363, and have little use for MTC in any form.

The U.S. Department of Transportation.

The U.S. Department of Transportation plays a major role in MTC's affairs by setting guidelines for transportation planning and enforcing compliance with them. The concern of USDOT is basically institutional and procedural: it must certify that the planning process maintained by MTC is in accordance with federal law and adminis-

* The UMTA involvement in MTC's creation and its consequences are more fully discussed in Chapter 4, page

trative regulations. Since such certification affects the flow of federal funds to the region, the power of USDOT to oversee MTC's operations is almost as great as that of the legislature. Federal policy tends to be divided along institutional lines, with the Federal Highway Administration emphasizing the technical aspects of the transportation planning process and UMTA placing stress on the integration of policy-making, financial planning, and regional level screening of capital grant applications. Actual certification evaluation is the responsibility of an Intermodal Planning Group composed of representatives of both agencies, but sharp differences still exist in the criteria used to determine compliance. Although primary liaison between MTC and USDOT has been through the regional UMTA office, MTC has had to try to satisfy both agencies. USDOT has taken comparatively little interest in either MTC's day-to-day activities or its substantive policies, but MTC's response to USDOT conditions for continued certification has had a profound influence on MTC's allocation of internal resources.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been involved with MTC through its efforts to enforce the Clean Air Act of 1970. Because the Bay Area fails to meet federal air quality standards, EPA has the authority to impose Air Quality Plans of its own which contain transportation elements. EPA has made proposals which would have affected the Bay Area transportation system drastically. Inasmuch as local and state authorities have objected to these, EPA has encouraged the state to propose an alternative air quality plan for the Bay Area, and MTC has been involved in preparing the transportation ele-

ment of this plan. Needless to say, EPA's primary interest in the regional transportation planning process is in the impact of the proposed system on air quality.

B. Political Resources

1. Economic Resources.

In Chapter 2, the key economic resource in transportation planning was identified as being control of the operating and project funds of public transportation agencies. In the past, little direct control has been exercised over such funds in California: the implementing agencies as a rule have attempted to gain as much control as possible over funding sources (or at least to insure their predictability) and have been reasonably successful.

The state legislature has the legal authority to determine the uses of state funds and to regulate the collection and allocation of funds by local governments. Through this authority, it can also determine the uses of federal transportation grants (in a negative way at least), since these must be matched by state or local funds. In practice, the legislature does not make detailed transportation fund allocations. To a very large extent, such funds are handled outside the normal appropriation processes, and are allocated according to fixed formulas. The basic allocation of transportation resources in California at the statewide level is not to transportation projects, but to the geo-political subdivisions of the state.* Within the con-

* Officially, the California Highway Commission does make allocations directly to the projects. The formulas fix the minimum amounts to be spent in specified geographical areas, and it is these, rather than the allocations to specific projects, which constitute the fundamental allocation of resources.

straints imposed by these formulas, the real economic power is in the hands of those who dominate the informal processes for setting project priorities.

Prior to the creation of MTC, very different allocation processes were in effect for the different modes. Mass transit allocations were not controlled at the regional level at all: each transit agency had its own source of locally-provided funds, which it allocated internally; federal funds were allocated at UMTA's discretion to projects proposed by the individual agencies. Highway allocations were subject to considerably more control at the regional level. The legislature had delegated the formal power to make highway fund allocations, within the constraints imposed by law, to the California Highway Commission. In practice, decisions about project priorities were made by the Division of Highways at the District level, although the Division respected local wishes in most cases. Priorities within counties were usually determined on an informal basis by local officials and economic interests, and the Division followed these priorities unless there were overriding considerations; normally, such exceptions involved interstate projects or other projects with high federal-state matching rates. Nevertheless, the final decision on project priorities within each district rested with the District Engineer, and he was in a position to exercise considerable discretion, since local interests never saw proposed capital improvement programs until they were submitted to the Highway Commission. Highway funds were sometimes used for political purposes: some members of the legislature had great influence over their expenditure,^{*} and rumor has it that District

^{*} A situation which apparently still exists. See Chapter 5, page

Engineers could (and did) use them to increase their personal influence and that of the Division.

With the establishment of MTC and the passage of SB 325 and AB 69, formal power over transportation fund allocations in the region was transferred to MTC. MTC was directed to draw up a financial plan, to set project priorities, and, after the passage of AB 69, to draw up a capital improvement program. Moreover, MTC has veto powers over all major categories of projects, which should in itself give it control of the allocation of project funds. This particular power, of course, is the one identified in Chapter 2 as most likely to threaten the organizational stability of the implementing agencies. The implementing agencies had been quite successful in the past in incorporating project programming in their domains, so that one obvious question at the time of MTC's creation (and subsequently) was just how - and to just what extent - MTC could actually claim the control of project funds.

MTC's own financial resources are not totally secure. Major sources of MTC operating funds include UMTA and FHWA funds, state highway funds, and, since the passage of SB 325, direct funding by the state from sales tax funds. The FHWA funds are matched by state highway funds, but the state has little discretion in this matter since federal law requires that a certain percentage of the state's total Federal Aid be passed on to local and regional planning agencies, requires that these funds be matched by the state, and further requires that they be allocated to planning agencies in accordance with a formula approved by the Secretary of Transportation. The funds available under SB 325, however, must be appropriated by the legislature on an annual basis and hence are vulnerable. MTC does not have

control over the operating funds of other agencies, except in the case of SB 325 funds, 25 percent of which may be used for transit operating expenses.

2. Technical Resources.

Technical resources identified in Chapter 2 include technical information, knowledge of and experience with accepted methods of analysis, and technical reputation or "technical legitimacy".

There was something of a vacuum in terms of technical resources in the functional areas MTC faced. The technical criteria (both the legally-enforceable Federal guidelines and those proposed by MTC and others involved in its planning process) had changed very rapidly, and in many cases neither research nor data-gathering had been able to keep pace. Consequently, there was a serious lack of both information and accepted methods of analysis, especially where such questions as the regional impacts of the transportation system were concerned.

Within its own sphere, Caltrans is perhaps the strongest actor in terms of technical resources, due to its reputation for technical competence and its virtual monopoly of technical information about the state highway system. For various reasons, the other actors are in considerably weaker positions. The technical staffs of the local public works and planning departments vary in quality from place to place; normally, however, they are small and lack Caltrans' reputation for competence. Transit agencies also tend to have small technical staffs and, with the exception of AC Transit (and perhaps Golden Gate Transit), lack reputations for competence. In the case of Golden Gate Transit and the Santa Clara County Transit District, the organizations

are too new to have really established reputations of any sort, although Golden Gate has made rapid progress with its bus operations; in the case of BARTD, highly-publicized technical problems have diminished the organization's technical reputation; and in the case of Muni, a long-standing reputation for inefficiency and technical conservatism weakens the organization's credibility in professional circles. The MTC staff had - and still has - the potential for superior technical resources; unfortunately, it was assembled in great haste and organized on an ad hoc basis in order to meet the deadline for plan adoption in 1973. As a result, staff members could not be very carefully selected, the staff tended to be young and inexperienced, and internal communications were poor. The result was that MTC began the process of developing the 1973 plan with its technical legitimacy very much in question.

Among the non-governmental actors, the Bay Area Council has perhaps the strongest technical capacity. It has a small but generally well-respected staff. When it chooses to address technical issues, it is fairly influential,* but the size of its staff prevents the Council's technical involvement across the full range of issues. The Sierra Club does not have a technical staff, but does have members from the technical professions who are sometimes called upon to deal with technical issues. The Club has generally been aware of the technical implications of proposals, but has not been taken as seriously on technical matters as has the Bay Area Council. The League of Women Voters appears to have been technically the weakest

* MTC Chairman John Becket actively sought Bay Area Council staff involvement in at least one case. See Chapter 6 , page 426

of the major citizens' groups, lacking both technical staff and any real technical capabilities among the membership.

3. "Pure" Political Resources.

The distribution of "pure" political resources differs considerably from that of economic and technical resources. The impact-oriented non-governmental actors who possess few economic or technical resources are often fairly strong in purely political resources, especially those adapted to an open decision-making process. This is particularly true of groups such as the Sierra Club and the League of Women Voters, which have good public images, many members with considerable rhetorical ability, the ability to command favorable publicity, and the ability to deliver blocks of votes when sufficiently aroused. Many neighborhood groups also possess the ability to deliver votes and, since they tend to side with groups concerned with regional impacts in particular cases, these opponents of proposals thought to have adverse impacts generally have a great deal of power at the polls. On the other hand, the major impact-oriented actors such as the Sierra Club are not well enough organized to control a majority of the local governments in the area; consequently, their ability to deliver votes is of real concern to MTC Commissioners only in isolated cases.

Members of the legislature and the local governments obviously possess open-system political resources as well - they manage to get themselves elected, and this cannot be accomplished solely in the back rooms. Quite often these elected officials possess considerable rhetorical skill and are able to command publicity; their public images may be either good or bad, but they will not remain in office long if they are bad. They are not very likely to command blocks of voters,

however - this is more often a weapon used against them than one they can use.

Bureaucratic organizations of all sorts are less likely to possess the resources important in open political processes than are other actors. They are usually led by persons with no great ability to sway public opinion, and often display ineptness in public relations campaigns. They can command a certain amount of publicity, but they cannot guarantee that it will be favorable; bureaucracy in general tends to have a bad public image. Finally, bureaucrats can rarely deliver votes and in most situations are prohibited by law from openly campaigning in elections. These weaknesses are particularly obvious in the case of Caltrans; ever since the San Francisco freeway revolt it has had an extremely bad press and public image. The same, to a lesser extent, could also be said of some of the transit operators; Muni's public reputation seems to be largely composed of rude drivers, antiquated equipment, and inability to meet schedules; BARTD has slipped from the popularity which carried it through its initial bond election to a public image of gross technical and managerial incompetence. The Environmental bureaucracies - EPA, BCDC, and the Bay Area Air Quality Control District - have fared somewhat better, but have not been able to totally escape from unfavorable publicity. Probably none of these organizations could influence an election without a great deal of outside help. MTC is probably stronger in this respect than the average bureaucratic entity. During the development of the 1973 plan, it displayed considerable ability in its public relations and publicity campaigns; however, its interest in this sort of activity seems to have waned. On the other hand, its staff is

probably no more articulate than any other group of technical bureaucrats, and, with a few exceptions, the commissioners have not shown themselves to be better than the common run of local politicians in generating public attention.

In terms of political resources adapted to behind-the scenes maneuvering, the picture is altogether different. The informal network by which transportation decisions were traditionally made in the Bay Area has already been described. (See Chapter 1, page 36) This network provided the various actors who were members of it with a pre-existing set of contacts with one another and with a thorough knowledge of structure and functioning of one another's organizations. In addition, some of the actors in the old system seem to have accumulated political IOU's with one another. This would seem to be particularly true with Caltrans, which had been able to build up a stock of goodwill among local officials through its past management of the highway program; it also appears to have been true of some of the local officials, who were easily able to persuade members of the legislature to intervene in MTC's affairs in a number of ways.

C. MTC'S Formal Domain

ABA 363 and subsequent legislation (especially SB 325 and AB 69) created a formal domain for MTC which was fairly strong in most areas, but which was somewhat ambiguous in the key area of translation of conceptual planning into specific proposals. It seems likely that MTC was always intended to deal with at least the conceptual basis of the regional transportation system - with "systems-level planning" - but it is not certain whether the legislature intended this systems-level planning to be a purely academic exercise or a practical guide

to action. The process of translating systems-level concepts into specific proposals implied by MTC's enabling legislation seems to have been either poorly thought out or else so compromised in the process of passing the law that it was no longer realistic; as a result, MTC was given enough formal power to interfere in the affairs of the implementing agencies, but not enough to secure its control of the project-development process.

MTC's powers relating to systems-level planning are spelled out in AB 363. They include the explicit instruction to adopt a regional transportation plan by June 30, 1973, which would include, but not be limited to, such major regional subsystems as Interstate highways, transbay bridges, and mass transit systems. AB 363 also instructed MTC to take over the responsibilities and resources of BATSC and the ABAG Regional Transportation Planning Committee - both of which had largely concerned themselves with mathematical modeling and systems-level planning. In addition, MTC was instructed to take the BATSC Plan into consideration in preparing its own plan. Finally, MTC was instructed to determine the region's transportation needs during the ensuing ten years and to propose a financial plan for the regional transportation system which would include "...a proposal for each segment of the system, including the amount and source of revenues necessary to construct and operate that segment."³ Thus, it would appear that the legislature intended that MTC at least propose the magnitude of the overall financial effort and the relative allocation to subsystems; also, the legislation would appear to have established MTC's responsibility for evaluating the financial feasibility of the proposed regional transportation system.

Beyond this point, MTC's formal powers become murky: in order to prepare needs estimates and financial plans, the legislature seems to have assumed that MTC would have to be able to translate its conceptual system into specific projects, whose costs could then be estimated. Accordingly, MTC was also instructed to prepare "... a schedule of priorities for construction, modification, and maintenance of various segments of the regional transportation system on a project basis..."⁴ (emphasis added) to meet the needs identified in MTC's ten-year transportation needs estimate. In addition, AB 69 requires MTC to draw up a capital improvement program for the regional transportation system.⁵ The real question concerns the legal status of the schedule of priorities. MTC was given no further authority to initiate or modify projects except that, with respect to the region's highway system, AB 363 requires the California Highway Commission to "conform to the regional transportation plan" in allocating construction funds unless there is an overriding statewide interest in not doing so.⁶ There is some dispute between MTC and Caltrans as to whether this requirement to "conform to" the MTC plan obligates Caltrans to initiate and modify projects at MTC's behest. Otherwise, MTC's only real means of enforcing its schedule of priorities is negative, and comes at the end of the project development process: it does have the authority to make the final decision on project implementation.

Even this veto power is somewhat ambiguous. AB 363 provides that, subsequent to the adoption of the RTP, no transbay bridge or multi-county rapid transit system employing exclusive right-of-way shall be constructed without MTC's approval - with certain stated exceptions,

including the Dumbarton Bridge, the Southern Crossing, and the completion of the first stage of the BART system. Furthermore, MTC approval is required for all projects proposed by local governments or transportation districts which involve state or federal funds, except those constructed with funds derived from Motor Vehicle License Tax Law subventions to local governments.⁷ Conspicuous by its absence from this list of project veto powers is any power over state highway projects, although the provision requiring the California Highway Commission to conform to MTC's Plan and schedule of priorities unless an ill-defined "overriding statewide interest" exists might be interpreted as excluding low-priority state highway projects or state highway projects omitted from MTC's Plan. Nevertheless, MTC gained practical veto power over almost all transportation projects in the region soon after it was created when ABAG delegated to MTC its A-95 review authority over projects involving federal transportation grants. This review authority does not constitute an absolute veto, since the final decision in such cases rests with the federal government, but it would appear that the federal government wanted MTC to have this power, and could normally be expected to sustain a finding by MTC that a project was incompatible with the Regional Transportation Plan.

The problem that this poses for MTC in translating systems-level concepts into specific action is that, first of all, MTC has no means of advancing the priority of a project, nor of even insuring that a project goes forward at all, unless the agency that is to implement it wants it to. Furthermore, MTC's negative powers are greatly diluted by its lack of formal authority to substitute projects it favors

for those planned by implementing agencies and local governments: an implementing agency or local government is perfectly within its legal rights to conduct its project development in such a way that only the projects it wants to implement are ready for implementation at any given time. This means that MTC can be confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it situation for particular projects - where what must be taken or left is not so much the project itself as the funding with which the projects was to have been accomplished. AB 363 granted MTC no allocative powers: these were retained by the state legislature, although MTC's financial plan was not bound to follow the existing legal restrictions on the expenditure of funds from particular sources, and MTC was instructed to "recommend appropriate legislation to the Legislature" in order to secure adequate financing for its proposed regional transportation system.⁸ Later, with the passage of SB 325, MTC was given some authority to allocate Transportation Development Act funds among transit operators. The act provides that:

The Commission may, on its own motion, arbitrate differences (1) between the various applicants, (2) between an applicant and a city or county regarding the costs of services, and (3) between the various entities within the region regarding priorities and the order that various improvements are to be made.

This power of allocation is far from absolute, however; sales tax imposed by SB 325 is technically a local tax, imposed and collected by Eden County, so that MTC can actually allocate only among competing applicants within a single county,

MTC's powers of education and advocacy are not set forth to any great extent by the laws governing the Commission. The Commission

has always considered public education - or propagandizing - to be a legitimate function, and it engaged in such activities to a considerable extent during the process of developing the initial plan. With respect to advocacy before other governmental bodies, the legislation is more specific, directing MTC to provide advice on certain matters. One of these was the financial plan and any legislation necessary to implement it; another was the instruction, contained in AB 69, that all regional transportation planning agencies should submit a report to the State Department of Transportation by January 1, 1974, containing, among other things, "recommendations concerning relationships between the transportation planning agency and the department." ¹⁰

D. MTC as a Political Mechanism

Major features of the political mechanism, as identified in Chapter 2, include MTC's organizational structure and its decision-making procedures.

1. Structure.

Major features of the structure of a transportation planning agency, as identified in Chapter 2, include the basis of representation and method of selection of the governing body, the internal organization of the governing body, and the organization of the staff.

MTC consists of 16 voting members and (potentially) 3 non-voting members. Fourteen of the voting members are selected by local governments. In the larger counties - San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, San Mateo, and Santa Clara - there are two representatives, one selected by the Board of Supervisors and one by a committee composed of the mayors within the county (except in the case of San Francisco, where the mayor appoints one commissioner directly). In the smaller counties - Marin,

Napa, Solano, and Sonoma - the Mayors' Selection Committee submits the names of three nominees to the Board of Supervisors, which makes a selection among them.

The original version of AB 363 had called for "City Selection Committees" composed of the mayors (or city managers in cities which have no mayor) and city councils of the cities in the respective counties; the amendment changing this to Mayors' Selection Committees had the effect of making the MTC selection process more nearly parallel to that of the ABAG Executive Committee. It is doubtful that this amendment had any great effect on the behavior of the Commission, since the designation of the county as the basic unit of representation and the specification of an appointment process involving local governments rather than direct election seem to be the crucial features of the Commission's structure. It did, however, make it likely that both MTC and ABAG would be controlled by the same group of local officials, and this may have affected the position of the commissioners within their own counties.

In addition to the direct representatives of the local governments, ABAG and BCDC each appoint one voting member to the Commission. Non-voting members include a representative of Caltrans (originally of the Secretary for Business and Transportation) and representatives of the U.S. Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, if they agree to appoint one.

Internally, the Commission is organized into six committees: an Executive Committee, a Grant Review and Allocations Committee (GR & AC), Public Information and Legislative Affairs Committee, Work Program Committee (WPC) (later renamed the Plan Review Committee (PRC)),

Finance Committee, and Personnel Committee. In addition, individual commissioners serve on the Boards of Control of special planning studies. This committee structure pre-dates the 1973 Plan and has been changed, when necessary, by expanding and redefining the functions of existing committees rather than by creating or abolishing committees.

The most important of the standing committees are the Work Program (now Plan Review) Committee and the Grant Review and Allocations Committee. The Work Program Committee is concerned to some extent with staff organization and preparation of the Work Program, but its major function is overseeing the development and revision of the Regional Transportation Plan. The Grant Review and Allocations Committee reviews applications for federal and state fund grants and makes recommendations to the Commission concerning their approval and allocates funds under SB 325. Of the other standing committees, two - the Finance and Personnel Committees - deal with internal matters. The Public Information and Legislative Affairs Committee is concerned with liaison between MTC and the legislature and the public. The Executive Committee provides overall coordination.

Staff organization has undergone fundamental changes since publication of the 1973 Plan. Prior to the beginning of serious work on the Plan in the summer of 1972, the MTC staff had been extremely small; staff expansion and organization proceeded simultaneously with the early development of the concept of the Plan in the period between (roughly) July and December, 1972. Although the concept of the Plan, as it emerged during this period, emphasized political decisions concerning transportation "issues," the formal organization of the staff seems to have been suited more to traditional transportation planning

activities such as mathematical modeling (see Chart 1).

The 1973 Plan was actually written by task forces. The composition of these task forces, which was a major factor in determining the substance of the 1973 Plan, is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Subsequent to the publication of the 1973 Plan, the formal organization of MTC's staff changed to more closely reflect the concept of regional transportation planning that the agency had developed. Under the new scheme (see Chart 2) responsibility for Plan revisions rests mainly with the Transportation Planning and Analysis Division and the Implementation Planning Division, while reports to the Grant Review and Allocations Committee are handled by the Resources Management Division. (Of the other two line divisions, one is concerned with internal affairs and the other with special projects.)

A major feature of the internal organization of both the staff and the commission is the relationship between the elements primarily concerned with the Plan and those primarily concerned with grant reviews. The Grant Review and Allocations Committee and the Resources Management Division have always been fairly independent of the rest of the Commission and staff. This is particularly true in the case of grant review actions involving minor projects, since these have never been specifically incorporated into the Plan. In these cases, staff recommendations are the responsibility of the Resources Management Division and the final decision rests with the GR & AC.* In the case

* Under the Implementation Procedures adopted in 1974, a formal division is made between projects considered to be of sufficient regional importance to require review by the entire commission and those which may be directly approved by the GR & AC. See page for details of these procedures.




CHART 1.

MTC ORGANIZATION CHART
FEBRUARY 15 - DECEMBER 1, 1973





CHART 2.

MTC ORGANIZATION CHART

SUBSEQUENT TO DECEMBER 1, 1973.

of major grant review actions (such as those described in Chapter 5) the tendency so far has been for the staff to produce special reports. These are normally the responsibility of the Implementation Planning Division, assisted by the Transportation Planning and Analysis Division where mathematical modeling or environmental assessments are involved. In such cases, major decisions about staff reports and recommendations are often made at the Executive Staff level. The GR & AC reviews these staff recommendations and sometimes modifies them.

The Resources Management Division and GR & AC, in turn, have had some influence over the Plan. This influence has primarily been confined to the parts dealing with plan implementation - Section VI in 1973 and the Plan Implementation Procedures which replaced it in 1974 - but the chairman of the GR & AC also sits with the WPC when it is considering Plan amendments.

There has been some feeling among MTC's citizen constituency that MTC does not intend to enforce its own plan.* To some extent, this may be the result of loose interpretations of the policy sections of the RTP by the GR & AC in "minor" grant review actions. On the whole, however, it would appear that any gap between policy and specific implementation decisions is not primarily the result of any separation of functions or lack of communication within MTC but rather of a general inability or unwillingness on the Commission's part to translate the policy sections into specific action: the same gap between policy and implementation proposals that manifests itself in the grant review actions also exists within the Plan itself.

* See Chapter 6

2. Procedures.

In Chapter 2, decision-making procedures were classified as either "open" or "closed." Major features of "open" decision-making procedures include decision-making by politically-responsible actors in open session, formal citizen participation programs, direct access by the public to the staff, and a well-defined "due process" for decision-making. On paper, MTC's procedures incorporated most of these features. The degree to which such procedures can be maintained in practice was discussed extensively in Chapter 2, and will be the subject of analysis in subsequent chapters. The purpose of the following account is to set forth what MTC's procedures were supposed to be; discussion of what they actually were will be reserved for the main body of the case studies and analyses in Chapters 4 through 6.

MTC's formal division of labor emphasizes decision-making by the commission's committees. The staff's role in this formal division of labor is envisioned as advisory: the staff develops alternative courses of action and technical information for the committees, and the committees make their decisions based on the possibilities developed by the staff. Taggart and Jones quote MTC Deputy Director Paul Bay as saying, "engineers should better understand and work with the political process, providing sound technical information to policy-makers including information on all consequences..., but not trying to supplant the policy-maker's judgment with our own." ¹¹ This is probably close to the "official" staff view of its role. In theory, the staff brings its technical information and alternatives to the committees; the committees debate the alternatives and produce a policy proposal; then the full commission either approves the proposal or

sends it back to the committee for more work.

During the development of the 1973 Plan, MTC had a policy of free public access to the staff. Several groups, most notably the Sierra Club, took advantage of this policy, and practically worked alongside the staff while it was preparing the early drafts of the plan. In addition to these contacts at MTC headquarters, staff members had numerous other informal contacts with individuals and groups in the community.

Besides the policy of free access to the staff, MTC maintained formal contacts with local governments, other agencies, and the public.

Formal public access to the planning process during the writing of the 1973 RTP was provided by a "Community Affairs" Program. This consisted of a "Regional Transportation Symposium" in San Francisco, on December 2, 1972; fifteen "town meetings" held in various places in the region between January 10 and April 19, 1973; and four "public meetings" - actually hearings on the Draft Plan - held at San Francisco, Oakland, Novato, and San Jose in mid-June. In addition, MTC announced that it would reproduce and circulate to the commissioners and technical staff all written opinions received by the Community Affairs Office, and that time would be allotted at Commission and WPC meetings for public comment.

At the beginning of the planning process, the Community Affairs Office sent letters to major Bay Area organizations thought to have an interest in regional affairs, inviting them to appoint liaison representatives. Otherwise, however, MTC tried to avoid giving special treatment to non-public interest groups and specifically refused to form a permanent citizens advisory committee. The major reasons given

for this policy were:

...(1) [T]he Commission does not want to appear to work exclusively with one group, 2) the Commission does not want a singular special interest group to take control, and 3) the Commission does not wish to put themselves in the situation of having a citizens group demanding equal voting rights with the Commission. 12

Meanwhile, the relationship between MTC and the agencies and local governments was developing along different lines. To some extent, liaison with these organizations was handled through official groups, such as the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and the Transit Coordinating Council (TCC) - not to be confused with the later Traffic Control Committee, also known as the TCC; more commonly, however, communication resulted from direct contacts between staff members or through official correspondence.

As set forth by the 1973 Plan, MTC's plan administration procedures were not well-defined. These procedures were contained in Section VI of the Plan, and were written in considerable haste; as a result, a number of important points were left uncertain.

The most important features of MTC's plan administration procedures are the grant application review and approval procedures, the plan amendment procedures, and the relationship between these two. By law and interagency agreement, MTC is required to review practically all transportation projects and programs in the regions that involve either state or federal funding. These reviews must normally include two findings by the Commission in order for the grant to be approved: (1) that the project conforms to the Plan and (2) that all applicable laws and regulations relating to procedural matters - those requiring Environmental Impact Statements or Reports, public hearings, housing relocation and the like - have been complied with. The Commission

has little latitude with respect to the latter type of review, since the requirements are quite specific - but these are matters of procedure rather than substance. On the substantive question of whether the project conforms to the Plan, the Commission has almost unbounded discretion.

The major factor in determining the freedom of the GR & AC and the Commission to approve projects, then, has been the extent to which the Plan has specified which projects may be considered for implementation. The 1973 Plan assigned proposals to four "categories" which were related to MTC's assessment of their desirability and readiness for implementation.* As originally conceived, there would have been a direct relationship between the categories and the sorts of action the Commission could have taken with regard to individual projects: of the four categories, only projects in Category I would have been eligible for immediate implementation. Although this interpretation remained implicit in the 1973 Plan, it was not made explicit in any of the later versions of Section VI. Nevertheless, precedents set in the Napa Bridge and Dumbarton Bridge cases (See Chapter 5, pages 323 to 331 and 337 to 350 .) would seem to indicate that the Commission did consider Category I status necessary for project approval. The review procedures established by the 1973 Plan called for staff recommendations on all grant applications to be sent to the GR & AC. The GR & AC was then to formulate comments on the application

* The exact meaning of the categories was subject to much confusion. See Chapter 4, pages 207 through 226 for a description of the development of the category system and the shifts in meaning that the categories underwent. By the time the 1973 Plan was adopted, the categories were supposed to be primarily descriptive, rather than evaluative, and were supposed to represent readiness for implementation.

and forward them to the full Commission with a recommendation for approval or disapproval. In all cases, the final decision rested with the full Commission.

If the 1973 Plan were taken to mean that only Category I projects could be approved, Plan amendment procedures were also an integral part of the project approval process. As set forth in Section VI of the 1973 Plan, the amendment procedures required that after March 1, 1974, regular amendments would be made on an annual basis. All regular amendments were to be submitted to the WPC by March 1; the WPC was then to review them and report them to the full Commission beginning with the first meeting in April. The Commission might then act on them at any time between May 1 and June 30. Approval of regular amendments required a simply majority of all voting members of the Commission (that is, nine votes). In exceptional circumstances, however, the Commission might consider emergency amendments. These circumstances included the following:

- 1....[T]he project/program/facility funding would be jeopardized by time factors associated with the normal amendment procedures.
2. In response to a natural, social, or environmental disaster.
3. In response to new evidence presented to the MTC. ¹⁴

Adoption of such emergency amendments required a two-thirds majority of all voting members or eleven votes. In the interim period between adoption of the Plan and March 1, 1974, amendments could be adopted on thirty days notice by a two-thirds majority of the commissioners present and voting.

If the plan amendment procedures were interpreted to require Category I status for any project prior to the approval of a grant application for it, it would have been very difficult to approve a

project on short notice after the regular amendment procedure went into effect; indeed, it would appear that this is what was intended - an orderly procedure which would prevent projects from being rammed through MTC reviews with inadequate consideration.

The 1974 revisions to the Plan were designed not only to clarify procedures left vague by the 1973 Plan, but also to make it easier for MTC to approve projects. The key change was the deletion of most of Section VI from the Plan. In its place, MTC adopted a document entitled Metropolitan Transportation Commission's Regional Transportation Plan Implementation Procedures.¹⁵ The Implementation Procedures, not being a part of the Plan, are specifically exempt from the "policies and procedures established for formal revisions to the Regional Transportation Plan."¹⁶ This would appear to mean that they can be amended at any time by a majority of the members present and voting. As originally proposed by the Resource Management Division of the MTC staff and passed by the GR & AC and WPC, the amendment procedures would have been included in the Implementation Procedures. This would have meant that the amendment procedures themselves would have been easier to change than the Plan and thus would have been practically meaningless. At the last minute, the Commission discovered this, removed the amendment procedures from the Implementation Procedures, and restored them to the Plan as a revised version of Section VI.

Otherwise, the major procedural change contained in the 1974 revision was the deletion of the issue categorization system. In place of this device, the 1974 revision relies almost exclusively on a ten-year capital improvement program and a three-year "Plan Implementation

Budget" (PIB) to express project priorities. Under the 1974 procedures, the Commission need only find that a project is generally in compliance with the Plan and that it is contained in the PIB in order to declare a grant application in conformity with the Plan.

Under normal conditions, additions to the PIB and the ten-year capital improvement program would take place as part of the annual revision of the Plan. Although the procedures hint (but do not state explicitly) that a project must be on the capital improvement program before it can be placed in the PIB, additions to the PIB (or reprogramming of items already in it) may be made by the full Commission at any time - presumably by a majority of the members present and voting. Where changes amount to less than \$5 million, and involve projects of the same mode, the GR & AC may proceed to alter the first-year PIB without full commission approval, provided all project documentation requirements have been met. Revisions to the ten-year capital improvement program still require plan amendment, and may be made annually by a simple majority of the voting members or as emergency amendments by a two-thirds majority.

The grant application review process was also revised to give the GR & AC more power over routine decisions. Under the 1974 procedures, the staff is supposed to classify grant applications as being for Commission Review or Staff Administrative Review. This classification is to be based on guidelines established for determining the extent of MTC's regional interest or concern, but any individual commissioner may demand a Commission Review in cases in which the staff has designated a project as being for staff review. For projects designated for Staff Administrative Review, the staff presents recommendations to

the GR & AC and the GR & AC acts on the application. For projects designated for Commission Review, the staff presents comments and recommendations to the GR & AC. The GR & AC reviews the comments and makes recommendations to the full commission, which then acts on the application.

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CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES OF MAJOR MTC DECISIONS, PART I: CREATION,
INITIAL ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING, AND INITIAL PLANNING PHASES

Previous chapters have introduced a model of political influence in transportation planning and have described certain aspects of the MTC political system in terms of the elements of the model. Chapters 4 and 5 present an account of major events involving MTC from its establishment in September, 1970, through the end of 1974. This narrative is organized according to the major stages in the life of a new transportation planning agency suggested in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 covers MTC's creation, its period of initial organization and staffing, and its initial planning effort, which culminated in the publication of a Regional Transportation Plan in June, 1973. Chapter 5 covers the initial implementation period between mid-1973 and the end of 1974. Subsequent chapters will test the model developed in Chapter 2 against the actual behavior of the MTC political system.

A. Creation.

MTC was created by Assembly Bill 363, which was passed by the California Legislature in September, 1970. The specific provisions of this bill, which was sponsored by Assemblyman John Foran of San Francisco, were derived from a number of sources.

The first of these was the BATSC report. BATSC had recommended that a multifunctional Bay Area Regional Organization (BARO) be established and that this organization include a transportation department; in the event no comprehensive agency could be established, BATSC recommended a "Metropolitan Transportation Agency" (MTA). The responsi-

lities of this agency were to include continuing planning studies of the transportation system and review and comment on all major transportation projects in the region. In addition, BATSC recommended that a separate transportation system composed of facilities of regional significance be drawn up; this was to include Bay Crossings, Rapid Transit Systems, and a system of "Metropolitan Highways," which would be made up of elements of the existing state and local highway systems. BATSC recommended that the MTA have full power to approve projects and allocate funds for this system and even that it should have direct responsibility for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the regional system - which would have meant, among other things, that the proposed agency would absorb such existing agencies as BARTD and the Golden Gate Bridge District. BATSC proposed that if no BARO was formed, the MTA be an appointive body, with the members selected by the region's state Assemblymen and by ABAG.¹

The major purpose of this agency, as BATSC conceived of it, was to be the coordination of transportation activities in the region.

BATSC declared:

[The study group] fully appreciates the work that has been done [by existing agencies] and the successes that have resulted. Nonetheless, it must conclude that present arrangements are not adequate to meet future requirements. The coordination of different modes and subsystems of transportation, the need for greater balance in the overall system, and the recognition of interrelationships between transportation goals and other social, economic, and environmental goals - all require a broader framework for decision-making on a regional basis than any voluntary arrangements under present institutions can provide. A "systems approach" dealing with all facets of transportation planning, including implementation, is needed.²

The report further stated that:

The chief purpose to be served by comprehensive regional transportation planning is coordination of many separate programs and practices within a larger policy framework, based on a broad

assessment of the region's transport requirements, and allowing for interrelationships between all transport modes and between transport and environmental and socio-economic goals.³

Although BATSC attributed the need for a permanent regional transportation agency to the need for coordination on a regional scale, the report did not state in detail why "present arrangements" were "not adequate to meet future requirements." Instead, it gave examples of the sorts of coordination problems the new agency might be able to resolve. These were all distinctly sub-regional in scope, involving such matters as coordination in the Golden Gate (San Francisco-Marina-Sonoma) corridor and the proposed San Mateo County rapid transit extension.⁴

Besides the coordination issue, BATSC and other local actors seem to have been concerned about environmental issues and the sort of intergovernmental problems encountered in the San Francisco freeway revolt. Both of these concerns were to be reflected in AB 363.

BATSC had expressed concern (in the passages quoted above) for the interrelationship between transportation goals and "social, economic, and environmental goals."* Other local actors involved in the movement for a regional transportation agency went farther, and seemed to feel that that would be the primary purpose of any such agency. John C. Beckett, later to become MTC's second Chairman, remarked in April, 1970, that:

*To some extent, this concern may be attributed to the existence of federal laws and guidelines on the subject. The exact wording "social, economic, and environmental" goals or impacts is directly parallel to that of certain federal requirements.

It is my observation that much of the interest in regional transportation control stems from its potential to effect a practical plan for preservation of open space, better land use, control of future development and the elimination of air pollution.⁵

Such concerns were reflected in language in AB 363 which required that in developing the Regional Transportation Plan, MTC should consider (among other things):

The ecological, economic, and social impact of existing and future regional transportation systems upon various facets of the region, including, but not limited to housing, employment, recreation, environment, land use policies, and the economically disadvantaged.⁶

BATSC's concern with the intergovernmental problems brought to light by the San Francisco freeway revolt expressed itself in the suggestion that one of the functions of the proposed agency should be to:

...[S]ummon to a public hearing and city or county, or city and county, which declines to enter into a freeway agreement for any Metropolitan Highway (or State Highway) or segment thereof, and order it to show cause why such agreement has been declined. Written findings, based on any such hearing, shall be disseminated to the public.⁷

Foran was apparently concerned about the same issue, and remained concerned even after the passage of AB 363. One observer's "understanding" of Foran's motives for proposing certain amendments to AB 69 was that:

[Foran] felt that the freeway agreement procedure...was unsatisfactory, both because he felt that freeways were being forced on cities against their desire under threat of dumping traffic on surface streets...and also because he appreciated the problem of connectivity in the system....⁸

When the time came to draw up AB 363, however, this issue was not really resolved. MTC was not given direct power to veto state highway projects, nor was it given any powers to compel local governments to sign freeway agreements (nor even the sort of propagandizing function BATSC seems to

have envisioned.) Moreover, MTC's own position with respect to the California Highway Commission and the Division of Highways was left uncertain: AB 363 declared that the Highway Commission must "conform to" the Regional Transportation Plan and MTC's schedule of priorities in allocating funds except when there is an "overriding statewide interest" in not doing so, but Foran himself said at the time of the bill's passage that "[MTC] could not tell the State Highway Commission what to do about highway and freeway planning, but it could advise - and we think its advice would be heeded."⁹

Although that main lines of MTC are visible in the BATSC proposal and the other local initiatives of the period, the agency actually created differed from that proposed by BATSC in several important features. The suggestion that the MTA should engage in construction, operation, and maintenance of a regional transportation system seems never to have received serious consideration; indeed, no system of specifically regional facilities were ever drawn up or authorized by the legislature. Also, the suggestion that the Commission's members should be selected by the region's Assemblymen and ABAG was rejected in favor of a selection process controlled by the region's cities and counties.

Although AB 363 was to some extent the result of initiatives by BATSC and other local actors, both the bill's timing and many of its specific provisions were directly related to federal policy.

Although USDOT and HUD do not have legal authority to dictate that form planning agencies will take, they do have to certify that regional planning processes are in accordance with federal law in order for metropolitan regions to receive federal funds for either transportation planning or specific projects (see Chapter 3, page 149). The certification

procedures allow the federal agencies considerable latitude in imposing sanctions non-compliance with federal laws and regulations and consequently give them a great deal of leverage in influencing the sort of planning institutions set up by the states. In the case of the Bay Area and MTC, the Urban Mass Transit Administration (at that time a part of HUD) seems to have felt that the existing institutional arrangements were ineffective, and used the threat of decertification not only to encourage the establishment of an agency with statutory powers but also to insure that ABAG's grant review powers over federal transportation projects would be transferred to it.

The special situation which prompted this UMTA action was the fragmentation of the Bay Area's mass transit operations. When efforts to achieve voluntary coordination proved frustrating, UMTA seems to have turned to the idea of a local agency with sufficient power to force the transit operators to cooperate. UMTA apparently felt that the ABAG Regional Transportation Planning Committee lacked sufficient power and consequently favored the establishment of MTC.

Passage of the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1970 placed UMTA in a position to exert a great deal of pressure on local and state authorities; for the first time, UMTA was managing large capital grants, which increased the importance of its certification actions. In the case of the Bay Area, the threat of decertification by UMTA was even more alarming than in most metropolitan areas because BART (in particular) was in a position to use large sums of federal money immediately.

Although it is difficult to establish a direct connection between the establishment of MTC and threats of decertification by UMTA, establishment of a statutory agency definitely was encouraged by federal

officials, and the legislature was aware of this. One newspaper account at the time of AB 363's passage quoted Foran as saying "...Washington was very much in favor of the change, since ABAG had no teeth, no power to make anyone listen to it..."¹⁰ MTC Executive Director Paul Watt has confirmed that there were threats on the part of federal officials to refuse full certification to the region unless an agency stronger than the ABAG Regional Transportation Planning Committee were established and that these threats were "in the background" when the legislature passed the bill. Former MTC Chairman Joseph P. Bort, likewise, has said that Class A certification was one major effect that MTC's existence has had on the region's transportation system - that there might have been a "substantial delay" in full certification had MTC not been created, although the federal government might eventually have certified ABAG.

Passage of AB 363 did not immediately end the certification crisis. ABAG applied for full certification in October, 1970, and was refused by UMTA on the grounds that ABAG had not indicated "what mechanism now exists" for "unified or coordinated operation of a mass transit system" and that there was a lack of detail in the Transit Improvement Program submitted by ABAG.¹¹ There seems also to have been concern about the type of relationship that would exist between MTC and ABAG, with the federal government anxious to have MTC clearly in control of transportation planning. It was only after ABAG formally transferred its review powers over federal transportation projects to MTC and MTC came to an agreement with UMTA about its work program that full certification was restored. At one point, a threat seems to have been made that if UMTA's requirements were not met in 1971, the decertification

action would go beyond the partial measures imposed in 1970 (which meant that the region was eligible for 50 percent federal matching funds rather than the full 2/3 federal matching rate) and result in a total cut-off of federal transit aid.¹²

Despite UMTA's role in the establishment of MTC, the legislature dropped one key provision directly related to UMTA's concerns. An early draft of AB 363 would have given MTC the power to decide "unresolvable disputes between transit operators over fare structures and schedules;" this was deleted "at the behest of the [transit] operators who viewed any form of binding arbitration as a threat to their operating independence" and Foran is reported to have remarked that this particular section "just might" have been included in the legislation for bargaining purposes.¹³

Aside from the specific pressures exerted by UMTA, formal federal guidelines contributed a great deal to the form of the agency created by AB 363 and the formal domain assigned to it. At the time of the BATSC report, federal guidelines under the Model Cities and Metropolitan Development Act required the planning process to include:

1. Preparation, as a guide for long-range development, of general physical plans with respect to the pattern and intensity of land use and provision of public facilities, including transportation facilities;
2. Programming of capital improvements based on a determination of relative urgencies;
3. Long-range fiscal plans for implementing such plans and programs; and
4. Proposed regulatory and administrative measures which aid in achieving coordination of all related plans of the departments or subdivisions of the governments concerned and intergovernmental coordination of related planning activities among the state and local governmental agencies concerned.

BATSC commented that "this conception of the regional planning process goes considerably beyond anything that has been proposed thus far in the Bay Area."¹⁴ Some provisions of AB 363, particularly those dealing with financial planning, seem to have been directly related to those guidelines, although the language directing MTC draw up its financial plan "without regard to constraints imposed by law on expenditures" from particular sources seems to have been added at Foran's initiative, reflecting his interest in reform of the California transportation finance system.

B. Initial Organization and Staffing.

Initial organization and staffing was a gradual process for MTC. At the time AB 363 was passed, it was expected that the Commission would begin functioning in November, 1970, and that it would be financed by a half million dollars in state and federal funds which were currently "in the coffers" of ABAG.^{*15} Actually, the Commission did not hold its organizational meeting until February, 1971, and it never got the money from ABAG, although it did occasionally made use of the small staff of the ABAG regional Transportation Planning Committee, which remained on the ABAG payroll after RTPC was disbanded. Paul Watt, who had been Program Director of RTPC and was still officially an ABAG employee, took over as interim Executive Director of MTC, and the Commission began a search for operating funds.

*Presumably this half million dollars involved the state and federal planning funds which were being used to finance the activities of the ABAG Regional Transportation Planning Committee.

This search did not bear fruit until July, 1971, when MTC obtained a \$250,000 contract with the State Air Resources Board. Meanwhile, in March, MTC had applied for a large planning grant from UMTA to undertake a series of studies of specific transit issues. This proposed project was not only intended to provide operating funds for MTC, but was also involved in the effort to secure Class A certification for the region from UMTA. Shortly after the Air Resources Board contract came through, this UMTA planning grant application was also approved. Finally, late in 1971, SB 325 passed, giving MTC its first substantial source of non-earmarked funds.

Watt was officially appointed Executive Director in July, 1971; he announced at that time that seven other RTPC employees would be transferred to MTC as soon as possible.¹⁶ Finally, in late September, the Commission authorized Watt to begin full-scale recruitment of staff; this effort took place in late 1971 and early 1972. By April, staffing was well underway, and the Commission had negotiated a lease for permanent office space. Also by April, 1972, MTC had produced a work program for the Regional Transportation Plan and a draft outline of the plan.

MTC was empowered by AB 363 to appoint committees of its own membership and advisory committees involving outsiders. At the organizational meeting in February, 1971, the Commission approved a Transit Coordinating Committee (TCC) to be composed of representatives of the Bay Area transit operators, the Division of Highways, and the Commission, and voted to retain a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) which had been appointed by RTPC. The TAC is composed of persons from transportation operating organizations, local and state governmental agencies, and

others. Its members "were chosen to represent transportation and planning interests."¹⁷ The initiation of the TCC, of course, was related to UMTA's concern that no mechanism existed in the region which could produce unified or coordinated transit operations.

At the same meeting, Commossioner Beckett presented a proposal for a committee structure involving an Executive Committee (which would be appointed immediately) plus Public Information, Interagency Coordination, Engineering and Technical, and Future Fiscal Resources and Powers Committees to be appointed later.¹⁸ Except for the Executive Committee, these committees were not appointed until July. By that time, the structure had shifted to the permanent one of Executive, Finance, Grant Review, Personnel, Public Information, and Work Program Committees.¹⁹

C. Initial Planning Phase.

MTC's initial concepts of what its Regional Transportation Plan would involve were influenced by the language of AB 363, the BATSC-RTPC experience, federal guidelines, and its own awareness of the development of the region's transportation politics. Shortly after the organizational meeting, the Commission issued a brochure in which it identified the following tasks to be accomplished before the July 1, 1973 deadline:

- # The formulation, testing, and evaluation of the regional transport plan, with special attention to social and environmental factors incorporated in the planning process.
- # Public review and reaction to plan elements, and subsequent amendment. Work might include a statement of regional goals for transport and a series of public hearings. Work must include bringing the plan into harmony with the review and amendment of ABAG's Regional Plan.
- # Preparation of short-range capital improvement programs for all transport modes under the purview of MTC.

- # A financial evaluation of Bay Area transport, covering and interrelating all modes and all sources of revenues.
- # Involvement of airport and seaport planning in the overall regional transport planning process.
- # Procedures for the conduct of project review and approval functions, in order that these will be ready when MTC actually acquires the authority for policy decisions. 20

Language such as the "formulation, testing, and evaluation of the regional transport plan" would seem to indicate that at that time the Commission envisioned the Regional Transportation Plan as a mathematical model of some future transportation system (or set of alternative systems) of the sort attempted by BATSC and other major transportation planning studies of the 1960's. This concept would also be in line with the activities of the RTPC staff at that time, which (officially, at least) involved the quantification of the ABAG land use plan, the refinement of the BATSC system of transportation models to a greater level of geographical detail, and the preparation of a Transit Development Program. These activities (and those apparently envisioned by the Commission at the outset) were related to federal certification requirements.

At the same time, the Commission saw its role as involving the resolution of "major transportation issues of the region." At this point, these were conceived of in general terms, and included the following:

1. The extension of the rapid transit system, given the huge increases forthcoming in federal aids, and the supply of auxiliary transit services, in which MTC may have a direct role.
2. The ultimate extent of freeway development.
3. The decisions taken about crossing of the Bay.

4. The relationship between airports and surface transport.
5. The relationship between trucking and freight terminals, ports and railroads.
6. The continuing deficiencies of local roads and streets to meet vehicular demands.
7. The questions raised for the ecology and environment of the Bay Area by all forms of transport development.
8. The ability of the transport system to deal with social needs, especially those in poverty areas.
9. The uses of the transport system to further the general goals of urban development.
10. The fundamental problem of financing transportation on a comprehensive basis that includes all modes.
11. The ability to grasp the achievements of modern technology for the benefit of the region's transportation.²¹

Detailed discussion of the development of the plan began in the spring of 1972. By late April, a tentative work program has been put together. At the same time, a tentative schedule was proposed. This involved preparation of an initial plan and opening channels of public discussion by July 1, 1972; definition of plan issues and options by August 1; preparation of a draft of the final plan and initiation of intensive public discussion by January 1, 1973. The April, 1972 work program also included a draft outline of the plan.²²

About April or May, 1972, MTC representatives met with state and federal officials to discuss the work program for the plan. At this meeting, MTC representatives responded to inquiries as to whether the Commission would follow the "traditional approach" to transportation planning by saying that it would not, and coined the phrase "issue-oriented plan" to

to describe the initial plan that they hoped to produce. The idea, as MTC Deputy Director Paul Bay describes it, was that MTC would start with an inventory of the existing system plus proposals to augment it that were already extant (or which might be suggested in the course of the planning effort), but not yet approved. These MTC would consider issues, and these issues would be the focus of the MTC planning process. At this point, the concept of the issue-oriented plan was not seen by the MTC leadership as precluding a modeling effort. In the view of some MTC staff members, improved transportation models would play a key role in the resolution of the "issues" which would be raised. MTC retained consultants to develop improved trip generation, trip distribution, and modal split models under what it called the Regional Travel and Transportation Projections Project (RTTPP)*²³. Some MTC staff members hoped that these models would allow MTC to better predict the consequences of policy options and would thus provide technical justification for decisions in the "issue-oriented" planning process.

* RTTPP was not intended to be an advance in the state of the art in transportation modeling, but rather an application of existing advanced techniques to the Bay Area situation. It primarily involved development of a disaggregate trip generation model and an attempt to combine trip distribution and modal split models. In addition, the consultants envisioned a modeling effort in which sensitivity analysis would be more important than base-year calibration of the models. It was this emphasis on sensitivity analysis which was supposed to make the model useful for testing policy options. The model was supposed to focus on the interrelationships among the factors affecting transportation demand, not on predictions of gross demand. This focus, while ideally increasing the model's usefulness in an issue-oriented planning process, created problems of credibility: the models would be only as good as their authors' understanding of the interrelationships among the factors affecting transportation demand, and these interrelationships are not well understood.

Others doubted that (1) the models could be ready in time to contribute to any plan drawn up before June 30, 1973, (2) that they addressed all the relevant issues (including the crucial ones of land development and environmental impact), or (3) that the state of the art was advanced enough to permit credible analyses of some of the issues which the models were designed to address.

Shortly after this, Bay solicited outlines of the organization of the proposed plan from the staff, and the staff began preliminary definition of policy and planning issues. During the period between the summer of 1972 and the beginning of 1973, the MTC staff developed several policy positions in considerable detail; these were adopted by the Commission as preliminary policy declarations. At the same time, the staff and Commission were preparing for the December 2, 1972 Regional Transportation Symposium, which was to inaugurate MTC's intensive citizen participation program, and which was originally supposed to involve the presentation of the first draft of the plan. It proved impossible to prepare a draft plan by this deadline, however, and the staff and Commission did not get down to the serious business of writing the Regional Transportation Plan until after the Symposium.

The main features of the Symposium itself were speeches by MTC commissioners and various state and federal dignitaries, a slide show in which MTC explained its conception of its role and outlined the tasks to be accomplished in the development of the Regional Transportation Plan, and a period set aside for group discussions involving members of

the audience.* MTC also distributed a packet of materials which included several position papers which had been adopted by the Commission (see pages 196 and 197) the list of "issues," and maps showing existing and proposed highway and transit facilities.

Immediately after the symposium, the MTC staff met to discuss the organization of the plan. They arrived at a scheme which would divide the plan into two basic sections. The first, called the "Constitution," would outline MTC's basic policy positions; the other, called the "Statutes," would make specific application of these to the regional transportation system. At the time, the outline was to be as follows:

Constitution:

Section I - Issues and Goals

Section II - Assumptions

Section III - Objectives and Policies

Statutes:

Section IV - Regional Transportation System and Ten Year Plan

Section V - Financial Plan and Priorities

Section VI - Proposals for Action

Section VII - Plan Implementation.

*The questions addressed by these discussion groups included: (1) Are we spending enough money for transportation? (2) How should we pay for transportation? (3) How can MTC have effective citizen participation? (4) What transportation services do we need first? (5) What kinds of transportation issues should MTC become involved in as a regional agency? (6) How should transportation be used to support social equality and economic opportunity throughout the region?

Shortly thereafter, the original Section II, "Assumptions," was dropped, so that the eventual organization of the Plan involved six sections: "Issues and Goals," "Objectives and Policies," "The Regional Transportation System," "Financial Plan and Priorities," "Proposals for Action," and "Plan Administration."

1. Policies and Preparations: December, 1972 - February, 1973.

The major activities of the Commission and its staff between the December 2 Symposium and March 1 were development of the "Constitution" - Sections I and II of the Regional Transportation Plan - and continuation of efforts to gather the information needed to write the rest of the Plan.

Section I.

Section I of the Regional Transportation Plan was entitled "Issues and Goals - Declaration of Intent." It was the shortest section of the 1973 Plan and the first to be provisionally adopted.

The staff version of Section I was first presented to the Commission on January 24, along with a draft of Section II. On February 14, Section I was provisionally adopted; Section II, on the other hand, was sent back to the Work Program Committee for further revision.

Section I consisted of an introduction and three subsections:

- A. Issues
- B. Declaration of Intent
- C. The Regional Interest²⁴

The issues subsection was left in outline form, with the notation that prose was to be supplied. The issues listed in Section I included those of planned regional development, environmental impact, social and

economic opportunity, and implementing transportation policy. The issues, and some of the subissues listed under them, appear to have been derived from the list of general issues in the initial MTC brochure (see page 190). The four major issue headings provided the format for the Declaration of Intent, which stated, in essence, MTC's intention to coordinate with planned regional development, preserve the environment, provide for social and economic opportunity, and achieve effective transportation decision making.²⁵

The subsection on the Regional Interest was an attempt to define, in general terms, the borderline between the "regional" transportation system - that is, the system over which MTC wished to claim primary jurisdiction - and state and national systems on the one hand and local systems on the other. The distinction was not couched in terms of specific sets of facilities, however, but rather in terms of national, state, regional, and local "concerns." Much of the material in this subsection was derived from a paper entitled Position Paper. Issue: Regional vs. Local Concerns, which had been adopted by MTC on August 23, 1972. At that time, MTC had proposed two criteria for determining whether a facility was of regional significance: (1) whether a proposed project was of such financial magnitude as to affect the funding available to competing projects within the region; and (2) whether the facility functioned as a regional facility by "serving or linking one or more local units of government or public institutions of regional significance such as major medical centers or universities."²⁵ To these two criteria, Section I added one which stated that the regional interest would extend to "those facilities which have a significant impact upon the society, the environment, the

economy, and land development which is of more than local concern!"²⁷
(Emphasis in original.)

Section II.

Section II was the first major section of the MTC Plan to be developed. It was intended to be the basis for the rest of the Plan, spelling out MTC's major objectives and sets of policies to support these objectives. Objectives and policies were broken down into the following general categories:

1. Transport System
2. Comprehensive Planning
3. Physical Environment
4. Social Environment
5. Special Transport Elements
6. Policy Implementation.

Some of the material incorporated in Section II was derived from the policy papers adopted by the Commission in the fall of 1972. These included Financial Planning Policy Assumptions (September 27), an untitled set of environmental policies (October 25), Travel Demand Assumptions (November 22), Working Assumptions for the Development of Transportation Facilities and Programs (November 22), and A Regional Transportation Planning Framework and Growth and Development Assumptions (November 22). The environmental policies and the Working Assumptions for the Development of Facilities and Programs were particularly important sources of material in Section II.

The Working Assumptions for the Development of Transportation Facilities and Programs was basically a staff document, although it was apparently developed in conjunction with the paper entitled A Regional Transportation

Planning Framework and Growth and Development Assumptions, which was the result of a joint effort of MTC, ABAG, and the Division of Highways. The environmental policies, on the other hand, were actually drawn up by an "ad hoc citizens committee" chaired by MTC Commissioner William Lucius and composed of representatives of Save San Francisco Bay, the Bay Area Council, the League of Women Voters, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, and the Sierra Club. Environmentalists apparently dominated this committee; in any event, it drew up, and the Commission adopted, a rather stringent set of environmental policies.

At this time, when policy issues were still being addressed in abstract terms, some Commissioners and members of the MTC Technical Advisory Committee seemed to feel that the MTC staff was too conservative. At the October 25, 1972 Commission meeting, for instance, Commissioner Ralph Trower of Napa County said he got the impression that the staff was "writing off" the next ten years in its growth and development assumptions and asked how this could be reversed. Staff members George Draper replied that the assumptions were trends which the staff felt would be followed during that period; that regional control mechanisms did not yet exist; and that where they did exist, for instance, in the Livermore Valley - they could not bring about significant changes in the next ten years. The TAC, for its part, felt that the assumption of implementation of a planned strategy for regional growth and development by 1980 would mean that control would come "too late" and that a commitment must be made sooner. In addition, Commission Chairman Joseph Bort was concerned with the lack of emphasis on social planning.²⁸

Walter D. Stoll, the MTC staff member in charge of developing Section II, has remarked that some of the staff came to MTC to "save the

world." Section II had its roots in a phase of MTC's development in even some of the Commissioners seemed ready to try to "save the world" and in which the specific implications of bold policy positions were not yet obvious. In this atmosphere, the Commission and staff were far more open to suggestions from the "public" than was to be the case later. According to David Jones:

The most intense interaction between citizens and planners occurred in the Work Program Committee. Representatives of the Sierra Club, the League of Women Voters, the Bay Area Council, and SPUR were deeply involved in the Committee's deliberations.

The objectives and policies element of the Regional Transportation Plan [that is, Section II] reflects the give and take of these sessions with plan language being hammered out in an atmosphere of good-natured compromise.²⁹

Despite the high degree of interaction with the public during the development of Section II, the section was largely a product of the MTC staff - specifically, of the elements of the MTC staff engaged in developing the transit program. The discussions in the WPC pertained in most cases to the exact wording of policy statements and (apparently) to the organization of the material in the section; they did not determine the scope of MTC's policy concerns, nor, in most cases, the basic directions of MTC's substantive policies. According to Stoll, most of the section came "from our heads," except for the policies derived from the previously-adopted environmental policies and the "Working Assumptions for the Development of Transportation Facilities and Programs." Staff engaged in writing the section went to other staff members concerned with given policy areas and asked them for suggestions; they then

tried to put these together to come up with a complete policy position. Consequently, the section reflects the diverse viewpoints of staff specialists and is not altogether internally consistent, except that by the time it was written, its authors felt that a public mandate was emerging for strong emphasis on mass transit and, therefore, tried to express a fairly strong transit emphasis on wording the section. Stoll's overall assessment of the section is that it reflected the "philosophy of some of the staff" at the time it was written, but "obviously hasn't been looked at since."

The document which emerged from the staff and WPC deliberations expressed a strong emphasis on mass transit and even contained some language which could be considered anti-automobile or anti-highway. The basic objective with respect to the transportation system was declared to be that:

Transportation programs shall consist of well-coordinated multi-modal systems to meet demonstrated travel demand which is consistent with policies of other regional agencies.³⁰

At the same time, another MTC objective was that:

Transportation programs will be designed to reduce over-dependence on the automobile as a transportation mode.³¹

Even here, a certain tension appears in the MTC policy position between cautious incrementalism and world-saving idealism: the Commission intended to "reduce overdependence on the automobile" but at the same time, it intended to "meet demonstrated travel demand" - and it could easily be argued that the demonstrated demand for travel in the region is for automobile travel. In general, the more specific policies that

follow do emphasize the development of mass transit; nevertheless several of them also define an important role for the region's highway system. These policies declare that:

Highway programs shall be designed to support the economic and social needs of the region by providing for efficient movement of people and goods within, to, and from the region.³²

Major urbanized areas and gateways to the region shall be linked by highway facilities.³³

and finally

In those areas where adequate transit service is not feasible highway investment shall provide a reasonable level of service for travel demands.³⁴

In addition to policies relating to the nature of the proposed regional transportation system, Section II expressed strong support for environmental protection, coordination of land use and transportation planning, and use of transportation programs to achieve social objectives. At the same time, however, it contained financial policies which were to prove in conflict with some of these objectives. Two policies which especially posed this problem were one which declared:

The Commission shall utilize all available means to insure that the present proportion of economic resources committed to transportation purposes in the region is not diminished.³⁵

- later amended to read "economic resources from the public sector"³⁶ -
and one which declared that:

The Commission shall take measures to maximize the financial aid from the Federal and State Governments to transportation programs in the region.³⁷

Events were to prove that choices sometimes have to be made between maximizing the expenditure of federal and state funds and achieving idealistic goals concerning environmental protection, land use planning, and

social welfare. Examples of this sort of conflict in MTC's experience include the Napa Bridge and I-580 cases (see pages 337 - 350 and pages 385-408).

Despite the implicit conservatism of some of the financial policies, the original version of Section II implied that MTC would take an aggressive stance on jurisdictional matters. It suggested that capital projects would be planned on the sort of multimodal basis which none of the implementing agencies could handle alone, suggested financial cross-subsidization between modes and implementing agencies, emphasized transit coordination, and even trespassed to some extent on the territory of airport and seaport authorities by suggesting, for instance, that there were inefficiencies in the regional seaport system resulting from overinvestment in facilities and stating that "the coordination of goods movement systems and people movement systems is of major concern to MTC to ensure efficient utilization of transportation facilities."³⁸

The first draft of Section II reached the full commission on January 24, 1973. Another draft, dated February 9, was reported out of the WPC, considered by the full commission on February 14, and sent back to the WPC for further revisions. Those revisions involved rewording (mostly minor) in about half of the policies, and rearrangement of the material in the section, but very little in the way of substantive changes. Finally, on February 28, the full commission provisionally adopted the section with the understanding that as further questions about it arose, they would be referred to the WPC.

The only immediate written reaction to the section as a whole was that of District 4 of the California Division of Highways. District 4, reacting to the January 24 version, complained that:

1. The proposed objectives and policy statement seem to express a total commitment to regionalism without recognizing the need for coordinating regional, local and State responsibilities....[L]ocal agency and State participation in the policy statement needs to be strengthened.
2. A heavy transit bias is quite evident in both papers [Section I and II]. This does not seem to be an advisable position for a multi-modal transportation planning agency to be taking. A more desirable approach, we feel, is to impartially and objectively work towards optimum utilization of all modes of transportation with the goal of providing the best service to the public for the dollar spent.
3. The overall draft seems to take a negative tone as far as the goals and objectives for transportation. [sic] The stated intent of the plan is to achieve solutions for various transport problems of the region. Thus the plan starts right off dealing with transportation as a problem rather than considering mobility as a social value.

Perhaps one of the early objectives of the plan would be to establish the social and economic value of mobility so this value could be compared to all other values.³⁹

More specifically, District 4 objected to some of MTC's pro-transit, anti-automobile policies. In the case of a policy stating that:

Before approval of new highway facilities, the corridor shall be evaluated for transit rights-of-way need and for the feasibility of a transit alternative to the highway.⁴⁰

District 4 suggested that:

[T]he same policy should apply when investigating a transit corridor, i.e. an evaluation should be made for the need of providing for vehicular transportation in the corridor.⁴¹

In another case, District 4 suggested:

Is it a viable policy statement for a multi-modal transportation agency to make automobiles relatively inconvenient for use in core areas?⁴²

And in response to a policy declaring that:

Financing of the regional transportation plan shall reflect the interest of state policy in fostering, continuance and development of public transportation.⁴³

District 4 challenged, "Specifically what State policy is this in reference to?"⁴⁴

A number of MTC's pro-transit policies were prefaced by the remark that:

Because of the problems which exist today as a result of the widespread use of the automobile, mass transit must be given a high priority as a substitute transportation mode. This is especially true in highly urbanized areas of the Region where air pollution is a crucial problem.⁴⁵

To this, District 4 objected:

Policies 29 to 35 are based on a premise that air pollution is a crucial problem in highway urbanized areas. Indications are that the problem of air pollution from automobile sources will be solved in the near future. How much longer, then, will air pollution be a control? Shouldn't MTC's policies reflect the fact that there will be an imminent solution to this problem?⁴⁶

District 4's objectives to Section II, however, were almost completely ignored by MTC in its revisions of the section in February.

The period between the December, 1972, Symposium and the provisional adoption of Section II on February 28 also saw the beginning of work on what were to become Sections III and IV of the Plan - the description and evaluation of the regional transportation system and the financial plan. A tentative list of project-related "issues" had been presented to the public at the Symposium, along with a series of maps

* In fact, the language of this policy is practically identical to that of SB 325, S99220(b), which declares: "The fostering, continuance, and development of public transportation systems is a matter of state concern."

showing the existing highway and transit systems, those highway and transit projects which the staff thought would be implemented within ten years, and those projects which were considered to be beyond ten years. Following the Symposium, these maps (or ones nearly identical to them) were sent to the State Division of Highways and the counties, and a series of meetings with county public works and planning officials was set up to solicit comments and to refine the list of issues. Comments were received from the Division of Highways and most of the counties prior to February 12 and were discussed at a staff meeting on February 15. Following this discussion, another set of meetings with county and state officials was set up beginning the week of February 19 to discuss these comments and proposed changes.

Meanwhile, in early January, staff assignments for work on Section III were made and preliminary work on the section began. At this time, the section was being addressed in general terms, with staff assignments to the following areas:

- A. Identification of Corridors
- B. Travel Demand
- C. Future Land Use
- D. Environment
- E. Existing Travel Facilities

In addition to these staff assignments, a consultant had been retained to develop a set of operational programs for the improvement of transit service; these were the foundation of what was later known as Section III-D.

Preliminary work on the financial plan was also going forward during this period. As in the case of Section III, some work on Section IV actually began before the Symposium. In September, 1972, MTC Assistant Director Richard Carll and Senior Economist Wayne English had made a presentation to the Commission in which they described the existing funding systems and revenue sources, reviewed the financial obligations of the transit operators, and presented projections of revenues from the existing sources based on current trends.⁴⁷ Later, staff prepared tentative ten-year capital improvement programs for both transit and highways for presentation at the Symposium. The highway program presented at the Symposium was actually that of the Division of Highways; the transit program, on the other hand, was a combination of operator-initiated proposals and MTC staff proposals for areas which were not currently served by mass transit.

On January 10, Carll and English discussed Section IV with the WPC. By this time, it was clear that, although AB 363 called for a financial plan which assigned revenue from the various sources without regard to existing legal restrictions, staff members working on Section IV were more interested in producing something which could be immediately implemented. Consequently, English was maintaining a sharp distinction between highway and transit money. At the same time, he did envision that capital improvement programs for both highways and transit would be drawn up at MTC's initiative and that the Division of Highways would review the highway portion "to insure coordination with their priorities for funding." The minutes do not make clear just what he thought this coordination would involve.⁴⁸

2. Categories and Confusion: March - April, 1973.

Section III.

During March and April, the Commission and MTC staff were primarily concerned with Section III. From the beginning, this effort was plagued by misunderstanding and confusion; the process of making decisions about the regional transportation system proved frustrating because neither the framework for making such decisions nor the devices for expressing them could be firmly agreed upon.

Section III-C. The major difficulties with Section III revolved around the organization and presentation of the factual material in the section and the resolution (in Section III-C) of the project-related "issues" that MTC had raised. On February 28, Bay reported to the WPC that the staff had done much work on Section III but that nothing was in written form yet and that there were questions about how the material should be presented.⁴⁹ At about the same time, a staff group was assigned to work out a scheme for "categorizing" the issues that MTC has raised. Several suggestions were made, but the task force was unable to agree upon any one scheme and came back to the senior staff with the issue unresolved. At this point, senior staff member Burton N. Crowell proposed what came to be known as the "Crowell Matrix," and this scheme was tentatively adopted within the staff as the device for classifying issues.

The Crowell Matrix, as Crowell conceived of it, was to be an attempt to relate the planning of the implementing agencies to MTC's planning; in particular, it was intended to provide the implementing agencies with advance warning in case proposed projects were contrary to MTC's plan. One dimension of the "matrix" was to consist of four categories expressing the relative importance of a given issue to MTC's plan; the other dimension was to be an expression of the project's "planning status" - that is, of the degree to which it was ready for implementation. An integral part of Crowell's scheme was the assumption that the matrix would be used in conjunction with MTC's financial plan.

At the same time that the staff was attempting to come up with a scheme for classifying issues, however, the Work Program Committee was still debating the overall outline of the section. The staff's first version of the outline was distributed to the Committee at its February 28 meeting; revised versions were presented at both the March 5 and March 14 meetings. Although the Committee minutes do not record the details of the discussions of these outlines, it appears that concern was expressed over the possibility that the section might appear to commit MTC to individual projects prematurely. At the March 5 meeting, Bay "explained to the Committee that the sense of the outline is to insure that the June RPP will not commit the Commission to approval of elements requiring further study" - on the grounds that not all elements of the ABAG Plan were fully defined.⁵⁰ On March 14, the second revision of the outline was distributed and there was a "lengthy discussion as to how to designate issues that were not committed and those that were

committed."⁵¹ From the context of the passage in the Committee minutes, it would appear that what was being discussed was a map, rather than any sort of tabular display or matrix, but it is possible that the Crowell Matrix scheme was discussed at this meeting. It was certainly discussed in detail on March 28, but even this late, the staff was emphasizing that it was not a finished product: according to the minutes, "it was brought out that this is not to be regarded as the final proposal but that this is an attempt to clarify issues to see whether or not the process is workable."⁵² No scheme for categorizing issues was formally adopted by the WPC until April 11, and then, only after important modifications had been made in the original Crowell Matrix.⁵³

The Work Program Committee's inability to reach quick agreements about the format of Section III and the devices for expressing decisions about the transportation system posed serious difficulties for the staff in their attempts to carry out MTC's planning process. The June 30 deadline for Plan adoption made it extremely important that staff manpower be utilized efficiently: the sheer volume of work which was supposed to be accomplished by that date made it imperative that the staff not be idled by indecision about the format of the plan. Because the Work Program Committee was meeting on an irregular schedule, with intervals between meetings ranging from one to two weeks, postponement of decisions from one meeting to another could have serious consequences for the scheduling of staff work. The only way for the staff management to keep the plan moving forward was to gamble by going ahead with substantive work based on

assumptions about what the WPC would decide. In the case of issue-classification scheme, about a month was to pass between the tentative agreement within the staff to use the Crowell Matrix and the WPC's official approval of a classification scheme - which turned out to be somewhat different from the original Crowell Matrix. The staff leadership felt it could not delay issue classification that long and, in fact, proceeded to use the Crowell Matrix in its original form in late March.

Once staff work had been done, there was considerable reluctance to undo it - not only was it time-consuming to redo work, but also the emotional attachment of staff members to their work had to be considered. Pride of authorship and commitment by staff members to painful compromises among themselves meant that decisions to scrap staff work were damaging to staff morale; consequently, there was a tendency to change the meaning of staff efforts rather than to repudiate them altogether and start over. This, in turn, served to frustrate substantive political debate because it was never clear just what was being debated.

Even within the staff, there was never any real consensus about the details of the classification scheme. The initial classifications were made by a staff group consisting of five corridor teams under the direction of MTC staff member Wesley E. Wells. These teams, which consisted of ABAG staff members attached to the MTC staff as well as MTC staff members, were formed in early March and told to study previously-identified transportation corridors in order that issues might be classified by March 23. On March 23, there was a staff

meeting involved Bay, Wells, the five corridor team leaders, and other staff. It would appear from statements made at this meeting that the corridor teams believed that the Crowell Matrix categories (intended to express "importance to the plan") would have significance for the timing of project implementation and would provide the basis for MTC's capital improvement program. Although the teams were not in complete agreement among themselves, all did agree that the categories had significance for the timing of project implementation and that only Category I and II projects should be implemented within the next ten years. At the same time, it would appear that the senior staff had not decided that the categories had specific significance for implementation timing - although it would also appear that Bay did not voice any immediate objections to the corridor teams' assumptions that they did. In fact, neither Crowell nor any other senior staff member had committed himself to any specific formula. Crowell was to tell the Work Program Committee on March 28 that the scheme was not final; later, he was also to carry on negotiations with the Division of Highways in an attempt to work out the details of the application of the category to the highway program.

The corridor teams, however, came to the March 23 meeting obviously believing that the categorizations would determine the direction of the MTC plan. Although only one or two of the corridor teams had actually attempted to categorize issues prior to the meeting, all did have a general idea of what they wanted to do. It was clear that there

were differences of opinion both as to what MTC's substantive direction should be and as to the role that the Regional Transportation Plan should play in MTC's pursuit of its goals.

Substantively, the major split was between the San Francisco-Marin and North Bay corridor teams (and, possibly, the Transbay team) on the one hand, and the West Bay and East Bay teams on the other. In the eyes of the former group, the major emphases of Section II were enforcement of ABAG's "city-centered" land use plan, control of urban growth, environmental protection, and promotion of the mass transit system. Consequently, their attitude toward most highway projects was very negative. The bulk of the highway program, however, was in the four counties covered by the East Bay and West Bay teams. These teams were, on the whole, more conservative and far less ready to try to dismantle the highway program. The major substantive debate of the meeting involved an attempt by the more radical minority of the West Bay team to move that team into the radical camp. This debate also involved closely related questions of political style and the role of the MTC Plan: should MTC write an idealistic plan, which would support its declared policies, and let the chips fall where they might, or should MTC write a plan that could be immediately implemented, making departures from the status quo only when it was on solid technical and political ground?

The debate involved the objections of John Holtzclaw, the ABAG staff member attached to the West Bay team, to his team's moderate stance. Holtzclaw argued for an alternative recommendation which would

support a "planning viewpoint" based on environmental protection and improved housing and job opportunities for low-income and minority groups. This alternative involved completion of the San Mateo-Santa Clara BART extension and a moratorium on freeway construction in the area. Holtzclaw argued that this pro-transit, anti-highway strategy would not only provide better transportation opportunities for disadvantaged people in the corridor, but would also lead to improved air quality and preservation of open space: air quality would be improved directly by the shift of trips from automobiles to mass transit, and pressure on open space would be reduced by the higher residential densities that would be promoted by use of mass transit in existing urban areas.

Bay answered Holtzclaw by saying that justification for decisions must have more weight than the sorts of things Holtzclaw was talking about, or else MTC would lose all credibility. Bay said that philosophically, he agreed with Holtzclaw, but that he thought that he needed more justification and that he preferred to reserve judgment rather than make judgments on the basis of a feeling or philosophy. At the same time, he expressed sensitivity to certain sorts of political pressures: he said that even to delay decisions about the construction of freeways (presumably those in the San Mateo Coast area) until growth limit decisions and open space plans were made would make San Mateo County officials "hopping mad" because they were already lined up in favor of the freeways. Bay now says that the thrust of his reply

to Holtzclaw was that "our job is to highlight issues, not to bury them." Immediately after the incident other MTC staff members seem to have felt that Bay's reaction to Holtzclaw had been intended to tell him to "keep things cool" - apparently they believed that Bay was not really adverse to what Holtzclaw was suggesting, but that he believed that a cautious approach would be more likely to produce results.

Meanwhile, the senior staff was still uncertain about the role of Section III in the MTC plan and the meaning of the categories. At a meeting on March 26, senior staff members questioned whether the emphasis of Section III should be on the plan or the system - presumably meaning that they were uncertain as to whether the phrase "importance to the plan" in the definition of the categories meant the importance of particular decisions to the process of making the plan or the importance of particular projects to a planned system. Also, at least some of them were insisting - contrary to what the corridor teams apparently believed - that Section III was not intended to be a checkpoint in the project-review process. There also seemed to be a feeling that specific categorizations were not very important at this point - some of the senior staff members saw the value of the categorizations as lying in their potential to get a dialogue going about the specifics of the plan - even if the dialogue were only "unproductive stone-throwing."

Immediately following the March 23 staff meeting, those corridor teams which had not already assigned categories did so. At this point, sheets were made up on each issue, listing its category and its "planning status" in terms of when it might be implemented. At this time, no attempt was made to assemble the submissions of the various corridor teams or to reconcile differences among them in cases in which more than one team had evaluated an issue. Sometime after this, but no later than April 11, the corridor team categorizations were assembled into a table - although there were still no attempt to reconcile differences. This table, which was prefaced by the statement that "this is not a staff recommendation to the Commission, but a first attempt to get Commission reaction to the direction in which staff is headed,"⁵⁴ was given to commissioners and at least some agencies and public groups.

While this was going on, the Work Program Committee was debating the details of the issue classification scheme. The Committee was still unsatisfied following Crowell's presentation on March 28. One objection, apparently, was that the scheme was too complicated. In an effort to meet this objection, the planning status dimension was dropped, leaving only the four-category system for indicating the relative importance of issues to the plan. When this happened, however, the meaning of the categories had to shift to account for planning status as well as importance to the Plan. The first attempt to do this was a very simple formulation included in the preface to the first version of the table of issues. At this point, the definitions of the categories were:

- I. Committed - should be implemented within 10 years.
- II. Approved for Planning Evaluation - transportation service requirements recognized; further evaluation required.
- III. Identified as an Issue - level of need not known or dependent upon unknown development factors.
- IV. Not in Plan at this time.⁵⁵

By the time the WPC finally adopted category definitions on April 11, this set of definitions had been elaborated into the following:

CATEGORY I APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The implications for items in this category are that MTC:

- 1. - recognizes a transportation need in the area that is of regional concern;
- 2. - states that this particular facility or program will meet or help to resolve that transportation need;
- 3. - has found this particular facility or program to be generally consistent with regional plans, goals, objectives, and policies;
- 4. - intends to include funding plans for implementation in the 10-year capital improvement program.

CATEGORY II APPROVED FOR PLANNING EVALUATION

The implications for items in this category are that MTC:

- 1. - recognizes a transportation need in the area that is of regional concern;
- 2. - states that further evaluation is needed to clarify:
 - a) which combination of facilities and/or programs can best meet the needs; or
 - b) the appropriate function, capacity, location, mode, nature, or timing of facilities or programs to best meet the needs; or

- c) the relationship of proposed facilities or programs to regional plans, goals, objectives, and policies;

- 3. - is committed to evaluating or assisting in evaluations as required to clarify questions relating to the appropriate facilities or programs.

CATEGORY III AN ISSUE IS RECOGNIZED

The implications for items in this category are that MTC:

- 1. - recognizes that a transportation need may exist in this area that is of regional concern;
- 2. - states that a transportation need that may exist in the area is not now known, or is dependent upon regional growth factors or other factors not yet known, and it not urgent;
- 3. - proposes to hold the question of such a facility or program's need open as an issue, but not one having urgency for either planning evaluation or implementation.

CATEGORY IV NOT INCLUDED IN PLAN

The implication for items in this category are that MTC:

- 1. - finds no transportation need in this area; or
- 2. - finds this particular facility or program to be inconsistent with present regional plans, goals, objectives, or policies; and
- 3. - finds this item should not be included as part of the Regional Transportation Plan.⁵⁶

By this time, the determination of whether or not a "transportation need" existed had emerged as a key issue in the assignment of categories. In the process, two key features of the original Crowell Matrix had been sacrificed: (1) there was now no way to express how much of a need existed (or how appropriate a proposed solution might be) and (2) there was no way to incorporate information about project lead times into the classification scheme. Instead, the categories now expressed the "planning status" of projects in terms of the planning actions MTC

would have to undertake, but not in terms of the implementing agencies' project planning.

Taken at face value, the category definitions of April 11 had transformed Section III-C into a "plan for making a plan." In reality, however, they were not accepted at face value. There was a tendency on the part of almost everyone to suspect that the categories constituted some sort of project priority system, and to act accordingly. This tendency was not confined to the outside actors: conflicting ideas about the meaning of the categories persisted within the Commission and the MTC staff right up until final adoption of the Plan in June. For instance, neither the issue of the categories' financial significance nor that of their role in the project review process was every really resolved.

Although questions about the meaning of the categories persisted up to (and beyond) the adoption of the 1973 Plan, most conflicts over individual categorizations occurred during the two-week period between the adoption of the category scheme by the Work Program Committee and the release of the first version of the table of issues on April 11 and the presentation of the table to the full commission on April 25. During this period, the categorizations drew reactions from individual commissioners, the Sierra Club, local public works officials, and the Division of Highways and underwent at least two, and possibly three, revisions.

The corridor team version of the table of issues had, of course, reflected the differing philosophies of the individual corridor teams. Although the bulk of the issues had been placed in Category II, there had been a tendency, especially on the part of the more radical teams, to place a substantial number of highway projects in Categories III and IV. Most of these projects, however, already had a low priority with the Division of Highways. Most of the really controversial highway projects - those which were being considered for early implementation despite potentially serious environmental and land use impacts - were placed in Category II in the first version of the table and remained there through the subsequent revisions. Thus, despite considerable talk at the time about a moratorium on freeway construction or an MTC policy to confine freeway building to "filling in the gaps" in the existing system,* the version of the table of issues produced by the corridor teams avoided suggesting positive MTC commitments to highway projects, without really doing anything to curtail the region's highway program. In the case of transit projects, the corridor teams displayed an even greater tendency to place everything in Category II: transit projects were for the most part judged to be in accordance with MTC policies, but because many of them were involved in individual

*MTC's official highway policy has, in fact, been characterized by some commissioners as being in opposition to extensions of the region's freeway system, but in support of projects to fill in gaps and make the existing system work better. This policy, moreover, was endorsed by the Sierra Club in 1973. It is, however, subject to considerable differences in interpretation: what constitutes a "gap" in the system in the Sierra Club's thinking is very different from what constitutes a "gap" in the system in the thinking of the Division of Highways/Caltrans organization or even that of most commissioners.

studies as a part of the Transportation Development Program, and because funding for them was uncertain, the corridor teams were reluctant to suggest MTC commitments.

Most Commission reaction to individual categorizations was expressed in a series of meetings in April between groups of commissioners and staff. Although these meetings were open to the public, no record of them was kept; consequently, it is now impossible to reconstruct Commission reactions in detail. It would appear, however, that for the most part individual commissioners reacted only to classifications of individual projects in their districts. Although some participants in the MTC planning process report that reactions by individual commissioners were a key factor in later revisions of the table, it is difficult to detect this influence in the overall trend of the revisions; on the contrary there are obvious examples of cases in which commissioners did not get what they wanted. Nevertheless, the sense that commissioners were being upset by the categorizations probably did contribute to the senior staff's tendency to vacillate about their meaning. Certainly it reinforced the pre-existing tendencies of both the staff and the commissioners to avoid making commitments (either positive or negative) about projects.

The Sierra Club and the other impact-oriented groups were generally pleased by the trend of the initial categorizations, but felt that the staff had not gone far enough in rejecting what they considered to be objectionable highway projects. These groups, along with neighbor-

hood groups opposed to particular projects, pressed for the further downgrading of some of the highway projects.

The most serious negative reaction to the corridor teams' categorizations seems to have come from the local public works departments and the Division of Highways. Although these groups continued to be unhappy about MTC's supposed anti-highway bias, their most urgent concern at this point was the possible effect of the category system on specific projects to which they felt they had already made commitments. The Division of Highways, in particular, was worried about the possible financial implications of the categories and was especially concerned about the question of whether Category III had negative funding significance. At the same time, the Division also objected to the fact that MTC was refusing to commit itself to controversial highway projects in cases in which the Division had a substantial financial stake due to completed design work, had already acquired right-of-way, or had made a political commitment in the form of a freeway agreement with a local government.

From about this period on, the Division's political approach to MTC shifted from the expressions of indignation with which it had greeted Section II to more subtle suggestions that MTC's "impractical" attempt to assert control over ongoing transportation programs would disrupt these programs. This was expressed in what became known as the "pipeline problem": because highway projects have long lead times (on the order of ten to fifteen years) it would be impos-

sible for MTC to reorient the highway program in the short run. Any attempt to do so would mean that there would be a temporary shortage of projects ready to implement and a consequent loss of highway funds, which would be spent in other parts of the state, instead of the Bay Area. Moreover, the efficiency of the project-development process (viewed by the Division in terms of projects flowing down a "pipeline" of necessary actions - hence the analogy) would be impaired. Consequently, the Division argued, MTC should go ahead and commit itself to a substantial number of highway projects on the grounds that to fail to do so would disrupt the smooth functioning of the highway program.

The MTC senior staff seems to have reacted to this new approach by the Division with a combination of genuine concern about the effects of the pipeline situation and determination to resist any attempt by the Division to deny MTC's right to intervene in the highway program. Throughout this period, MTC and Division staff members at middle management levels were carrying on negotiations concerning the relationship between the category system and the highway program; these negotiations appear to have been amicable, but never resulted in any agreement at a high enough level in the two organizations to become official policy; consequently, they were never made public. At the same time, there were open conflicts in Work Program Committee meetings and elsewhere between MTC and Division staff members. Finally, according to Bay, the District 4 planning staff came in and

demanding a full hearing, saying that the controversial highway projects were "really their projects." This resulted in an all-day meeting between Watt and Bay (but primarily Bay) and Leo Trombatore, Joseph Browne, and Milton Louie of the District 4 staff. Even this meeting did not result in an agreement, however: Bay says that the Division of Highways staff members "lobbied hard" but went away unhappy because he and Watt would not agree to the changes they were demanding.

In the period between April 11 and the release of the table of issues to the full Commission on April 25, the categories underwent several revisions. Wells says he believes that there were at least three: one in which the discrepancies among the submissions of the corridor teams were reconciled, a second made by Watt and the "Plan Task Force" consisting of himself, Crowell, Carll, Stoll, and Bay, and, finally, Bay's personal revision of the table. Bay remembers at least one revision involving the reconciliation of the corridor team versions as well as the final revision, which he made personally. It is not exactly clear when Bay made his personal revisions in the table. Most of the participants remember it was being done before the Work Program Committee meeting of April 20; Sierra Club documents, however, make reference to a version of the

table dated April 20 which appears to have been one of the interim versions.*⁵⁷

In any event, Bay says that at about the time of the meeting with the Division of Highways' planning staff, there was a second round of discussions within the MTC staff about the meanings of the categories. Bay says that in an attempt to resolve this question, Watt asked him to go over the whole list of issues and give his personal recommendation for the categorization of each. Bay recalls working intensively on this for about a day and a half; he says that he went over all the categories and issues and made his cuts based on his own best judgment.

In general, the changes Bay made seem to have reflected his philosophy as he expressed it to Holtzclaw on March 23: he preferred to reserve judgment rather than to make judgments on insufficient grounds. Consequently, Bay's revision of the table reflected a tendency to move issues out of the more definite categories (I and IV) and into the less-certain ones, especially Category II. This meant that several transit projects which had been assigned Category I, but for

*Whether this revision occurred before or after the April 20 WPC meeting, it would appear that the discussion of the table of issues at that meeting had little to do with Bay's decisions. As usual, the Committee minutes do not record the details of this discussion, stating only that "there was a lengthy discussion concerning the classification of several of the issues."⁵⁸ The fact that no one can state positively whether Bay's revisions occurred before or after the meeting would seem to indicate that the opinions expressed there were not an important consideration.

which no funds were available or for which studies had not been completed, were moved into Category II and that a number of highway projects were moved from Categories III and IV into Category II. This trend, however, was apparently a continuation of that established in the other revisions. Wells says that in all the revisions the tendency was to increase the number of issues in Category II and also to soften the meaning of Category IV - that originally the staff had conceived of Category IV as meaning that a project would never be implemented, but that in the revisions there was a tendency to shift to an interpretation in which an issue could move from Category IV to Category III if a "need" were recognized in the future.

Despite the fact that Bay's revision did not represent any sharp break in the direction of MTC's development of the table of issues, it created something of a furor, apparently because of its timing and the manner in which it was done. From within the MTC staff, Wells wrote a memorandum objecting to the fact that there were so many changes after the corridor teams had put forth so much effort. From without came an attack by the Sierra Club, which Bay feels, was intended to imply that he made his revisions in secret collusion with the Division of Highways. Although this was hardly the case - the Division of Highways did not get the commitment to highway issues that it wanted from MTC - most of the changes made subsequent to the first version of the table of issues were contrary to the positions on individual issues which

the Sierra Club later released.* Sierra Club representative Dwight Steele lodged a strongly-worded protest at the May 9 Commission meeting and a later Sierra Club statement refers to the revisions in these terms:

The initial staff proposals...had relatively few highway issues in Categories I and II. However, after a letter of objection by the State Division of Highways and meetings by the DOH representatives and staff, at least 19 highway projects were moved up from Categories III and IV to Categories I and II....These upward moves do not appear to be based on MTC policies as reflected in Sections I and II.⁵⁹

These protests, however, did not result in any further revisions of the table of issues, nor did either the WPC or the Commission intervene to amend the table, despite extensive discussion of individual categorizations by both the WPC and the full Commission. The version of the table released in the June 1, 1973, Draft Plan is virtually identical with Bay's version.

Section III-D While the controversy over the categorizations in Section III-C was approaching its climax in mid-April, the MTC staff was also preparing Section III-D. This subsection, which dealt with non-facility programs, was based on the work of a consultant which had been supplemented by the MTC staff. It was first presented, in outline form, to the Work Program Committee on April 11. The first full draft was presented to the WPC of April 20; this draft, with minor revisions, was released to the full Commission and the public on April 25.

* See Appendix B for a detailed comparison of the two versions of the table with the Sierra Club positions on highway issues.

This original version of Section III-D was one of the more radical parts of the proposed 1973 Regional Transportation Plan.

Its primary objectives were listed as being:

- A. Reduce overdependence on the automobile for travel
- B. Make efficient use of existing facilities
- C. Minimize environmental disruption
- D. Minimize social disruption
- E. Meet the needs of low-mobility groups
- F. Minimize resource depletion
- G. Enhance coordination between transportation planning and other regional planning concerns.⁶⁰

As in the case of some of the corridor team categorizations in the first version of the table of issues, the primary objectives of this first version of Section III-D represented an interpretation of and selection from the policies of Section II. Again, the emphasis was on promotion of idealistic social and environmental goals and promotion of the mass transit system at the expense of the automobile. In pursuing these goals, Section III-D suggested not only such relatively obvious measures as transit coordination, low-capital programs for improving the efficiency of highway facilities, and special services for the handicapped, but also sweeping measures aimed at changing basic patterns of travel behavior and such basic institutional features as the tax system and the transportation planning process.

The non-facility programs were divided into eight major categories. There were:

- I. Transit System Coordination
- II. Low Capital-Intensive Transit System Improvements
- III. Intermodal Transportation Management
- IV. Highway System Improvements
- V. Programs to Alter Trip-Making Behavior
- VI. Special Transportation Needs
- VII. Improvements in the Transportation Planning Process.⁶¹

A complete list of the proposed programs may be found in Appendix C.

The MTC staff seems to have felt that, since these programs did not involve massive commitments of physical capital, they could be easily implemented and should prove noncontroversial. The April 25 draft declared that "most of the programs in this section have been assigned a very high priority for study and implementation," arguing that:

- (a) Many of these programs can be implemented cheaply and quickly;
- (b) Many of these programs can be implemented with little alteration of the financial, legal, and institutional conditions which now exist in the Bay Area's transportation system;
- (c) The planning stage preceding most programs is of short duration compared to planning a large transportation facility;
- (d) It is imperative that we derive the fullest benefit from the existing transport system before committing funds to enormous capital improvements.⁶²

The MTC staff seems to have been almost totally oblivious to the non-facility programs' potential for disrupting the functioning of the implementing agencies, not to mention their probable impacts on the daily lives of ordinary people. Included among the transit-coordination proposals, for instance, were proposals not only for coordination of transit routes, schedules, and fares, but also for joint marketing, research, and maintenance operations - not to mention pooled vehicle and labor schemes - which threatened to break down the organizational identities of the transit operators. Likewise, intermodal transportation management and highway systems improvement schemes went beyond mere traffic engineering improvements. Basic aims of MTC's transportation management proposals were to "increase the attractiveness of transit and person-movement capacity of roads by giving preferential treatment on streets and highways [sic]" and to "decrease the amount of travel by private automobile, particularly during peak periods."⁶³ To these ends, the drafts proposed such measures as preemption of traffic signals by buses, wrong-way operation of buses in city streets, bypasses for buses around metered ramps, and exclusive transit lanes. Although there was nothing particularly radical about such ideas, per se, it was not at all clear how they could be applied to specific situations in the Bay Area, nor - more important - what sorts of institutional arrangements would be necessary to implement them. Other suggested programs, intended to improve the utilization of existing highway facilities, may have

seemed disruptive to the Division of Highways or the local public works departments. Among the suggested programs, for instance, was one involving the rescheduling of maintenance work to avoid interference with peak-period traffic flows - a reasonable enough suggestion, except for those concerned with the efficient use of maintenance crews.

In proposing programs to alter trip-making behavior, the MTC staff was venturing into an even more sensitive area. It had now gone beyond merely challenging the institutional arrangements and management practices of the transportation agencies, and had begun to advocate deliberate action to alter the daily lives of private citizens. In doing so, the staff was urging a bold departure from past planning practices. As the April 25 draft put it:

In much transportation planning, travel demand is measured or estimated and a facility is built to meet the "need". Seldom has this travel demand - grounded in individuals' behavior - been considered subject to change in advance, even though public policies obviously have a profound impact on it.⁶⁴

The proposed programs to alter trip-making behavior, then, were "designed to alter the traditional travel behavior of individuals and the travel policies of institutions in a manner that helps to eliminate transportation problems."⁶⁵ Specific objectives of these programs were given as being:

1. Make transit increasingly the most convenient means of travel.

2. Provide incentives which increase the probability of transit usage in traditionally non-transit situations.
3. Encourage institutions and companies to adopt transportation or employment policies which provide or support non-facility solutions to transportation problems.
4. Increase the opportunity for convenient adoption of the bicycle mode for a variety of trip purposes.

Proposed programs involved incentive and disincentive measures to encourage off-peak travel and use of transit, alteration of private practices to reduce peaks in travel demand and to discourage business travel by automobile, and provision of "new modal opportunity" - primarily bicycle facilities and delivery services intended to encourage use of transit for shopping trips. Among the specific programs were (1) inclusion of transit cost in public event ticket prices, (2) peak hour bridge toll surcharges, (3) reduction or abolition of transit fares, (4) penalization of high-powered passenger vehicles through taxation or higher bridge tolls, (5) staggering of work hours and work weeks, (6) programs to encourage carpooling, and (7) substitution of transit subsidies or bicycle pools for business-use carpools. These measures, by themselves, would hardly have caused a dramatic shift in travel behavior; it was hoped, rather, that a combination of such measures with massive improvements in transit service would result in a shift to transit. As critics were quick to point out, however, the proposed disincentives threatened immediate deprivation to automobile users, whereas the transit improvements might not be forthcoming for a long time, if ever.

Section III-D's proposals for financial and legal programs involved MTC in even more controversial matters. These programs were prefaced by the remark that:

Many of our current regional transportation problems have their roots in laws which theoretically should be helping us to solve our problems. Especially notorious in this respect are the laws which deal with the financing and administration of transportation programs. While it is not within the scope of the MTC to create many of these laws or administrative procedures, it is nevertheless our responsibility to advocate these legal changes which are gross impediments to the development of an effective balanced regional transportation system [sic]. ⁶⁷

Proposed legal changes included revised compensation and replacement programs carried out in response to economic and social disruption resulting from new transportation facilities, tax reform measures designed to confiscate increases in the value of land near transportation improvements and to help support mass transit through taxes on automobiles, a proposal (which was added between the April 20 and April 25 versions) to make MTC elective, and revision of requirements for new land developments to replace requirements for the provision of parking with requirements for the provision of transit service. Perhaps the most startling of these proposals was one to "tax 100% of the excess appreciation of land value (compared to regional average land appreciation) near BART exists, highway interchanges, ferry terminals, etc." or, alternatively, to condemn excess land in the vicinity of transportation improvements for eventual resale.⁶⁸ These measures were intended to allow "the public to reap the benefits of land appreciation near transportation

improvements, since this appreciation accrues as a result of publicly funded projects; and to reduce land speculation by reducing profits."⁶⁹

Other tax reform measures included opening up the U.S. and California Highway Trust Funds to transit expenditures, an increase in the gas tax, MTC control of toll bridge revenues, a regional parking tax, and an evaluation of the current transit operating subsidies provided by SB 325. MTC would go on record in support of opening up the highway trust funds, would "supply expert witnesses to legislative committees," and would "initiate a publicity program seeking public support for the referendum"⁷⁰ necessary to amend Article 26 of the California Constitution to allow expenditure of highway funds for transit. MTC would not support increases in the tax tax "unless (or until) the Highway Trust Funds are made truly intermodal."⁷¹

Other proposals for legal changes included making Commission membership a full-time, elective position in order to "increase the public responsiveness of the Commission"⁷² (as the April 25 draft put it) and changing zoning and land development laws to require provision of transit service for new developments in some cases, to remove off-street parking requirements in areas which could be served by transit, and, eventually, to impose heavy taxes on parking spaces provided for customers or employees.

Finally, Section III-D addressed the transportation planning process itself, remarking that:

To the extent that the planning processes are imperfect, policy decisions are likewise imperfect, many times in a compound-interest fashion... As the RTP is refined in the ensuing years, it will be necessary in addition to refine the methods whereby the RTP is formulated.⁷³

Suggested changes in MTC's procedures included (1) measures to encourage public participation, (2) a procedure for full accounting of costs and benefits of transportation systems, (3) research into the effects of new transportation systems, and (4) establishment of standards for bicycle facilities.

Measures related to public participation were aimed at insuring two-way communication between MTC and the public - meaning whoever chose to participate - while at the same time establishing special "citizens" organizations which would work closely with MTC. In order to achieve the first goal, Section III-D suggested that all important meetings, especially those of the Grant Review Committee, be open to the public and that MTC hold public meetings in communities prior to decisions affecting them. The second goal could be achieved by the establishment of a continuing, MTC funded, regional citizens' transportation forum (or preferably, full participation in the ABAG Regional Citizens Forum, with concentration on the Transportation Issues Committee) and development of a coalition of low-mobility groups. The section on improving the transportation planning process also included a proposal that statements (similar to environmental impact statements) be prepared to document the social distribution of costs and benefits of new transportation systems.

The non-facility programs were assigned categories similar to those used in Section III-C. All programs were assigned Categories I or II, with the majority being placed in Category I.⁷⁴ This did not necessarily mean that the staff was asking the Commission to commit

itself to implementation of all the Category I programs in Section III-D - in many cases, the actual proposal was to study a proposed program rather than to implement it.

There seems to have been little immediate reaction to Section III-D when it was presented to the Commission on April 25. The Commission Minutes report that:

Discussion of Section III, part D, was limited to the list of programs and their priorities. Commissioners were asked to review the entire draft and submit any comments by May 4.⁷⁵

Copies were given to the press, however, and summaries of the subsection were printed in the region's major newspapers.

Section IV.

Although Section III was the main focus of attention during March and April, work on the financial plan that was to make up Section IV continued. This work, which was carried out by English and a small group of other staff members, was a continuation of earlier efforts and was largely independent of the effort to produce Section III. English did contribute to the financial proposals in the original version of Section III-D, but otherwise, there was little contact between the two groups. To some extent, this state of affairs may have been deliberate: Bay did not want Section III (especially the categorizations of the issues) to be influenced by the financial priorities of the implementing agencies; Section IV, on the other hand, was being drawn up in full recognition of those priorities. At the same time, according to several MTC staff members, the lack of communication between the two staff groups was also due to a lack of attention to Section IV on the part of the Commission and the staff leaders during this period. These staff members believe that Section IV was over-

looked by the MTC leaders because the individuals concerned either did not understand the material in the section or else did not believe it to be very important.

For whatever reason, work on Section IV appears to have gone forward with a minimum of policy guidance and a minimum of coordination with the other sections of the plan. Staff members working on the financial plan, like those on the corridor teams, were trying to work out the practical consequences of the MTC policies in Section II - as they interpreted them. Not surprisingly, they ended up emphasizing different aspects of MTC's policy stance and basing judgments about individual projects on considerably different criteria.

In Section III, the primary considerations in categorizing the issues were the "need" for particular projects - that is, some sort of combination of the political push for proposals and their potential to serve travel demand - and their impacts - primarily, their environmental and land use impacts. Consideration of financial feasibility - that is, the question of whether funds would be available - was deliberately reserved for Section IV. At the same time, Section III was also drawn up with little regard for cost-effectiveness. In the early work on Section IV, on the other hand, considerations of cost-effectiveness and financial feasibility dominated, but there was little or no attempt to incorporate consideration of political popularity or potential impacts - except as these considerations were reflected in the implementing agencies' proposed programs. Staff working on Section IV were no doubt aware of the categorizations as they were made but had no clear mandate for applying them to the financial plan so long as the question of the categories' financial significance remained unresolved.

At the same time, the early work on Section IV expressed a rather unique approach to the "transit-first" orientation of the MTC plan: staff efforts to quantify project costs and establish project priorities related almost exclusively to the transit program. As mentioned previously, the MTC financial plan throughout this period resembled a transit development plan far more than the financial plan called for by AB 363. The law envisioned a process whereby MTC would determine ten-year transportation needs, draw up a schedule of implementation priorities "on a project basis to meet such needs," and prepare a financial plan relating sources of revenue to expenditures.⁷⁶ Despite this rather well-defined set of required financial-planning products, actual staff work prior to May, 1973, concentrated on the exploration of revenue sources and the development of capital improvement programs* - which addressed the questions of transportation needs and project priorities only implicitly. As late as May 15, the outline of Section IV was:

- A. Introduction
- B. Revenues by Source
- C. Development Programs by Mode and Agency
- D. Plan Elements - Financial Implications
- E. Provisions for Implementation.⁷⁸

It was only after the middle of May that a separate section on Transportation Needs was added; meanwhile, the implementation priorities were

*AB 69 did require a "program" as one element of the regional transportation plans drawn up under its authority.⁷⁷ However, it did not specify the ten-year time span that MTC adopted, perhaps in an attempt to equate the program with the transportation needs estimate called for by AB 363. Also, MTC was under no obligation to make its initial Plan conform to AB 69: plans under AB 69 were not due until April 1, 1975.

never really divorced from a specific capital improvement program.

The MTC staff's revenue estimates were broken down into three major categories. Estimates of highway revenues involved investigation of existing sources and projection of their yields over a ten-year period. Although these projections were relatively cut-and-dried, they did lead to a dispute with the Division of Highways over the total amount likely to be available to the region. The MTC staff, whose assumptions about future federal policy were more optimistic than the Division's, projected slightly higher ten-year revenues for the state highway system within the region than did the Division. Although the difference (\$1.4 billion as opposed to \$1.33 billion) was probably insignificant in view of the uncertainties involved in both forecasts, this estimate was a source of continuing criticism by the Division of Highways.

The second category of MTC revenue estimate involved the region's toll bridges. These estimates were of special interest to the staff because bridge surpluses represented an existing revenue source that might be used for mass transit. Since the bridge tolls were also a primarily local source, the staff believed that there was a good chance that the legislature would give MTC control over their allocation. Consequently, bridge toll surpluses were analyzed in some detail, and the results of various strategies for retiring bridge bonds and scheduling bridge replacements were compared.

Transit revenue estimates were broken down into two categories: revenues for the existing and committed system, which were derived from existing sources, and potential new sources. Existing sources were projected in much the same manner as highway revenue sources. Potential

new sources were investigated in general terms, these included, besides the bridge tolls, increased property and sales taxes, increased transit fares, an increase of one cent per gallon in the gas tax, and limited diversion of existing highway funds. Highway fund diversion options that were explored by the MTC staff included the then-proposed Federal Aid to Urban Systems funds and diversion from state subventions to local governments. It would appear, however, that MTC staff members working on Section IV (unlike those working on Section V) never suggested diversion of any of the \$1.4 billion they had projected as being available for the state highway system within the region.

Most MTC staff work on the capital improvement program centered on the transit program, with the Division of Highways' proposed program being accepted intact as the MTC highway program. English says that so far as he was concerned, that this was a deliberate political decision - that "we were afraid to mess with" the highway program for fear of an adverse reaction from the Division. English also says that he believed that this was what his superiors wanted; that, although he was never given any instructions in the matter, it was his impression that "that was the way the game was going to be played."

The transit program was quite another matter. This was broken down into a program for the existing and committed system, which dealt with the operating deficits expected to result from continuing present (or committed) levels of service, and with capital improvements which had already been approved by UMTA; a proposed system, which included projects proposed by either operators or special studies; and a recommended system, which was an independent staff proposal.

The "recommended system" was based on crude, but objective, measures

of levels of service. The staff took the level of service provided by the AC Transit District to be "adequate" for local service, and that of Golden Gate Transit to be "adequate" for trunkline service. The ratios of buses to population served were then determined for these two systems, and calculations were made of the number of buses needed to extend this "adequate" level of service to the entire region. As compared to the proposals of the transit operators, the recommended system emphasized extension of local service and use of buses, rather than rapid transit, to serve trunkline demands. Only one of the proposed BART extensions - the San Mateo County extension - was included in the recommended system, and this only as an alternative. Even so, the staff's estimates placed the total ten-year capital and operating costs of this bus-rail proposal at more than twice that of their all-bus proposal.*⁷⁹

Thus, the implications of staff work on Section IV in March and April were that MTC would not disturb the status quo of the highway program, but would press for a transit system featuring extended local service and a low-capital trunkline system.

3. The Final Push: May, 1973.

As late as April 11, the MTC staff had announced plans to distribute a draft version of the whole Plan by May 11.⁸⁰ By the end of April, it was evident that this deadline could not be met. Sections I and II had been provisionally adopted two months previously, but Section III was subject to continuing controversy. As matters stood around the first of May, Sections III-A and III-C were complete, except that there

* These figures somewhat overstate the advantage of an all-bus system because they ignore the differences in amortization periods for bus and rail.

was continuing confusion about the meaning and implications of the categories in Section III-C; Section III-B was still undergoing revision; and parts of Section III-D were apparently meeting opposition as either being too extreme or as being more appropriate to Section V, which was supposed to outline MTC's proposals for action. Much work had been done on Section IV, but nothing was yet on paper. Work on Sections V and VI was apparently just beginning. Consequently, the staff and Commission were faced with tremendous time pressure in order to produce a draft in time for public review before Plan adoption, which was still scheduled for the end of June.

Completion of Section III.

Although the categorizations of Section III-C remained virtually unchanged after the version of April 25, Section III as a whole was not provisionally adopted until May 9. Major changes made in the Section in early May included the completion of Section III-B and the revision of Section III-D. In addition, there was continuing discussion of the meaning of the categories in Section III-C.

Section III-B was entitled the "Evaluation Process." It consisted of a brief discussion of "evaluative factors," - including regional growth and development, travel demands, environmental trends and assumptions, and social needs - and of "evaluations" - "descriptions" might have been a more accurate word - of the transportation corridors which formed the geographical basis for the table of issues. Much of the delay in completing Section III-B seems to have been related to revision and coordination of these corridor descriptions.⁹¹

Revisions to Section III-D included deletion of most of the introduction to the section, including the statement of objectives (see page 227), some fairly minor rewording of the text elsewhere, deletion

of the financial and legal proposals and those dealing with the transportation planning process, and a number of category changes.⁸² It would appear that the financial and legal and transportation planning process proposals were deleted from Section III-D because it was felt that it would be more appropriate to deal with them in Sections V and VI - in any event, many of them were repeated in the drafts of those two sections. The category changes involved the dropping of a number of programs from Category I to Category II. Among those reclassified were the joint transit vehicle maintenance proposal, terminal and vehicle redesign proposals (under both "Low-Capital-Intensive Transit System Improvements" and "Special Needs-Facility Redesign"), the improved highway maintenance practices proposal, and the proposals to penalize high-powered passenger vehicles and reduce employee travel.⁸³

Meanwhile, there was continuing controversy about the meaning of the categories. The definitions of the categories in the Issue Evaluation Recap distributed to the Commission on April 25, were the same as those adopted by the Work Program Committee on April 11. By the May 9 Commission meeting, a paragraph introducing the definitions had been added. This read:

The Metropolitan Transportation Commission has adopted a set of categories to indicate the status of plan development. They define the extent to which MTC has determined that any program or project may further the attainment of regional transportation goals in the years to come, and illustrate the overall direction in which the Commission is moving to achieve these goals.⁸⁴

This statement perpetuated the key ambiguity involving the category system: did it mean that the categories "defined the extent" to which MTC had made a determination about the projects it was considering or that the categories defined the extent to which the projects under

consideration would help to meet regional transportation goals? Was this The Plan or just a plan for making a plan?

Meanwhile, a paragraph had been added to the definition of Category II stating that the Commission:

...may establish conditional priorities for implementation of some programs or facilities, and may consider their probable costs for conclusion in the 10-year capital improvement program.⁸⁵

At the same time, there was an increasing tendency to deny that the categories had specific financial implications. In the memorandum transmitting the Issue Evaluation Recap, Watt had written: "Since these categorizations have not yet been fully related to the proposed 10-year C.I.P., further minor adjustments may be required."⁸⁶ The impression being left by the staff at this point, then, was that the categories were in some sense related to the capital improvement program (but "not yet fully") and that minor adjustments would be made to fully relate the two elements of the Plan. By May 15, in the memorandum transmitting the provisionally adopted version of Section III, Watt was writing:

These categories do not, in any sense, reflect priorities or timing for implementation. Priorities for timing and funding are the subject of Section IV which deals with The Program, while Section III deals only with The Plan. [emphasis in original.]⁸⁷

Thus, as of April 25, the categories were "not yet fully related" to the capital improvement program (which expressed priorities and timing for implementation) but would be after "minor adjustments" had been made; by May 15, they did not - in any sense - even reflect priorities or timing for implementation. The categorizations themselves were of course virtually identical on the two occasions.

It is not quite clear what caused the MTC staff to adopt the position that the categories were not related to the program (even though their definitions in the text of Section III continued to imply that

they were). One possibility is that this position was urged on MTC by its Technical Advisory Committee. The TAC did make comments about Section III, which were reviewed by the Work Program Committee on May 7; as usual, however, the details of these comments were not recorded in the minutes. On May 16, however, the TAC passed a motion requesting that language similar to that of Watt's memorandum of May 15 be included in the text of the Plan. According to the Commission minutes, the TAC reported that:

There were two motions passed at the May 16 meeting. One of the motions resulted from discussions of the four (4) categories of the regional transportation system. The first motion states that the text of Section III should include a preamble to the Category definitions which should substantially say that these categories are descriptive of the degree of certainty about including elements in the transportation system and are not intended as comments regarding financing, programming, etc., which are covered in a subsequent section of the Plan.⁸⁸

Section III was provisionally adopted by the Commission on May 9, and sent out to the public on May 15.

Section VI.

One of the major uncertainties surrounding the category system of Section III was the role that it might play in the administration and modification of the Regional Transportation Plan after its adoption. From the very beginning, the senior staff and the Work Program Committee had emphasized that nothing in Section III was meant to imply MTC commitment to individual projects; final approval was viewed as a function of the Grant Review Committee, and was to be granted on a project-by-project basis. Throughout the period during which the categories were being assigned, these procedures had not been spelled out. Consideration of permanent grant review procedures was reserved for Section VI; meanwhile, the Grant Review Committee operated under interim procedures.

Nevertheless, the relationship of the categories to this set of as-yet unformulated procedures was hardly irrelevant to the debate over the meaning of the categories, the willingness of the Commission to accept the category system, or, for that matter, to individual categorizations. In every case, there was uncertainty as to how the categories would be applied and what the consequences of individual categorizations would be. This uncertainty contributed to the general air of indecisiveness that surrounded the category system. Finally, the question was raised at the April 25 Commission meeting. According to the minutes:

Commissioner Gatov inquired about the process or mechanism by which an issue could be changed from one category to another and was informed that this information will be contained in Section VI, which is being drafted...

A question was raised about how categorization of an issue would affect its Federal funding. Mr. Bay replied that MTC is discussing this matter with DOT representatives now. Staff will be addressing in this section [apparently Section VI, not Section III] the question of whether the Grant Review Committee could consider acting on a facility in Category II.⁸⁹

At about this time (and possibly because of the shadow that the plan administration question was casting on Section III) work was begun on Section VI. As a result, the first drafts of Section VI were completed prior to the first drafts of Sections IV and V.

The first draft of Section VI was completed around May 4, and went to the Grant Review and Work Program Committees on May 9. According to this draft, the Plan Administration Section was to be based on the category system, and "the principal concern of Plan Administration is the movement of a regional project/program/facility within the structure of these categories."⁹⁰ A closely related concern, of course, was the classification of issues as being of regional or local nature. This draft referred to the criteria and procedures in Section I for determin-

ing regional significance, and declared that "a project not formally classified as being regional...is not within the Metropolitan Transportation Commission jurisdiction."⁹¹

The first draft of Section VI envisioned plan administration and implementation as consisting of:

1. Plan Amendment
2. Section 66520 Review*
3. Transit-Aid and Claims Administration
4. Public Participation.⁹²

The proposed plan amendment process was to be the responsibility of a new Plan Amendment Committee. Provisions were made for regular annual amendments and for emergency amendments. Amendments might be submitted to the Plan Amendment Committee by the Commission, the staff, or an implementing agency (through proposal of a project) and might be submitted for any one of eight reasons listed in the draft. The amendment process was to involve staff evaluation, Plan Amendment Committee recommendations, and a vote by the full Commission. A two-thirds majority of all voting members was to be required for adoption of a regular amendment, and a three-fourths majority of all voting members for an emergency amendment.

At this stage, the amendment process was apparently seen as pertaining primarily to the table of issues. Not all category changes, however, were to require amendments. The draft declared that:

*That is, project reviews carried out under the authority of Section 66520 of the California Government Code, which declared that MTC shall review any application by a local government for state or federal matching funds if the proposal contains a transportation element.

Recognizing that the first category in which substantial regional resources can be committed to a project/program/facility is Category II..., the movement of a project/program/facility from either Category III...or Category IV...to Category II will require amendment.⁹³

Other category changes, however, could be accomplished by other means. Movement from Category IV to Category III could be accomplished by a majority vote of the Grant Review Committee, and movement from Category II to Category I, by a simple majority of the Commission.⁹⁴

The project review process was to be undertaken in cases of proposed category changes not requiring amendment and whenever final approval for implementation was contemplated. Exact procedures for project review had not been drawn up at the time of the first draft, but reviews were definitely to include environmental review, and final approval of a Category I project was apparently viewed as being a staff function except in unusual circumstances. On this point, the draft reads:

Final construct/purchase approval requires a staff analysis and... [a] letter by the Executive Director explaining the level of funding approval. If the Executive Director so desires, for reasons of policy clarification, the final approval can be passed by a majority vote of the full commission.⁹⁵

On the question of approval of Category II projects, the draft declared that:

Final construct/purchase approval can be authorized by a majority of the full Commission if a project is in Category II and construct/purchase approval is requested along with action to change a proposal to Category I.⁹⁶

Thus, final approval would require Category I status - but only as a formality.

The major feature of the Public Participation Section of the first draft of Section VI was a proposed Citizen's Advisory Committee. This Committee was to be composed of representatives of citizens organiza-

tions dealing with MTC. Citizens not affiliated with an organization would not be allowed to participate directly in the Committee, but might work with the ABAG Regional Citizens' Forum Transportation Issues Committee, which would be represented on the Citizens' Advisory Committee. A full-time MTC staff member would be assigned to provide liaison between MTC and the committee and to carry out supporting activities and research under the direction of the committee.⁹⁷

Other features of the proposed public participation program included working with organizations and individuals on an individual basis as much as possible and, in connection with this, continued maintenance of a citizen opinion file; working with citizens' advisory groups on a project-by-project basis in the case of transit development projects and the like; and the use of amendment proceedings as public hearings on projects and facilities.⁹⁸

Section VI was reviewed by both the Grant Review and Work Program Committees on May 9. Although the Grant Review Committee reported to the full Commission that it generally approved of the section at that time,⁹⁹ what would appear to be major revisions were made prior to the release of the Draft Regional Transportation Plan on June 1. The introduction to the section was revised to deemphasize the category system; plan amendment was now looked upon as a procedure which applied to all parts of the Plan equally. The June 1 version declared that "all substantive changes in the Regional Transportation Plan will be subject to the amendment process;" this specifically included any "movement within categories in any direction."¹⁰⁰ Regular amendment remained an annual procedure; however, requirements for adoption of regular amendments were reduced to a simple majority of all voting members of the Commission

and those for emergency amendments to a two-thirds majority. Moreover, it was stipulated that the regular amendment procedures would not go into effect until January 1, 1974; in the interim, amendments might be adopted on thirty days notice by a two-thirds majority of Commission members present and voting. Section VI was also revised to provide that responsibility for the amendment process would rest with the Work Program Committee rather than with an all-new Plan Amendment Committee. All mention of the issue of approval of Category II projects was dropped, and hence, the question was left unresolved.¹⁰¹

The Public Participation proposal was revised to remove all reference to the proposed Citizens' Advisory Committee. Instead, the decision about the final nature of the public participation program was postponed until after a meeting involving "all interested organizations and individuals" could be held for the purpose of recommending a plan of public participation. In the interim, the MTC public participation program would consist of (1) liaison with interested groups, including the ABAG Regional Citizens' Forum Transportation Issues Committee; (2) encouragement of public attendance and comments at Commission and Grant Review Committee meetings; (3) the citizen opinion file; (4) an MTC mailing list; (5) the project-oriented citizen advisory groups; and (6) use of the amendment proceedings as public hearings on projects and facilities.¹⁰²

Section IV.

The last two sections of the 1973 Plan to be written were Sections IV and V. Although work in support of Section IV had been in progress

for nearly a year by May, 1973, the first draft of the actual text was not written until the latter half of May.

In early May, prior staff work on the financial plan was compiled into two documents entitled Revenue Forecasts and Development Programs.¹⁰³ These documents, which were presented to the Work Program Committee on May 18, were apparently intended to be Subsections B and C of Section IV, as it was then outlined (see page 237). These documents contained the revenue forecasts previously described (see page 238) and the development programs as they were then envisioned by the staff group which had been working on the financial plan. The Development Programs consisted of the Division of Highways' capital improvement program, which was listed on a project-by-project basis and broken down into a three-year program (corresponding to that required by federal guidelines) and a seven-year program covering the remainder of the ten-year period, and of the Existing and Committed, Proposed, and Recommended transit programs previously described (see page 239).

The details of the Work Program Committee's reaction to these documents are not recorded in the minutes, which merely state that the Committee reviewed the material and noted changes for the staff to consider.¹⁰⁴ Bay's reaction reportedly was that the documents were too detailed to be included in the text of the plan as they then stood - that Section IV would have to be cut back, lest it "overshadow" Section III. Judging from the subsequent revisions to Section IV, however, it would appear that the Revenue Forecasts and Development Programs posed serious problems for the Work Program Committee and the MTC staff leaders.

These problems involved (1) the discrepancy between MTC's concept of the financial plan (as expressed in the outline of Section IV) and the staff's priorities for work on the section and the requirements of AB 363 and (2) the continuing problem of coordination between the category system and the capital improvement program.

The most serious discrepancy between the requirements of AB 363 and the May 18 version of Section IV was the lack of a transportation needs estimate. The law required a needs estimate, but the outline of May 15 made no mention of one; furthermore, it was not clear just how the work which had been done in forecasting revenues and identifying development programs could be used as the basis for a needs estimate. A part of the problem stemmed from confusion over what the "needs estimate" was supposed to be.

Ideally, a "needs estimate" would be an estimate of the cost of attaining some clear-cut objective. The term originated in the field of highway finance; in that context, the traditional objective was the attainment of some predetermined level of service on all highway segments within a system. MTC, however, would not be able to directly apply such a definition to its situation: in the first place, the Commission had not established attainment of any specific level of service as a goal of the plan; in the second, it did not necessarily support the idea that the level of service should be the same in all cases; and finally, there was a real question as to whether levels of service for transit could be meaningfully compared with levels of service for highways.*

*In fact, there were (and are) no universally accepted criteria for determining levels of service for transit. In the case of highways, the definitions of levels of service contained in the Highway Capacity Manual are generally accepted.

In California highway law, the concept of "needs" was used in a similar, but subtly different sense. In this case, "needs estimates" were used as the basis for fund allocations among highway districts. These needs estimates were based on predetermined levels of service, but there was no intention that these levels of service necessarily be attained. The needs estimates were intended to measure the performance of the system in each geographical area relative to that of the system as a whole, rather than the total financial effort needed to attain a realistic set of objectives. In California highway terminology, a distinction was made between the "unconstrained" (or "modified unconstrained") estimates used as the basis for the allocation formulas and "constrained" estimates which were intended to identify projects which might be accomplished with available funding.

The authors of AB 363 apparently did not consider the relationship between the needs estimates MTC was to produce and the needs estimates used in the highway fund allocation formulas. MTC's needs estimate was apparently intended to be "constrained", if not by the funding MTC expected, then at least by what it was willing to propose. MTC was to draw up a schedule of implementation priorities on a project basis "to meet such needs" as it might identify. It was also to include in its financial plan proposed sources of revenue "necessary to construct, maintain, and operate" each segment of the regional transportation system. The implication seemed to be that MTC was not to claim needs where it was not ready to propose solutions; and it was not to propose solutions where it was not willing to propose sources of revenue for their implementation.

Finally, MTC had already used the term "needs" in defining the categories. In this sense, "needs" definitely were not related to predetermined levels of service. To the extent that the term meant anything, it meant that MTC recognized an unfulfilled transportation demand which it wished to see fulfilled to some extent. But because of the shifts in the meaning of the categories, it was never clear (particularly in the case of Category III) whether MTC was assigning categories on the basis of the existence or non-existence of unfulfilled transportation demands or on its evaluation of the projects proposed to satisfy those demands.

The root of the problem facing the MTC staff was that none of the possible definitions of "needs" actually got at the real issue: given all the circumstances, (including transportation demands, transportation service conditions, costs, social and environmental impacts, and possible sources of revenue and their competing uses) how much did MTC want to spend on the regional transportation system in the next ten years? Lacking any really clear mandate to address that issue, the staff members involved seem to have seen their choice as being between accepting "unconstrained" estimates produced by the implementing agencies or "constrained" estimates based on the proposed development programs. It apparently did not occur to them to base the needs estimates on the category system; English says that they always considered the "needs" referred to in the definition of the categories to be a different kind of "needs" from those in Section IV. It would appear that as of May 18 it had not been decided which definitions of transportation needs would be used in Section IV, nor even that the Plan would contain a needs estimate.

A second problem with the legality of the financial plan, as matters stood on May 18, was that of whether MTC's development programs could serve as the schedule of priorities called for in the enabling legislation. The law called for a schedule of priorities "on a project basis." It could certainly be argued that the highway program contained sufficient detail to constitute a schedule of priorities "on a project basis" - although the priorities implicit in that program were those of the Division of Highways, and not necessarily MTC's - but the transit development program made no distinctions of priority except those between the existing and committed program, the recommended ten-year program, and those projects which were on neither; projects in this last group were presumably to be implemented only after ten years, if ever.

Even though the development programs (especially the transit development program) may have lacked sufficient detail to conform to the law, in another sense they were too detailed. Publication of a detailed capital improvement program as a part of the Plan would force the issues of the degree to which MTC was committing itself to individual projects and the correspondence (or non-correspondence) between the category system and the program.

Throughout the development of Section III, the Work Program Committee and the senior staff had stressed that (with a few exceptions) they did not want the Plan to commit MTC to specific projects. Although this policy was not universally popular - at least one commissioner worried out loud that, by adopting the category system, the

Commission was postponing making decisions on controversial issues¹⁰⁵
- it was, by and large, the intent of both the commission and the
staff leadership to keep MTC commitments to a minimum. In actually
assigning categories, the trend had been to place most projects in

Category II, the least definite of the categories, and this trend had become stronger as time went by. If MTC published a detailed development program, however, it would be very difficult to claim that the Commission was not making commitments to specific projects that went far beyond those it had been willing to make in assigning the categories. For instance, the tendency in Section III had been to lump all the transit proposals that were currently under study into Category II. In the Development Programs of May 18, however, a very definite distinction was made between the recommended transit program and those program elements which had merely been proposed by the operators. In the case of the proposed BART extensions, in particular, Section IV was suggesting that a very definite order of priorities existed. This suggested a commitment that might seem premature, in light of the fact that almost all the BART extensions were in Category II and MTC had never indicated how it would determine which Category II projects would have priority. Likewise, a detailed highway program would imply the sort of commitments that the Commission and senior staff had been careful to avoid in drawing up Section III. It was hard to see how MTC could publish a detailed capital improvement program or a detailed schedule of priorities, and still claim that it was not committing itself to specific projects - and at the same time, given the language of AB 363, it was hard to see how it could avoid publishing a detailed priority list.

Publication of a detailed capital improvement program would also bring the issue of the relationship between the category system and the program to a head. By May 18, there had clearly been a retreat from the original assumption of the corridor teams that the categories

would provide a definite basis for the program. This retreat had gone through a stage in which the program was to be developed separately, but there was to be a process of mutual adjustment between Sections III and IV (Watt's April 25 memorandum) to one in which the categories were not supposed to reflect funding or implementation priorities in any sense (Watt's May 15 memorandum). At the same time, however, the question of the possible negative funding significance of Category III was still open within the staff, and negotiations with the Division of Highways over the implications of the categories were still going forward. Meanwhile, Watt's memorandum did not necessarily say that the funding priorities would not reflect the categorizations. Adoption and publication of the Division of Highways' program as contained in the May 18 version would force the issue, since this program did contain several Category III projects. Moreover, publication of any detailed highway program was politically hazardous: since MTC had entered into negotiations with the Division of Highways, unilateral publication of any highway program other than the Division's (for instance, one in which Category III did have negative funding significance) might appear to the Division as evidence of bad faith; at the same time, given the Sierra Club's reaction to the revision of the table of issues, publication of a highway program that could be identified as the Division's would almost certainly provoke renewed accusations of collusion.

Publication of a detailed capital improvement program would also reveal another problem. As of May 18 (and, indeed, until the revision of the Plan in 1974) the category system was seen as the principal device for administering the Plan. Yet, it would be clear from the

capital improvement programs in Section IV that there were a number of projects - some of them by no means minor - that had never been defined as issues in Section III and, consequently, never categorized. What was the status of these projects?

There had always been some question about whether non-controversial projects should be identified as issues and included in the table in Section III-C. Consequently, there was one school of thought that held that projects of regional significance might be approved and implemented without being recognized as issues or categorized. This position would, of course, have been incompatible with the use of the category system as the central mechanism of the Plan and the key element in its administration. In fact, most of the projects which had been omitted had not been omitted because they were necessarily non-controversial, but simply because they had been overlooked. Discovery of a class of projects which were proposed for implementation but not included in the table of issues would reveal a class of projects that were in limbo so far as their relation to the Plan was concerned.

It would appear that at or shortly after the Work Program Committee meeting of May 18 a decision was made to revise the outline of Section IV. The task of revising the section itself fell to Carll. By May 23, a draft was complete and ready for presentation to the full Commission. This draft consisted of four subsections:

- A. Resource Allocation as a Whole
- B. Revenues for Transportation
- C. Ten-Year Estimate of Regional Transportation Needs
- D. Plan Elements.¹⁰⁶

The "Resource Allocation as a Whole" subsection served as an

introduction to the Section. It began by declaring that:

The regional transportation system described in Section III of the Plan would cost roughly \$10 billion of public funds to construct and \$400 million a year by 1990 to maintain and operate. Although this system anticipates an increasing emphasis upon the public transit element, as compared with highways, the highway, road and bridge system nevertheless accounts for nearly one-half of the total expense, which is sufficient to consume funds that can presently be forecast to be available for highways.¹⁰⁷

The \$10 billion figure was actually derived from the state's submission to the 1968 National Transportation Needs Study. It was deliberately chosen as representing an extremely high estimate; contrary to the implication of the passage quoted above, it was not based on any system described in Section III. Subsection A went on to declare that "the gap between mass transit costs and funding, however, is considerably wider,"¹⁰⁸ and to make a plea for increased spending for transit. This involved a comparison of the overall costs of the automobile system with those of the transit system. The point was made (at least implicitly) that it was difficult to compare transit and automobile costs because of the different division of responsibility between the public and private sectors: in order to increase transit service, resources would have to be shifted from the private to the public sector; while this would mean an increase in public spending, it might not represent an increase in the total cost of the transportation system. Subsection A concluded with the remark that:

Throughout the next ten years, a transit-emphasis plan will have to increase the level of current spending on mass transit, mainly through developing sources of revenue not now available for Bay Area transportation, and call upon a wide spectrum of revenue sources in order to provide adequate financing for the Commission's plan.¹⁰⁹

Subsection B, "Revenues for Transportation" formed the bulk of the May 23 draft (27 of 44 pages). This subsection followed the

Revenue Forecasts document of May 18 very closely in most matters.

Exceptions included the deletion of much of the plea for the proposal to give MTC control of bridge toll surpluses and the addition of an extensive list of "additional revenue sources" whose funding potential had not been explored.¹¹⁰

Subsection C, the "Ten-Year Estimate of Regional Transportation Needs," began by stating:

The estimate of 10-year needs is based upon development programs regularly provided to the Metropolitan Transportation Commission by transportation agencies. These are reviewed for their consistency with the plan for the regional system in Section III, and they are revised or supplemented where necessary by staff studies of needs not yet identified in agency programs.

Ten year needs should have two characteristics: (1) they should be higher in priority, as compared with long-range needs, and (2) they should represent projects or financial requirements that can be reasonably programmed over the ten year period....

In line with the direction pointed out in Section III, projects and programs designated as "Category I" are generally considered to be included in ten-year needs. Most projects designated "Category II" -- under active planning -- are considered to indicate at least some financial need before the end of the period. Category III items are largely regarded as beyond the ten-year period, and Category IV items are excluded altogether.

There should also be a reasonable expectation that any ten-year element can be funded during the period. This does not mean that all elements can be funded from present sources of revenue.... Elements are included in the ten-year program, however, if it appears that the requisite financial commitments could be arranged under an overall financial plan.

Finally, the estimate may to some extent be excessive because of the number and variety of plan options that are indicated in Section III...

Thus, the needs estimates were represented as being based upon Section III - but in no definite manner. According to this version of Section IV, the needs estimates were based upon implementing agencies' programs which were "reviewed for their consistency" with Section III - but there was no indication of the manner in which they were supposed to be

consistent. "In line with the direction pointed in Section III" (what direction?) items in Category I were "generally" included in the needs estimates, "most projects" in Category II were considered to indicate "at least some financial need before the end of the period", and Category III items were "largely regarded as beyond the ten-year period." Only in the case of Category IV was there a definite relationship between the category system and the needs estimate: all Category IV items were excluded. Finally, it was stated that the estimate might be excessive because of the "number and variety of plan options that are indicated in Section III" - not the number and variety of plan options that had been considered in an independent process of making up development programs for Section IV.

In fact, the highway needs estimate was nothing other than the total of the Division of Highways' capital improvement program - although the May 23 draft never stated where the number came from. This figure was used, not because any detailed evaluation of the program had revealed that it was consistent with Section III, but because Carll believed that, as a matter of policy, transit should have a prior claim on any new funding. Saying that the region "needed" the highway funding that it expected to get from existing sources - and no more - was his way of signaling that MTC would not support increases in highway funding. That the use of this figure also signaled that MTC would not support diversion of existing highway funds to mass transit apparently did not occur to him - although Section IV elsewhere did refuse to commit MTC to diversion should it become legally possible - but on entirely different grounds (see below, page 264). In discussing the highway needs estimate, however, this draft of

Section IV did continue the balancing act between commitment and non-commitment, stating that:

However, the great majority of this estimate is representative of projects having a "Category II" designation in the MTC Plan, indicating that while the projects are under active planning consideration and therefore should be included in the programming of funds for the next ten years, they are not committed needs and are still open to further evaluation.¹¹²

The transit needs estimate, on the other hand, represented a compromise between the "proposed" and "recommended" programs of the May 18 version. "Total needs" were represented as being the combination of both programs, while ten-year needs were now held to consist of the recommended system plus partial funding for a Marin busway, including a transit deck on the Golden Gate Bridge and a subway in San Francisco, and BART (or other rapid transit) extensions in the San Mateo, Santa Clara, Pittsburg-Antioch, Livermore, and Geary (San Francisco) corridors. Of these, only the San Mateo extension had been on the recommended program, and that only as an option. In discussing the transit needs estimate, the draft declares:

The specific projects and capital commitments identified for funding within the ten-year program are representative of a possible distribution of resources based upon presently known needs and status of planning. As planning programs are completed and proposals and needs further evaluated it is expected that the programming will change to represent more "realistic" commitments. For example, the BART extensions to Livermore, Antioch, and Geary Boulevard are all programmed for partial funding. The actual program for ten years must await the evaluations of the studies underway after which it may be determined to fund one or all these extensions in part or completely within ten years.¹¹³

Thus, it was now hinted that the rail rapid transit extensions, which had been largely rejected by English's group in their recommended system, might be approved (rather than rejected) when the studies then underway were complete.

Subsection D, the "Plan Elements," consisted of the financial plan and a so-called "Priorities Program." The financial plan was intended to relate revenues to proposed expenditures. In the case of highways, the draft stated that expected revenues (\$1.4 billion) would be sufficient to cover "the investment in State system highways programmed for the next 10 years,"¹¹⁴ and went on to state that:

In view of the dominance of "Category II" items in the highway program, the financial plan at this time does not contain any recommendation for revision in present funding sources. Should the federal discretionary policy come into effect in the near future, use of funds would be largely dependent upon decisions reached about highway program elements now having "Category II" status.

As an essential part of the financial plan for highways, however, the Commission urges that Federal and State policy for the allocation of federal-state funds within California recognize the full range of urban transportation needs and the generation of highway user revenues within the Bay Area. The region contains well over 20% of the State population and travel and federal policy for allocating funds to California and State policy for the division of funds within the State, should provide a comparable distribution of revenue for use in the region.¹¹⁵

In the case of transit, the draft noted that existing revenue sources would be just about adequate for the existing and committed system, but that "it is evident that in total amount the presently available funding (excluding federal funds not now committed) could be largely consumed before any substantial addition to public transit in the region was made." (emphasis in original.)¹¹⁶ The draft suggested that the following revenue sources deserved first consideration for funds to expand the transit system:

1. Federal transit aid
2. Federal discretionary funds
3. Bridge tolls
4. Gas tax increase (an increase of two cents per gallon, with revenue marked for an intermodal fund.)

5. One-half percent sales tax.¹¹⁷

The "priority program" of the May 23 draft consisted of three-year capital improvement programs for both highways and mass transit. No funds were shown as programmed for the succeeding seven years except in cases in which projects were to be initiated but not completed during the first three years. Transit projects were listed according to operator and included only projects for which federal grants had already been committed. The highway projects listed, of course, were from the Division of Highways' proposed capital improvement program. This list was broken down on a county-by-county basis. Major projects were listed individually if they had been identified as issues in Section III; minor projects and those that had been overlooked in Section III* (including one \$17 million project) were lumped together as "other projects" and listed on a county-by-county basis.¹¹⁸

These programs were prefaced by the statement that:

The schedule of priorities over a ten-year period depends upon the funding assumptions that attach to the transportation improvement programs. Projects during the initial years must rely on revenues that are obtainable from existing sources, and those expenditures to which present revenues are committed must be considered as having highest priority. Projects that depend upon new revenue sources must be staged according to the availability of the new funds and the uses that may be made of them.

In view of the uncertainty of transit plans and funding, this priorities program at this time indicates only those improvements that have been committed in a policy sense, and for which funds are available. Also, highway program elements are listed only for the immediate future and includes [sic] those projects designated in "Category I" or those having a high likelihood of acceptance.¹¹⁹

*Actually, one project that had not been categorized, the I-80/Route 113 interchange in Solano County, was listed; however, no other projects omitted from Section III were identified.

The priorities program in the May 23 draft left one major question unanswered - what was the status of the rest of the capital improvement program listed in the May 18 version? So far as the May 23 draft was concerned, no program existed for the period beyond three years. Yet the three year program manifestly did not "meet such needs" as MTC had claimed in the needs estimate, nor did it cover the ten-year period required by AB 363. Moreover, the Division of Highways still had a ten-year capital improvement program. Did projects on it have any special status?

This issue was not settled when the section came up for provisional adoption on May 23 - and possible was not even raised. The minutes report:

Provisional Adoption of Section IV, Financial Plan and Priorities Program. Dick Carll discussed the priorities of projects for Section IV. Commissioner Trower questioned the validity of having studies if we are doing everything by priorities.

Commissioner Houghteling stated that we should have the best possible plan, but it appears that because of the money situation, we are developing priorities according to money and not druthers.

Commissioner Giersch wanted to know where the source of each project came from. Dick Carll said that the basic source of information came from transportation systems in Section III.

Commissioner Kenny requested that the list of projects be submitted to members of the Commission. He further asked that issues be listed within the Plan. Paul Bay explained that there are hundreds of projects and that the corridors would become too clustered [sic] if we were to list them all and that some projects were not of regional significance.

The section was then provisionally adopted with the provision that it be sent back to the WPC for further editing.¹²⁰

The draft of Section IV was revised considerably in the ensuing week. Subsection A was retained much as it had been on May 23, except that the \$10 billion figure for the total cost of the regional transportation system was increased to \$12 billion to reflect the effects of inflation.¹²¹ Subsection B, however, was drastically condensed. Most

of the description of the present highway funding system was deleted, as was much of the discussion of toll bridge revenues. In the discussion of transit revenues, the section on additional sources was revised. The proposal for use of surplus funds from existing bridge tolls, which had been included in the May 23 draft, was moved to a separate location and replaced in the list by a proposal for doubling bridge tolls; at the same time, the proposal for making two cents of the existing gasoline tax discretionary was dropped. Also, the list of potential sources whose yields had not been investigated was condensed. Finally, in certain instances, language which might have been upsetting to the transit operators was deleted. One such case involved a sentence reading:

Some difficulty was encountered...since in several cases there is significant ambiguity as to the exact use of funds by transit operators.¹²²

Another example involved a sentence reading:

The county-by-county origin of present sources precludes their use for areas of extreme need (i.e. SF-Muni) while resulting in a sizeable surplus for areas without established public transit services.¹²³

There were also a number of changes in Section IV-C between May 23 and June 1. In the introduction to the subsection, the paragraph beginning "There should be a reasonable expectation that any ten-year element can be funded....(see page 260), was revised to read:

Although all 10-year elements cannot be funded from present revenue sources, there should be a reasonable expectation that they can be covered in MTC's financial plan, which includes new or revised revenue sources and may require policy decisions beyond MTC's existing authority.¹²⁴

The paragraph in the May 23 version reading:

Finally, the estimate may to some extent be excessive because of the number and variety of plan options that are indicated in Section III. Where options are plainly exclusive -- such as a

transit extension by one corridor or another -- the needs estimate does not include the cost of each alternative. Where alternatives are less certain and more generalized, such as highway development compared with public transit within a corridor, the level of needs may depend upon further planning studies being completed before it can be estimated with precision,¹²⁵

was replaced by a paragraph reading:

Each year, the 10-year program must be reviewed and advanced one year. Continuing public feedback and consultation with transportation agencies will help to improve the quality of the data and convert numbers representing mainly orders of magnitude into actual estimates of need.¹²⁶

In the June 1 version, a statement was added to explain how the highway needs estimate was derived. This paragraph read:

The 10-year estimate of capital needs for the State Highway System is placed at \$1.33 billion. This estimate was made through evaluation of the 10-year program of the State Division of Highways which relies considerably upon an assumption about available funding and does not include roads outside the State system which may have regional impact.¹²⁷

This explanation hinted at the real situation, but did not come right out and say that the figure was merely the total of the Division of Highway's program.*

The June 1 draft also added to the discussion of the highway needs estimate a paragraph attempting to relate MTC's needs estimates to those used by the state as a basis for allocation formulas. This paragraph read:

Section 188.8 of the State's Streets and Highways Code requires the Highway Division to prepare an inventory of regional highway needs. Because the inventory is not limited as to funding availability but is used to determine statewide allocations, it

*The difference in the figures quoted - \$1.33 billion in the June 1 draft as opposed to \$1.25 billion in the May 23 draft--apparently represented minor projects which had been overlooked in the earlier draft.

includes more projects and costs than are recognized in the Division's 10-year program. MTC believes it important that the entire highway inventory be used for statewide allocation purposes, at least until allocation techniques are changed, but that the 10-year program be used for regional planning purposes.¹²⁸

The major changes in Section IV-D involved the tables presenting the Priorities Programs. In both tables, figures representing the total amount of money to be allocated to each operator or county during the last seven years of the ten-year period were added. The totals in the transit program were based on the ten-year program listed in conjunction with the transit needs estimate; those in the highway program were based on the Division of Highways' proposed capital improvement program. All references to individual highway projects not in Category I* were dropped from the table listing the highway program; but the funds programmed for them were not dropped, but simply listed by year and by county with no indication as to which projects they represented.¹²⁹ In conjunction with these changes in the tables, the text was also revised. The paragraph beginning "In view of the uncertainty of transit plans...." (see page 264) was replaced by the statement that:

In view of the uncertainty of transport plans and funding commitments, suggested by the preponderance of transport issues in MTC's Plan designated "Category II," it appears advisable at this time that the priorities program indicate those improvements which can be regarded as largely "committed" in a policy sense, and for which funds are available. The programming of individual projects therefore is restricted to the immediate future.

For the remainder of the 10-year period, funds are programmed without regard to individual projects or staging by year....

As suggested in footnotes to these tables, it is important that the allocation of funds over the full 10-year period as between agencies or counties not be considered as an order of priority beyond the initial years.

*Highway projects not in Category I which had been listed in the May 23 version of the Priorities Program included I-580 in Alameda County, the Napa Bridge, I-280 in San Francisco between 3rd Street and I-80, Route 101 south of San Jose, and the I-80/Route 113 interchange in Solano County.

As funding sources are decided upon and planning evaluation proceeds, the identification and staging of projects on an annual basis will be further worked out. A yearly review and update of the priorities program will be carried on according to the procedures adopted for amendment of the Regional Transportation Plan. [Emphasis in original.]¹³⁰

These changes hardly clarified the status of the priority list for the final seven years. MTC now had aggregate figures for counties and agencies for this period. These aggregate figures were quite obviously based on the estimated costs of specific sets of projects - the estimates were carried out to the last \$100,000 for the ten-year period - but the plan claimed that funds were programmed without regard to individual projects. If so, why were the aggregate figures based on individual projects in the tables? Moreover, if the priorities were not on a project-by-project basis for the full ten years, the Plan still did not conform to AB 363.

Section V.

The text of Section V, like that of Section IV, was a product of the last-minute rush to complete a draft of the Regional Transportation Plan in time to allow some sort of public review and discussion before adoption. The earliest version of the section was produced around May 15; this draft, slightly modified but still in rough form, was presented to the Commission at its May 23 meeting.¹³¹

In its original form, Section V seems to have been seen mainly as a follow-up to Section III-D. It was divided into three subsections: Subsection A was concerned with actions within MTC's existing powers; Subsection B with proposals for legislative action concerning finance; and Subsection C with proposals for legislative action concerning institutional matters.

Actions suggested in Subsection A included the creation of a Metropolitan Transit Federation to implement Section III-D's proposals for transit coordination, creation of a Traffic Management Council to implement the transportation management proposals, broadening of the membership of MTC's Technical Advisory Committee, initiation of planning programs to refine the transit coordination and transportation management programs, initiation of "legislative research and action" programs to be undertaken by the MTC staff, and coordination of efforts to improve mathematical models as part of a "regional analysis program". Subsection B, the "Legislative Proposals for Financing", consisted of proposals for an intermodal gasoline tax fund, an increase in the California state gasoline tax, MTC control over Bay toll revenues, regional parking taxation, a "luxury tax surcharge" (on alcohol and tobacco) to finance transit-related programs, an airport ticket surcharge to finance airport access improvements, and progressive taxation on vehicle type and ownership. Of these, the first four were directly derived from the "Financial and Legal" proposals in the April 25 version of Section III-D; the remaining two proposals, however, were essentially new: they were mentioned in passing in the May 23 draft of Section IV as possible additional sources of transit revenue, but were developed in detail only in Section V. Subsection C, the proposals for legislation affecting institutional relationships, consisted of proposals (1) to give MTC emergency authority to institute new transit services by contract, (2) to grant transit-regulatory powers to MTC, (3) to make the Commission elective, (4) to create a joint land use/transportation development authority, (5) to establish regional land use controls, (6) to require that MTC issue building permits for con-

struction and modification of fee parking lots, (7) to change the "state override provision" in AB 363, and (8) to give MTC increased control over highway planning funds.¹³²

Subsections A and B, while far from non-controversial, were not very remarkable in light of previous MTC staff proposals. Most of the proposals in them had already been introduced in connection with Section III-D or else were logical extensions of the proposals in Section III-D. The proposals of Subsection C, on the other hand, were altogether radical, even in the context of past MTC staff proposals, and seem to have caught the Commission off guard. They amounted to no less than a comprehensive strategy for extending MTC's organizational domain in such ways as to make possible immediate implementation of a transit-first plan; as a result, they were almost certain to provoke strong reactions from the implementing agencies, the local governments, and the Commission.

Perhaps the mildest of the proposals in the staff version of Section V-C was that involving MTC emergency powers to contract for extensions of transit service. This proposal was intended to make it possible for MTC to intervene in cases in which there was substantial agreement that new transit services were needed, but no agreement on which agencies were to provide them. In the context of the immediate situation, there were a number of cases in which MTC was ready to make a commitment to new transit services, but either two or more transit operators were in a position to provide the service or there was no agency with the necessary territorial jurisdiction to provide the service on its own authority. A particularly acute example of this latter situation existed in Central Contra Costa County, where

feeder service to the BART stations was being delayed while the local governments tried to decide whether to extend the AC Transit District or form an entirely new transit agency. The MTC staff proposal was that in such cases, MTC could contract with an existing transit operator to provide service on a temporary basis and fund the operation out of SB 325 funds.

The proposal for MTC to be granted transit-regulatory powers was intended to allow MTC to control the operational characteristics of the Bay Area transit system. Included would have been powers over routes, fares, and quality of service; unlike the powers of the California Public Utilities Commission, the proposed MTC powers would have extended to public as well as private transit operators.

The proposal for an elective commission was similar to that in the original version of Section III-D. Included were both the proposal to make the Commission at least partially elective and the proposal to make it a full-time, salaried body. The original version of the draft went on to state that there were many possible schemes which might satisfy this objective, but that "...the exact details are not as important as making known to the State Legislature MTC's endorsement of the concept of direct election as a simultaneous action with MTC's proposed acquisition of major new decisionmaking powers."¹³³

The proposal for a joint land use/transportation authority was a followup to the suggestions in Section III-D that land in the vicinity of major new transportation facilities either be acquired by the public or have any "surplus" increase in value due to the transportation improvement confiscated by taxation. The proposal in the staff version of Section V was that MTC seek legislative authority to plan and implement joint land use/transportation projects. This would have involved authority

to condemn land near transportation nodes, to plan its development in conjunction with regional land use planning bodies and local governments, and then to sell or lease the land to developers who agreed to follow these land use plans.

The proposals for regional land use controls involved creation of a regional land use authority. In the original draft, this authority would have had power to "acquire or control land for preservation or planned conversion and development through leaseback, sale or zoning." At some point, however, this was changed to say that the authority was needed to "guide land use development" and to coordinate the efforts of BCDC, the Coastal Commission, and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, all of which already possessed the power to issue building permits in certain situations.¹³⁴

The proposal that MTC issue building permits for construction and modification of fee parking lots was apparently modeled after the permit authority of BCDC, the Coastal Commission, and the Air Pollution Control District. MTC would have had the authority, in deciding whether to grant a permit, to "evaluate the transportation system of the affected area...in order to determine its consistency [that is, the permit's] with the Regional Transportation Plan objectives."¹³⁵

The proposal to change the "state override provision" in AB 363, read as follows:

At the present time MTC's enabling legislation (A.B. 363) enables the State Highway Commission to override MTC in the establishment of highway construction priorities if the C.H.C. determines that there is an overriding state need. Such an override provision is potentially harmful since it relates to a single mode -- highways, over which the California Highway Commission has jurisdiction. And, it fails to recognize that the state of California may have an overriding interest in transit improvements and other modes as well.

Furthermore, to override MTC's Regional Transportation Plan based upon a state highway need may cause severe problems in following through on the implementation of other modal programs which interrelate with highways. Accordingly, it is suggested that if the State of California Legislature desires to retain the "override" provision, that it be vested in an intermodal commission of some sort at the State level and perhaps best in the legislature itself.¹³⁶

The proposal for MTC control over highway planning funds was intended to make MTC's powers in this area comparable to its powers over the allocation of transit planning funds. The draft proposed that "MTC execute a Memorandum of Understanding with the California Department of Transportation and with the Federal Highway Administration such that highway planning funds are passed through, or at least reviewed by MTC to assure that those projects listed in the Regional Transportation Plan Capital Improvements Program are those which are being planned."¹³⁷

When this first draft of Section V was presented to the Commission on May 23, the reaction was that parts of it were "unrealistic." The section was sent back to the Work Program Committee for reworking, with the instruction that the Committee was to send out the resulting revision as provisionally adopted.¹³⁸

The version of Section V which was sent out by the Work Program Committee as "provisionally adopted"¹³⁹ retained the format of the first draft, but deleted many of the controversial proposals, including most of those in Subsection C. In Subsection A, the proposal to broaden the MTC Technical Advisory Committee was deleted. In Subsection B, a proposal to exempt transit operators from state and federal gasoline tax, gasoline sales taxes, and sales taxes on vehicles and equipment was added. In Subsection C, all proposals except those calling for granting transit-regulatory and emergency operating powers to MTC were

deleted. Otherwise, however, there was little change in the wording of the section.

Although this version was released to the public as provisionally adopted, it is apparent that the Committee was still far from satisfied. The section was completely redrafted by the Work Program Committee prior to the assembly of the Draft Regional Transportation Plan of June 1. In this revision, the format of the section was changed, and there were further deletions of controversial material.

In this version, Section V consisted of an introduction, a subsection dealing with financial proposals, and a subsection dealing with coordination programs within the existing powers of MTC. The financial proposals were now divided into a set of proposals for immediate action and a set of "potential financial resources requiring further research and evaluation." The former included MTC control over Bay toll revenues, the multimodal gasoline tax fund, the increase in the California state gasoline tax, the tax exemptions for transit operators, and the regional parking tax, all of which had been included in the second draft of the section, plus a proposal for an additional one-half percent sales tax, which had been included in Section IV but which was new to Section V.¹⁴⁰ The "potential financial resources requiring further research and evaluation" included the proposals for progressive taxation of vehicle type and ownership and the airport ticket surcharge from the earlier version of Section V, plus an "employee-lot parking tax" aimed at discouraging employers from providing free parking for employees in areas which were adequately served by transit. The proposal for a luxury tax surcharge was deleted.¹⁴¹

The coordination programs consisted of the Metropolitan Transit Federation and Traffic Management Council proposals which had been included in the earlier version, plus proposals for cooperative planning bodies to deal with airports and seaports. However, the Metropolitan Transit Federation proposal had been greatly modified (see chapter 5, page 359). Cut from this version, along with the remaining proposals for institutional legislation, was the entire proposal for an MTC unified transportation planning work program, including an extensive proposal for legislative research programs.*

4. Reactions and Revision: June, 1973.

As late as April 11, the MTC staff had hoped to have the draft plan finished by mid-May; as late as May 15, it was hoping to distribute Sections IV, V, and VI immediately after the May 23 Commission meeting and to begin public meetings by May 30.¹⁴² As it turned out, the Draft Plan was not ready until June 1, and the public meetings had to be rescheduled for the week of June 11. This left the Commission with less than two weeks to consider the public reaction to the Plan, make whatever revisions it thought appropriate, and adopt it.

*These proposed programs would have included development of specific legislative proposals to follow up the Plan's legislative recommendations, reports "outlining the benefits of the various proposals, including equity considerations" and summary reports for public distribution. Legislative proposals specifically mentioned as candidates for refinement under this program included (1) the regional parking tax, (2) model subdivision regulations, (3) a "garage tax" to be applied to residential developments, (4) revised compensation programs for those displaced by transportation projects, (5) revised procedures for the issuance of commercial vehicle license plates, (6) possible gasoline rationing programs "as an equitable alternative to pricing some consumers out of the gasoline market," (7) the joint land use/transportation development authority mentioned in the first draft of Section V, and (8) the proposal to give MTC authority to grant building permits for parking lot construction and modification.

Throughout this period, there were suggestions that adoption be postponed; for the most part, these stemmed from a controversy over whether it was necessary to prepare an Environmental Impact Report along with the Plan (see Chapter 5, page 331 for details of this controversy), but concern was also expressed over the lack of time for review and revisions. Nevertheless, the Commission decided to stick to its decision to adopt the Plan prior to July 1, as required by AB 363.

Reactions.

During the June revision period, the MTC Plan drew comment from a wide variety of sources. Much of this reaction was voiced at the public meetings; in addition to this, most major organizations involved in the MTC planning process submitted written statements. Of these written statements, the most extensive (and probably the most influential) were those of the Division of Highways, the Sierra Club, the League of Women Voters, and the Bay Area Council.

The Division of Highways. The Division of Highways transmitted its comments via a letter dated June 15. Since the Division had already commented on Sections I and II, its statement of June 15 dealt mainly with the remainder of the Plan. The Division's most important concerns included MTC's overall role and its relationship with the implementing agencies, especially as this related to the application of the category system to the highway program; MTC's treatment of the highway needs estimates in Section IV; MTC's assumptions about the availability of surplus toll bridge revenues and the bonding schemes that might be based on them; the structure, purposes, and membership of the proposed Metropolitan Transit Federation and Traffic Management

Council; and the amendment procedures established by Section VI.

The Division's concern with MTC's overall role and its relationship with the implementing agencies centered around the so-called "pipeline problem" (see pages 221-2). In its June 15 statement, the Division maintained that:

MTC should give special consideration to prior planning already performed by other responsible agencies.... We feel that MTC must recognize the "pipeline situation" as it now exists, and that some procedure must be worked out to give special consideration to pipeline projects. Perhaps a grace period of two or three years should be allowed for operating agencies to get their project planning cycled in with MTC's planning process. There will be an immediate need to develop clearly defined criteria for establishing regional, local, and Statewide levels of concern.¹⁴³

The Division was particularly concerned about MTC's application of the category system to the highway program and the possible effect of interpretations of the system by federal officials. The Division urged that:

It is very important that MTC and the State come to an understanding regarding FHWA approval of Federal-Aid projects for engineering and rights-of-way acquisition purposes as they relate to MTC's system of categorizing projects. We have been assured that MTC is preparing a Letter of Understanding on this matter. Agreement should be reached between MTC and the State before final adoption of the Regional Transportation Plan in order to preclude the possibility of any cut off of Federal funds for engineering and rights-of-way acquisition purposes.¹⁴⁴

The Division appears to have been particularly concerned that Category III designations would lead to such fund cut-offs.

The Division was also very much concerned about the status of projects that had been overlooked when the "issues" in Section III had been defined. In connection with this, the Division proposed that a large number of relatively minor projects be exempt from MTC review, arguing that "If submittal of these types of projects to MTC

were required, a great many man hours of unnecessary work will be expended in each year in the submittal and review process."¹⁴⁵

Finally, the Division disagreed with the whole concept of presenting the Regional Transportation Plan wholly in terms of "issues", preferring instead to have systems of facilities designated and evaluated in terms of more traditional criteria. One passage in the June 15 comments which expressed this idea was the following:

We recommend that the highway networks shown on the existing and proposed maps follow a systems concept similar to the Functional Classification System. This would enable MTC, the State, and the Federal Government to discuss the plan relative to other on-going and future programs with a defined vocabulary and predetermined criteria of function and levels of service.¹⁴⁶

When it came to commenting on specific categorizations, the Division's main plea was that MTC commit itself to more projects by classifying them as Category I issues. Although the Division had asked for only a "two-to-three year grace period" in the passage quoted above, it formally requested that MTC change the classification of some fifteen highway projects from Category II to Category I. By no stretch of the imagination could all these projects have been implemented within the next two to three years. Reasons cited by the Division in its requests for Category I designations included such things as (1) the existence of freeway agreements with local governments, (2) acquisition of rights-of-way, (3) commencement of detailed design by the Division of Highways, (4) appearance of the project on the State capital improvement program, (5) Interstate status, (6) appearance in the 1972 Annual Highway Planning Report as "route of statewide significance," and even (7) "strong local pressures for early construction." The Division also requested upgrading of a

number of projects in Categories III and IV, arguing that MTC's own definitions of the categories (in their then-current form) made such changes appropriate.¹⁴⁷

At the same time that the Division was arguing for more favorable treatment of highway projects within MTC's category system, it was also concerned about the relationship of MTC's plan to the proposed State Transportation Plan, and about the long-range division of planning authority between the Division and MTC. In this regard, the Division declared:

We feel it is important for MTC to recognize our specific interest in routes of statewide significance in the RTP. Our preliminary thinking as to what comprises the routes of statewide significance within the Bay region is outlined in the State's 1972 Annual Highway Planning Report dated March, 1973...and our February 6, 1973 letter...to you commenting on MTC maps distributed at your Town Meetings. The Department intends to work cooperatively with MTC to determine Routes of Statewide Significance. There will undoubtedly be many questions left unanswered when MTC's Plan is adopted. These questions must be negotiated in good faith pending resolution of responsibilities among those involved.¹⁴⁸

One of the Division's main concerns regarding Section IV involved MTC's transportation needs estimates. The Division objected to MTC's use of the \$1.33 billion figure as a "highway needs estimate", arguing that:

The MTC plan confuses programs with needs. Transportation needs should reflect the difference (in dollars) between the existing transportation system and the system proposed to meet the adopted goals, objectives, and policies. This is not the basis for the needs expressed in the plan. Our main concern in this area is in developing the plan pursuant to AB 69 (including needs) to be integrated into a State Transportation Plan.¹⁴⁹

In raising this issue, District 4 was clearly concerned with the effect of the MTC plan on its competition with other Districts for construction funds. As it explained, under the present system:

Gas tax revenues are basically apportioned throughout the State in accordance with Sections 187 and 188 of the Streets and Highways Code.

In summary, these sections state that all highway revenues must be allocated on a split of 40% in the 45 northern counties and 60% in the southern 13 counties. The statutes further state that at least 70% of these moneys must be expended in each of the various Highway Districts within these two county groups in accordance with a formula which is derived from an estimate of existing State Highway construction needs in each District as a percentage of total construction needs in the county group. The Highway Commission then allocates available funds to specific projects based on the priority of the various projects, always assuring that these minimum expenditures are met.

In short, the "fair share" of the State Highway dollars as set up in the Statutes is 70% of the construction needs to deficiencies in a Highway District as compared to the total needs or deficiencies in each of the two county groups. The remainder of the money is expended on a statewide basis in accordance with the North/South split on the highest priority projects or as dictated by other constraints, such as the Federal timetable for completion of the Interstate System. As stated above, the Highway Commission makes this determination.¹⁵⁰

In other words, the higher MTC's highway needs estimates, the better off District 4 would be relative to other highway districts in Northern California.

The Division of Highways' stand on the highway needs issue, however, reflected more than just the District's desire to improve its position relative to other districts. It also reflects some of the Division's internal problems (and quite probably, some of its internal politics). In a letter dated February 6, 1973, District 4 had stated to MTC that:

Our estimated 10-year highway needs may be defined by referring to the attached map. The Red System denotes the basic network of routes of Statewide significance; the Green, a supportive network with strong regional importance....Our best estimate of highway needs in District 04 in the next 10 years would include completion of the Red and Green Systems, plus some widening, interchange upgrading, and minor projects....Based on today's dollars, these needs add up to approximately 1.6 billion dollars. These needs do not include approximately 100 million dollars for minor projects needed on state highways not on the Red or Green systems.¹⁵¹

But by June:

The estimated ten-year highway needs shown as 1.33 billion dollars on Page IV-9 does not represent the actual state highway needs. The actual 10-year highway needs is considerably greater than 1.33 billion dollars and is closer to 3 billion dollars. The 1.33 billion dollars is an estimate of the amount of capital improvement money that will be available to the Bay Region in the next ten years for highway construction.¹⁵²

The \$3 billion figure (the exact amount was \$3.22 billion) was derived from the Department of Public Works 1972 Annual Highway Planning Report, which was published in March 1973. This document, which is a part of the Resources Management System's annual cycle of planning and programming actions, was under revision in Sacramento at the time District 4 made its initial statement concerning highway needs to MTC. Apparently, there was a lack of coordination between Sacramento and the District Planning staff over the way in which needs were to be determined.*

Otherwise, the Division quarreled with MTC's highway revenue estimates (its own were slightly lower, although it is doubtful that

*This is not surprising, considering the complexity and inconsistency of the needs formulas. According to the 1972 Annual Highway Planning Report, three types of needs were recognized: ideal, modified ideal, and economically constrained. Ideal needs involve everything needed to bring the highway system up to the standards adopted by the state, and are expressed in lane-miles rather than dollars. Modified ideal needs involve elimination of clearly infeasible projects from the ideal needs list, and are expressed in monetary terms. Economically constrained needs are defined as "those solutions we would propose if present funding levels remain unchanged."¹⁵³ Apparently the figures in the 1972 Annual Highway Planning Report were supposed to be "modified ideal" needs - yet the document is not itself consistent on the needs totals, stating in one place that statewide ten-year needs are \$21.89 billion¹⁵⁴ and two pages later that they are only \$14.69 billion.¹⁵⁵ The District's first needs estimate really does not fit any of the definitions in the Highway Planning Report: it is too high to be an "economically constrained"

the differences were significant, considering the inherent instability of such predictions), and expressed serious (and apparently valid) doubts about MTC's estimates of the bonding capacity that might result if the region's bridge toll surpluses were used to finance transit projects. Finally, the Division expressed some concern that:

The information shown in Table 4 on page IV-16 [the MTC "Capital Improvement Program"] appears to have been taken from our preliminary working planning program dated February 9, 1973. This document is preliminary in nature and has not received official approval of the California Highway Commission....We are assuming Table 4 is an estimate, subject to change, and not a firm commitment.¹⁵⁶

Here, the implication seems to be that MTC needed Highway Commission approval for its Capital Improvement Program, despite the language of AB 363, which states that the Highway Commission must conform to MTC's Plan and schedule of priorities for construction, unless there is an overriding statewide interest in deviating from them.

The Division's responses to Section V centered around the MTC proposals for a Traffic Management Council and a Metropolitan Transit Federation. Concerning the Traffic Management Council, the Division had this to say:

We recommend that the wording describing the role of the Traffic Management Council (TMC) be set up similar to that described for the Metropolitan Transit Federation (MTF).

Under the MTF, it would "propose, plan, advise, coordinate", etc., while enabling the transit agencies to fully retain their individual identities.

estimate - MTC's \$1.33 billion figure was the revenue estimate - but it is grossly lower than the "modified ideal" estimate published in the Highway Planning Report. For all the emphasis the Division of Highways placed on needs estimates in its reply to MTC's 1973 Plan, it is clear that the numbers in the estimates were highly unstable and that there was little consensus within the Division of Highways about either their meaning or the method of their computation.

The wording under the TMC leads us to believe it would "plan, implement, direct", etc. We feel that retaining individual identities and responsibilities is most important, and that the TMC should basically be an advisory organization only, leaving the implementation of its recommended programs to operating agencies.

An alternative to the Transit Federation and Traffic Management Council would be a single body (and possible subcommittees) to address the entire problem of transit coordination, operational improvements, and other programs to increase bus and auto levels of service. The two are so interdependent on the highway system, they are difficult to separate.¹⁵⁷

In the case of the Metropolitan Transit Federation, the Division (which had been omitted from the list of potential participants) felt that it, too, should be represented.¹⁵⁸

The Division's response to Section VI focused on MTC's amendment procedures. Here, as in its response to Section III, the Division was primarily concerned with the effect of the category system on the highway program. Since the June 1 version of Section VI required an amendment for "all substantive changes" in the Plan, including "movement within categories in any direction" and failed to state whether Category II projects could be implemented, the Division assumed that only Category I projects could be approved and that implementation of any projects not classified in Category I would require an amendment. The Division protested that:

The proposed vote requirement for plan amendment is not consistent with that presently required for all MTC actions. It only takes a majority vote of the members present to adopt the MTC Regional Transportation Plan. This could be as few as five votes out of a quorum of nine. The proposed plan amendment procedures call for a vote of nine for the annual amendment and a vote of eleven for an emergency amendment. This indicates that an amendment decision is twice as important as the decision for original adoption of the plan.

We recommend that the vote requirements for plan amendment be changed to a majority vote of voting members present for the annual amendment and for the emergency amendment.

We feel that the door should not be closed to accepting annual amendment proposals after March first of each year. Otherwise, some worthy proposals may have to wait as long as sixteen months to be included in the following year's annual amendment.¹⁵⁹

The Sierra Club. The Sierra Club, unlike the Division of Highways, had not submitted a written statement on Sections I and II prior to their provisional adoption. Consequently, the Club's statements of June, 1973, addressed themselves to the entire Plan. There were two major sets of Sierra Club statements: a set of statements on Sections III, IV, and VI, presented at the Public Meeting in Novato on June 12,¹⁶⁰ and a statement by the Northern California Regional Conservation Committee covering the entire Plan, which is dated June 11, 1973, but was actually presented at the Public Meeting in San Francisco on June 13.¹⁶¹

The major theme of these Sierra Club statements was that the Plan, as written, lacked unity and specificity. The Club proposed that it be unified by adoption of an overriding goal of reducing automobile usage in the region. The Club justified choice of this particular goal on the grounds that drastic action to reduce automobile travel was necessitated by the emergence of the federal air quality standards and the energy shortage as major factors in the overall urban transportation situation. In order to implement this goal, the Club maintained, MTC ought to declare a moratorium on expansion of the region's freeway system, downgrade the classification of many highway projects in Section III-C, move forward immediately to implement most of the non-facility programs in Section III-D, coordinate the ten-year capital improvement program with the category system (specifically, by excluding Category III items), back efforts to allow diversion of state gasoline tax to finance mass transit as its first priority for financial

action in Sections IV and V, and make independent determinations of transportation needs and project priorities.

The Regional Conservation Committee statement of June 11 began by declaring that the Plan:

...is not yet a plan in the sense of clearly stating the direction regional transportation planning should take and the specifics of how to reach desired goals....[W]e think the plan should clearly state that its goal is the reduction of automobile usage in the Bay Area. [Emphasis in original.]¹⁶²

The statement went on to recommend that "reduction of automobile usage and encouragement of public transportation and other less-polluting modes of transportation" be stated as being the goal of the plan in the Declaration of Intent in Section I and that Objective B of Section II (which stated that transportation programs would be designed "to reduce overdependence on the automobile") be made the "basic tenet" of the Plan.¹⁶³ The Club also urged MTC to "outline in broad brush a long-range transportation system for the Bay Area (circa, year 2000) towards which this plan is moving."¹⁶⁴

In order to carry out this reduction in automobile usage, the Sierra Club recommended (in the words of the June 12 statement on Section III) that:

...[T]here be a clear policy statement by MTC in all appropriate sections of the plan, that for the next several years there be no additional highway or freeway facilities except for reasons of safety or where there is a bottleneck caused by a small incomplete highway link.

Such a moratorium would give MTC a chance to properly consider the critical problems of air quality, gasoline conservation, and proper land use. It would also permit the commissioners to discuss and decide on each issue before putting it in Category I or II and make sure that these discussions reflect MTC policies and are not simply rubberstamping someone else's priorities.

The Sierra Club requested downgrading of a substantial number of highway projects from Categories I and II to Categories III and IV. Included

among these were major projects scheduled for early implementation such as I-580, the Napa River Bridge, the Dumbarton Bridge, and Route 1 from Pacifica to Half Moon Bay.

In addition to proposing a moratorium on extension of the freeway system and recommending the downgrading of numerous specific highway projects, the Sierra Club criticized the lack of continuity between Sections III and IV. The June 11 statement declares that:

A more distinct relationship should be established between projects in Category I and II and financial priorities. To do this, a clear distinction of projects that are in the 10-year Plan and those that are not must be made. We recommend that MTC consider as part of their 10-year Plan projects in Categories I and II as defined in our Appendix A and Section III-C of the Plan; those projects in Category I would be committed, and those in Category II uncommitted. Projects in Category III and IV should not appear in the 10-year plan at all but rather should become a supplemental list of other projects under consideration. All projects in Category I and II would appear on Charts 3 and 4 in Section IV as committed or uncommitted. Other projects could come into Category I and II through Plan amendment proceedings. [Emphasis in original.]¹⁶⁷

The Sierra Club also urged action to expedite implementation of the non-facility programs of Section III-D. The June 11 statement declared that:

We endorse these programs [in Section III-D] and urge MTC to proceed as fast as possible with implementation. We would give high priority to transportation management programs, incentive programs to use public transit, and programs to make transit operate better. Such programs would have the effect of making the existing transportation system operate more effectively.

These programs have received much favorable publicity and have had a favorable reception by the public. When MTC's Plan is adopted, we urge MTC to maintain leadership in this area and to follow through with immediate and visible implementation of high priority programs listed above by establishing a schedule of dates.¹⁶⁸

The Sierra Club was perhaps most severely displeased by Section IV. The June 11 statement complained that "Section IV has the same basic weakness of [sic - as?] the entire Plan: it provides no over-

all financial plan or strategy."¹⁶⁹ The June 12 statement, however, was more blunt (and perhaps more accurate), declaring bitterly that:

Your tentative decision seems to be "business as usual" with respect to continuing to build as many more highways as available funds will permit.

So - in spite of much language in other parts of the plan as to ways to reduce auto use in the region and in spite of the legislative finding that "Excessive reliance on the private automobile for transportation has caused air pollution and traffic congestion..." [ellipsis in original] (PU Code 99220) -- and in spite of the air pollution agencies' mandates, the energy crunch and public desire to substitute public transportation for more highways and freeways -- MTC has so far apparently adopted in large part the priority and spending program of the State Division of Highways and other proponents of automobile usage (instead of proposing to cut down highway construction and urge the legislature and public to provide for diversion of a specific portion of highway funds to public transportation.)¹⁷⁰

Specifically, the Sierra Club criticized the Commission's failure to back diversion of state gasoline taxes and MTC's failure to produce its own needs estimate and project priorities. The June 11 statement argued that:

Certainly MTC should lend its full support to diversion of both federal and state highway fund monies to public transit, including pending legislation. Local funds slated for highway projects should not be spent on such projects even though it means "foregoing" federal and state money. This is not a new concept, especially in the Bay Area, and is essential to provide critically needed funds for public transportation. In short, MTC has not "bitten the bullet" and shifted support to public transportation, ...In additional Sources of Transit Revenues, gas tax diversion legislation at the state level should be added.¹⁷¹

The June 12 statement went even further, advocating that MTC allocate gasoline tax revenues to transit projects in advance of any changes in the law:

AB 363 specifically provides that MTC's Financial Plan disregard present legal constraints on availability of funds, and Section VI [sic] should reflect allocations based on Division of Highways funds after 1974. Doing this will help get the votes necessary for the constitutional amendment.¹⁷²

The Sierra Club also objected to MTC's use of the Division of Highways ten-year program as the basis of its needs estimate. According to the June 12 statement:

Page III-9 reveals that the 10-year study of highway needs was made through evaluation of the Department of Highways 10-year program, "which relies on an assumption about funding..." This points up the need for MTC to make its own planning decisions.¹⁷³

Finally, the Sierra Club insisted that MTC should set its own project priorities, and should make those priorities public. The June 11 statement commented that:

On [page IV-9] a section has been added that was not in the draft provisionally adopted by the Commission: "MTC believes it is important that the entire highway inventory be used for state-wide allocation purposes, at least until allocation techniques are changed, and that the 10-year program be used for regional planning purposes." It should be made clear that the Highway Division's 10-year program in no way obligates MTC.¹⁷⁴

The June 12 statement had this to say:

Page IV-14 states "projects during the initial years must rely upon revenues that are obtained from existing sources and those expenditures to which present revenues are committed must be considered as having the highest priority."

This sentence should be deleted or changed to make clear that it applies only to committed projects which MTC has put in Category I, based on its own decisions as to Regional needs.¹⁷⁵

Finally, the June 11 statement commented that:

The Priorities Program on p. IV-14 nowhere states the priority of projects. It merely states: "the schedule of priorities over a 10-year period depends upon the funding assumptions that attach to the transportation improvement plans." We feel top priority should be given to public transportation projects, regardless of the funding that might be available for highway projects.

There are priorities implicit in the unidentified projects contained in the "other" category of Table 4 - Highway Improvements. These categories should be broken down and individual projects listed.

Non-facility programs listed in Section III-D don't appear as financial priorities. These programs...should be included in this table or should be the subject of another table indicating financial priorities.¹⁷⁶

Although the main thrust of the Sierra Club statements was that MTC should adopt reduction of automobile usage as an overriding objective and should commit itself to specific programs to achieve this goal, they did address other issues. One of these was MTC's overall role and its relationship to other agencies. In the June 11 statement, the Club commented:

We disagree with the following statement on page II-1: "... a major effort has been made to adopt policies that complement and support the concepts of other regional agencies, especially the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) 1970-1990 Regional Plan and the regional development projections formulated by the joint ABAG/MTC planning program." We believe that MTC can and must establish land use priorities favoring public transportation and the reduction of transportation demand, and should make efforts to convince other agencies like ABAG.¹⁷⁷

The June 11 statement also took issue with a policy in Section II which stated that transportation programs should be designed to "provide service capacity which corresponds to the travel demand generated by the plans of other regional agencies," suggesting that:

...the last part be reworded "...service capacity which takes into consideration the travel demand generated by activities approved by other regional agencies, provided such agencies have given heed to MTC policies and objectives." Some phrase like this is necessary to avoid inconsistency and to avoid MTC being required to violate its own policies because another regional agency has ignored or violated MTC policies.¹⁷⁸ [Emphasis in original.]

In addition to its disagreement with MTC's handling of the auto-versus-transit issue in Sections III and IV, the Sierra Club objected to statements in Section III related to airport planning. The June 1 draft of the Regional Transportation Plan had declared that "the recently completed Regional Airport System Study has been accepted by MTC as the Regional Transportation Plan's aviation component...." The Sierra Club, in its June 11 statement, objected that "there has never been public discussion of this issue at meetings," and urged that "before

finally accepting the RASS plan MTC should look at this plan in light of MTC's own plan and in terms of its own objectives."¹⁸⁰ In particular, the Sierra Club questioned the study's demand projections and objected to plans to expand Oakland International Airport by adding a runway involving Bay fill.

The Sierra Club had little to say about Section V. With regard to Section VI, it urged that in the Plan amendment procedures, "it should be stipulated that except for establishing bus service, a project move up only one category at a time."¹⁸¹ In the June 12 statement, the club also urged that "the amendment procedure should provide for continuous review and amendment indefinitely beyond January 1, 1974."¹⁸² The Club wanted MTC to allow amendment at any time, with republication of the revised plan taking place annually. Besides this, the Sierra Club questioned the environmental procedures in Section VI and the failure of the Plan to incorporate the "compromise" solution to the Environmental Impact Report dispute (see pages 331-7) which had been recommended by the Work Program Committee on May 29. Finally, the Sierra Club came out in favor of the proposal for an independent MTC Citizens Advisory Committee that had been in the early drafts of Section III-D and V but had since been deleted, and reiterated suggestions that adoption of the Plan be delayed pending completion of an Environmental Impact Report:

Perhaps MTC should again consider asking the legislature for time to properly complete the RTP. This would also give time for the commissioners to carefully review other critical parts of the plan and make their own decisions, rather than rubberstamping decisions of others.¹⁸³

League of Women Voters. The League of Women Voters submitted statements at each of the Public Meetings in June. By and large, the tone of these statements was more positive than those of either the Division of Highways or the Sierra Club: the League seemed to detect fewer contradictions in the Plan and was less concerned with the details of the Plan and its proposed implementation and revision procedures. The League's general philosophy, as expressed in its statement of June 11, was that:

LWVBA supports an area-wide transportation system that is flexible, balanced, and coordinated. We have long recognized the extreme importance of regional transportation policy being coordinated with overall planning for future development of the San Francisco Bay Area and commend you for endeavoring to do this. We are also pleased that MTC is concerned about the depletion of energy resources and is considering this problem in the construction and operation of the regional transportation system. League is concerned about encouraging alternatives to the automobile, which, among other benefits, would conserve fuel.¹⁸⁴

The League's concept of MTC's overall role was that of an agency which would coordinate transportation agencies in the Bay Area; the League supported the Metropolitan Transit Federation as the appropriate means to achieve this coordination, but worried about possible misinterpretation of language in Section I to the effect that:

To develop a closely coordinated public mass transit system in the region, MTC must have control and influence to insure that all transit operators function together as a unit, and therefore must concern itself with transit operations such as scheduling, transfers, levels of service, joint fare structures, compatibility of equipment, and operational interfaces; but nevertheless, not intrude too far into the right of communities to commit themselves to the type and extent of public transit they are willing to support, nor fail to act as the instrument of federal and state policy to aid public transit.¹⁸⁵

The League objected to the "negative phrase 'intrude too far'" and suggested that this part of the sentence read:

"...but nevertheless, respect the right of communities to commit themselves to the type and extent of public transit service they are willing to support but encourage them to meet public needs."¹⁸⁶

The League did not specify how far it thought MTC should go in such "encouragement," but the implication was that MTC's "concern" for transit coordination should be more than mere lip service.

The League had relatively few comments on Section II. Its comments on project categorizations in Section III generally involved requests for upgrading of transit projects and downgrading of highway projects. The League's position on individual projects tended to be somewhat more moderate than the Sierra Club's; however, this was not so much because the League was more favorable to highway projects, but rather because it commented on fewer of them.¹⁸⁷ The League's comments on Section IV involved support for diversion of state gasoline tax, coupled with the realization that "the ten year plan cannot be financed solely by a shift in highway money; it will necessitate money from new sources as well."¹⁸⁸ The League supported use of increased bridge tolls, use of property tax (as a "last resort") to support transit operating deficits, and use of personal income tax as a "possible long-term solution to financing public transportation."¹⁸⁹ The League had no comments on Section V except to voice support for the Metropolitan Transit Federation concept.

The League's comments on Section VI all related to the Public Participation subsection. The June 14 statement declared:

The League of Women Voters believes that public participation during the planning process is vital to understanding, acceptance, and support of any plan developed. We encourage MTC to make every effort to insure citizen input at every step of MTC's planning, re-evaluation, and implementation program.

However, the proposal to hold a meeting for the purpose of developing and making recommendations for a plan of public participation seems too time consuming, costly and duplicating in view of ABAG's recent efforts in establishing the Citizen's Forum. Bay Area organizations were given ample opportunity to participate in ABAG's formation of this new organization.

A Transportation Issues Committee has been established under this newly structured Forum. We urge MTC to take an active, cooperative and supportive role in strengthening and, perhaps, broadening the Committee's operations so it will provide a regional citizen participation effort to MTC. We believe that furnishing the Committee with the necessary materials, making staff available for resource and guidance, encouraging citizen attendance (possibly by simultaneous meetings in various communities), and requesting reactions to MTC's plans and documents will serve to strengthen the Issue Committee.¹⁹⁰

The League's comments on Section VI concluded with the following plea for early and intimate citizen involvement in the planning process:

Today's concerned citizen expects to serve on committees and task forces to distill alternatives which will be considered later at public hearings. The public thinks they have the right to open planning, with informational meetings and exchange of views with agencies, long before official hearings. By their nature and usual lack of adequate funds, citizen groups function slowly, especially if they seek great member involvement. Adequate advance notice of all hearings and meetings with material distributed in ample time for their evaluation is vitally important. Citizens want to be given alternative proposals to consider, with a price tag for each alternative and an explanation of what would be the social and environmental affects [sic].¹⁹¹

The Bay Area Council. The Bay Area Council's response to the Regional Transportation Plan was prepared by its Regional Transportation Task Force and was transmitted to MTC via a letter dated June 5. In contrast to the statements of the other major participants, the Council did not address itself to particular facility-issues, but rather concentrated on the overall nature of the plan and on MTC's role in the institutional system.

The major theme of the Council's statement was that MTC's Plan should be more definitive. The letter of transmittal declared that:

The Council strongly urges that MTC develop a more definitive plan which offers guidelines to local governments, transportation agencies and districts, and to the private sector. We encourage MTC to exercise leadership in establishing standards for transportation service that will challenge all those individuals and institutions with transportation responsibilities in the nine Bay Area Counties.¹⁹²

The Council's statement elaborated this point:

One of the uses of a Bay Area Regional Transportation Plan is to delineate directions for future transportation developments and facilities which provide private and public organizations with guidance for their own future planning. The Regional Transportation Plan, in our opinion, is not sufficiently definitive nor strongly enough directed to avoid future changes and shifts in emphasis. While it is recognized that the Regional Transportation Plan should maintain flexibility, the Plan must also ensure basic consistency by providing a firm foundation for coordination of future long-range public and private commitments.¹⁹³

Elsewhere, the Council commented:

The Plan's first two sections overgeneralize, indicating apparent indecision and unresolved questions of transportation priorities and directions. Although the goals and objectives in Parts I and II set forth some broad directions, it would appear that supportive interpretations could be found for any transportation action which conceivably could be initiated or approved by MTC.

Similarly, a lack of direction is apparent in Section III, which defines the system....In the Council's opinion, strong MTC leadership is required to provide transportation policy which is responsive to immediate and future problems of air pollution and mounting energy shortages....¹⁹⁴

The Council, like the other major citizens' groups, urged MTC to adopt a pro-transit-anti-highway stance and to take vigorous action to protect the environment. The Council's statement declared:

Improvement of public transportation services in the Bay Area needs to be emphasized as a priority objective of the Plan. This clearly supersedes further expansion of the use of the automobile as a primary transportation mode. This requirement is mandated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. While the objective to create a balanced transportation system is supported, there is strong evidence that to achieve an effective balance in the region, a greater commitment for public transportation and its supporting elements is required. MTC should state that one of the important results which must accrue to the transportation

system is the reduction of the total demand for automobile trips within the region, and that the policies and objectives of the Regional Transportation Plan will be applied and interpreted in the light of this general objective.¹⁹⁵

With regard to environmental standards, the Council declared that:

It is important in private and public sector planning to meet public agency guidelines and requirements regarding environmental quality (e.g., EPA air quality standards) and energy use. Lack of coordination between MTC and other planning and regulatory agencies creates confusion and contradictory directions. The interdependence of transportation planning on land use and air pollution makes it particularly important that MTC precisely state its intentions to exercise its responsibility for helping in implementation of BAAPCD and State Air Resources Board auto use and air pollution goals.¹⁹⁶

Other concerns of the Council related to transportation finance, transit marketing, feeder system priority, goods movement, the non-facility programs of Section III-D, the Proposals for Action in Section V, and plan administration. At the time the Council's statement was written, Section IV was not available; consequently, the Council did not comment on it, except to express the hope that it would contain "key decisions that will provide the specific direction we found to be lacking in other parts of the Plan."¹⁹⁷

The Council's position on transportation finance was that "transit is a public responsibility and therefore...financing is a public obligation to be met by public financing reduced by equitable 'user' charges." ¹⁹⁸

More generally, the Council's position on the provision of transit services was that top priority should go to provision of feeder service to existing transit trunk lines, and that increased coordination would be needed. In particular, the Council believed that MTC should devote more effort to coordinating transit marketing. It also cautioned that the creation of the Metropolitan Transit Federation would "not relieve

MTC of its prime responsibility for coordination of regional transit operating policy."¹⁹⁹

The Council's reaction to the non-facility programs was that there were too many items for practical implementation; that no real sense of priorities could be gained from the Plan, since most were designated Category I; and that "the adverse safety and economic implications of implementing some of these programs have not been weighted against their advantages in a cost/benefit analysis."²⁰⁰ The Council disagreed with MTC's reasoning that the non-facility programs should have high priority because they were less costly, more quickly implemented and involved fewer legal and institutional changes than facilities; on the contrary, the Council argued:

...[I]t is suggested that a careful test against these criteria will reveal that many proposals are inconsistent and indeed some may be more costly (in terms of continuing administration), are long-range in nature and more disruptive to established institutions than proposed facilities issues.²⁰¹

In particular, the Council cautioned that MTC should not ignore the impact of these proposals on the region's labor unions. The Council also warned that automobile disincentives would not in and of themselves reduce travel demand if trends toward rising personal income and more leisure continued. Consequently, the Council argued, "policies and facilities aimed at reduction of automobiles are to be planned and dependent upon commensurate increases in transit capacity to serve the travel need being diverted from private automobiles."²⁰²

Although the Council Task Force supported a dominant role for MTC in the local transportation planning system, it was apparently somewhat alarmed at some of the MTC staff's political proposals. It is not clear to what extent the Council was aware of the details of the

proposals in the early versions of Section V; according to the statement, the Council had an outline of the Section, apparently dating from May 9, but no real details. It did, of course, have access to the April 25 version of Section III-D. The Council commented that:

One non-facility program proposal originally in Section III-D implies that MTC should take a role in political action for or against legislation relating to transportation issues. While MTC is required to make recommendations and should supply information and technical reports in such matters, propaganda campaigns are questioned as an appropriate activity.²⁰³

In regard to the legislative proposals implied by the outline of Section which the Council had, the Council had this to say:

Proposed legislative items to give MTC further powers and financing appear to be premature in the absence of further detail and require further study to determine each proposal's effectiveness and feasibility before being included in the Plan. For instance, legislation to increase MTC authority over land use regulation is questioned since this would add to the confusion and overlap of land use authorities already being exercised by other agencies within the region.²⁰⁴

Other Statements. In addition to these statements addressed to the Plan as a whole, MTC received comments of a more fragmentary nature from other implementing agencies, citizens groups, and individuals. There was, for instance, reaction to Section II from the Port of Oakland Authority and the Port of San Francisco. The ports were concerned that some MTC policies would tend to restrict their independence and that language referring to use of user charges to cross-subsidize transportation services (apparently intended to apply to use of toll bridge revenues for transit services and to subsidies between trunk and feeder transit systems) would be applied to port revenues. The region's transit operators appear to have also made comments, but with the exception of one rather lengthy letter concerning Section III-D

(which charged at one point that "one of the apparent fundamental objectives of MTC...is to take over the entire transit industry"), these seem to have been verbal. An MTC staff summary of reaction to the Plan, for instance, mentions that there were verbal reactions by transit operators to Section V prior to its final revision.²⁰⁵

In addition to these reactions by implementing agencies other than the Division of Highways, there was a great volume of response from individuals, public officials, neighborhood groups, and other special interest organizations. For the most part, this response was either highly specific, confined to a few policies or projects, or else so broad as to indicate only a general attitude.

The most popular general issue was that of the future of the automobile in the region's transportation system. The MTC staff summary, in commenting on response to Section II, stated that:

Comments received from both individuals and organizations regarding the Transport System were overwhelmingly consistent in their opposition to any emphasis on or further accommodation of the automobile.²⁰⁶

Likewise, with regard to the more specific issues of Section II:

Many of the reactions can be clearly sorted into a "freeway vs. no freeway" dichotomy. Public concern is significantly and strongly opposed to further proliferation of freeways, even to the extent in some cases of recommending a moratorium on freeway construction. On the other hand, while citizens and private groups are advocating transit, many public officials are actively endorsing facility construction.²⁰⁷

With regard to transit, on the other hand:

While there is consensus support for increased transit, matters of timing, financing and operation receive different emphases depending upon the respondent.²⁰⁸

Other matters provoking significant general response included the environmental and social policies of Section II and the format of the

Plan itself, particularly the category system of Section III. According to the staff summary, comments directed at the environmental policies "were primarily concerned with air quality and the need to achieve the EPA standards."²⁰⁹ As for the social policies, "there were no public responses...which were negative in nature. Responses supported the policies and urged more emphasis on the recognized problems."²¹⁰

The staff summary characterized responses to the format of Section III as follows:

There are two major criticisms of the presentation format of the Regional Transportation System. The categorizations of issues into four categories is vague and unacertive [sic]. Unless there is a clear timetable or program for implementation, one which specifically associates an implementation priority with each category, the need to differentiate is unnecessary. In its present form it is hard for one to know whether issues in Category II are closer to an MTC decision than are issues in Category III. If this is the purpose of the categorization and responses suggest it should be, the strategy employed in Section III needs clarification.²¹¹
[Emphasis in original]

The second criticism was that the maps accompanying the Plan were vague and difficult to read and that they tended to play down the transportation proposals.

Revisions.

Most of the revisions of the Draft Plan of June 1 seem to have been made during the week prior to Plan adoption on June 27. There had already been some rewording of Section I-C (which defined the "regional interest" in transportation) and one Category change in Section III-C (the Dumbarton Bridge, which was changed from Category I to Category II on June 13 - see page 328), but other revisions appear to have been held up pending completion of the Public Meetings and the

resolution of yet another debate about the format of Section III-C. Another circumstance which seems to have delayed work on the revisions was the continuation of the debate which had begun in late May over the necessity to prepare an Environmental Impact Report for the Plan; until this was resolved by the passage of Resolution 78 on June 20 (see page 334), there was some doubt as to whether the July 1 deadline for Plan adoption could be met. Meanwhile, this debate distracted attention from the Plan itself, since it was a major piece of business at both the June 13 and June 20 Commission meetings.

The major problem with the Plan continued to be the ambiguity of the Category system. Moreover, several commissioners (most especially Bort) were disturbed by the absence of the project-by-project schedule of priorities required by AB 363, and by the continued tendency on the part of some members of the public to assume that the categories somehow constituted implementation priorities. Although there was some question as to whether Section IV was not the logical place to address the issue of priorities, the Commission decided, over staff objections, that priority indications should be added to the table of issues in Section III-C.

This decision to assign priorities, which was made at the June 20 Commission meeting, was resisted by a number of commissioners. Commissioner Gerald Day of San Mateo County was particularly displeased - probably because he suspected staff reluctance to assign high priorities to freeways in the San Mateo Coast area - and, along with Commissioner Gatov, opposed having Senior Staff set priorities without input from the public and the political entities involved. Another Commissioner worried about the lack of time. Stewart Eurman of UMTA,

the non-voting Federal DOT delegate to MTC, suggested that the existing categories be retained but that a set of intermediate priorities that could be used as an initial Capital Improvement Program be added. Following this, the need for a mechanism by which priorities would be set was discussed, and a motion was finally passed directing the staff to develop a mechanism for consideration by the Commission at its June 27 meeting.²¹²

Instead of developing a "mechanism", however, the staff actually assigned priorities between June 20 and June 27. Since the deadline for Plan adoption was imminent, revisions were parceled out to the senior staff members. Bay worked on the table of issues over the weekend and assigned what in his version were called "Plan Priorities" classified as "high," "medium," and "low." In some cases, no priority was assigned because there were still outstanding questions to be resolved. According to Bay, "Plan Priorities" "did not mean funding or implementation priority, as was stated repeatedly in MTC meetings," but "this was still confused in some Commission members' minds, of course."* Bay also added, as a separate column in the table, a set of remarks about the "financial implications" of projects; these indicated whether projects were in the capital improvement program and whether funding was available to implement them. The financial implications column represented information used in developing Section IV (including District 4's proposed Capital Improvement Program), but the priorities

* Possibly because AB 363 very explicitly called for a schedule of implementation priorities. The exact language is "...a schedule of priorities for the construction, modification, and maintenance of various segments of the regional transportation system on a project basis...."

were based on Bay's own judgment.

When the table was brought before the Commission on June 27, the column headings were changed. What had been called "Staff's Proposed Category" in the June 1 Drfat Plan and "System Category" in the final staff version, was now changed by the Commission to "Planning Status Category." The "Plan Priorities" of Bay's last version were changed to "Transportation System Priorities."²¹³ Whether the heading changes made the description of the contents of the table more accurate is debatable: the "Planning Status Categories" were still described in terms of funding implications and the text accompanying the final version of the table seems to indicate confusion over whether the priorities were priorities for decisions or priorities for implementation. This passage reads:

Within each Category, the degree of planning certainty about an issue will not always coincide with the priority for development that the Commission attaches to system elements....The Commission therefore has indicated the level of planning priority it associates with each issue....Those in Category II having high priority are mainly the elements of public transit development where planning and design should be pushed forward to completion and decisions about project implementation reached. These issues must be prior concerns of the Commission....

So far, the text agrees with Bay's view that the priorities were priorities for allocation of MTC planning resources. But the next paragraph reads:

The planning determinations indicated by priority levels will be incorporated in the Commission's estimate of 10-year transportation needs and programming priorities in Section IV of the Plan.²¹⁴

Following adoption of the column heading changes, Day moved that the entire "priorities" column be struck. Following the failure of this motion by a vote of 9-6, the table was adopted by means of

separate motions covering each of the corridors. In several cases, the priority designations assigned by Bay were amended. Day had the priorities of three highway projects in the San Mateo Coast area (Routes 1, 92, and 380) moved up from "medium" to "high," Commissioner Dillon got the priorities of two segments of Route 238 in Hayward and Fremont increased from "medium" to high," Commissioner MacIntyre got the Gateway Boulevard project in Contra Costa County moved from "medium" to "high," and the Napa Bridge was assigned a "high" priority at the instigation of Commissioner Curtola. Following these changes, Section III was adopted by the Commission.²¹⁵

Changes in Section III-C other than the addition of the priorities and the "financial implications" column to the table of issues included a complete rewording of the text describing the category system. Although the actual definitions of the categories remained the same, the introductory text was changed to read as follows:

The Metropolitan Transportation Commission has adopted a set of Categories to indicate the status of plan development. They express MTC's determination of the extent that any proposed additions would further the attainment of regional transportation goals, and illustrate the overall direction in which the Commission is moving to achieve these goals. As indicators of general planning intent, they suggest those issues in the expansion of the regional system that should claim the Commission's prior attention, as regards the planning and implementation of system elements.

The categories, however, do not represent policy commitments by the Commission, or an order of priorities for project programming. A subsequent Section of the Plan -- Section IV -- contains the capital improvement program and financial plan for development of the system in line with the Commission's planning intentions. Specific actions for transportation projects and programs, as authorized by the Metropolitan Transportation Commission Act, will be taken by the Commission according to procedures defined in Section VI of the Plan.²¹⁶

Another significant change in Section III was the withdrawal of unqualified support for the Regional Airport Systems Study, which had been attacked by the Sierra Club and other environmental groups; where the June 1 version declared that the study had been "accepted by MTC as the Regional Transportation Plan's aviation component to establish a foundation for continuing airport planning and development," the revised version stated that the study had been "accepted by MTC at this time, for planning purposes only, as the aviation component of the Regional Transportation Plan."²¹⁷ The revision also deleted all references to the Category system in Section III-D and the entire table in which program elements had been categorized.

Despite the promises in Section III that "a subsequent section of the Plan -- Section IV -- contains the Capital Improvement Program and financial plan for development of the system in line with the Commission's planning intentions" and that "the planning determinations indicated by the priority levels will be incorporated in the Commission's estimate of 10-year transportation needs and programming priorities in Section IV of the Plan," the revision of Section IV (which was proceeding simultaneously) did not result in any revision or elaboration of the MTC needs estimates or "Priorities Program." The only indication in the Plan of the full extent of the capital improvement program, for instance, was the Financial Implications column in the table of issues in Section III-C.

Major revisions of Section IV did involve further explanations of the needs estimates and MTC's (Section IV) stand on diversion of highway funds. In these revisions, there was a continuing tendency to represent Sections III and IV as being closely related. In the

introduction to the needs estimate, for instance, the revision added the statement:

The estimate of needs is based upon the regional transportation system designed to accomplish the goals and objectives of the MTC Plan.²¹⁸

This echoed language in Section III-A to the effect that:

The Regional Transportation System has been selected to achieve Objectives stated in Section II of the MTC Plan in accordance with Section II Policies.²¹⁹

At the same time, it was no more clear than before just which "regional transportation system" underlay the needs estimates or how this system related to MTC's stated goals and objectives. Language was also added to the discussion of the highway needs estimate which hinted at the real reason for selection of the \$1.33 billion figure - but without quite explaining that the needs estimate was no more than the total of the Division of Highways' program and that some projects in that program were in Category III. The language added to this section was the following:

The 10-year estimate [of highway needs] does not include all "Category II" system elements, and it omits a substantial list of projects on the Regional System that would fall into the "Category III" area of issues. Those projects that are included in the 10-year estimate are considered to have priority, should they be recommended for development as part of the regional transportation system.

The estimate of needs might be increased if more among the projects recognized on the Regional System were added. However, given the priority placed in the MTC Plan upon development of mass transit, it is questionable whether the overall level of highway capital needs in the ensuing 10 years could justifiably exceed the amount indicated. Should additional funding for transportation purposes be available, it would be expected that transit projects would have a prior claim. Much of this question will be resolved by further planning and evaluation of the Regional System, and the total estimate will be reconsidered each year.²²⁰

This language was apparently added in reply to the Division of Highways' objections to the highway needs estimate (see page 280).

The revision did not alter Section IV's position on the allocation of existing funds, which was inconsistent with both the position that immediate decisions could be made about the allocation of new funds and the position, expressed in Section V, that existing highway funds should be made multimodal. The Sierra Club had pointed out the inconsistency between Sections IV and V in its June 12 statement, but the staff summary of public comment dismissed the point with a parenthetical "MTC note" on the grounds that "the funding of the Intermodal Fund would come from a new source of revenue -- an increase of 2¢ per gallon in the fuel tax."²²¹ Instead of changing Section IV to conform to Section V, the revision of Section IV elaborated the earlier position that the diversion of existing highway funds would depend on decisions about Category II issues. The revision reads:

In view of the dominance of "Category II" items in the highway program, the financial plan at this time does not contain any recommendations for revisions in present funding sources - either to increase the monies available for major highway development or to reallocate the revenues from existing taxes upon motor fuel and vehicles that are being expended in the Bay Area to non-highway purposes.

Should a Federal discretionary policy come into effect in the near future, the matter should be reconsidered. Use of Federal funds under a discretionary program would be largely dependent upon decisions reached about highway program elements now having "Category II" status.²²²

Section V, meanwhile, still read:

Although there is some dispute as to the adequacy of the existing per-gallon gasoline tax for supporting the Region's highway system both in the current year and in the future, there is no less need for making this revenue source truly multimodal. Major inequities have arisen in the past from the specification that this major revenue source must be spent for highways, as, for example, the net loss to the taxpayers of San Francisco who refused many large highway construction

projects. The nature of the Region's transportation problem is intermodal, and it is well within the competence of the Commission to exercise flexibility in allocating an intermodal gas tax fund if it is established.

MTC states its support for an intermodal gasoline tax fund, both at the State and Federal levels. Furthermore, because of provisions in the State Constitution, this cannot be done through legislative action. MTC supports the enactment of a Constitutional Amendment which will allow at least the Bay Area's share of the state gasoline tax to become intermodal. The legislation might contain the following specific points:

- Funds which aid in the development and maintenance of the local highway system should be left relatively intact at their existing levels.
- The portion of the gasoline tax fund applicable to regional transportation improvements should have modal restrictions lifted and be eligible for expenditure in accordance with the MTC Regional Plan and Capital Improvements Program.
- A percentage of the portion of the gasoline tax fund applicable to regional transportation improvements should furthermore be capable of supporting revenue bonds for intermodal improvements, a provision now lacking.
- Legitimate expenditures from the Intermodal Fund would include, in addition to the construction of transportation facilities, the support of non-facility programs such as traffic management, transit coordination, etc.²²³

Section V contained a separate proposal to increase the state gasoline tax, arguing that:

Simply making the State and Federal Gasoline Tax funds intermodal will not provide adequate amounts for the development of a balanced regional transportation system.²²⁴

Another revision to Section IV dealt with the financial plan for transit. The June 1 version had not listed a single figure for ten-year transit needs, but had rather reported a range of "roughly \$2.3-\$5.5 billion". The \$5.5 billion figure, of course, had not originally been intended as a ten-year needs figure, but as an estimate of what the ultimate expenditure on the regional transit system might be.

The June 1 version had nevertheless commented that:

The total size of the ten-year program will depend upon planning recommendations for transit projects and the development of new funding sources.²²⁵

To this, the revision added the following paragraph:

The Commission, however, believes it of the highest urgency that funds for expenditure on public transit be greatly augmented. A minimum of 2.0 billion not available from present funding sources should be provided over the next 10 years. [Emphasis in original.]²²⁶

A final revision to Section IV dealt with the programming of funds for toll bridge projects. These projects had been omitted from Tables 3 and 4 in the June 1 version, possibly due to an oversight - or possibly because MTC was elsewhere advocating that the toll surpluses be made intermodal, and hence did not want to imply commitment to individual bridge projects. The Division of Highways had raised the question of the status of these projects in MTC's priorities program, and in response, the following statement was added:

Bay Crossings. The financing of bridge investments programmed for the next 10 years - which include improvements to the Golden Gate Bridge, replacement of the Dumbarton Bridge, and expansion of capacity at Carquinez Straits - will be provided from toll revenues and revenue bonds. Revenues at present rates are more than sufficient to cover presently outstanding debt of \$143 million, plus the \$73.5 million for the above mentioned projects.²²⁷

The following paragraph was also added:

In addition to highway and transit projects, a bay crossing project of about \$50 million (Dumbarton Bridge) is programmed to begin in fiscal year 1974-1975, and allowance is made for the start of Carquinez Straits improvements after 1980. (These items are not represented in Tables 3 and 4),²²⁸

The reasoning behind the addition of these statements seems to have been that some sort of use for the toll surpluses had to be proposed in order to "hold" the money, and that the lack of Category I designations in Section III would indicate the lack of MTC commitment to these

specific projects, should the bridge toll bill pass the legislature. At the same time, listing these projects was inconsistent with the idea that Tables 3 and 4 should list only Category I items on a project-by-project basis, since other funds were not really programmed on a project-by-project basis.*

Revisions of other parts of the Plan were less extensive than those in Sections III and IV. There had been a great deal of public discussion of Section II before its tentative adoption in February; consequently, many revisions in this Section had already been made. Additional revisions made in June followed no clear pattern, but seem to have been related to pressures by specific organizations directed at specific policies.

Perhaps the most notable change in Section II was the complete replacement of Policy 1:1. The original version had set up criteria for determining modal priorities for specific areas; in general, these would have established transit priorities in areas with high population and employment densities and automobile priorities in area of low density. This policy was changed to read as follows:

MTC shall emphasize the development of public transit to provide a level of mobility within this mode that is more reasonably comparable to that afforded by the privately owned automobile.²²⁹

This change seems to have been in response to widespread public demands that MTC lend some substance to its objective of "reducing overdependence on the automobile." Otherwise, however, the revision of

* Of course, so were most of the "in CIP" notations in the Financial Implications Column in the table of issues in Section III-C, since most of the projects so designated were omitted from Tables 3 and 4 in Section IV.

Section II did not alter the pro-automobile policies, despite Sierra Club demands that they be weakened or deleted. At the same time, MTC ignored the Division of Highways' objections to policies favoring transit and its demands that highways be given equal treatment. The Commission did alter a policy stating that:

Pricing mechanisms and other economic incentives and traffic and parking restrictions shall be used to reduce automobile usage in major urban areas.²³⁰

This policy, which had been opposed by MTC's Technical Advisory Committee and some individual local officials, was changed to read:

Pricing mechanisms and other economic incentives and traffic and parking restrictions shall be considered for appropriate application to reduce traffic congestion and improve access in major urban areas.²³¹

Other changes in Section II involved a general tightening of environmental policies, presumably the result of comments by the Sierra Club and other environmental groups, and deletion or modification of statements which the Ports of Oakland and San Francisco found offensive, including the one implying that there were inefficiencies, duplication of facilities, and a lack of coordination in the regional goods-movement system.

Despite the fact that Section V had been subject to serious controversy involving the Commission and some elements of the staff in the period immediately preceding publication of the June 1 Draft Plan, there was only one substantive revision to that section in June: the California Department of Transportation was added to the list of prospective members of the proposed Metropolitan Transit Federation.²³²

The June revisions also left Section VI largely unmodified. The only major revision was to the Environmental Review and Procedures

subsection, which was replaced by an entirely new text incorporating the substance of the compromise regarding the Environmental Impact Report.²³³ The Plan Amendment subsection was also modified to reflect provisions of that compromise, which extended the interim amendment period from January 1, 1974 to March 1 and pledged that MTC would review all elements and policies of the Plan in light of the Environmental Impact Report.²³⁴ The only other change was the addition of language saying that amendment proposals might result from "public input to MTC's continuing planning process."²³⁵ This change seems to have been related to the Bay Area Council's comment that "Section VI should include procedures that specify how citizen or other groups not representing transportation or public agencies may propose Plan amendments."²³⁶

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Chapter 5

CASE STUDIES OF MAJOR MTC DECISIONS, PART II:

INITIAL PLAN IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

In the eighteen months following the adoption of the 1973 Regional Transportation Plan, MTC produced an Environmental Impact Report for the Plan, extensively revised Sections III, IV, and VI, completed staff work on a Transportation Control Plan in response to the Clean Air Act of 1970, and established precedents for interpretation of the Plan in three important test cases.

A. The Dumbarton Bridge Case

The first important piece of business undertaken by MTC following the adoption of the 1973 Plan was an evaluation of the Dumbarton Bridge project. Strictly speaking, MTC did not have authority over the bridge, since AB 363 had specifically exempted it from MTC review; however, MTC did have authority over the approaches to the bridge, and had included the entire project in the list of issues in the Plan.


The existing Dumbarton Bridge was built in 1927. It is a low-level two-lane bridge with a lift span which results in numerous traffic interruptions. In addition to its low capacity, questions have been raised in recent years about its structural condition. Studies for replacement of the bridge began in the 1960's. Following the defeat of the Southern Crossing in the June, 1972, referendum, Assemblyman Carlos Bee of Hayward and State Senator John Homdahl of Alameda County pushed a bill through the legislature authorizing construction of a new Dumbarton Bridge span. Opponents of the proposal in the Assembly managed to add a rider to the bill restoring the project to MTC's jurisdiction, but Homdahl succeeded

in preventing a similar amendment in the Senate. The conference committee dropped the rider from the bill, and Bee guided the conference committee version through the Assembly at a time when some of the key opponents were off the floor. ¹


By the time MTC began to prepare the 1973 Plan, then, the project was already highly controversial. Most environmentalists were opposed, and the local governments and legislators of the South Bay Area were divided. Generally speaking, three main issues were involved in the dispute.

The first of these was the expected effect of an increase in the bridge's capacity on population growth and settlement patterns. In the recent past, the trend has been for employment to locate on the west side of the Bay, especially in Palo Alto and Menlo Park, and for new residential development to be concentrated in the East Bay. Palo Alto had recently adopted a policy to limit population growth, but had not adopted a similar policy with respect to employment. Opponents of the new bridge argued that to increase its capacity would encourage this trend, leading to patterns of development contrary to the ABAG Plan and an increase in commuting, with attendant increases in air pollution. Proponents of the proposal argued that the trend would continue in any event and that, if the bridge were not rebuilt, traffic would either endure the resulting congestion or follow a more circuitous route around the south end of the Bay - thus resulting in even more air pollution.

The second issue was that of the impact of increased traffic on the western approaches to the bridge. The present approach to the bridge, Willow Road, is already congested; at one time, an expressway was pro-



MAP 2.
DUMBARTON BRIDGE
PROJECT AND VICINITY



MAP 3.
PROPOSED WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE
DUMBARTON BRIDGE

--- Proposed Approaches
— Existing Streets
- - - Boundaries

posed for this corridor, but the proposal was dropped because of opposition to it, especially from the city of Palo Alto. Alternate proposals called for up to four western approaches on conventional facilities. Palo Alto continued to oppose any alternative which would route the traffic through its territory, while the adjacent city of Menlo Park opposed concentrating the traffic on its streets and demanded that all four approaches be constructed. Inasmuch as the bill authorizing the construction of the bridge provided that no western approaches should be constructed unless all the cities involved were in agreement as to which should be constructed, this dispute was of major practical importance to the bridge project itself.

The third issue was the desire of transit advocates (and MTC) to finance transit improvements out of surplus toll bridge funds; these interests opposed the project because it would tie up some of these funds. The bridge itself was expected to cost \$35 to \$40 million; but, since transit advocates expected to use the toll surplus to match state and federal funds, the loss in capital for transit improvements would be much greater.

Geographically, the East Bay cities, Alameda County, and the state legislators from the East Bay tended to be strongly in favor of the project; in the West Bay, Palo Alto, Los Altos Hills, Santa Clara County, and the West Bay legislators were opposed; and Menlo Park and San Mateo County were in favor, but with reservations concerning the approach routes. In addition, East Palo Alto, a predominantly Black community in San Mateo County, was strongly in favor of the project because its leaders believed that the project would increase access to East Palo Alto and help them to attract industry.

Although MTC had no official jurisdiction over the bridge, the MTC staff decided to include the entire proposal in Section III of the 1973 Plan as a transportation issue. This was done partly because AB 363, while exempting the specific proposal from the requirement for MTC approval, also provided that MTC "shall consider the ecological, economic, and social impact of the existing and future transportation systems..."² Other reasons for recognizing the issue were the problem with the approaches, over which MTC did have jurisdiction, the impact of the surplus toll bridge revenue question on MTC's financial plan, and the fact that there was another move afoot in the legislature to give MTC jurisdiction over the bridge itself.

Both the bridge and the approaches were placed in Category II by the corridor teams in the first version of the table of issues, despite the fact that the project was one of those most vehemently opposed by Holtzclaw. When Bay came to make his revisions, he placed the bridge in Category I because he believed that the legislative mandate for construction made this appropriate.

At about this time, several things happened. First, the heavy criticism the project received at the MTC Town and Public Meetings seems to have convinced some commissioners - including Bort and Beckett - that it might be bad politics to support the project too openly. Second, the move in the legislature to restore jurisdiction to MTC seemed to be gaining impetus. Finally, BCDC was planning to hold hearings on the project, and in conjunction with these, requested a report from MTC on the project's significance in the regional transportation system. At the June 13, 1973, Commission meeting, Beckett, (who was actually a strong supporter of the project) introduced a

motion to consolidate the issue of the bridge and the approaches, and to drop the entire issue to Category II on the grounds that the project would not be ready for implementation until the bridge was approved by BCDC and the Coast Guard. This motion passed by a vote of 11-3.³

At the next Commission meeting on June 20, Senator Homdahl appeared before the Commission to protest this action. Beckett explained that the action had been on technical grounds, citing the lack of BCDC and Coast Guard permits. Homdahl had brought with him a Mr. Ritchie of the State Department of Public Works Planning and Public Design Division, who detailed the estimated cost figures for the projects and suggested that the MTC staff was not fully aware of the funding sources. Homdahl then asked that the Category I designation be restored and that he and the city managers of Fremont, Newark, and Union City be advised when the matter came before the Commission again.⁴

The Commission did not act on Homdahl's request, and even though the bill to give MTC jurisdiction over the bridge failed, MTC went ahead with the report requested by BCDC.

This report,⁵ which was prepared under the direction of MTC staff member John Warren, was published October 24, 1973. It detailed eight possible alternatives:

1. Do nothing
2. Construct a parallel low-level span
3. Remove the existing span with no replacement
4. Relocate the span to a location north or south of the existing one
5. Construct a two-lane high-level structure
6. Construct the four-lane high-level structure proposed by the

state

7. Provide rail rapid transit
8. Combine all structures crossing the Bay in the vicinity (including a railroad, transmission lines, and an aqueduct) into one. ⁶

The MTC report was supposed to be purely factual, and hence did not include recommendations; still, it seemed to indicate that MTC favored the state's proposals. In coming to this conclusion, the MTC staff had to deal once more with the issue of the relationship between the Regional Transportation Plan and the ABAG Plan. The report declares:

...MTC has newly examined the continuing growth and development in the bridge area and made projections based on lower rates of growth. The conclusion is that the forces already in motion will create traffic volumes in excess of the capacity of the existing bridge...

This raises an important question concerning growth and development goals as reflected in the ABAG Land Use Plan, MTC's transportation policies based on the plan, and the goals of communities in the Dumbarton Corridor. MTC has stated that "no longer will future travel demand be the sole determinant of facilities provided." The question is, how much weight should be assigned to the policy of providing for travel demand generated by existing patterns of development?

MTC has stated its intention to support ABAG's city-centered growth goals. How does this apply to a situation where development patterns have already manifested themselves? More importantly, how does this apply, for example, where the City of Fremont has designated itself for growth but Palo Alto has opted for almost no additional residential development but has proceeded apace in the development of new jobs?

MTC and ABAG recognize that certain trends now in motion cannot be reversed overnight. Over the short term, solutions must be sought that offer some relief to existing transportation congestion. These must also provide to a degree for that growth and travel demand that cannot be reversed immediately, and at the same time will not preclude future achievement of desired regional development forms.⁷

This last paragraph might have been a covert policy statement of immense importance - if it meant anything at all. In fact, few if any

MTC personnel have taken much note of it, and no one seems to know where the line might be drawn between projects which "provide to a degree" for the inevitable and those of "a magnitude that will... preclude future achievement of desired regional development forms."

Following the release of this report, at the October 31 Commission meeting, MTC voted to "endorse" the project provided at least two western approaches could be agreed upon. ⁸ Later, however, the WPC decided that a Plan amendment would be necessary to raise the project to Category I status, and scheduled a hearing on it for the March 27, 1974, Commission meeting.

Meanwhile, BCDC held its hearings in January and on February 21, 1974, following an agreement with the Division of Bay Toll Crossings on environmental impact mitigation measures, voted to give the project a permit. At about the same time, an opponent of the project introduced a bill in the legislature to require a plebescite similar to the one over the Southern Crossing, but this move was defeated. MTC held its hearing on March 27, but since it was already into the annual revision process, decided not to amend the Plan immediately. Finally, on June 26, 1974, MTC unanimously passed Resolution 173, approving the project. ⁹ Opposition did not cease, however: even after this, a bill was introduced in the legislature to halt the project, but it died in committee.

B. The Environmental Impact Report

MTC had not originally planned to produce an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the Regional Transportation Plan. State law required EIR's for "local general plans," but MTC staff and Commission members had assumed that the Plan did not fall within the state's definition of

a general plan. In view of the short time available for adoption of the Plan, the Commission had intended merely to develop environmental guidelines for approval of individual projects - these clearly did require EIR's - but did not intend to produce an assessment of the overall environmental implications of the Plan.

Sometime in May, 1973, Joseph Houghteling, the BCDC representative to MTC, became convinced that the MTC Plan was a local general plan in the meaning of the law, and that an EIR was required.

Houghteling, who has consistently been the Commission's strongest advocate of environmental causes, was predisposed by his personal sympathies and contacts with the environmental movement to favor an environmental assessment of the Plan, and his experience with BCDC had given him a "layman's knowledge" of environmental law - which was considerably more than most people associated with MTC possessed. He asked the opinion of other people knowledgeable about environmental law and found that they agreed that the issue was clear and that the EIR was required. MTC's attorney, Arthur Harris, however, did not agree.

Houghteling and Harris debated the issue at the May 18 WPC meeting. ¹⁰ The debate was continued at the May 23 meeting of the full Commission. At this time, Houghteling again raised the question of the legality of the Plan without an EIR and urged that adoption be postponed until one could be prepared. Harris insisted that EIR's were necessary for specific projects only, and Beckett sided with Harris. Another commissioner suggested entitling a section of the Plan "The EIR." Houghteling replied that he was totally opposed to calling something an EIR if it wasn't. Another commissioner wanted to

know the consequences of not including an EIR if the law required one - who could challenge the plan? Harris replied that any public group, agency, or private citizen might challenge the plan and get an injunction. The Commission then asked the opinion of Sierra Club representative Dwight Steele and was told that he thought an EIR was necessary and that, moreover, MTC had previously promised to prepare one. Houghteling's motion to delay adoption of the Plan failed, however, by a vote of 10-1. ¹¹

The focus of the debate then shifted to the Environmental Review subsection of Section VI. Houghteling raised the question of whether this subsection was an attempt to "cover an EIR" and suggested that it be retitled "Environmental Review and Procedures." After several other suggested changes, Commissioner Lucius moved that the Commission accept Section VI in principle and send it back to the WPC for revision. After some disagreement over this, MTC Chairman Joseph Bort proposed that the revisions be worked out by a temporary committee composed of Commissioners Lewis, Houghteling, and Giersch and staff members to be appointed by Bay. Lucius then amended his motion to say that the section was provisionally adopted except for the Environmental Review subsection; this would be referred back to the WPC for revision. ¹²

Following this meeting, Houghteling wrote State Senator Alfred Alquist and requested that he raise the question of the necessity for an EIR with the State Legislative Counsel. The Legislative Counsel ruled that the EIR was necessary, and Alquist forwarded this opinion to the Commission along with a request that MTC delay adoption of the Plan until the EIR could be prepared. This letter was received by MTC on (or before) June 11 and was read into the record of an MTC Public

Meeting on June 11. ¹³ Despite the Legislative Counsel's opinion, Harris and the Commission (except for Houghteling) continued to maintain that a full EIR was not necessary: at the June 13 Commission meeting, the Commission passed a resolution (Resolution 77) which directed the staff to forward comments on the State Secretary of Resources' guidelines to the Secretary and asserted that the Secretary's guidelines did not pertain to transportation plans of a regional magnitude. ¹⁴ Alquist's letter was read a second time following this vote, and Bort replied to it by citing the actions of the Commission with regard to environmental review and Harris' opinion that a general statement of the Plan's environmental impact would suffice. At this same meeting, MTC also adopted a resolution reaffirming the environmental policies adopted on October 27, 1972, and adopting by reference a document entitled Environmental Objectives Criteria and Environmental Review Procedures. ¹⁵

Following this, however, Harris and the MTC leaders had a change of heart. Between June 13 and the next Commission meeting on June 20, Harris and other MTC staff members worked out a compromise whereby MTC would adopt the Plan on schedule, but would prepare a full EIR for it by December 15, 1973. Upon completion of the EIR, MTC would review all elements of the Plan and consider appropriate amendments. Houghteling and the environmental groups accepted this compromise, and it was adopted as Resolution 78. ¹⁶

The EIR was a joint effort of the Transportation Planning and Analysis Division of the MTC staff, headed by Wells, and outside environmental consultants. Consequently, it was heavily influenced by the staff elements that had been defeated in the battle over Section

III-C in 1973, and it reflected their misgivings about the Plan as it then stood. Stoll, for instance, has said that the Draft EIR (DEIR) was a vehicle for staff members to express dissent, adding that "the front office and Commission hope it will die."

The DEIR's assessment of the 1973 Plan is not a flattering one. It divided the issue proposals of the 1973 Plan into four categories: committed projects, high decision-priority elements (which turned out to not necessarily be those issues addressed first by the Commission - neither the Napa Bridge nor I-580 was in this category), elements in planning/evaluation, and non-facility programs. It found the non-facility programs (corresponding to the proposals in Section III-D of the 1973 Plan) to be largely innocuous. The committed elements it found individually to have minimal regional impact but added that, collectively, the highway projects involved "should not be dismissed as inconsequential" due to the impact of the total highway system on air quality and open space. The high-decision-priority elements it found to have more pronounced negative effects, especially the highways in this category. The DEIR goes on to state that:

It could be argued...that from a regional transportation standpoint, it might be better policy to leave these highways unfinished and provided the added capacity through trunkline transit. Such a decision would have the effects of eliminating most of the negative impacts attributable to freeway elements, tangibly evidencing policy support for trunkline transit and encouraging the transfer of automobile trips to transit facilities. ¹⁷

The bulk of the issues in the table in Section III-C fell into the category of "elements in planning/evaluation." The DEIR declared that these elements - especially the highways - would have a wide variety of negative environmental impacts. Under the heading

"Mitigating Measures," the report comments:

Many, but not all of the adverse impacts cited above derive from highway proposals included in the Plan. This may be mitigated in many cases by implementing only transit proposals.

Another way to mitigate some of the adverse impacts related to growth is to use land use zoning powers to control the location and type of growth in areas affected by regional transportation decisions. This alternative was briefly considered but was rejected as being politically infeasible. 18

Under the heading "Alternatives" the DEIR adds:

The major alternative to this set of proposals would be a set from which most highway proposals, including all proposals which would generate new or accelerated growth at low densities, are deleted. This has also been considered politically unfeasible. 19

MTC was unable to complete the DEIR by the original deadline of December 15; the document was finally released to the public on March 31, 1974. Originally, public comments were to be received between then and May 13, but the deadline was later extended. Receiving and processing these comments and conducting four formal and two informal bilingual public hearings on the DEIR were the major activities of the MTC Public Affairs staff and the Public Information and Legislative Affairs Committee during this period. The result was a very large number of comments.

According to the State Secretary of Resources guidelines, an Environmental Impact Report must contain the lead agency's responses to all comments raising "significant environmental issues." The MTC staff attempted to comply with this by analyzing the comments to extract those it considered "environmentally significant," replying to these in general terms, and summarizing the rest.

EIR adoption was scheduled for the June 26 Commission meeting. At this time Houghteling challenged MTC's readiness to adopt the docu-

ment on the grounds that responses to the comments were inadequate. Bort, Lucius (Chairman of the PI/LAC), and the staff members responsible for the document argued that responses were adequate and that all "environmentally significant" comments were answered. Houghteling challenged this assertion and produced what he considered to be environmentally significant comments that were not addressed to the Appendix to the EIR. There was some debate over whether these were in fact environmentally significant. Houghteling also challenged the Commission's readiness to vote on the issue on the grounds that most of the Commissioners had not read all the comments received and thus could not know whether they were justified in certifying that all "environmentally significant" issues had been addressed. He said that he himself had been able to get through only half of the comments and that he doubted that any of the other Commissioners had done more. Lucius replied that he had read all of the comments, but no one else made this claim. ²⁰ Apparently, most of the Commissioners had been sent comments pertaining to projects or issues in their districts, but had made no attempt to read all the comments. Houghteling argued that by adopting the EIR with unanswered comments that might be considered "environmentally significant", the Commission was creating "time bombs" - that if comments were not answered, they would be assumed to be valid, and might be raised as objections to MTC actions in lawsuits. The Commission, nevertheless, proceeded to adopt the EIR.

C. The Napa Bridge Controversy


The Napa Bridge controversy involved the proposed construction of a high-level bridge over the Napa River south of the city of Napa and

freeway segments connecting this bridge to an existing freeway north of the project and an existing expressway south of it. State Routes 12 and 29 would utilize the proposed freeway link to bypass Napa.

(See map)

At one time both Routes 12 and 29 had been planned as freeways. Route 12 is an east-west route extending from the Central Valley Region north of Stockton, through Solano County, across the Napa Valley, and through the Valley of the Moon (near the town of Sonoma) to US 101 at Santa Rosa. Route 29 extends north from Vallejo through the wine-producing region of the Napa Valley. During the 1960's, a segment of Route 29 north of Napa was constructed as a freeway; the segment south of Napa is a four-lane expressway. Ultimate plans for Route 29 were to connect these two segments with the Napa Bridge project and to extend the freeway segment north of Yountville. Route 12 between Route 29 and Santa Rosa was a part of the proposed California Freeway and Expressway system and was planned for ultimate development as a freeway. As an interim measure, Routes 12 and 29 are routed over Imola Avenue, a two-lane east-west arterial which crosses the Napa River on a lift span on the southern outskirts of the city of Napa.

The Route 29 project had long been politicized. Although Route 29 carried heavy volumes of recreational traffic, it had been omitted from the State Freeway and Expressway System when this was drawn up. Napa County was at one time a part of the district of State Senator Randolph Collier, the "Father of the California Freeway System," and perhaps the most powerful figure in California highway politics. Collier had promoted the freeway project on Route 29 and (presumably in deference to him) the California Highway Commission had not only agreed to



MAP 4.
NAPA BRIDGE PROJECT AND VICINITY

construct it to freeway standards, but also to do most of the work with discretionary funds.

Initially, the freeway plans seem to have been accepted with enthusiasm by the local residents. Times changed, however, and eventually the residents of the Napa Valley and the Valley of the Moon became alarmed about the prospects of extensive land development and air pollution. In the late 1960's, Napa County passed an ordinance setting aside the vineyard country north of the city of Napa as an agricultural preserve; several years later, the county requested that Route 29 north of Yountville not be constructed to freeway standards. By the time MTC got involved in the situation, there was also vigorous local opposition in the Valley of the Moon to the construction of a freeway through that area.

By 1973, most of the leadership in and around the city of Napa still favored the construction of the Napa Bridge and Southern Bypass on the grounds that it would relieve existing congestion on Imola Avenue. There was, however, a vocal minority faction, led by County Supervisor John Tuteur and former Napa City Councilman Ralph Trower, that opposed the project. Since Trower was Napa County's representative to MTC, he was in a unique position to express his opposition.

To some extent, the opposition of Trower and Tuteur to the Napa Bridge was based on their ties with environmentalists who feared that construction of this link would "take the cork out of the bottle" and create intolerable pressure for development in various parts of the North Bay area. (Because of the increase in east-west traffic capacity, Northern Sonoma County was involved in this as well as the Valley of the Moon and the area north of Napa.) Trower, however, was also

opposed to the project because he thought its expense would preclude construction of a bypass to the east of Napa, in the vicinity of Route 121. He argued that if the goal were to remove traffic from the streets of Napa, this latter project would be more effective than the Southern Bypass.

The MTC staff seems to have misread the situation in its earliest evaluations of the regional transportation system. The North Bay corridor team did not grasp the implications of the bridge for east-west traffic movement, and considered it only as a part of the more general issue of access to the "Wine Country" of the northern Napa Valley. No category was assigned to the improvement of Route 29 in the first version of the table of issues.

The issue involving the Napa Bridge did not really begin to come into focus until April 11. On that day, the Grant Review Committee met to discuss the Division of Highways' Environmental Impact Report on the project. Trower (who was a member of the GRC) objected to the EIR on the grounds that it omitted relevant alternatives - specifically, the East Side Bypass. Another commissioner wanted to know what would happen if MTC disapproved the EIR. Division of Highways representative Robert Jahrling objected that a lot of planning had gone into the project and he would hate to see it wasted. Commissioner Dillon responded to this by saying, "It is no concern of ours how much planning or money has gone into a study. What is past is past and we are looking at it again."²¹ That evening, MTC held a Town Meeting in Napa at which opinions on both sides of the issue were expressed. Still, the issue was far from the most explosive that MTC was facing at the time: the Town Meeting Summary mentions that "a mild, congenial atmosphere existed

throughout the evening, though opinions were firm." ²²

The project retained its low visibility throughout the development of MTC's 1973 Plan, even though it was then scheduled for construction during fiscal year 1973-74. It was recognized as a separate issue in Category II in Bay's version of the issue table, and it remained in that status in subsequent versions. Bay did not assign the project a priority, due to the questions about it that were still outstanding, but the Commission assigned it a "high" priority on the motion of Commissioner Curtola of Solano County at the June 27 meeting. ²³ (Trower was not present at this meeting.)

The project is next mentioned in official MTC records on November 9, 1973. At this time, it was noted in a WPC meeting as being on the 1974-75 highway budget, along with I-580 and Doyle Drive in San Francisco. ²⁴ Between this WPC meeting and that of December 19, the question arose of whether the project could be approved without a Plan amendment placing it in Category I. On December 19, the WPC reported to the Commission that it had ruled that the project would require Plan amendment and that it had set the February 27, 1974 Commission meeting as the time for a public hearing and action on the proposal. ²⁵

At this point, the political maneuvering began in earnest. The January 11 WPC minutes report that Caltrans District Director Thomas Lammers told the Committee that "there are no funds available for the Napa River Bridge Project." ²⁶ It is not altogether certain what Lammers meant by this, but it was probably that no funds would be available in the 1973-74 budget, since it was announced to the full Commission on January 23 that:

...The State Department of Transportation has indicated that funds for construction of the bridge would not be available for their fiscal year 1973-74 budget and that the project is being carried over to 1974-75. No commitment has been made for its inclusion in the proposed budget, however. 27

At the same Commission meeting, the staff announced that it would prepare a report on the project for review by the WPC and the GR & AC at their February meetings.

Meanwhile, Paul Bay went to Napa to address the local Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs. According to the Napa Register, Bay told the clubs that:

... [T]he financial aspects of the Southern Crossing will weigh heavily in any decision. With only so much money to spend on transportation in the nine Bay Area Counties which MTC serves, the Commissioners must consider the cost of the Napa County project against other proposed projects. 28

At this point, Bay was clearly indicating that the staff thought MTC had the power to shift funds among highway projects within the region.

On February 27, the Commission held its hearing on the project. At this time, the staff report was also presented. It revealed that the project had been given top priority not only by the Napa County Board of Supervisors, but also by the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors - an unusual act, since none of the construction was in Sonoma County. At the same time, Watt, speaking for the staff, emphasized the point that the project was to be built with discretionary funds (which had been obtained by Collier). The staff evaluation comments:

This raises the issue of what happens to the funds if the project is not approved. Can they be used for an alternate project in the North Bay or even the Bay Area? Based on the best information available, I would say that, if the project is not approved, the Region has no assurance of having the money programmed for either the North Bay or the nine counties. This information indicates that monies for this project are available because it has been programmed in the state pipeline for many years. It has passed through many hearings, design and right-

of-way engineering, and environmental reports. Since the project is well above the county minimums, a substantial share of the \$18-21 million dollar cost comes from "free money" - discretionary monies the Highway Commission can use to program such projects. If the project is not approved, the "free money" could go anywhere in the state. An alternative project would have to start down the processing line with hearings, engineering and environmental reports to move into position. Under present procedures, this could take years. 29

Obviously, the MTC staff had had second thoughts on the Commission's funding powers following Bay's speech in Napa.

The legal issue involved was a relatively subtle one. State law provides that:

Except as otherwise provided by law, the [California highway] Commission may... (b) Allocate, from funds available therefor, moneys for the construction, improvement or maintenance of the various highways or portions thereof under the jurisdiction of the department. 30

This passage establishes the basic authority of the California Highway Commission to allocate highway funds. The apparently sweeping powers of Section 75, however, are severely limited by the phrase "except as otherwise provided by law." The most conspicuous examples of such limitations are those of Section 188 of the Streets and Highways Code, which sets up limitations on the allocation of highway funds in the form of a fixed division between Northern and Southern California and a fixed formula for allocation of 70 percent of the State Highway Funds among the districts within the two county groups. The 30 percent of the State Highway Fund not covered by the district minima is commonly known as "discretionary funds," since under Sections 75 and 188 of the Streets and Highways Code it may be spent anywhere within the two major divisions of the state at the discretion of the Highway Commission. Prior to the passage of AB 363 and AB 69, the Highway Commission

allocated money directly to projects (or Division of Highways budget line items) at its own discretion - except that it had to respect the minima of Section 188. Customarily - at least officially - such funds were "...expended on a statewide basis...on the highest priority projects or as directed by other constraints, such as the Federal timetable for completion of the Interstate System." 31

Passage of AB 363 greatly clouded the issue of the Highway Commission's powers in the Bay Area. Section 66518 of AB 363 declares:

When allocating funds for construction on the state highway system within the region, the California Highway Commission shall conform to the regional transportation plan and the schedule of priorities for such construction included therein. The California Highway Commission, however, may deviate from the regional transportation plan and the schedule of priorities established for construction on the interstate system and the state highway system within the region because of an overriding statewide interest. 32

Since the Highway Commission's powers are established "except as otherwise provided by law," Section 66518 clearly transferred some sort of allocational power to MTC. At the very least, MTC, not the California Highway Commission, would now allocate funds to individual projects within the region. At the time it passed Section 66518, however, the legislature apparently did not consider its effect on either the county minimum 8 provisions of Section 188 or the allocation of discretionary funds. In the case of the county minima, the two laws appear to be flatly contradictory, and there is no indication as to which is to govern. In the case of the discretionary funds, the legislature ignored the fact that there was not a fixed amount of highway funds allocated to the region.

* The County Minimum Provision states that at least \$4 million (\$3 million in two mountain counties) must be spent in each county within a four-year period.

If MTC is to allocate funds to projects within the region, to how much of the 30 percent of the State Highway Fund not covered by the district minima does it have a claim?

One interpretation of the laws is the one implied by the Napa Bridge staff report: AB 363 did not abolish the county and district minima for the Bay Area and left the Highway Commission in full control of the discretionary funds. An alternative interpretation, suggested by a literal combination of the "except as otherwise provided by law" clause of Section 75 and the wording of Section 66518 is that the California Highway Commission must allocate discretionary funds as directed by MTC unless it can demonstrate an "overriding statewide interest" in not doing so. The real issue, of course, is that of who is to take the initiative in deciding how discretionary funds are to be spent within the region - but this, under the present law, is inseparable from the issue of the overall amount to be allocated to projects within the region.

In the period of time between Bay's speech in Napa and the February 27 hearing, the MTC staff appears to have sought legal advice as to the exact extent of the Commission's powers from several sources, and to have received conflicting opinions. By February 27, the staff had clearly decided not to take the issue to court and to support the most conservative interpretation of the laws.

The February 27 hearing also featured a personal appearance by Senator Collier, whose intervention had been solicited by local interests in the North Bay and at least one North Bay Commissioner. The minutes report:

Following Commissioner Lawson was Senator Collier, who cited east-west movement in the North Bay as the biggest deficiency in the highway system. He indicated support of Route 37 and added that, if the bypass is not built as programmed, funds reserved for construction will go to other projects throughout the State.³³

Collier was thus echoing the concept of the relationship between MTC and the Highway Commission that Watt had expressed in the staff report - the Highway Commission had full control of the "discretionary funds" and MTC had none. According to one newspaper account of the incident, Collier also "warned MTC not to cross him," saying, "Give some thought to where your funds come from." MTC Chairman Beckett is reported to have replied, "We get the message."³⁴

Despite Collier's direct intervention, the Commission voted 8-6 on February 27 to delay action on the project by referring it to a joint committee composed of the WPC and GR & AC for further staff recommendations.³⁵ Since no action could be taken before March 1, the project was now involved in the regular annual review process, which meant that final action would not occur until June or July.

By this time, MTC's conception of the implications of the project had expanded greatly. It was now felt that with the agricultural preserve and the decision to not extend the existing Route 29 freeway segment into the area north of Yountville, the impact of the project on the northern Napa Valley would be minor. The real concern was the east-west traffic. As Collier indicated, there are no really good routes between US 101 and I-80 at present, and it was feared that the bridge project would make Route 12 overly attractive.

Although MTC had pretty well decided that there should be no freeway through the Valley of the Moon, opponents of the bridge now argued that traffic would use Route 12 anyway, unless other east-west

routes were improved. Primary candidates for this upgrading were Route 37 along the northern shore of San Pablo Bay and Routes 121 and 116 between Route 12 south of Sonoma and US 101 at Petaluma. At a WPC meeting on March 8, Bort moved conceptual approval of a compromise involving limited upgrading of Routes 37, 121, and 116, a limitation of Route 12 through the Valley of the Moon and Route 29 north of Yountville to two lanes, and inclusion of the East Side Bypass in the MTC Plan in exchange for immediate approval of the Napa Bridge. Trower and Houghteling opposed the motion, and it failed. ³⁶

Later, however, the WPC did adopt a similar package of proposals as a part of the proposed revision of Section III. On April 24, Trower requested quick action on the matter: he wanted the proposed amendment read immediately so that it could be acted on at the May 8 meeting. Bort said that he preferred to postpone the vote until May 22, but went along with Trower's request. Trower moved that the amendment be placed on the May 8 agenda, and the motion passed by a margin of 9-4. This maneuver was opposed by other opponents of the project: Commissioner Dearman "indicated his opposition to the motion as he felt the project was being rushed through;" and Houghteling "questioned the action on the Plan amendment prior to the adoption of the Environmental Impact Report on the RTP as provided in Resolution No. 78." ³⁷

On May 8, the WPC version of the compromise was introduced as Resolution 154. Trower introduced a substitute resolution providing:

...for the transportation development of the North Bay as recommended in the original resolution proposed by the Work Program Committee, except for incremental upgrading of the east-west corridor 116/121/121, provided, however, that strict land use controls over development are maintained in the counties and cities involved, and particularly in the Napa Valley and the

Valley of the Moon. It further stipulates that construction of all phases of the project must be coordinated as a unit and that a funding commitment must be obtained for the total project before any isolated portion is built. 38

This substitute motion failed for lack of a second. The original motion, which directed the staff to incorporate the details of the proposed compromise in the Plan revisions, passed by a vote of 9-3 with Houghteling, Kenny, and Trower in opposition. 39

The final MTC votes on the project came on June 26. At this time, Bort introduced Resolution 163 on behalf of the Work Program Committee. This resolution provided for adoption of those parts of the 1973 revisions of Section III involved in the compromise prior to the adoption of the entire revised section. The minutes report:

Discussion followed with Mr. Trower expressing dismay at the "loose procedure" employed to produce RTP revisions. He expressed concern that no committee action had been taken on the staff language proposal. The question of funding for related system improvements provided for in Resolution 154 was also raised by Mr. Trower, who wanted to know if a financial commitment had been made by Caltrans to finance the other North Bay improvements mentioned in Resolution 163. Staff responded that no such commitment had been made. 40

The resolution, however, passed by a vote of 11-4, with only Gatov, Houghteling, Kenny, and Trower in opposition. Dearman, a long-time foe of the project, asked that the record show that he voted for it "reluctantly."

Following this, Resolution 174, which expressed MTC's formal approval of the project, was introduced by Commissioner Giersch on behalf of the GR & AC. There was also some discussion of the exact wording of the resolution. The minutes report:

Prior to voting on the motion, there was discussion on the meaning of a phrase in the resolution that says that construction

"shall conform to the RTP and the schedule of priorities for construction included therein." Staff explained that this particular language is required by the Federal Highway Administration in resolutions approving construction projects. It was further explained that "schedule of priorities" refers to the RTP program for funding highway projects. 42

After some discussion, the reference to the "schedule of priorities" was removed and, at Bort's suggestion, the language "provided special funding for construction is available" substituted. The Resolution passed 11-2, with only Houghteling and Trower holding out. 43

Shortly after this, Trower resigned from MTC.

While all this was going on, there was some furious action behind the scenes that was carefully excluded from the public record. At some point, Collier apparently moved to make good on his implied threat to cut off MTC's operating funds if the project were not promptly approved. After his appearance at the February 27 hearing failed to secure immediate action, Collier reportedly threatened to act in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee to block appropriation of planning funds under SB 325. According to one Commissioner, this would have resulted in a statewide cutoff of funds to regional transportation agencies. Although it is quite possible that MTC would have approved the project in any event, it seems likely that Collier's action convinced several Commissioners who had doubts about the project - and who had been willing to drag their feet on approving it in February - that MTC's continued survival demanded prompt and favorable action.

D. Institutional Relationships: The Report to Caltrans,
The FAU Funding Issue, and
The Metropolitan Transit Federation

Considerable clarification of the relationships between MTC and

other institutional actors occurred during the year following adoption of the 1973 Plan. Three major incidents in the evolution of these relationships were preparation of a report to the Director of Caltrans concerning relationships between the Department and the regional transportation agencies, a dispute over how Federal Aid to Urban System (FAU) funds were to be allocated, and MTC's attempt to persuade the Bay Area's transit operators to form an organization to facilitate coordination of their operations.

1. The Report to Caltrans.

One of the provisions of AB 69 required that by January 1, 1974, each regional transportation agency should submit to the State Director of Transportation a report containing, among other things, "recommendations concerning relationships between the transportation planning agency and the department."⁴⁴ At the time this report came due, the staffs of MTC and District 4 recognized that there were a number of unresolved questions concerning the relationship between MTC and Caltrans. These included the issues of who was to initiate and control project planning and project programming as well as the difficult transitional problems which would result from any transfer of control over the "project pipeline."

The report submitted in response to AB 69, however, made only oblique references to these problems and contained only vague hints about MTC's position on them. This seems to have reflected a desire on the part of the MTC leadership to resolve such issues as much as possible through direct negotiations with District 4 officials. This policy of collaboration and negotiation extended to the preparation of the report itself. The original draft seems to have been drawn up by

the MTC staff, but it was sent to District 4 for review prior to being forwarded to Sacramento, and the minutes of MTC's January 11, 1974, meeting report that "...Lammers reported that Caltrans and MTC staff have worked together to revise the AB 69 report." ⁴⁵ In another instance, language in the report stating that:

The policy body [meaning MTC] may have the authority to supervise the preparation of plans for the transportation system that would be subject to future decisions, and it may decide which plans are given approval... ⁴⁶

was struck by the WPC when Lammers questioned it.

The one major point of disagreement which was discussed in the report involved differing concepts of the "statewide interest." Both AB 363 and AB 69 allude to situations in which the actions of regional transportation agencies might be overturned because of overriding statewide interests, but neither bill defines the term "statewide interest" (or "statewide significance"), and neither specifies who is to determine when such an interest exists. One means of preventing constant jurisdictional conflicts and of sidestepping the more general conflict implied by the simultaneous regionalization of transportation planning and programming and its centralization at the statewide level through such devices as the Planning Programming Budgeting System and the Resources Management System might be stratification of the highway system into statewide and regional systems. This concept had been suggested a number of times previously, and had been incorporated in both the BATSC Report and a Functional Classification Study undertaken by the state. It had not, however, been written into either AB 363 or AB 69. Despite the lack of legal sanction, Caltrans favored this solution to its jurisdictional problems with the regions. In its reply to the MTC's Draft

Plan, District 4 had declared:

We feel it is important for MTC to recognize our specific interest in routes of statewide significance in the RTP. Our preliminary thinking as to what comprises the routes of statewide significance within the Bay region is outlined in the State's 1972 Annual Highway Planning Report dated March, 1973.... and our February 6, 1973 letter... to you commenting on MTC maps distributed at your Town Meetings. The Department intends to work cooperatively with MTC to determine Routes of Statewide Significance. There will undoubtedly be many questions left unanswered when MTC's Plan is adopted. These questions must be negotiated in good faith pending resolution of responsibilities among those involved. ⁴⁷

MTC has always objected to this concept. The Report to Caltrans discusses the issue in these terms:

We fully recognize that there will be questions of equity between regions and issues where the local and regional interest must be subservient to statewide interests. It is our recommendation that these issues be addressed on a conceptual basis insofar as is possible, i.e.:

- 1) State sets regional parameters for employment, population, etc. Regional agency allocates within region.
- 2) State determines levels of service to serve statewide needs. Details of fulfillment left for local and regional determination.
- 3) Statewide significance to be determined with a minimum of fixed, rigid guidelines and a maximum of interagency negotiation.

MTC feels that the early establishment of extensive, detailed guidelines will hinder development of simple, logical procedures which will evolve through experience around the conference table. ⁴⁸

MTC's conception of statewide significance, then, is clearly based on a concept of interregional travel: trips, not routes, are of statewide significance, and the state's only obligation is to insist that MTC accommodate interregional trips. This the state may do by specifying levels of service for these trips, which MTC will then undertake to provide. It is also clear from this passage that the MTC leaders preferred to keep the exact limits of the Commission's power vague and

subject to negotiation.

In discussing the relationship between MTC and Caltrans, the report ducked the central issue of how two agencies with planning responsibilities at the regional level - MTC and District 4 - could coexist without either duplicating functions or establishing a relationship in which one dominated the other. Instead, the report notes the inherent conflict of interest in having a single-mode implementing agency engaged in multimodal planning, but concludes with the rather impractical suggestion that these two functions be kept separate, especially at the district level:

CAL TRANS plays two roles. First it is the state-wide transportation planning agency charged with development of a state-wide multi-modal transportation plan and implementation. Second, it is the operating agency for the State highway system. Every effort must be made, particularly at the District Transportation Office level, to separate the two roles so the regional agencies can effectively carry out their mission - that of preparing and implementing a Regional Transportation Plan. 49

2. The FAU Funding Issue.

A second major event in the evolution of MTC's institutional role was a dispute over the way in which Federal Aid to Urban Systems funds should be allocated. One role the sponsors of AB 363 had apparently envisioned for MTC was that of making decisions about the allocation of multimodal transportation funds - in the event such funds were ever made available. Inasmuch as there were no multimodal funding arrangements at the time, MTC had been invited to ignore existing legal restrictions on the expenditure of funds from various sources in drawing up its financial plan. In 1973, however, MTC had not done so. From the very beginning, the staff had felt obligated to produce a financial plan which could be implemented immediately and had thus maintained a

distinction between highway funds and mass transit funds (see Chapter 4, page 206). Moreover, the 1973 Plan took a self-contradictory position on the entire subject of multimodal transportation funding. Section IV declared that no recommendations about reallocation of existing funds could be made until decisions were made about Category II highway projects and that "use of Federal funds under a discretionary program would be largely dependent upon decisions reached about highway programs issues now having a 'Category II' status." Section V, on the other hand, declared that MTC supported making existing state and federal highway funds intermodal (see chapter 4, pages 307-08).

Shortly after adoption of the MTC Plan, Congress passed the 1973 Highway Act, which made FAU funds available for discretionary use on either urban highway or mass transit projects. The Act, however, was somewhat ambiguous as to whether regional transportation planning agencies or local governments in urbanized areas were to have lead agency status for preparing implementation plans to utilize the money. The relevant passage reads as follows:

In approving programs for projects on the Federal Aid Urban system, the Secretary shall require that such projects be selected by the appropriate local officials with the concurrence of the State Highway department of each State and, in urbanized areas, also in accordance with the planning process required pursuant to section 134 of this title.* 52

After passage of the Act, a dispute arose within USDOT over just who the "appropriate local officials" were, and by December, 1973, the federal officials had come to the conclusion that they could not resolve

* Section 134 requires a "continuing, comprehensive and cooperative transportation planning process" in order for urbanized areas to remain eligible for highway funds.

it among themselves. They proposed to delay their decision, but decided that funds would be made available whenever an agreement could be reached among state and local officials as to their expenditure. This meant that the question of temporary lead agency status fell to the state to decide.

At this juncture, the Director of Caltrans proposed that the regional transportation planning agencies should prepare implementation plans for review and approval by the State Transportation Board. This proposal, however, was "greeted by furious opposition from the County Supervisors Association of California, highway-user groups in the state, and public works officials on the California Transportation Advisory Committee."⁵³ These groups proposed that the FAU funds be broken down by county, and the counties be given the lead role in implementation planning. "After a month of intense lobbying by both local and regional officials," the Director and the State Transportation Board approved a compromise proposal that had been put forward by the Advisory Committee.⁵⁴ Lead agency status was awarded to the counties, but regional transportation planning agencies were given the right to review and approve both the project evaluation list and the formal list of projects. This statewide compromise did not specify the exact manner in which the regional transportation agency was to review and approve county submissions; in particular, it did not specify whether the regional agency should review the lists on a project-by-project basis or all at once.

In MTC's case, this detail was to be worked out through local "negotiations." What actually happened was that the task was delegated to the Traffic Control Council (TCC), a group composed mainly of repre-

representatives of the local public works departments. * According to the minutes of the March 14, 1974 TCC meeting:

Mr. Bay discussed the fact that in 1973 Congress passed the Federal Highway Act ... The state guidelines say that agreement must exist between implementing cities and counties, the regional transportation agency, and the state for the funds to be obligated. If disagreement occurs, no funds will be obligated. Before June 30 we must arrive at a way to obligate funds for the region. At the same time we must develop appropriate procedures for handling this matter in the future. This procedure must be multi-modal to include state highway capital projects and transit capital projects. At this time MTC is required by statute to approve State Highway Funds, Federal non-FAU funds, FAU funds, UMTA funds and TDA funds. Mr. Bay feels that the TCC can be a forum for discussion of methods for local agreement and distribution. The Commission doesn't see its role as determining which specific projects should be funded, it's only interested in assisting the division. 55

In the discussion that followed, representatives of the various local governments suggested procedures that would have tended to exclude MTC from an active role in drawing up the implementation plans. The first attack was on the idea that there should be a pre-determined division of funds between the modes:

Contra Costa County feels that each application for funds should be judged on its own merits, no modal split should be decided in advance. Alameda County has similar feelings. 56

Bay apparently did not reply directly to this suggestion, but rather raised the point of what was to be done about situations in which single counties could not deal with projects by themselves - thus reasserting the need for MTC involvement:

Mr. Bay stated that his concern was projects that overlapped counties and how they should be handled. A procedure must exist for this. He continued that the Legislation states that the money should be spent on substantial projects, not "dribbled

* See page 377 for a more detailed description of the TCC and its overall role.

away." He asked what the TCC could do to help ... [ellipsis in Minutes] . He felt that they should be involved only with respect to recommending procedures, not on individual project review. ⁵⁷

Following this, the Santa Clara County Public Works Director James T. Pott suggested a measure which would have even further limited MTC's involvement in drawing up the implementation plans:

...Mr. Pott suggested that with regard to Project Review, this Committee might consider recommending that MTC work with State and Federal Agencies on "Block" grants. Project review could be "Post-Audit" rather than "Pre-project" review. ⁵⁸

The terms "pre-project" and "post-audit" review stem from the terminology of the Federal Highway Administration. A "post-audit" review is the sort performed under the Federal Aid funding mechanism, in which states are reimbursed for completed work if it is found to be in accordance with federal standards. The significance of Pott's suggestion was that MTC should have no role in determining the projects undertaken by the counties, but only in determining after the fact whether they were eligible for FAU funding.

At this point someone suggested that the TCC set up a subcommittee to work out the details of the review procedure. After some discussion, it was decided that Bay should appoint the subcommittee and that "the purpose of the subcommittee will be to help simplify MTC's approval of the funds procedure."

The procedures agreed upon by the subcommittee stipulated that MTC should have a voting role in each county's project evaluation process and that MTC and Caltrans should then review the entire list simultaneously. Once the list was approved, no further MTC approval of individual projects would be required.

This agreement was brought before the full commission at the April 10 meeting in the form of Resolution 150. The Commission minutes state:

Resolution No. 150 was introduced by Mr. Bay, who explained that it authorizes the cities and counties within the nine Bay Area Counties to proceed with development of their three-year programs for expenditure of FAU funds...

Motion to approve Resolution No. 150 was made by Mr. Lucius and seconded by Mrs. Giersch. Discussion followed with amendments being offered by Commissioners Houghteling and Crowley. Neither amendment was accepted, however.

Mr. Bay explained that the wording of the resolution was carefully chosen to represent the intent of the officials who negotiated with the TCC subcommittee, and he urged approval of the original language. 59

The resolution passed on a unanimous vote. Later, however, MTC felt compelled to revise Resolution 150 to make it clear that FAU projects were still subject to the regular MTC project review process and that "MTC approval of the FAU program only pertains to distribution of FAU monies between local streets and roads, state highways, and public transit projects." 60

3. The Metropolitan Transit Federation.

Another major function of MTC, as envisioned by its early proponents, was to encourage coordination of operations among the Bay Area's transit operators. 61 Although language which would have given MTC the power to decide "unresolvable disputes between transit operators over fare structures and schedules" was amended out of AB 363 at the behest of the transit operators, the transit coordination issue was of major concern to UMTA in its certification actions and transit coordination was a central MTC function in the eyes of state officials.

MTC began boldly in the area of transit coordination. In 1972, Bort persuaded the commission that the so-called "Hamburg Plan," a federation of German transit operators which succeeded in making

dramatic improvements in transit service and operating economics through coordination of service and pooling of revenues - should be the model for transit coordination in the Bay Area. The Hamburg Plan was introduced to the public at the December, 1972 regional transportation symposium; following the favorable public reaction to it at that time, MTC retained a marketing consultant to design a transit coordination program. The consultant's proposal recommended joint promotional efforts, joint customer information programs, incentives to encourage trial patronage, and service improvements to levels of service which would encourage patronage among those who have alternative means of travel. These proposals were elaborated by the MTC staff, and were presented in Section III-D of the 1973 Plan. (See Chapter 4, pages 226 - 35.) The major transit operators were something less than enthusiastic over the proposals in Section III-D. One operator, responding to a preliminary version, went so far as to charge that "... one of the apparent fundamental objectives of MTC ... is to take over the entire transit industry." This suspicion of MTC's intentions with regard to transit coordination was no doubt confirmed in the minds of the transit operators by the early versions of Section V, which proposed, among other things, legislation to give MTC powers to institute transit services on an emergency basis and regulatory powers over transit routes, fares, and quality of service.

Another Section V proposal called for the formation of a Metropolitan Transit Federation, which was seen as an instrument for carrying out the transit coordination programs of Section III-D. In the early versions, this federation was to be composed of representatives of MTC, all public and private transit operators in the region, and other in-

volved agencies, such as the California Public Utilities Commission and UMTA. Originally, the purpose of the federation was to be:

...to fully integrate the region's transit services, with certain management, research and planning activities being delegated to the MTF, while enabling the various transit operators to retain their individual identities. ⁶²

The federation was to be established by a Joint Exercise of Powers agreement among MTC and the public transit agencies, and was to be a "duly constituted governing body, with regularly scheduled public meetings, agendas, and public notices." ⁶³

Although the purpose of the federation was ostensibly to preserve the independence of the transit operators, the federation was to be directly responsible to MTC, which would have "enforcement responsibility" for its recommendations. ⁶⁴ MTC was to consider the MTF's recommendations in allocating SB 325 funds, in reviewing grant applications, and in amending the Plan, and

In addition, if MTC is given regulatory powers over transit operations, MTF will be the primary advisory body to MTC in making decisions on routes, fare adjustments, etc. ⁶⁵

The original version of the proposal stated that the "recommendations of MTC [sic - probably intended to be "MTF"] would be enforced by means of MTC's periodically updated Regional Transportation Plan and by MTC's control over transit aid funds," ⁶⁶ and that during the period before the federation became operational, all "temporarily avoidable" actions relating to transit coordination, "including re-numbering of transit routes, commitments to fare collection systems, redesign of schedules and markers, etc." were to be postponed. ⁶⁷

In the revision of Section V which took place just prior to June 1, the proposal for the Metropolitan Transit Federation was considerably

softened. MTC abandoned the preemptory tone of its statements about the composition and organization of the federation: in this version, "the composition of the MTF, which should be the subject of further discussion by all affected parties, might ideally include..." the list of agencies proposed in the earlier versions, plus a public member representing transit users. ⁶⁸ (Later, Caltrans was also added as another "involved agency." See page 311 .) All reference to public meetings, agendas, and notices was dropped, and the language declaring that the federation would be set up by joint powers agreements was replaced by a statement that "the memorandum of understanding accepted by MTC and the transit agencies." ⁶⁹ Meanwhile, the language outlining specific functions for the federation was deleted, along with the legislative proposals elsewhere in Section V to give MTC emergency operating and transit-regulatory powers. Instead, the Plan suggested that the major goals of the federation might include:

- a. Increase public transit's share of the travel market in the Bay Area.
- b. Improve the image of public transit and its role among users and non-users alike.
- c. Increase efficiency of present transit operations.
- d. Develop new and improved sources of equitable funding for public transit. ⁷⁰

The Plan added that:

These goals might be achieved best by integrating or coordinating certain of the functions of the transit operators, such as marketing, research and planning, while enabling the transit agencies to fully retain their individual operating identities. ⁷¹

MTC suggested that:

Some early programs for MTF to concern itself with ... should include the following:

- a. Coordination of routes and schedules, including a regional route numbering system.
- b. Coordination of fare structures, ticketing, transfers, and fare collection procedures, including development of formulas for the disbursement of pooled fare revenues among operators.
- c. Coordinated transit research, marketing, and public information programs.
- d. Development of intermodal transit centers, including a program of terminal redesign.
- e. Development of a legal vehicle or authority to implement new transit services in areas of great need pending establishment of permanent services by a regular operator. ⁷²

References to MTC "enforcement" of the federation's recommendations were replaced by the statement that MTC could "encourage" the federation's recommendations through its planning and allocation powers. ⁷³

The WPC's rejection of the more extreme transit-coordination proposals in Section V left the MTC staff in the position of having to secure the voluntary cooperation of a group of suspicious and hostile agencies. Under the circumstances, a cautious approach seemed warranted - in Watt's words, quoted by Dorosin and Jones, one of " 'walking on eggs' while have 'a chance to sniff each other out.' " ⁷⁴

At early meetings of the general managers of the "Big Five" transit operators (BARTD, Muni, AC Transit, Golden Gate, and the Santa Clara County Transit District) MTC staff members did not press for a specific agenda of coordination priorities; instead, these meetings were taken up

by MTC attempts to reassure the operators about the role the Commission intended to play in the proposed federation, and discussions among the operators concerning the organization and purposes of the proposed association. By November, MTC had begun to promote a specific agenda of proposals for the federation; at this time the operators agreed to draw up a statement of purpose for the organization which could be endorsed by the governing bodies of the transit operators. This was done, but by December, the operators had still not approved the statement of purpose or reached agreement on the organization or function of the federation. By this time Bort "was beginning to think of strategies to pull the reins on the operators and capture their attention," ⁷⁵ but Beckett dissuaded him. Finally, on December 28, Bay met with federation chairman Alan Bingham of AC Transit to present him with MTC's priorities for coordination and to emphasize that MTC had secured a \$200,000 UMTA grant for a consumer-related transit marketing analysis and coordination program. By February, this had produced no response. Finally, MTC agreed to a meeting by the operators without MTC staff members. This was held on March 4, and produced a consensus among the operators to go ahead with a joint powers agreement creating an "Association of Bay Area Transit Operators" - but the structure and activities of the Association were still unclear. The operators did agree at this meeting that the Association would hire its own staff rather than utilizing the MTC staff. Finally, in May, 1974, the transit operators began circulating a memorandum of understanding establishing a board of directors of the Association consisting of the Big Five general managers but not including representatives of Caltrans or MTC. Any operator can veto the actions of the

board, and the board's functions are restricted to

[S]erving as an advocate for the position of the major transit operators of the Bay Area with respect to the need for additional sources of revenue for transit operations, and assuring that the plans, objective, experience and know-how of the major Bay Area operators are reflected in the plans and policy decisions of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the State Department of Transportation, and the State Legislature. 76

Thus, after nearly a year of foot-dragging, the transit operators had produced a lobbying association which was as likely as not to oppose the Commission in its transit policy. In the next year, the Association's accomplishments were modest, to say the least. MTC's 1975-76 Transit Development Program reports that:

The first major achievement of the Association of Bay Area Transit Operators (Transit Association) has been the development of a unified region-wide identification system for handicapped fare discounts ... Coordinated work under MTC leadership will include the handicapped and elderly study which will identify in quantitative terms these needs and develop a unified approach on delivering such services including hardware and operating standards ... A joint task force is also working on transit marketing - identifying those areas where joint efforts by operators and MTC would be most effective. Major attention will also focus upon developing a unified approach to transit financing as well as further service, fare, and transfer coordination. 77

Thus, two years after the adoption of the 1973 Regional Transportation Plan, the proposed federation had produced one actual coordination program; otherwise, it was still attempting to identify where coordination could take place, or else promising to address the knottier coordination problems in the future.

E. The 1974 Plan Revisions

It was generally recognized that MTC's 1973 Plan was an unfinished product. Resolution 78, for instance, had contemplated the possi-

bility of extensive revisions around the beginning of 1974 as a result of the Environmental Impact Report. There were several other unresolved issues to be addressed in the 1974 revisions. Among these was the Table of Issues in Section III-C; in this case, the Commission and staff had never really come to any agreement among themselves as to its purpose, its format, or the exact definitions of the Categories and priorities assigned to projects. In addition, it was felt that the table was confusing to the public; that the category system necessitated an inordinate number of Plan amendments, thus hampering the process of project approval; and that Category designations looked too much like MTC commitments to projects, despite statements in the text that they were not. A second area of concern was Section IV; in addition to its inaccuracies and inconsistency with other sections of the Plan, there was the dispute with Caltrans over the highway needs estimate, and the question of whether MTC would come up with its own capital improvement program for highways. The final major area of concern was Section VI; here, the problem seems to have been that some of the Commission - especially the GR & AC - felt that the procedures in the 1973 Plan that applied to project evaluation and approval were too vague - witness the uncertainty over what action was necessary in the cases of the Napa and Dumbarton projects - and too cumbersome. Also, if there were major alterations in Sections III and IV, Section VI would have to be changed to take these into account.

The first approach to modification of the Table of Issues seems to have been to elaborate it. The Draft Environmental Impact Report contained a version of the table in which the format had been expanded to include the following information:

Implementation Status:

Category [as in the 1973 Plan]

Priority [as in the 1973 Plan]

Commission Action [whether action had been taken on that specific proposal]

Commitment Level

Capital Improvement Program [whether in or not]

Scale:

Cost [from the Capital Improvement Program]

Movement Impact

Trunk/Local

Comment [as in the 1973 Plan] 78

Bort, however, was unhappy with the whole idea of the Categories, and finally prevailed upon the staff to take the opposite approach - to simplify the table by dropping the categories and to shift the emphasis of the Plan from Section III to Section IV.

On March 27, 1974, Watt announced that the plan amendments would be presented to the WPC by April 12. According to the minutes of this meeting, Beckett

...mentioned that the project categorization in Section III would be deleted... It is hoped that the new format will simplify the Plan's use for cities, counties, and citizens. Section VI will also be substantially revised to clarify the role of Plan amendment. 79

The revised Section III was reviewed by the WPC on April 12 and accepted except for the table of issues, now renamed "Proposed Transportation Improvements" and renumbered Section III-E. This subsection was incomplete on April 12 and apparently still contained priority designations. Watt reported to the Commission on April 24

that at around this same time (that is, April 12),

Staff... held intensive review meetings on the 12 proposals which staff identified as needing further evaluation prior to Plan revision. These meetings were well attended by all of the affected agencies. ⁸⁰

Apparently, these meetings concerned specific projects and contributed to the revision of Section III-E. On May 1, the completed version of Section III-E was presented to the WPC; by this time it had been revised to eliminate the priorities and to describe the system elements in more general terms. In addition, many of the "issues" listed in the 1973 Plan had been eliminated altogether, and several important highway projects not recognized as "issues" in 1973 had been added.

Meanwhile, work had also been underway to revise Sections IV and VI. As in 1973, MTC's tendency was to accept Caltrans' highway program with little or no modification, but to try to play a more active role in transit programming. On April 10, the staff made a presentation to the Commission on funding sources and the programming process; by this time a decision seems to have been made to follow Caltrans' highway program closely, since copies of the District 4's proposed capital improvement program were distributed at the meeting and the projects on it were described as having been proposed by the Caltrans and MTC staffs for inclusion in the MTC capital improvement program. ⁸¹

The transit program proposed in the 1974 revisions to Section IV was derived from MTC's 1974 Transit Development Program, which was completed in early May. This document was based to a considerable extent on the financial planning efforts that underlay the early staff work on Section IV in 1973, and consequently reflected some of the same concerns. As in 1973, the staff members most intimately involved in

drawing up the transit program pressed for a set of priorities which would emphasize provision of basic local transit services in areas which lacked them and use of express buses to serve most trunk transit needs. Also, as in 1973, they pressed for establishment of definite priorities among the proposed rapid transit extensions.

The order of priorities established by the Transit Development Program was, first, to fund the existing and committed transit systems - in particular, to secure funds to cover expected operating deficits; second, to implement a "Basic System" establishing minimum levels of local and feeder service and low-capital transit coordination programs; third, to expand to a "Moderate System" including the basic system plus express bus, recreational bus, and extended local service and one rapid transit extension; and finally, to expand to a "Recommended System" including the above plus about \$800 million more of rapid transit extensions. 82

Early drafts of the Transit Development Program had come out quite strongly in favor of establishing the San Mateo BART extension as the top-priority rapid transit project, and had even gone so far as to declare:

Based upon the analysis of travel demand, cost and service factors viewed from a regional perspective, rapid transit in the San Mateo corridor is the most important [transit] investment over the next ten years. 83

The "Moderate System" discussed in the Transit Development Program would have included a rapid transit extension in the San Mateo corridor as far as San Francisco International Airport, coupled with upgrading of the existing Southern Pacific commuter service; the "Recommended System" would have included a rapid transit extension to

Palo Alto. These suggestions met with opposition from the Work Program Committee. According to David Jones:

The staff report received a devastating critique from the Work Program Committee, with Chairman Joe Bort sending the document back for more politically seasoned treatment. Bort pointed out that the staff had made no specific proposals for Santa Clara County, which is closer to reaching a political and institutional concensus than is San Mateo County.

Stung by the Work Program Committee's response, the technical staff omitted specific references to BART and the SP in its final transit development proposals. Instead, it "recommended," and the Commission approved, one rapid transit extension during the next decade. The staff used the cost of Peninsula BART for the purpose of estimating revenue needs. 84

The official excuse given in the Transit Development Program for not setting rapid transit priorities was that, since technical studies were not yet complete, MTC lacked the necessary information about project costs, patronage potential, and environmental impact. According to the Transit Development Program:

... [W]e do not feel that the information currently available is adequate to determine overall project-by-project priorities. Accordingly, rapid transit program expenditures are not assigned to individual projects but rather are allocated to the program category of rapid transit. 85

Thus, the final version of the Transit Development Program recommended "one rapid transit extension" - which just happened to cost the same as the proposed San Mateo corridor BART extension. Comments elsewhere in the Transit Development Program made it clear that the MTC staff was not satisfied that other proposed BART extensions were appropriate, at least in the near future. The document's evaluation of the proposed Livermore-Pleasanton BART extension was that:

While there is a definite need for a travel alternative to the auto for residents of the Livermore Valley, the scale of service and

expense represented by a BART extension may not be warranted in view of the present population and environmental conditions within the service area. 86

The Program's evaluation of the proposed Pittsburgh-Antioch BART extension was that, although the project would offer the possibility of fostering desirable regional growth patterns and serving low-income residents:

... [T]he population and potential transit patronage within the service area is small in comparison to the cost involved in the full extension. 87

The transit program incorporated in the 1974 revisions to Section IV consisted of elements of the Existing and Committed, Basic, and Moderate Systems of the Transit Development Program, although the designation "Moderate System" was not used. In listing proposed additions to the Basic Program, Section IV mentioned only "one major rapid transit extension to be completed" and "one major rapid transit extension to be begun" - but the amount of money to be reserved for additions to the rapid transit system equalled the cost estimate for the San Mateo BART Extension. 88

Another issue involving Section IV which provoked discussion was that of needs estimates. Caltrans continued to push for the \$3.2 billion figure it had mentioned in its response to the 1973 Plan, arguing that the transit agencies had been treated more generously than it had. Bort, for one, was inclined to go along with this. At the May 1 WPC meeting, there was a "lengthy discussion ... on the subject of 'needs' as defined by law, as defined in terms of services for mobility, and as defined in terms of dollars for specific projects." The Committee minutes continue:

There was strong feeling that part of the plan should be devoted to describing real needs (service) regardless of financial and institutional restraints. It was also felt, however, that the plan had to be realistic and limit itself to those projects for which funding is available.

It was accepted that, if Section III concerned itself with the former, i.e. a description of total needs, and if Section IV concerned itself with the latter, i.e. projects financially possible, this would be satisfactory, provided that there be complete consistency in word usage. It was suggested that a word such as "requirements" replace the word "needs" in some instances. ⁸⁹

Despite this agreement in the WPC that Section IV would deal with only those projects considered financially feasible, the revision of Section IV retained the language from the 1973 Plan which stated that the regional transportation system "described in Section III" could cost up to "\$12 billion in public funds to construct." ⁹⁰ In addition, needs figures reported in Section IV included ten-year highway needs of \$3.1 billion (close to the figure Caltrans was seeking) and a ten-year mass transit capital needs of \$7 billion. ⁹¹ Obviously, neither of these figures was constrained by what MTC considered to be financially feasible.

Section IV received further attention at the May 31 and June 10 WPC meetings. On May 31, Carll presented a paper entitled 10-Year Estimate of Regional Transportation Needs. At this meeting staff also presented another chart detailing its concept of the interagency relationships involved in regional transportation planning, especially financial planning. According to this chart, implementing agencies were to identify their own needs and propose priorities for comparison by MTC on a regional basis. MTC's role would be to insure uniformity in the application of needs estimates in the region and to determine priorities (presumably based on those proposed by the implementing

agencies) for system elements of regional significance. MTC would also have some role in allocations of funds to projects on a year-by-year basis, but this role was not defined. ⁹²

On June 10, the WPC reviewed part of the Section. It made one significant change: language which read "For Bay Area funds, a maximum of 25% of [State Highway User] revenues is estimated as open to discretionary use" was revised to read "15%." ⁹³ MTC's ten-year Capital Improvement Program lists were apparently not ready at this time, but most of the decisions about what would be included in them had been made, and a hand-written table assigning funds to general program areas had been prepared. The highway program which finally did appear in the document "Proposed Revisions to the Regional Transportation Plan," dated June 17, was a minor revision of District 4's proposed CIP. ⁹⁴ There were some changes in the projects included in the program, some disagreement about the exact amounts to be expended, and some discrepancies in the timing of projects in the 3-year program (the Caltrans version reports year-by-year allocations to projects for the entire 10-year period; the MTC version, for only the first three years), but the main thrust of the highway program was clearly the work of District 4 and not MTC. Any real MTC influence on the highway program in 1974 was indirect: although the program was drawn up by Caltrans unilaterally, and was subject to only token MTC revision, Caltrans may have been influenced in its revisions by the 1973 Regional Transportation Plan. District 4's proposed 1974 program reflected drastic downward revisions in revenue estimates; in deciding which projects to drop, the District seems to have been guided to some extent by MTC comments and categorizations in the 1973 Plan.

By May 1, staff of the Resources Management Division had completed a proposed revision of Section VI. This involved the deletion of the section from the Plan, its redesignation as the Plan Implementation Procedures, and extensive revisions of the process for dealing with individual project review (see Chapter 3). These proposed revisions were reviewed by the GR & AC, which agreed that the section should be deleted, and forwarded to the WPC for its consideration on the same day. The WPC concurred in the recommendation to delete the section.⁹⁵

The proposed revisions first came before the full Commission on June 26, but no action was taken at this meeting except for the adoption of the special amendments pertaining to the Dumbarton Bridge and the Napa Bridge projects (see discussion of these projects, pages

On July 10 and 24, the Commission devoted a portion of its meetings to public testimony on the revisions, and scheduled other public hearings for July 15, 16, 17, and 18. On August 28, after several more changes, including the restoration of the Plan Amendment Procedures to the Plan as Section VI, the 1974 revisions were adopted.⁹⁷

F. The Transportation Control Plan

Another major MTC activity in the period following the adoption of the 1973 Regional Transportation Plan was the preparation of a Transportation Control Plan (TCP) for the achievement of air quality standards under the Federal Clean Air Act of 1970. The Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality standards; these standards are supposed to represent the maximum concentrations of various air pollutants consistent with public health and welfare and are required by law to reflect "the latest scientific knowledge" on the effects of pollutants.⁹⁸ The act further requires

that each state adopt a State Implementation Plan (SIP) for achievement of the standards by no later than 1977. In the event a state fails to submit a plan or EPA finds a plan unacceptable, EPA is to prepare and enforce an alternative plan for the state. 99

The Clean Air Act did not admit the possibility that the standards adopted under it might be impossible to attain. It made no provision for this contingency, and it specified no limit to the measures which might be undertaken in an effort to meet the standards. In the case of California, the state plan did not propose (and did not claim to propose) measures which would result in attainment of the federal standards for all pollutants prior to the legal deadline; indeed, there was real doubt that the measures proposed would ever result in the achievement of the federal standards in the Bay Area and the Los Angeles Basin. In due course, EPA (with some prodding from the federal courts) ruled the California Implementation Plan unacceptable and prepared an alternative plan, which proposed drastic reductions in the use of private automobiles in the major California metropolitan areas. The first version of the EPA plan proposed to achieve this through gasoline rationing; a later version dropped the rationing proposal in favor of parking management measures - but in either case, the intended effect of the EPA proposals was a drastic reduction in private vehicle use.

These measures, which were admittedly extreme, provoked a violent political reaction from state and local officials and local economic interests in the affected metropolitan areas; these groups believed (with a great deal of justification) that compliance with the EPA plans would be economically disastrous. EPA replied that it had no choice

under the law but to propose such extreme measures, that it agreed that the plans it had promulgated were "impractical," and that it would certainly welcome further attempts by the state to devise acceptable alternative plans. EPA also hinted that one reason it had proposed such Draconian measures was to dramatize the issue of the law's rigor, and that it hoped that Congress would provide relief by modifying the Clean Air Act.

Caltrans was designated by the state to produce the transportation control section of the State Implementation Plan; Caltrans, in turn, delegated responsibility for the transportation element of the Bay Area regional air quality plan to MTC. Neither Caltrans nor MTC was particularly enthusiastic about proposals for the achievement of air quality standards through restrictions on personal travel. Although Caltrans reported at one stage that reductions in projected 1977 vehicle miles traveled (VMT) on the order of 25 percent might be possible, there was a great deal of skepticism that dramatic shifts in travel behavior could be achieved without the sorts of measures proposed by EPA. Although some lower-ranking MTC staff members certainly favored the use of disincentive measures to reduce automobile traffic, this course of action found little favor with the MTC Executive Staff, the Caltrans staff, or the Commission itself. Some leading members of the Commission - most conspicuously, Bort - were also leading foes of EPA and the Federal air quality standards. Bort has said that "the original regulations were a fiasco," that the Clean Air Act itself was "not intelligently-drawn legislation," and that the original EPA plan calling for drastic reductions in VMT (a 60 to 90 percent reduction by 1977) was "about as ridiculous as

can be imagined." The feelings of top-level MTC staff about EPA and all its works, while less violent, still involve strong disapproval. Watt, for one, seems to see EPA's political style as the direct anti-thesis of MTC's: EPA (like MTC) is "the new kid on the block;" but, unlike MTC, "they just look at their side of things. They have to get into the trade-off world." The way that this is going to take place is that "they will have to get their nose bloodied a few times before they will start trading off. " Watt does concede that EPA needed to get people's attention and has succeeded at that. But neither the Commission nor the Executive Staff was in any hurry to take political risks in support of EPA policies.

MTC began work on the TCP in late 1973. In September, Paul Watt proposed to the MTC Executive Committee that the TCP be prepared by what was to be called the "Traffic Control Council."¹⁰⁰ This organization was to be composed of transportation professionals representing the cities and counties, Caltrans, the California Highway Patrol, and MTC's proposed Metropolitan Transit Federation. The city and county representatives were to be chosen by the same groups of local officials - the county boards of supervisors and the mayors' selection committees - as MTC Commissioners, but were to be civil servants rather than political appointees. As it turned out, most of the counties appointed their public work directors, while the mayors' selection committees appointed public works directors, city managers, and traffic engineers. MTC assigned Paul Bay the task of chairing the Council. This group was formally constituted by MTC in November.¹⁰¹

Sometime after the publication of the 1973 Regional Transportation Plan but prior to the TCC's effort (which began in earnest in January) Caltrans District 4 had proposed a Plan ... to Reduce Air Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Intrastate AQCR ^{*}. This proposal referred to the MTC Plan "in its entirety" as being a "systemized method for simultaneously reducing air pollution and providing the residents with greater transportation opportunities." ¹⁰² It referred specifically to various policies in Section II, to evaluative factors in Section III-B, and to the proposals for improvement of transit usage in Section III-D. Although this document took the position that

Disincentives for auto use are not a part of the plan. They should be considered only after the desired transit ridership fails to develop when the new services have been placed in operation. Apply only the most palatable ones at first and keep applying others until the desired transit usage is reached. ¹⁰³

it did list a series of auto-use disincentives, including higher bridge tolls and parking fees, reduced parking in central business districts, gasoline rationing, reserved bus lanes, and a number of special tax measures. It also suggested that by 1977 reductions in vehicle miles traveled on the order of 25 percent (as compared with 1972 VMT) could be achieved by implementation of expanded transit service and promotion of carpools. ¹⁰⁴

At the same time, the District seems to have felt that the current federal standards - particularly those for oxidants, the critical pollutant in the Bay Area - were too stringent. In a paper introduced at an early TCC meeting, the District summarized the methods used in determining the standards and quoted extensively from

^{*} AQCR stands for Air Quality Control Region.

statements by others which were somewhat critical of these methods. 105

Some members of the TCC itself seem to have felt that it would be possible for them to deviate from the standards in drawing up the TCP. The Council's minutes report, for instance, that:

There was much discussion on whether the Council should set its own goals. It was suggested that perhaps the Council can do a better job than the federal government. Setting our own goals may influence the national goals. 106

This attitude may, in fact, have been encouraged by representatives of EPA's regional office. In a presentation before the TCC on February 21, 1974, one EPA representative claimed that the Clean Air Act was one of the most stringent pieces of law ever passed by Congress, and that much of its stringency was due to the fact that most states- but not California - had been doing little about air pollution problems; a second reason for the law's rigor, he said, was the severity of the air pollution problem around Washington, D.C. He went on to state that the oxidant standards were still subject to debate, * that EPA had been forced by court rulings to promulgate the standards prematurely, and that:

EPA realizes the deadlines are unrealistic in many areas. They realize the plans were developed too quickly but the court officer gave them only two months to develop a plan. 107

On the subject of "where the [Clean Air] act might be changed and when it might be changed," the EPA representative declared that:

One problem has been in transportation and land use. The major problem is in the 1977 date. The administration is making

* The National Academy of Sciences had, in fact, concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish the oxidant standard, but that there was no reason to believe that it should be relaxed.

recommendations to Congress about the act... They wish to take the approach that if an air quality control region can show that it is making a reasonable effort to improve, the administration would be able to give the area up to five years additional time ... New cars, new mass transit systems, bus-and-carpool lanes, parking management plans, [or] a willingness to look at new complex sources could all be involved in the real effort. 108

By April, 1974, the TCC had gotten MTC to go on record as urging relaxation of the Air Quality Standards; Resolution 151, setting forth MTC's position on the matter, was drafted by the TCC and passed by the Commission, apparently with little discussion. 109

The actual writing of the TCP took place during the spring and summer of 1974. Parts of the document were written by the MTC staff, but two key chapters were written by the Caltrans staff. One of these, which took a very negative attitude toward the subject of traffic control measures, concerned the social impacts of the TCP. 110 After the document was written, it was reviewed by the TCC and then transmitted to the Commission. 111

The Draft TCP issued on October 31, 1974, was more an attack on the idea of using VMT-control to improve air quality than a plan for doing so - as might have been expected, considering the fact that even EPA representatives regarded the Clean Air Act as unrealistic.

Its first finding was that:

There is considerable scepticism about the appropriateness of the National Air Quality Standard. 112

It went on to argue that:

For vehicular sources, by far the greatest reductions in emissions of the precursors of ozone (O₃) will come from hardware control devices (catalytic converters) - not from reductions in VMT. 113

The draft TCP contained the following table 114 - which indeed shows

<u>Source</u>	<u>1971 RHC* Emissions (TPD)*</u>	<u>Reductions Due to Proposed Controls</u>	<u>Expected 1977 RHC Emissions (TPD)</u>	<u>Reduces 1971 Annual O₃ Max. of 0.36 PPM* by</u>
Stationary	186	133	62	0.094
Aircraft	31	13	18	0.015
Vehicular	286	208.8	77.2	---
FMVCP	---	157	---	0.11
Retrofit & Inspection/Maint.	---	46	---	0.032
Trans. Cntl. Pln.	---	5.8	---	0.004
Totals	512 TPD	354.8 TPD	157.2	0.255PPM
*RHC = Reactive Hydrocarbon - TPD = Tons Per Day - PPM = Parts Per Million				

TABLE 2 Projected Reactive Hydrocarbon Levels in 1977 According to
MTC's Proposed Transportation Control Plan.

traffic control measures accounting for only a small percentage of the pollutant reduction - but nowhere justified or referenced any of the figures in the table except those relating to the Transportation Control Plan itself. In particular, the assumptions underlying the predicted 0.11 ppm reduction in oxidant concentrations resulting from the Federal Vehicle Control Program were not discussed.

The Draft TCP admitted that:

The control measures proposed for implementation in this plan will probably meet the Carbon Monoxide (CO) standard but will not attain the oxidant standard (O_3) by the 1977 compliance date, ¹¹⁵

concluded that:

Those transportation control measures recommended for implementation in this plan will result in minor short run air quality improvements. The effect of these measures is more likely to be felt over the longer term as more efficient land-use configurations evolve, ¹¹⁶

and recommended, in part, that:

MTC should continue to urge the Congress to further study the air quality standard. The compliance date should be revised to assure that unduly harsh short-term measures are not undertaken to the detriment of community viability and long-term land use goals. ¹¹⁷

In other words, the Draft TCP argued that the catalytic converter program would solve the smog problem - as far as it could be solved - and that (since these devices would be so efficient) further reductions in vehicular travel would have a negligible impact on air quality. Accordingly, the Draft Transportation Control Plan did not recommend any drastic measures to reduce vehicular travel; and consequently,

the measures it did recommend were not likely to have much effect. The entire argument hinged on the supposed effectiveness of the catalytic converter program, and the assumption that this particular emissions control program would actually be undertaken.

The Draft TCP's assessment of the impact of proposed transportation control measures on VMT itself represented a drastic reduction from the estimates previously published by Caltrans: in place of the earlier estimates that VMT reductions of around 25 percent might be achieved by 1977, the Draft TCP concluded that the maximum reduction possible by that year would be around 7 percent.¹¹⁸ Anything above that figure could be achieved only through gasoline rationing or some sort of parking management plan. The Draft TCP did not deal with parking management, since this was to be covered in a separate document, but did state that:

... [T]he socio-economic impact of the PMP* could meet stiff opposition ... in the Bay Area and it is doubtful that the final PMP will have as great an impact on VMT as could be obtained.¹¹⁹

The authors of the Draft TCP also rejected gasoline rationing as a strategy for reducing VMT - not because they felt it would be ineffective, but precisely because they believed that it would achieve its purpose and that this would result in intolerable political consequences:

The affluent climate resulting from the recent decades of technological advances, and the conditioning to an abundant availability of amenities, pose an action of personal deprivation as an almost intolerable solution to any type of problem.¹²⁰

The Draft TCP was supposed to focus on short-term strategies for meeting the air quality standards; accordingly, it did not deal in

*Parking Management Plan

depth with the more important long-run questions of the maintenance of air quality standards if and when they are achieved. With regard to this subject, the Draft TCP contained only some rather vague references to land use controls. The Draft TCP did not go into the subject of just how such land use controls were to be achieved and what their effects might be: so far, the interrelationships between transportation, land use, and air quality are still matters of controversy; moreover, it is still not certain that institutional arrangements exist which would permit the enforcement of comprehensive land use plans.*

In introducing the Draft TCP to the Commission, Bay noted that the document had been written with the active collaboration of the local EPA officials and that EPA planned to use such local TCP's as a basis for amendments to the Clean Air Act relaxing the air quality standards. The minutes of the November 27, 1974, Commission meeting report:

Recognizing the impossibility of meeting the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 1977 Clean Air Act Standards, Mr. Bay explained, the TCP was prepared to propose short term measures designed as a first step toward clean-up of the Bay Area's air pollution problems. Major changes will be reserved for long term improvements.

EPA concurs on the need to amend the Clean Air Act to provide a more realistic time schedule for implementation of stricter standards. The agency is prepared to propose congressional amendments accordingly. Input for these amendments will come from local plans such as MTC will submit.

The Traffic Control Council (TCC), in consultation with local EPA representatives, has developed a draft TCP. It is hoped the TCP will be an acceptable substitute for EPA's own plan,

*The I-580 case (see pages 385 - 408) illustrates both technical and institutional problems associated with the interactions between transportation, land use planning, and air quality.

which called for drastic disruption of travel methods to meet the 1977 standards. That plan was found unworkable both locally and throughout the State.¹²¹


The full Commission made a few preliminary changes in the TCP, the most notable being the deletion of the findings that "there is considerable skepticism about the appropriateness of the National Air Quality Standard" - Houghteling argued that many people think it should be stricter. Hearings were then held on the document during January 1975, and it was adopted.¹²² EPA has yet to rule on its acceptability, but given EPA's role in its creation, there is considerable chance that it will be accepted, despite the fact that the Clean Air Act has yet to be amended, and until such time as it is, the Bay Area TCP is clearly in conflict with the law, since it provides no means for meeting the standards by the legal deadline.

G. I-580 Case

1. Introduction

I-580 is an Interstate highway route intended as a connector between the Bay Area and I-5, the main north-south Interstate route through California. As such, it was expected to play a major role in handling traffic between the Bay Area and the Los Angeles area, especially trucks. The route extends from I-80 just east of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, through Oakland, San Leandro, Hayward, Castro Valley, and the Livermore Valley, across Altamont Pass in eastern Alameda County, to I-5 near Tracy in the Central Valley. This route generally parallels, and in some cases, replaces that of US 50; consequently, this was a major route long before it was designated a part of the Interstate System. (See map.)

MAP 5.
I-580 PROJECT AND
VICINITY



The entire route was planned as an eight-lane freeway. The official reason for this, as advanced by the Division of Highways and its successor, Caltrans, was that the route was intended for through traffic and that eight lanes were necessary to provide an adequate level of service for through traffic. This was true, but only in the sense that eight lanes would be necessary to accomodate the expected combination of through and local traffic at what the division considered to be an adequate level of service. I-580 passes through heavily-developed residential areas in the East Bay and was expected to provide access to the East Bay and San Francisco for work trips from the rapidly-expanding suburban areas in the Livermore, Amador, and San Ramon Valleys. At the time the route was planned, it was expected that the Livermore Valley would experience very rapid suburbanization: the population of the Valley increased from just under 30,000 in 1960 to 77,655 in 1970. Projections made in 1966 indicated a population of over 400,000 as possible by the year 2000; the Alameda County Planning Department was using a 1990 projected population range of 235,000 to 284,000 for planning purposes as late as the beginning of 1972.¹²³ At present, through traffic accounts for only about 12 percent of the vehicle miles traveled on I-580 in this area, and, if anything, this percentage was expected to decrease as the local population expanded.¹²⁴

By the time MTC entered the picture in 1971, I-580 was complete except for the segment through Castro Valley and Dublin Canyon between Route 238 in Hayward and I-680 at Dublin. This segment had been constructed to fairly high standards prior to adoption of the

Interstate route (it was designed to near-freeway standards, but did not meet Interstate standards because of inadequate alignment and retention of several minor at-grade intersections) and thus at one time was one of the better segments of the route; also, its construction posed some problems of alignment and seems to have been put off because the Division of Highways was designing the easier segments first.

By the late 1960's, however, an eight-lane freeway design for this segment had been completed. This original design for the Division of Highways had ignored the fact that BARTD had long been contemplating a rapid transit extension to Livermore. By the time the design was completed, BARTD was nearing completion of its basic system and was beginning to give more active consideration to the proposed extensions. Consequently, BARTD and Livermore Valley local officials questioned the lack of coordination between BARTD and the Division of Highways. Since the State was pushing the concept of joint use of rights-of-way for freeways and mass transit (partly in an attempt to keep peace between freeway and mass transit advocates) and had actually collaborated with BARTD on joint use of rights-of-way on Route 24 and a segment of I-580 in Oakland, the Division of Highways felt obligated to make some effort at collaboration on this project as well, and sent it back to the drawing board so that the freeway median could be designed to accomodate a rapid transit line.

By the time the project emerged from redesign, some major changes had occurred in its overall circumstances. The 1970 census revealed changing demographic trends in the nation as a whole and in California in particular; these caused a downward revision in population

projections. At the same time, the environmental movement had emerged as a major political force, and attitudes toward population growth and land development in suburban fringe areas underwent a corresponding shift from open boosterism to adamant anti-growth sentiments. In the Livermore Valley, this attitude was strengthened by the existence of a severe air pollution problem. By 1972, Livermore Valley communities were seriously discussing growth restrictions to deal with the problems of air quality, overloaded sewage treatment facilities, and the need for an enlarged water supply and more schools to accommodate the new residents. The city of Livermore actually passed an ordinance restricting growth, which was immediately challenged in the courts by land developers and labor unions. Meanwhile, the passage of state and federal environmental legislation created the need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the project and the possibility that action to restrict growth in the Livermore Valley would be taken as a part of a state or federal Air Quality Plan under the Clean Air Act of 1970.

2. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Its First Supplement

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the project was completed in late 1971. Although ABAG and MTC declined to comment on the document, it received serious adverse comments from EPA, the State Air Resources Board, the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, and the Alameda County Planning Department. These objections centered around the impact of the project on air quality, its impact in inducing population growth in the Livermore Valley, and the appropriateness of the scale of the project. These were all interrelated. The Division of Highways argued - and its opponents generally agreed -

that the fumes produced by traffic on I-580 itself would have a negligible effect on air quality in the Livermore Valley; the real problem was the effect of increased population in the Valley on the quality of the air; and this, in turn, depended on the relationship between the scale of the project and the amount of population growth which would result. The Division of Highways argued that emission control devices would result in such a dramatic improvement in the air quality of the entire region that air quality in the Livermore Valley would improve despite the predicted increase in population. The EIS did not, however, actually claim that either national or state air quality standards would be met in the Livermore Valley.¹²⁵

As for the increase in population itself, the Division of Highways maintained that this was not its concern, but rather that of the local planners, and that "traffic will increase due to the natural growth phenomenon.... Population growth and land development will be here for years to come with or without this freeway."¹²⁶ As to the relationship between population growth and the scale of the facility, the Division continued to insist that the eight-lane section was intended only to provide a high level of service to through traffic. In reply to a comment from the Alameda County Planning Department questioning the basis of the Division's population estimates and inquiring about the effect of various design alternatives on the population "carrying capacity" of the Valley, the Division declared:

The Division of Highways does not itself predict or control population growth but uses projections indicated by local agencies to predict future traffic. The 8-lane freeway is required to meet interstate uses with a high level of service. Traffic projections have been analyzed to allow sufficient capabilities to handle interregional needs. The added stress of local use in the Livermore-Amador Valley will create

increased transportation demands. As a lesser system such as a 6-lane freeway would not handle existing traffic or future interregional traffic, this analysis is not appropriate.¹²⁷

In January, 1972, the national Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) returned the Draft Impact Statement, stating that it was placing "particular emphasis upon the comments ... of the Environmental Protection Agency."¹²⁸ CEQ commented that in assessing the air quality impact "... the enlarging from 4 to 8 lanes should be considered in terms of traffic generation as well as relief of congestion," and that with respect to the proposed transit median "... a fuller description should be included on the expected reduction in automobile usage and resultant air pollution."¹²⁹ CEQ further commented that:

Growth as it relates to further pollution is the second concern of this area. Since air pollution and stress on other waste disposal systems is at a crucial level, careful consideration should be given the effect this project will have on development and the desirability of the "no action" alternative.¹³⁰

In March, 1972, the Division of Highways completed a supplementary air quality report in an attempt to satisfy CEQ's objections. In September, 1972, the Division released the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the project; this was approved by the Regional Federal Highway Administration in October and forwarded to the Federal Highway Administration in Washington. In March, 1973, FHWA's Associate Administrator for Right-of-Way and Environment commented that although the supplementary air quality report was "well done and utilized the most current techniques available to analyze the air quality impact of the project," the "issues raised by EPA, BAAPCD, and CEQ do not seem to be adequately resolved."¹³¹ FHWA suggested that several issues relating to air quality be "discussed with the local and State air quality control agencies to determine whether the

project as proposed is consistent with the State implementation plan to achieve air quality,"¹³² and noted that there were still conflicts over the population projections. FHWA concluded by suggesting that "the California DPW* work with the local agencies which have addressed the population and air quality issues to resolve them at the State level."¹³³

The Division of Highways responded to these comments by preparing a supplement to the air quality report in May, 1973. In June, the State Air Resources Board and BAAPCD responded to this supplement. BAAPCD noted that, according to the Division's latest air quality report, there was a 10 percent unfavorable difference between the full project and the no-build option in terms of hydrocarbon emissions. BAAPCD commented that "this should be considered as a negative factor in determining whether the project should be undertaken."¹³⁴ The State Air Resources Board declared that it did not have "the information to evaluate the impact of the subject project or the air quality of the Livermore/Amador Valley. This agency is unable to relate the project to the population growth of the Livermore/Amador Valley and hence unable to evaluate the impacts of the alternative projects on air quality in the area," and concluded that "in the absence of specific analysis of the project's impact on population growth, we can only conclude that it would appear that this project will be detrimental to achieving the national ambient air quality standards in the Livermore/Amador area."¹³⁵ The Division of Highways replied:

It is agreed that we have not predicted the growth in the Valley for each alternative project development. The problem at hand is that the local agencies have planned for populations

*The California Department of Public Works, the Division's parent agency

equal or exceeding those used in our traffic projections. We do not have available information to quality or predict the growth rate, density, or distribution of population; the growth which can be supported by alternate routes or modes; or the growth which may have already occurred in anticipation of the long planned transportation corridor....

The development of the Livermore/Amador Valley will depend on local planning and control. Alternate highway routes are available to get automobile traffic to the Valley and transit extension being considered by BARTD will allow growth to continue with the related auto trips.¹³⁶

3. I-580 and The MTC Plan

Meanwhile, MTC was involved in writing this Plan. I-580 was included as an issue, and was initially placed in Category II. Sometime after the initial version of the table was made up, Bay reports, the corridor teams decided to change the project's status to Category III; Bay restored it to Category II on the grounds that the corridor teams had emphasized environmental concerns to the exclusion of transportation service concerns and that a recommendation to "do nothing" would undermine the Commissions's credibility. Bay believed that any MTC move to place the project in Category III would result in the State's preempting control over it by asserting that it was a "route of statewide significance," and that this would lead to a reversal of any recommendation of inaction which, in turn, would be detrimental to MTC's prestige. Later, Bay assigned the project a "high" priority during the June revisions. Section III-C contained the comment that the project "may be [an] important interregional connection. Growth impacts should be evaluated with [the] BART corridor study now in progress."¹³⁷

The Division of Highways had meanwhile pressed MTC to place the project in Category I. At the MTC Public Meeting in Oakland on

June 14, 1973, supporters of the project turned out in force - an unusual event, since this was the only instance in which non-official elements of the "highway lobby" made their presence felt during the development of the plan. Speaking in favor of the project at this meeting were the city manager of Pleasanton, the Alameda County Public Works Director, and representatives of the Associated Homebuilders of the Greater East Bay, the Operating Engineers Union, the Aggregates and Concrete Association, and the Committee for Proper Regional Planning, a Livermore group apparently organized for the purpose of promoting the project.¹³⁸ The proponents of the project mounted something of an attack on MTC itself: Andrew Sabhlok, the representative of the Associated Homebuilders, even attacked the MTC Plan on the grounds that MTC had not prepared an EIR for it and that the plan "does not state what level of population growth is used in preparation of this plan, does not relate to the plans of other regional agencies and especially is inconsistent with the recently adopted asinine [sic] policy, Section 2144, of the State Water Quality Control Board."¹³⁹ The Committee for Proper Regional Planning complained that "rural suburbs are a unique geographical area with many problems dissimilar from those of highly urbanized areas, yet they are frequently dominated by urban centers' needs and desires." The Committee claimed to have conducted a survey in the Valley which showed that only 42 percent of the people agreed with the concept of a master plan for the area administered by a regional transportation agency and that 73 percent of the respondents had not heard on MTC. The Committee claimed that 80 percent of the respondents favored immediate widening of I-580 and 90 percent favored state acquisition

of the BART right-of-way median. The project was opposed by the Sierra Club and the city of Livermore.

4. The Second Supplement to the EIS.

Shortly after the adoption of MTC's 1973 Plan, Congress passed the Highway Act of 1973. This law contained the following language:

The Secretary [of Transportation] after consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall develop and promulgate guidelines to assure that highways constructed pursuant to this title are consistent with any approved plan for the implementation of any ambient air quality standard for any air quality control region designated pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended.¹⁴¹

In November, the Federal Highway Administration published guidelines for the implementation of this section. The key section of these guidelines states that:

The final EIS [for any Federal-Aid highway project] may be adopted by the FHWA only after a determination that the proposed highway is consistent with the State Implementation Plan. The determination of consistency shall be made by the FHWA.¹⁴²

EPA had opposed this language, maintaining that under its indirect sources review guidelines, the final determination of consistency with the State Implementation Plan should be made by the state or local air quality agencies. In the case of I-580, there was a further complication: although the law merely states that projects must be found consistent with "...any approved..." air quality plan, the FHWA guidelines required a positive finding of consistency with "the State Implementation Plan." Since there was no approved Implementation Plan for the Bay Area, there could be no positive finding of consistency with the State Implementation Plan in the case of I-580. Around the beginning of 1974, there were rumors that the new FHWA guidelines, combined with continued opposition by EPA and the state and local air quality agencies, would block the I-580 project.

Despite these rumors, Caltrans forwarded a grant application for the project to MTC in February, 1974. By April, Caltrans had prepared a second supplemental air quality report, updating the information included in the previous reports and addressing some of the air quality issues which had been raised earlier and not resolved. On the growth issue, however, Caltrans stuck to its former position that it could not predict growth impacts and went on to declare that "it has been shown in the past that the addition of a highway or as in the case, widening a highway has not in itself materially affected growth."¹⁴³ In assessing air quality impacts, Caltrans assumed 1990 populations of 180,000 and 220,000 for the Valley.

The State Air Resources Board replied that:

...[I]t is stated "It has been shown in the past that the addition of a highway or as in the case, widening a highway has not in itself materially affected growth." We are unaware of the justification for the statement and what factual evidence supports this conclusion. Our understanding of the Progress Report of the State Transportation Board seems to indicate that development follows transportation.¹⁴⁴

The Board also concluded that:

In the absence of a transportation control plan approved by the State of California for the Bay Area which includes the 580 widening, we are unable to conclude that the project is consistent with the implementation plan.¹⁴⁵

Caltrans replied to the State Air Resources Board's comments about the growth issue by stating that:

...We disagree...that the freeway widening will materially influence growth or the rate of growth, in this particular situation. We also believe we have demonstrated for any reasonable range of future population projections the proposed widening will result in

air quality at least as good as the no-build alternative.* [Emphasis in original.]

The state of the art is such that we are unable to forecast population for the Valley for various alternate highway proposals. Since access now exists, the population will be based on availabilities of sewer, education, economic land values, and local land use policies. CALTRANS is not in a position to predict the outcome of the combinations of these factors and their effect on growth. All population projections for the Valley by other agencies assumed inclusion of an improved Interstate 580.

... In the long run, any inducement of growth provided by the widening of Interstate 580 will be small and completely overshadowed by growth controlled by land values, sewage facilities, availability of utilities¹⁴⁶ and particularly land use policies and control by local agencies.

The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District responded to the second supplement by stating that it could accept Caltrans' conclusions, given Caltrans' assumptions about population and traffic growth, but added that:

The above comments are dependent upon the correctness of the traffic and population growth estimates. We feel that comments should be obtained on the estimates presented from agencies having particular competence in the field, such as ABAG, MTC, and Alameda County. The project EIR makes a selection from among population projections made by various agencies, but does not necessarily relate them to the project or no project condition. It, in fact, contends that the improvement of I-580 will have essentially no effect on the growth of the Livermore-Amador Valley. We would feel much more comfortable with independent confirmation of this judgment and would be reluctant to continue approval of the project if that position could not be supported.¹⁴⁷

Caltrans' reply to BAAPCD's comments was similar to its reply to the State Air Resources Board:

Again, it is agreed that we have not predicted the growth of the Valley for each alternative project development. The problem at hand is that the local agencies have planned for populations equal or exceeding those used in our traffic projections. We do not have

*This conclusion follows more or less automatically, if it is accepted that the project would not induce population growth. All the statement means is that any additional traffic on I-580 itself would not result in a significant increase in air pollution; this contention was never the real issue.

available information to quantify or predict the growth rate, density, or distribution of population; the growth which can be supported by alternate routes or modes; or the growth, if any, which may have already occurred in anticipation of the improved transportation corridor.

As pointed out at the May 10 meeting it is an extremely difficult task to realistically predict population for incremental transportation assumptions. We do not believe any agency has this ability. Even if a change could be predicted, it would be of meaningless significance as our studies have shown no difference in air quality for the build or no build alternative.* It should also be noted that some growth is inevitable in the Valley and the existing roadway is already experiencing congestion.¹⁴⁸

The Caltrans reply concluded that "growth in the Valley is inevitable and as an issue in this project is a mute [sic] point."¹⁴⁹

In July, EPA's regional administrator commented to FHWA's regional administrator that he believed that, in a general sense, the conclusions of the second supplementary air quality report were reasonable, but that in light of the disagreement over Caltrans' growth assumptions, he believed that:

...[T]he responses to the questions raised by the California State Air Resources Board and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District are critical to the air quality analysis of this proposed project. Furthermore, the recommendations of both the Association of Bay Area Governments and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission should be solicited with the caveat that air quality is a legitimate land use and transportation planning concern and should be weighed in the regional planning process. I recommend that FHWA direct CALTRANS to obtain a resolution to these state and local conflicts prior to further federal involvement.¹⁵⁰

The EPA regional administrator concluded that the final EIS "would also require a formal statement of consistency with the State Implementation Plan" and that "EPA's findings set forth herein do not substantiate your belief that the Second Supplement answers all the relevant questions."¹⁵¹

*Again, this is true only if the direct, rather than the indirect, air quality impacts are considered. Caltrans had assumed that the project would not affect growth. But air quality would vary with population.

The FHWA regional administrator replied that:

We agree with EPA that conflicts between State and Regional agencies, regarding the air quality impacts of the proposed Interstate 580 project, should be resolved. However, we believe that before any of the current disagreements regarding the assumptions used by Caltrans can be resolved, basic agreement must be reached as to what constitutes the State Implementation Plan. The California Air Resources Board has taken the position on the Interstate 580 project, and other projects in California, that they cannot determine the consistency of proposed projects in the absence of a Transportation Control Plan approved by the State of California. In light of the fact that Transportation Control Plans have been promulgated by EPA and Caltrans is currently developing alternate plans to meet EPA/FHWA requirements, we consider the inflexible position of the ARB to be unsupportable.¹⁵²

FHWA suggested a meeting among EPA, Caltrans, FHWA, and the Air Resources Board to discuss this matter. The FHWA regional administrator's letter did not refer to the issue of growth impacts.

Meanwhile, MTC had been drawing up its 1974 revisions. The proposed revision of Section III contained the comment:

I-580 is an important interregional link in the State Highway System. Serious environmental problems could develop if additional capacity is provided without careful growth management.¹⁵³

Elsewhere, the proposed revision of Section III added the statement that "a future decision to support a limited growth policy in the Valley by restricting access in the Valley may be impossible to realize given the current proposals to both improve freeway access and extend fixed rail BART service to the Valley."¹⁵⁴ The project was included in the MTC capital improvement program, with a substantial sum programmed for fiscal year 1974-75. The description of the project in Section III included "...provision for preferential treatment of buses and carpools;"¹⁵⁵ this last point was controversial, since preferential treatment was not included in the Caltrans proposal.

In early August, MTC sent a letter to the Assistant Secretary of

Transportation for Environment, Safety, and Consumer Affairs (the official in USDOT responsible for determining the acceptability of the EIS) stating that "it has been suggested that it would be of assistance to you if we wrote this letter outlining the status of MTC's review of the I-580 project." The letter went on to state:

The Regional Transportation Plan adopted by MTC last summer explicitly identifies the need for improved transportation facilities in the I-580 corridor, and labels the need for both highway and transit improvements "high priority." The adopted Plan includes a 10-year program for transportation expenditures, which provides for funds to construct the I-580 project as presently designed. However, the Plan also suggests review of the capacity/design aspects of the project in relationship to transit improvements and growth in the Livermore Valley.

Since the Plan was adopted last summer, much technical staff review work has been accomplished, the required first annual revision of the Plan has been drafted, public hearings have been held on the revisions, and the full Commission is expected to approve the revisions later this month. The proposed revisions provide for the I-580 project to be constructed during the next three years, but call for operational changes in the use of the facility to give preferential treatment to buses and carpools, and for careful growth management by local governments.

The Commission now has before it the formal application of the State of California to construct the project. Following approval of the Plan revisions this month, it is expected that resolution of the operational changes proposed by MTC will be worked out and Commission action to approve the construction will take place within 60 days.¹⁵⁶

Apparently, then, MTC leaders expected at this point that the project itself would be approved, and that the only real issue in the grant review process would be the proposed preferential treatment for buses and carpools.

Shortly after this letter was written, both EPA and the Air Resources Board shifted their positions. In a memorandum dated August 20, the State Air Resources Board reiterated its earlier conclusion that it could not find the project consistent with the State Implementation Plan in the absence of a Transportation Control Plan for the Bay Area. The Board went

on to state, however, that:

While this conclusion remains, we are not unmindful of factors which decision-makers may bring to bear in considering this project. First, the project was delayed approximately two years so that it could be redesigned to include a median corridor for public transit. Second, this project is part of an overall plan to widen 580 through the Livermore Valley; the rest of the widening is completed and this segment is a serious bottleneck. Finally, while the problem we raise with respect to this and other short freeway segments, viz., the lack of comprehensive transportation plans related to air quality, prevents us from commenting affirmatively, you are moving forward with MTC to develop and obtain approval of such plans.

In light of these factors, if the project is approved, the Air Resources Board will not take action to oppose it.¹⁵⁷

The EPA regional office, meanwhile, was having second thoughts on the subject of the project's growth impacts. In a letter dated August 27, EPA's acting regional administrator declared:

...I recognize the difficulty in determining a "cause and effect" relationship between widening in this corridor and secondary effects of urbanization in the Livermore Valley; and consequently I do not wish to press the point in this case. In the absence of such a "cause and effect" relationship, the assumption of a probable maximum population is appropriate for assessing ultimate air quality impacts provided that the basic population assumptions can be validated.

Since the I-580 situation basically presents a case of land use as it ultimately affects air quality, it is most appropriate to rely on the land use decision-makers to validate the population assumptions utilized by CALTRANS in planning for this project. EPA suggests that FHWA direct CALTRANS to seek formal review and certification of the population projections by each responsible general purpose local government with jurisdiction in the case....¹⁵⁸

In other words, EPA was first of all withdrawing its challenge of Caltrans' declaration that the project would not affect population growth and also withdrawing its demand that ABAG and MTC be consulted on the growth impact issue prior to the release of the EIS. EPA did, however, come out in favor of the exclusive-bus-lane proposal:

...EPA recommends that one further consideration in the resolution of state and local conflicts would be the commitment by CALTRANS to specifically reserve one lane of the new I-580 facility for the exclusive use of express bus service to be initially available at the time the new facility is open to traffic.¹⁵⁹

5. The MTC Staff Report

The I-580 EIS was finally released on October 17, 1974. In early November, the MTC staff published a report containing its evaluation of the population growth and air quality issues. This study concluded that existing congestion on I-580 in peak periods was not the result of the total traffic volumes but of the high percentage of trucks in the traffic stream on the upgrade in Dublin Canyon.¹⁶⁰ The MTC report considered six alternatives and made predictions as to their impact on population growth and air quality in the Livermore-Amador Valley. The six alternatives were:

1. Do nothing
2. Institute express bus service and ramp metering; add a truck climbing lane in Dublin Canyon
3. BART extension; add truck climbing lane
4. Caltrans' proposal: eight-lane freeway with a truck climbing lane
5. A "downscoped" version of the Caltrans proposal: a six-lane freeway with a truck lane and lane-control signals
6. An eight-lane freeway plus the BART extension.

MTC reported 1990 population projections for the Livermore Valley (based on a joint MTC-ABAG study) which ranged from 138,000 to 186,000 and 1990 projections by Alameda County of between 180,000 and 220,000. The MTC staff chose the 180,000 figure as the most likely projection. (The Division of Highways had used a 1990 projected population of 235,000 in writing the EIS.) MTC then performed its own calculations of the capacity of the facility, traffic generation in the Livermore Valley,

and predicted pollution levels for all alternatives. The results of the population projections are given in Table 3.

6. The Project Approval Actions

At the time MTC regained control of the project, it was faced with a rather strict deadline for action. EPA indirect sources air pollution regulations were scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1975; these would permit EPA to refuse permission for construction of projects having an adverse effect on air quality in areas in which the federal standards were not met. I-580 was obviously a prime candidate for adverse action under these regulations - especially in light of the MTC report - unless it were approved prior to January 1. Commission action on the project was scheduled for December 18.

The Grant Review and Allocations Committee met to consider the project on December 9. At that time, the MTC staff recommended an alternative which was essentially the same as the "downscoped" Caltrans proposal of the staff report. This proposal involved paving six of the eight lanes immediately and reserving two of these lanes for exclusive bus and carpooling operations on weekdays, provided the following conditions could occur in the next four to six years prior to the time the project is opened to traffic:

- a. MTC can program and secure funds sufficient to support provision of regional trunk transit service through this corridor, and
- b. Local jurisdictions can provide local transit service sufficient to support the regional trunk transit system
- c. Both regional and local agencies encourage the utilization of carpools in these two lanes.¹⁶⁴

The staff's reasons for favoring this particular alternative seem to have been primarily political and essentially symbolic. Some staff

TABLE 3 MTC Population Projections for the Livermore Valley

Alternative	Possible Population	
	40% Transit Modal Split	20% Transit Modal Split
1	149,000*	-
2	171,000	157,000
3	171,000	157,000
4	180,000	180,000
5	217,000+	197,000+
6	180,000	169,000
	180,000	180,000
	228,000+	197,000+

*Both facilities at capacity.

+Assuming full utilization of freeway. Population in excess of 180,000 not expected to occur.

members reportedly favored the "do nothing" proposal, but this seems to have been overruled on the grounds that some sort of action would have to be taken to relieve the existing situation. According to one newspaper account, the "downscoped" alternative had been originated by the city of Pleasanton - a strong proponent of the project - but had been accepted by Livermore - which opposed the extension of the freeway - and by the ABAG staff.¹⁶⁵ Later, it was to be accepted by the Sierra Club as part of an out-of-court settlement of a suit against the project.

The acceptance of the "downscoped" alternative by the project's opponents was purportedly based on the idea that reducing the number of freeway lanes would reduce the project's growth and air pollution impacts. This would not be the case, however, if MTC's "most likely" population estimate of 180,000 in the Livermore Valley by 1990 were correct, since the alternative would result in a population carrying capacity of over 180,000, assuming a 40 percent transit modal split, and one of 166,000, assuming a 20 percent transit modal split. There seems to have also been some skepticism on the part of the MTC staff that its conditions for the designation of the bus lanes would actually be met, but even a six-lane freeway with the levels of bus service assumed in the "do nothing" alternative would not have resulted in a population carrying capacity appreciably less than 180,000, using MTC's assumptions and methods of calculation. (In fact, the carrying capacity would be higher without the bus lanes, assuming a 20 percent transit modal split.) At the same time, the "downscoped" proposal was not expected to result in any appreciable cost savings in comparison with the full eight-lane freeway, so it could not be defended on grounds of economy. Apparently the real appeal of the "downscoped" alternative was that its acceptance would be a symbolic

victory for its proponents - in that Caltrans would have to modify the proposal - but that at the same time it would not threaten the real interests of Caltrans, the land developers, or the construction industry, since it would alter the Valley's population growth potential and the cost of the project only marginally.

Caltrans nevertheless refused to accept the downscoped alternative at that time. Deputy District Director Burch Bachtold replied to the staff proposal that:

1. Caltrans did not agree that the freeway width (number of lanes) would determine the growth of the valley and requested that MTC document this philosophy.
2. Caltrans did not agree with the population statistics MTC used in determining its recommendation.
3. Caltrans believes that paving 8 lanes with the rapid transit median would accomplish the goals of MTC.¹⁶⁶

The GR & AC itself questioned the cost-effectiveness of the staff proposal, noting that the full eight lanes could be paved immediately for the same amount as six and that if the freeway had to be expanded later, paving them would result in additional costs. Commissioner Lewis suggested yet another "compromise" alternative: pave all eight lanes, but reserve two for exclusive bus lanes. After what the minutes characterize as "considerable discussion," the GR & AC voted to recommend Lewis' version of the "compromise."¹⁶⁷

The I-580 project came up for Commission action, as scheduled, on December 18, although a few days earlier, EPA had announced a six-month delay in the initiation of indirect sources regulations. The MTC minutes report the following discussion:

Of concern to both committee members and the full Commission in their deliberations was the substantial increase in cost to pave the two lanes in question at a later date. Such a delay was estimated to raise the cost by \$5 to \$7 million. The question of varying population projections for the Livermore-Amador Valley was an important part of the Committee's consideration as was the impact on air quality and the availability of sewage facilities to accommodate any population increase that may be induced by the improved access. The lowest population projection was accepted by GR&AC as the most realistic figure.

Urging approval of resolution No. 205 were Commissioners Bort and MacIntyre. Mr. Bort said that the people of the area want all eight lanes. He pointed out that this final link in Route 580 for which funds are now available had been in the planning stages for years. Proponents maintained that six lanes were not sufficient to alleviate current congestion.

Commissioners Houghteling, Lawson, and Gatov urged a "no" vote on Resolution No. 205. Mr. Lawson termed the project an oversized white elephant and suggested that traffic management be tried before consideration is given to construction of all eight lanes. Mr. Houghteling contended that the Valley's population was more suited to just six lanes. He commended the staff for its recommendation that only six lanes be opened now and reminded the Commission of the down-scope proposal preferred by ABAG's Executive Director.¹⁶⁸

The Commission approved the project by a vote of 11-5, with Beckett, Dearman, Gatov, Houghteling, and Lawson opposing it.¹⁶⁹

7. Epilogue

The controversies surrounding I-580 and population growth control in the Livermore Valley have continued. Two days after MTC approval of the I-580 project, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors, apparently motivated, like MTC, by the expectation that indirect sources regulations would go into effect on January 1, voted to allow formation of the "new town" of Los Positas. This development, located just northwest of Livermore, was planned for an ultimate population of 40,000-45,000. This action so aroused ABAG that it took the unprecedented step of declaring the project in violation of the Regional Plan, thus rendering it ineligible for any form of federal funding assistance. The Alameda County Board of Supervisors threatened to withdraw from ABAG in retaliation (but

did not do so) and the developer declared that he would attempt to carry out the project without public assistance - a highly improbable feat in a time of rising construction costs and tight money.

Meanwhile, the I-580 project itself has been the subject of litigation. The Sierra Club brought suit against it in April, 1975 on the grounds that the EIS was still inadequate, but later dropped the suit after Caltrans agreed to cut the project back to the "downscoped" alternative. This has created an even more questionable legal situation, since the alternative now proposed for construction is not discussed in the EIS. Rumor has it that more suits against the project may be forthcoming, but construction has been started nonetheless.

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CHAPTER 6

A TEST OF THE MODEL OF POLITICAL INFLUENCEIN REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

Chapter 2 outlined a model of political influence in transportation planning. The approach of modeling isolated transportation planning decisions was considered and rejected as being inappropriate to a case study in which only a very limited number of decisions could be observed. Reasons for the rejection of this approach included:

(1) isolated-decision models are inherently multivariate statistical models, yet the sample of decisions available for study is too limited to permit meaningful statistical analysis; (2) classification and quantification of the variables involved would be highly subjective; and (3) there is considerable reason to suspect that the "independent" variables would prove to be neither really independent nor, on the other hand, sufficiently autocorrelated to permit elimination of any of them.

Accordingly, the remainder of Chapter 2 presented a model in which planning decisions were considered to be manifestations of a process of organizational development. In brief, this model postulates that organizational evolution is guided by a mixture of political influence and organizational management considerations. The establishment and defense of organizational domain and the evolution of organizational structure are seen as parallel and interrelated processes. External actors have domain ideals for the transportation planning agency which they seek to impose by political means; the agency itself seeks to establish an organizational domain which will insure its survival and

stability. In establishing its domain, the agency may employ a range of domain defense strategies; the particular strategies employed depend on the extent of its political resources and the risk propensity of its leaders. The effectiveness of the organization depends on its political resources and its leaders' willingness and ability to employ strong domain defense strategies. The extent to which an agency's constituents can exercise influence through it depends on the agency's effectiveness and the openness of its political procedures. Political procedures are themselves subject to influence by outside actors, but are also shaped by the agency's need for internal communication, coordination, and control. Where the various actors have the option to withdraw from the transportation planning arena, the substantive and institutional directions taken by a new agency in its formative period will tend to be self-reinforcing, since the success or failure of outside actors in influencing the agency will tend to determine which actors will remain in its political arena.

The purpose of this chapter is to test the propositions of this organizational-evolution model against the case studies of MTC decisions presented in Chapters 4 and 5.

A. The Establishment and Evolution of Domain.

1. Domain Ideals of External Actors

Chapter 2 advanced a number of propositions about the establishment and evolution of organizational domain. The first two of these were:

- 5.1 Constituents will seek to expand an agency's informal domain at least to the limits of its formal domain and, if possible, beyond; anticonstituents will seek to limit an agency's informal domain as much as possible.

and:

- 5.2 Organizations will act to reduce critical dependencies by seeking to acquire or develop political resources related to their needs. The decision to seek particular kinds of resources will be based, in part, on the demands such activity places on current resources and on the risks involved.

These two propositions, taken together, were intended to predict the attitudes of external actors toward MTC's performance of various functions in its potential domain. More specifically, Chapter 2 predicted that:

In general, we would expect the actors whose substantive orientations center around the impacts of the transportation system on the environment to be the strongest constituents of the agency and to favor an informal domain as wide or wider than the agency's formal domain. In addition to these impact-oriented actors, we would expect those system-efficiency-oriented actors whose organizational goals are not threatened by the new agency to favor an extensive domain. Equity-oriented local governments and facility-efficiency-oriented elements in the implementing agencies we would expect to be the agency's anticonstituents. These would be in favor of limiting the agency's domain, especially in the areas of resource allocation and the translation of conceptual planning into specific proposals. In other cases, implementing agencies which feel they may gain by the substantive decisions of the new agency or elements of implementing agencies whose substantive orientations are to system-oriented efficiency, but who nonetheless feel their independence threatened, may be expected to display ambivalence toward the new agency, supporting its domain-claims in some cases and opposing them in others. (Page 106.)

Proposition 5.2 might also apply to MTC's behavior in establishing and defending its domain. For the moment, we will only attempt to test the two propositions quoted above against the behavior of external actors; later, however, we will examine Proposition 5.2, along with other propositions related to domain establishment and defense, in the light of MTC's behavior. (See pages 433-51.)

Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 appear to be largely true so far as the behavior of external actors was concerned. There were very definite

divergences of opinion among external actors concerning MTC's fundamental role and the extent of the domain that this role implied; for the most part, this divergence of opinion was along the lines predicted. The major impact-oriented citizens organizations - the Sierra Club, the League of Women Voters, and the Bay Area Council - and most of the more casual participants in the MTC planning process believed that the Commission's fundamental role was that of an agent of radical change. In their view, MTC was supposed to develop and enforce a coherent regional plan - specifically, one which would conserve energy, control urban growth, improve air quality, and "end overdependence on the automobile." Politically, these groups were MTC's natural constituency. They expected MTC to play a dominant role in regional transportation politics, and they looked to the Commission to protect the region from the depredations of the Division of Highways and the petty rivalries of the transit agencies and local governments. The implementing agencies and local governments, on the other hand, conceived of MTC's legitimate role as being that of an advocate of regional interests within the existing system of transportation decision making. In the view of these actors, MTC's Plan should be a compilation of - and an endorsement of - their past planning efforts. MTC's natural anticonstituents were willing to tolerate the new agency - but only if it were willing to "join the club" and assume the subordinate position proper to a newcomer.

The Sierra Club and the Bay Area Council were the principal advocates of coherence and definitiveness in MTC's 1973 Plan. The Sierra Club condemned the Plan's lack of a single overriding goal and urged that the Commission adopt the reduction of automobile usage as the

Plan's basic goal. The Bay Area Council charged that the 1973 Plan was "not sufficiently definitive nor clearly enough directed to avoid future changes in emphasis....[T]he Plan must...ensure basic consistency by providing a firm foundation for coordination of future long range public and private commitments."¹ Both organizations believed that a coherent plan was necessary in order for the region to come to grips with such problems as air pollution, energy consumption, and uncontrolled land development. Both urged MTC to assume a more dominant position in the region's transportation community. The Bay Area Council envisioned an MTC Plan which would offer "guidelines to local governments, transportation agencies and districts, and the private sector"² and urged MTC to "exercise leadership in establishing standards for transportation service that will challenge all individuals and institutions with transportation responsibilities."³ The Sierra Club criticized MTC for "rubberstamping the decisions of others" - presumably those of the Division of Highways - and urged MTC to "make its own planning decisions."⁴

Some of the implementing agencies and local governments also criticized the lack of coherence in MTC's 1973 Plan. In this case, however, the criticism was aimed more at MTC's unorthodox format and vocabulary than at its failure to provide specific support for the new direction it had proclaimed in Section II. Taggart and Jones, for instance, report that critics of MTC in Caltrans District 4 claim that "MTC cannot fulfill its responsibility for providing systems-level technical evaluation because it refuses to specify horizon objectives"⁵ and that "until MTC clearly spells out its plan, MTC cannot claim that the public has reacted to the plan and that MTC is responding to public

mandate."⁶ According to other Caltrans officials, Caltrans cannot respond to MTC's plan until MTC produces a plan which is "clear, concise, and measurable." What the Division of Highways/Caltrans organization appears to have wanted was a "plan," similar to the BATSC final report, in which an ideal system for a safely-distant target year would be proposed. District 4's overall concept of MTC's role, as related by Taggart and Jones, was:

Caltrans District 4 has pressed for MTC to develop systems-level planning options and systems-level evaluation procedures that would provide technical rigor for "bottoms up" planning decisions. In this view, MTC would share responsibility for determining transportation needs, corridor capacity and appropriateness of highway or transit solutions. It would not be involved in the detail of design decisions or the negotiation of freeway agreements. Nor would it initiate programming and budgeting decisions; MTC would be involved in reacting to the District's program budget in a sufficiently timely and cooperative manner to reduce uncertainties and surprises.

In contrast, Caltrans expects MTC to take the lead role in establishing programming and budgeting procedures for transit improvements within the region and in formulating plan elements for harbor, port, and railroad development in accord with AB 69.⁷

District 4 definitely did not want immediate realignment of either intermodal spending priorities or of priorities within the highway program - witness the Division's plea for MTC to "give special consideration to prior planning already performed by other responsible agencies" and to provide "a grace period of two to three years...for operating agencies to get their project planning cycled in with MTC's planning process."⁸ At the same time, District 4 wanted MTC to act as an advocate of its more immediate financial interests in the context of the upcoming state transportation plan: the District's plea for a high highway needs estimate in 1973, for instance, was couched in terms of the effect that a low MTC estimate would have on resource allocations among the regions. Finally, the Division wanted to

establish continuity between its planning vocabulary and criteria and MTC's - specifically, by having MTC adopt a highway classification scheme similar to the functional classification system used by the state and federal governments, since "this would enable MTC, the State, and the Federal Government to discuss the plan relative to other on-going and future plans with a defined vocabulary and predetermined criteria of function and level of service."⁹

It is doubtful that potential MTC anticonstituents other than the Division of Highways/Caltrans organization were very concerned about MTC's overall role; rather, they were concerned about MTC's relationships with them and about the exercise of specific functions in MTC's potential domain. The local governments, for instance, were particularly concerned about the distinction between regional and local issues. Both the Division of Highways and the local governments were disturbed by the vagueness of the MTC guidelines for determining regional significance, and both favored a settlement in which specific systems of facilities would be classified as state, regional, or local; once this distinction was made, each level of government would have undisputed control of its own system. In its response to Section II, the Division of Highways had complained that:

The proposed objectives and policy statement seem to express a total commitment to regionalism without recognizing the need for coordinating regional, local, and State responsibilities....It is also our feeling that local agency and State participation in the policy statement needs to be strengthened.¹⁰

In its statement in June, the Division suggested that MTC "develop clearly defined criteria for establishing regional, local, and statewide levels of concern," participate in the creation of a highway system of statewide significance, and exempt minor projects from MTC

review. The Division also suggested that:

With regard to regional determination as described, we suggest that MTC adopt criteria from which other agencies can make their own determination as to what would be clearly non-regional in significance. This would avoid MTC having to look at every single transportation proposal in the region to determine its regional significance.¹¹

Local governments also voiced concern that:

Using the functional, financial, and impact guidelines set forth [in Section I - see page 196], just about everything can be interpreted as being of "regional" interest and therefore requiring MTC review and approval.

At least one local government suggested that:

It would be better for all concerned if MTC as the "regional" agency, was given the responsibility for not only planning the regional system but also building and operating the regional system. Local agencies could then be charged with planning, building, and operating local systems.

At the time of the 1973 Plan, transit operators seem to have accepted the proposition that there was a need for greater coordination among them - although some of them felt that local problems were more acute than regional ones - and that MTC should have some sort of role in sponsoring this coordination - but not necessarily the dominant role implied by MTC staff suggestions for MTC transit-regulatory powers. Given UMTA's certification requirements, the transit operators had to accept an MTC role in coordination efforts and in long-range capital planning. Nevertheless, there was rather sharp opposition to specific coordination proposals by at least one operator, who charged that MTC was "trying to take over the entire transit industry." On the whole, however, MTC's difficulties in setting up the Metropolitan Transit Federation seem to have stemmed more from a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the transit operators than from outright opposition to an MTC role in transit coordination. The transit operators seem also

to have accepted MTC's role in allocating SB 325 funds and to have looked to MTC for support and leadership in their quest for more funds - although some were afraid that MTC would preempt potential sources of local funds and others may have felt that they could do better on their own in lobbying for more funds. On the whole, the transit operators were more receptive to a strong MTC role in their affairs than were MTC's other potential anticonstituents: despite the desire to protect funding sources and retain control of their operations, some of the transit operators actually complained of a lack of MTC leadership in transit coordination and planning.

Chapter 2 contained a number of predictions about the attitudes of specific actors toward specific functions in MTC's potential domain. The most significant of these were that conceptual planning - except for financial planning - would be relatively noncontroversial and that functions which threatened the economic security of the implementing agencies, such as translation of conceptual plans into specific proposals and allocation of funds, would be particularly controversial.

For the most part, these suppositions seem to be borne out. Certainly, both constituents and anticonstituents supported conceptual planning as an MTC function - the constituents, because they believed that a definitive conceptual plan was a necessary foundation for any marked departure from the status quo; the anticonstituents, probably because they perceived that conceptual planning was a function which MTC could undertake with little or no disruption of their routine affairs.

In 1973, for instance, the Sierra Club urged the Commission to produce a more detailed conceptual plan:

While we recognize that it may not be practical for MTC to now be specific about its long-range plans for a more efficient and less damaging transportation system, we feel there should be a clearer indication of the direction MTC believes transportation development should take, and a specific objective and policy to severely retard future highway development. We urge that MTC outline in broad brush a long-range transportation system for the Bay Area (circa. year 2000) toward which this Plan is moving.¹²

For the Sierra Club, then, a "broad-brush" conceptual plan was a necessary step in translating vague goals, such as the creation of "a more efficient and less damaging transportation system," into a specific plan. In conjunction with this conceptual planning, the Sierra Club actually urged MTC to go beyond its formal domain - for instance, by establishing its own land use priorities (see page 290) and by refusing to sanction plans by other regional agencies unless they respected MTC policies. Other MTC constituents, while questioning the wisdom of allowing MTC to regulate land use, also urged the Commission to produce a more detailed conceptual plan. The Bay Area Council, for instance, complained that the 1973 Plan failed to provide an adequate foundation for the planning of other organizations, both public and private, and that MTC goals and policies were so loosely drawn that "supportive interpretations could be found for any transportation action which could be conceivably initiated or approved by MTC."¹³

For the most part, the implementing agencies and local governments were willing to have MTC do conceptual planning; indeed, in some cases they even criticized MTC for displaying little interest in it. The Division of Highways, for instance, expected MTC to "develop systems-level planning options and systems-level evaluation procedures" and to "share responsibility for determining transportation needs, corridor capacity and appropriateness of highway or transit solutions."

Note, however, that the Division did not accept MTC's right to make unilateral decisions even at the level of conceptual planning: at most, the two agencies would "share responsibility" for these decisions.¹⁴

Chapter 2 suggested that a transportation planning agency would encounter serious opposition from implementing agencies and local governments if it undertook functions threatening the economic security of these organizations. Such functions were identified as being:

1. Determination of the overall size of the financial effort and the allocation of funds to major subsystems.
2. Translation of conceptual planning into specific proposals,
 - a. Initiation of projects.
 - b. Determination of design standards
 - c. Determination of project priorities.
 - d. Programming of project funds.
 - e. Determination of compliance with plan.
3. Allocation of funds to implementing agencies.

Attempts by MTC to exercise a number of these functions did prove controversial; organizations such as the Sierra Club and the Bay Area Council wanted the Commission to be more active in these areas, since they saw them as being crucial to a coherent plan; the implementing agencies and local governments, on the other hand, either openly opposed MTC's assumption of such responsibilities or else criticized the way in which MTC performed them.

MTC had no clear authority to initiate projects or to dictate their design features, and even the Sierra Club was willing to admit this. Because of the "pipeline problem," however, MTC found it very difficult to exercise control over the selection and programming of

projects by the implementing agencies without controlling the initiation and development of projects. From the time of the original version of the Crowell Matrix, MTC sought in various ways to control "the other end of the pipeline" and to assert some sort of authority over the definition of project boundaries and some of the grosser features of project design. The implementing agencies - particularly the Division of Highways/Caltrans organization - generally opposed these attempts.

According to Taggart and Jones, Caltrans District 4 officials did not envision that MTC would be involved in "the detail of design decisions or the negotiation of freeway agreements."¹⁵ When MTC tried to use the device of conditional project approval to dictate design modifications and to stipulate that certain types of projects had to be undertaken in conjunction with projects under review, the reported reaction of Caltrans officials was that "...MTC's conditions have only 'rhetorical value' and carry no substantive authority."¹⁶ Later, however, Caltrans did not officially dispute MTC's right to specify inclusion of bus lanes in the design of I-580. Caltrans District officials also opposed language in the January, 1974, report to the director of Caltrans suggesting that MTC should have the "authority to supervise the preparation of plans...that would be subject to future decisions...and it may decide which plans are given approval..."¹⁷

A far more controversial area was MTC's authority to set project priorities and draw up capital improvement programs. In this case, there was no dispute about whether the functions were in MTC's formal power - they clearly were - but there was considerable doubt about how

much independence MTC would display in exercising them. MTC's constituents - particularly the Sierra Club - expressed dismay at MTC's reluctance to depart from the priorities and programs of the implementing agencies; the implementing agencies, in turn, simply assumed that MTC would not take the lead role in determining priorities and programs - or that if it did, it would confine such actions to the as-yet unfunded parts of the transit program.

In 1973, the Bay Area Council expressed the hope that Section IV would contain "key decisions to provide the specific direction we found to be lacking in other parts of the plan."¹⁸ The Sierra Club, reacting to the Plan after Section IV was released, expressed its disappointment that MTC had not displayed much independence in its financial planning and commented that the MTC Priorities Program represented "business as usual."¹⁹ The Sierra Club urged MTC to make project priorities depend on MTC categorizations, which would in turn be based on MTC's "own decisions as to regional needs;"²⁰ that MTC make it clear that "the Highway Division's 10-year program in no obligates MTC;"²¹ and that MTC avoid "simply rubberstamping someone else's priorities."²² The Sierra Club also urged that MTC "follow through with immediate and visible implementation" of the non-facility programs in Section III-D of the 1973 Plan by "establishing a schedule of dates" for their implementation.²³

Officials of Caltrans District 4, on the other hand, did not envision that MTC would "initiate programming and budgeting decisions" but rather that "MTC would be involved in reacting to the District's program budget in a sufficiently timely and cooperative manner to reduce uncertainties and surprises."²⁴ As early as May 23, 1973, Milton Louie

of District 4 reported to the MTC Grant Review Committee that "DOH has been asked to reevaluate their priority procedures and MTC will be involved in the setting of priorities"²⁵ [Emphasis added.] Later, speaking at a public hearing concerning a specific project, Caltrans Deputy District Director Burch Bachtold said that, following the completion of the necessary environmental documentation, "it will be necessary for the Metropolitan Transportation Commission to concur in the priority need for the proposed work."²⁶ [Emphasis added.] This statement would seem to imply that not only should the implementing agency make the basic decision on project priorities - subject, of course, to MTC's approval - but that the decision on project priority should be made very late in the project development process. Finally, in its reply to the 1973 Plan, District 4 implied that MTC's capital improvement program would need the approval of the California Highway Commission, despite language in AB 363 requiring the Highway Commission to "conform to" MTC's schedule of priorities unless there was an "overriding statewide interest" in deviating from them. All these statements reflect the Division of Highways/Caltrans organization's confidence that it would retain the lead role in project programming despite MTC's formal responsibilities in this area.

There was a similar divergence of opinion over the degree of independence MTC should display in determining overall financial needs and about the extent to which MTC should seek power to allocate funds. The Sierra Club, for instance, urged MTC to make its "own planning decisions" about transportation needs estimates. The Division of Highways/Caltrans organization, on the other hand, attempted to retain a role in the determination of highway needs - this was one of the

areas in which Caltrans officials thought the two organizations should "share responsibility" - and was eventually successful in getting MTC to accept its needs estimate.

In the case of fund allocations, MTC's formal powers were initially restricted to the SB 325 funds. Nevertheless, the Sierra Club urged that Section IV "reflect allocations [to transit projects] based on Division of Highways funds" as a part of a campaign to amend Article 26 of the California Constitution.²⁷ MTC's Technical Advisory Committee, on the other hand, objected to MTC's use, in one of its policy statements, of the phrase

The commission shall proposal allocation of funds from the various sources of revenue, regardless of constraints on their use,²⁸

preferring the exact working of AB 363, that

In developing the financial plan, the Commission shall consider various sources of revenue without regard to constraints imposed by law on expenditures from such sources [Emphasis added.]²⁹

Opposition to the very suggestion of MTC allocation powers was also present in the opposition of the Ports of Oakland and San Francisco to an MTC policy stating that

Revenues from tolls, fares and other direct charges upon transport users may be used for the cross-subsidization of transportation services.³⁰

Later, local governments and public works officials, acting through the County Supervisors Association, the California Transportation Advisory Committee, and, finally, through MTC's Traffic Control Council, were to prevent any effective MTC power over the allocation of FAU funds.

Although there was little open opposition to MTC's power to determine whether proposals were in compliance with the Plan, there was -

as in the case of MTC's financial powers - considerable divergence of opinion about the amount of independence MTC should display in exercising this power. The Sierra Club, for instance, declared that:

We realize that MTC does not have direct authority to mandate which highway projects should be built, but you certainly have the authority and responsibility to decide which should not be built, and we believe this authority should be used to its fullest extent.³¹

The implementing agencies did not deny that MTC had the power to make final determinations about specific projects, but they did argue that the "pipeline problem" meant that MTC should at least postpone any real exercise of the power, and they did try to get MTC to exempt specific classes of projects from detailed review on the grounds that they were either of local or of statewide significance. In addition, local officials, acting in concert with state legislators, contrived to keep the Dumbarton Bridge project out of MTC's jurisdiction and to compromise substantially MTC's review process in the Napa Bridge case.

2. The MTC Domain

Proposition 5.2, that

Organizations will act to reduce critical dependencies by seeking to acquire or develop political resources related to their needs. The decision to seek particular kinds of resources will be based, in part, on the demands such activity places on current resources and on the risks involved,

might be applied to the behavior of MTC as well as that of external actors. Other propositions relating to the phenomena of domain establishment and defense include:

5.3 The more an organization's leaders feel confidence in the strength of its resources, the more likely they are to pursue risky strategies of domain defense.

- 5.4 In periods of great uncertainty about goals and technologies, or in periods of great time pressure, organizational leaders will display high risk propensity.
- 5.5 Cosmopolitan professionals (including transportation planners) will display high risk propensity and political aggressiveness as a result of their role as professionals.
- 5.6 An agency will tend to take bold substantive stands and pursue active domain defense strategies only if (a) the governing body is directly elected or appointed by the agency's constituents or (b) the staff is in a position to ignore the governing body.

Proposition 5.2 suggests that the quest for political resources is limited by the types of domain defense strategies an organization is able and willing to undertake; the domain defense strategies, in turn, depend on its leaders' assessment of their current resources and on their propensity to take risks. Propositions 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 suggest that the propensity to take risks (or to engage in aggressive political activity) may be related to uncertainty concerning goals and technologies, time pressure, professional affiliations of staff leaders, and the method of selecting the agency's governing body.

In attempting to test these propositions, we wish to first answer the following questions:

- 1. What domain did MTC seek?
- 2. What domain-defense strategies did it pursue and what steps did it take to secure key political resources?
- 3. What assessment did MTC's leaders make of their existing political resources?
- 4. How was the risk propensity of MTC's leadership affected by:
 - a. Uncertainty and time pressure?
 - b. Professional affiliations?
 - c. Governing body selection procedures?

In discussing the domain sought by MTC, it is important to remember that there was never any great unity within the Commission or the MTC staff about what the organization was supposed to be doing. By and large, the divisions among external actors over MTC's domain were mirrored within the organization. It must also be understood that MTC did not set out to occupy any particular domain; rather, decisions about which functions MTC would try to exercise were made piecemeal throughout the period under consideration, often in response to specific crises. In some cases, what seem in retrospect to have been key decisions about MTC's domain were probably not seen as such at the time, or else were so masked by other considerations that they could hardly be considered to have been deliberate decisions about domain defense. Some examples of decisions (or non-decisions) which have significantly affected MTC's domain, but which were probably not considered in that context at the time, might include the failure to publish an independent highway program in the 1973 Plan, the failure to take action in the earlier stages of the fight over the I-580 EIS (MTC failed to comment on the original Draft EIS in late 1971, and actually did not try to intervene until after the capitulation of EPA and the State Air Resources Board in August, 1974), and the surrender of effective power over project priorities in the Napa Bridge case. There were other cases, however, in which deliberate decisions were made about the domain MTC would seek - for instance, the rejection of much of the material in the staff drafts of Section V. This action implied some clear choices about MTC's domain and the means by which it might be defended - although, considering the haste in which these choices were made, they may not have been given careful consideration.

Conceptual Planning.

There was no real question that conceptual planning was a part of MTC's formal domain. Nevertheless, there was considerable disagreement within the MTC staff as to the importance of this function, and there were charges by external actors that MTC was neglecting it. Specific acts of omission which were taken to indicate MTC's lack of interest in conceptual planning included:

1. MTC did not establish priorities among its policies. Consequently, even the policies expressed no clear concept of what MTC hoped to accomplish.
2. MTC did not specify its objectives in quantifiable form.
3. MTC did not draw up an "ideal system" for any horizon year.
4. MTC did not take a particularly clear or consistent position on the overall division of resources among the modes. The Commission itself never really discussed the issue and the staff seemed unable to decide whether the overall allocation of resources should be subject to a prior decision or whether it had to emerge from decisions about specific projects. Moreover, it was not clear (particularly in 1973) that either the Commission or the staff had considered "various sources of revenue without regard to constraints imposed by law on expenditures from such sources" as directed by AB 363.
5. Although both the 1973 and 1974 Plans contained schemes for the evaluation of projects, the one in the 1973 Plan was very rudimentary, and neither stated clearly the connection between the Section II policies and the evaluation scheme. Moreover,

comments about specific projects in Sections III and IV were not detailed enough to establish connections between the selection of particular projects and either the evaluation schemes or the policies.

The feeling was widespread, particularly in 1973, that MTC was jumping from (perhaps) overly-idealistic policies to (perhaps) overly-pragmatic lists of proposals without developing any clear connection between the two.

To some extent, this feeling seems to have been justified. Most MTC leaders believed their political environment to be both pluralistic

and unstable; hence, they saw a great need for flexibility in the Plan. These MTC leaders thought it inevitable - and possibly desirable - that many considerations would be weighed in each substantive decision and that the importance of particular considerations might vary from decision to decision. Consequently, they had no real desire to establish priorities among the policies or to devise an explicit - and hence somewhat rigid - evaluation scheme relating policies to individual projects. Moreover, some of them had come to believe that past transportation planning had been overly academic - that too much emphasis had been placed on the process of planning or on the planning documents themselves, and not enough on the implementation of plans. By and large, MTC staff members agree that what MTC was really trying to accomplish in 1973 was the adoption of a plan before the legislative deadline so that MTC could assume its powers over implementation. As a consequence of this orientation, there was considerable reluctance to devote time and resources to detailed conceptual planning; this reluctance was increased by the belief that MTC lacked the immediate capability to perform some of the conceptual planning tasks - for instance, that its transportation demand models needed updating - and that such capability could not possibly be developed in time to contribute to the 1973 Plan. Subsequently, MTC did devote substantial resources to the development of these capabilities and did accept in principle the desirability of producing an "ideal plan." Nevertheless, MTC apparently did not consider lack of conceptual planning to be an urgent problem. At the same time, some MTC staff members wished to expand MTC's conceptual planning responsibilities beyond the field of transportation planning. The original version of Section V, for

instance, included proposals for MTC authority to plan and implement joint land use-transportation projects and to issue permits for parking construction. These proposals, however, were deleted from the Plan.

Translation of Conceptual Planning Into Specific Proposals

Although MTC did not place a very high priority on conceptual planning, it did seek to include in its domain most of the functions involved in translating conceptual planning into specific proposals. MTC did want to control what got implemented, whether this resulted from a coherent plan or not.

Project Initiation and Control of the Project Development Process

MTC leaders looked upon MTC's lack of explicit authority to initiate projects, monitor the implementing agencies' project development process, and dictate design features as a serious obstacle to MTC's control of the region's transportation development. Given the "pipeline situation" and the existing funding arrangements, they felt that MTC's project veto powers would not be an effective means of asserting this control. Unless MTC could control the "other end of the pipeline," how could it prevent the implementing agencies from developing whatever projects they chose, in whatever order they chose, and presenting them to MTC on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis? So long as the implementing agencies could argue that the projects MTC wanted to implement were not ready for implementation, MTC would have to approve the projects that were ready or else forego state and federal funds.

This problem was particularly acute where the highway program was concerned. MTC did have considerable control over transit project

planning, since UMTA planning funds were channeled through MTC. At least some staff members thought MTC should seek similar powers with respect to highway planning - one of the proposals in the original version of Section V in 1973 was that MTC should execute a memorandum of understanding with Caltrans and FHWA to the effect that highway planning funds would be "passed through, or at least reviewed by MTC to assure that those projects listed in the Regional Transportation Plan Capital Improvements Program are those which are being planned."³² Although this suggestion was apparently among those considered "unrealistic" by the Commission, MTC subsequently tried to assert limited control over the initiation and progress of highway project planning and over such gross design features as the class of roadway (whether freeway, expressway, or conventional highway) and the number of lanes. One device for asserting such control was the statement in the 1974 Implementation Procedures that placement of a project in MTC's ten-year capital improvement program implied MTC approval of the implementing agency's proceeding with project planning, public hearings, and preparation of environmental documents. Another such device was granting project approval with conditions specifying design features or other projects to be undertaken in conjunction with the project under consideration. At the same time, MTC was slow to demand formal powers to initiate projects. At a legislative hearing in October, 1973, for instance, the following exchange between Bort and Assemblyman Ken Meade took place:

Bort: ...[W]hile we do have a lot of veto power we don't have the power to tell the highway commission to, "Build this road." We don't have the ability to tell BART, "Build this extension." We don't have the ability to tell AC Transit, "Go out and buy another 100 buses"...

Meade: Do you want that responsibility?

Bort: I would say that if it doesn't work out that they do a good job, then somebody will have to take that responsibility. I think MTC would be the appropriate one. And I don't think I, for one individual, am asking for that power today.³³

Project Priorities and Programming. One of the more puzzling aspects of MTC's behavior was its attitude toward setting project priorities and drawing up capital improvement programs. On the one hand, these functions were clearly within MTC's formal domain and were regarded by most MTC personnel as crucial to the agency's mission; on the other hand, MTC seemed very reluctant to actually perform them.

Taggart and Jones write that:

MTC Executive Director Paul Watt is emphatic in arguing that regional planners must be able to influence the programming and budgeting of transportation funds before regional plans can be implemented.³⁴

According to Taggart and Jones, Watt's argument specifically included the assertions that MTC must be able to determine the sizing and staging of transportation access, that MTC must be able to coordinate both local and regional transit improvements, and that MTC must be able to "make funding cuts among highway and transit needs, between local and regional needs and among projects proposed by competing jurisdictions."³⁵

Despite this strong statement from Watt in support of priority-setting and programming functions, and despite other MTC staff members' denials of the suggestion that MTC "lacked interest" in these functions, MTC had accomplished very little in the way of independent priority-setting and programming by the end of 1974. MTC's actual record in this area was as follows:

1. MTC did not publish independent highway priority lists in

either the 1973 Plan or the 1974 Plan revision; in both cases, MTC essentially accepted the Caltrans highway program intact. Moreover, MTC did not publish transit priorities or programs on a project-by-project basis in either 1973 or 1974; transit programs assigned funds to transit operators rather than projects, and priorities were expressed in terms of classes of projects rather than individual projects. Concerning the highway program, English says that in 1973 he thought the senior staff did not want him to "mess with" the highway program although he was never given specific instructions on the subject. Also, some MTC staff members believe that this lack of policy guidance and the lack of integration between Sections III and IV in 1973 stemmed from a lack of appreciation of Section IV's importance on the part of at least some MTC leaders. The transit programs actually published in both 1973 and 1974 were somewhat less definitive than what the transit staff had been willing to recommend in the Development Programs document of May, 1973 and the 1974 Transit Development Program; in particular, attempts to establish rough priorities among proposed rapid transit extensions were deleted in both cases.

2. MTC has always regarded the "state override provision" in AB 363 as a threat to its right to set priorities for highway projects. The original staff version of Section V in 1973 suggested modification of this provision, but the suggestion was deleted. MTC did not pursue this issue in its January, 1974, report to the Director of Caltrans on the relationship

between Caltrans and MTC, but took instead the position that the issue of statewide interest should be kept vague and subject to negotiation: "MTC feels that the early establishment of extensive, detailed guidelines will hinder the development of simple, logical procedures which will evolve through experience around the conference table."³⁶

3. MTC has never sought clarification of legal ambiguities involving control of "discretionary" highway funds. In the Napa Bridge case, MTC passed up an obvious opportunity to resolve the issue by (in effect) conceding that it could not reprogram the funds allocated to the project.
4. In May, 1974, the Work Program Committee was presented with a chart outlining relationships among Caltrans (as a statewide planning agency), MTC, and the implementing agencies. According to this chart, implementing agencies would be responsible for identifying their own needs, proposing project priorities for regional comparison, and setting their own priorities for "local" elements; MTC's role would be to assure uniformity of application of needs estimates in the region, priority-setting and programming for the region based on inputs from implementing agencies, and a role in the allocation of "some funds" to projects on a year-to-year basis.³⁷

The concept expressed in this chart of the relative roles of MTC and the implementing agencies is essentially the same as that which was being proposed by Caltrans District officials at that time: although MTC's concurrence would be needed, the implementing agencies would retain the initiative in

setting project priorities and in programming funds.

5. MTC did not commit manpower to priority-setting and programming on a continuous basis. Far less manpower was committed to Section IV in 1973 than to Section III; in 1974 a concerted effort was made to put together the Transit Development Program and to rewrite Section IV; but thereafter, the effort seems to have lapsed. It would appear, for instance, that MTC never permanently assigned even one staff member to monitor the highway program.

Despite this record of inaction, it seems likely that MTC leaders did appreciate the importance of programming and priority-setting. MTC's record is largely explained by its leaders' belief that it would have been inexpedient or even impossible for MTC to determine multimodal project priorities in a truly independent fashion in the early phase of its existence. This belief was based on a number of considerations:

1. MTC's domain defense strategies (see pages 451-60) limited its independence in this area.
2. MTC lacked the sort of information its leaders felt they needed in order to set project priorities. Most of this information was simply not available and had to be developed through special studies. This meant that there would be a delay of several years before MTC could produce an independent set of multimodal priorities. In particular, some MTC staff members felt that they could not make comparisons between the highway and transit programs until the transit program was more fully developed. In some cases, however, lack of

information may have been more of an excuse than a reason: there seemed to be very little sense of how much information was enough to allow priorities to be set, so that time was spent producing detailed studies where sketchy ones would have sufficed.

3. Even had sufficient information been available, MTC still felt that the "pipeline problem" and the existing funding system would undermine its effectiveness in setting project priorities. So long as MTC did not have control of the project development process, it could not be sure of enforcing its priorities; and so long as the funding system remained as it was, MTC's priorities would either have to conform to the available funding or else be meaningless gestures. Both of these considerations encouraged MTC to accept the priorities of the implementing agencies.

Project Review and Approval. MTC's attitude toward its formal powers to review and approve (or veto) projects was similar to its attitude toward priority-setting and programming: MTC began by believing that the project approval power was the key to the integration of planning and implementation but gradually came to realize that it was very difficult to bring this power to bear. As this realization grew, so did the suspicion that MTC considered its project reviews to be mere formalities or, at most, occasions to extract minor concessions from implementing agencies.

At one point in MTC's development, project review and approval powers were regarded as the Commission's key function. In preparing

Section III of the 1973 Plan, for instance, the Work Program Committee and the senior staff were especially anxious to preserve the Grant Review Committee's freedom of action in project reviews, and repeatedly cautioned that project evaluations in the plan itself were not intended to preempt the Grant Review Committee's power to make final decisions. Thus, the desire to enhance the project review function was partially responsible for MTC's reluctance to make commitments to projects in the text of the Plan. Even more dramatic evidence of MTC's esteem for the project review function was the willingness to rush the 1973 Plan to completion - at a considerable sacrifice in quality - in order to assume as soon as possible project review powers which were to go into effect when the Plan was adopted.

The eighteen months following Plan adoption saw a gradual disillusionment with MTC project review powers. The realization that the "pipeline situation" precluded short-run flexibility in project selection suggested that the project review powers could be employed only in mutually-destructive confrontations with implementing agencies or in attempts to persuade them to make minor modifications in designs or operational strategies. At the same time, there was increasing criticism that MTC reviews - especially the more routine ones - were becoming perfunctory. David Jones, for instance, comments that:

...[T]he transit-first orientation of the Commission's policies has not carried over into the evaluation and approval of projects. Instead, the plan policies have been applied to these projects permissively, having a cosmetic rather than limiting effect on project decisions.³⁸

By mid-1974, there were other signs that MTC was placing a declining value on its project review powers. For instance, MTC allowed the integrity of the project review process to be severely compromised in

the Napa Bridge case by quietly yielding to Senator Collier's pressure for approval of the project. Perhaps more disturbing, MTC approved the Traffic Control Council-written first version of the FAU fund allocation resolution, which read, in part:

The approval of the three-year program [of FAU projects] by MTC shall constitute final approval of each and every project within the program, and projects shall not be required to be submitted to MTC for Pre-Project Design Reviews, etc. In other words, cities, counties, and transit agencies may proceed to make the projects eligible for FAU reimbursement without further reference to MTC.³⁹

Although MTC was later to "clarify" the resolution to state that FAU projects were still subject to MTC project reviews and that "MTC approval of the FAU program pertains only to the distribution of FAU monies between local streets and roads, state highways, and public transit purposes,"⁴⁰ the passage quoted above speaks for itself.

Regulation of Transit Operations. A final function related to the translation of conceptual plans into specific actions is the regulation of transit operations. MTC definitely wanted to play a role in transit coordination, and at least some staff members were willing to suggest that this role include formal powers to regulate transit routes, fares, and quality of service. Following the deletion of this suggestion from Section V, however, MTC was left in the position of having to promote voluntary coordination among the region's transit operators, and this was slow to develop.

Allocation to Implementing Agencies.

MTC very definitely sought the power to allocate funds among the implementing agencies. Although, at one point in its history, there was a tendency for some associated with MTC to claim that MTC had

"powers to plan and allocate resources for both highway and transit modes"⁴¹ or even that "...MTC has newly intervened in established federal, state and local patterns of responsibility...to make resource allocation decisions for each mode...",⁴² MTC actually never had any direct powers to allocate resources except in the case of the SB 325 funds - and even in that case, these powers were greatly limited. MTC's ultimate aim, as expressed by Section V of its Plan, was the establishment of an intermodal regional transportation fund under its control. This fund would initially contain the region's share of the existing state gasoline tax and would be expanded to incorporate any new revenue sources as they were developed. MTC also proposed that it be given control over Bay Toll revenues and be allowed to allocate these on an intermodal basis, even if the full-scale intermodal fund were not created. Later, MTC was active in trying to secure control over new revenue sources such as the FAU funds and the federal transit operating subsidies provided in 1974, but with uneven results. In the FAU case, for instance, MTC tried to secure lead agency status, but when this effort failed at the state level, retreated in its dealings with the local governments to the position that "the Commission doesn't see its role as determining which specific projects should be funded, it's only interested in assisting the division."⁴³

Education and Advocacy.

MTC's experience with education and advocacy functions was another case of high hopes fading over time. MTC began by promoting its point of view with almost missionary zeal. MTC spokesmen tried to persuade the public, the legislature, and their fellow transportation professionals

of the virtues of regionalism, transportation planning, transit coordination along the lines of the Hamburg Plan, and increased transit funding. In addition, they spent a great deal of time explaining MTC, its prospective role in regional affairs, and its philosophy of transportation planning. These efforts at explanation and persuasion included the December, 1972 Regional Transportation Symposium, the Town and Public Meetings during the 1973 Plan development process, media publicity, speeches by Commissioners and staff members, meetings with community groups, articles in professional publications, and testimony at legislative hearings. In addition, Section V of the Plan itself was set aside for MTC advocacy of new legislation as well as proposals for action within MTC's existing powers. Early staff versions of Section V also suggested an ongoing staff role in the development and advocacy of legislative proposals to follow up the recommendations for legislation in Section V.

Despite this early activity, education and advocacy did not emerge as primary MTC functions in the eighteen months following the adoption of the 1973 Plan. Despite MTC's growing belief that its hands were tied by inappropriate funding arrangements and a lack of formal authority to fully exercise its other functions - and despite considerable receptivity in Sacramento and Washington to MTC as California's prototypical regional transportation planning agency - the Commission chose to maintain a "low profile" following adoption of the Plan. Passages in Section V outlining a staff role in preparing and publicizing legislation were deleted. Formal liaison with the legislature was left in the hands of the Public Information and Legislative Affairs Committee; in practice, lobbying duties fell to Watt (in the absence of a full-time

staff lobbyist) or were carried out in a haphazard fashion through informal contacts between individual commissioners and legislators. Although, according to Bort, these informal contacts have been the most fruitful from MTC's point of view, there have been instances in which MTC has been embarrassed by them, either through misjudgement of the legislature's internal politics or through the private dealings of commissioners who were opposed to MTC's official policies.* MTC also failed to develop strong contacts with USDOT or with Caltrans' state-wide headquarters and passed up the opportunity to make a strong statement on its role relative to Caltrans in the January, 1974, Report to Caltrans. Meanwhile, efforts to build grassroots public recognition and support lagged due to a lack of staff resources, the indifference of the region's news media, and a lack of dramatic issues with which to command public attention.

In summary, then, MTC began with the expectation that it would occupy most, if not all, of its formal domain and that it would seek expansion of its domain in certain areas. As time went by, it became increasingly evident that MTC was either unwilling or unable to perform many of these functions to the extent originally anticipated; instead, MTC began to emphasize routine research and planning tasks - in the words of one staff member, to become a "paper tiger" whose only

* An example of the former was MTC's switch of its primary contact with the State Assembly from Foran to Willie Brown of San Francisco, who was thought to be in line for the Assembly Speakership. As it turned out, Brown was defeated by Leo McCarthy, a close political ally of Foran's. The Napa Bridge case is an example of how commissioners' private dealings with legislators sometimes ran counter to MTC's organizational interests: Senator Collier's involvement was actively solicited by at least one commissioner.

role was to "push paper." This shift in MTC's expectations with regard to its domain resulted from internal differences over the proper extent of its domain, continuing reassessment of its political and technical resources, and the emergence of domain defense strategies which precluded active defense of controversial functions.

3. MTC Domain Defense Strategies and Actions to Secure Political Resources.

Domain Defense Strategies.

Whenever possible, MTC has attempted to employ the middle range of domain defense strategies, particularly co-optation and contracting. Despite a widespread expectation that MTC would eventually have to "bite the bullet" by rejecting a Caltrans pipeline project, MTC avoided serious confrontations with implementing agencies and local governments throughout 1973 and 1974 and did not use its project programming and project review powers as the basis of an active defense of its domain. On occasion, when faced with the possibility of confrontation, MTC either failed to independently exercise a function it claimed or abandoned a previously-claimed function.

These characteristic MTC domain defense strategies did not emerge at once, but rather evolved through MTC's responses to specific crises, particularly during the development of the 1973 Plan. Initially, it was expected that MTC would exercise most of its functions unilaterally. Specifically, MTC seems to have started the 1973 Plan development process with the expectation that it would use its project review and approval powers to veto undesirable projects but not to force general compliance with its Plan and that it would use its education and advocacy powers to seek additional transit funding and transit coordination.

In actually putting together the 1973 Plan, MTC pursued a combination of unilateral action, negotiation, and co-optation. In general, the contents of the plan resulted from unilateral actions. Section II was drawn up from staff suggestions and Work Program Committee deliberations; subsequent objections by the Division of Highways were largely ignored. Section III-C was also basically a staff and WPC product. It did rest to some extent on discussions with the Division of Highways and the local planning and public works officials, but there is no evidence that its contents were determined by agreements between MTC and other agencies. When members of the Division of Highways District Planning Staff implicitly questioned MTC's jurisdiction over highway projects (in connection with the table of issues) Watt and Bay were ready to confront them. Section III-D was basically the product of an MTC-retained consultant and the MTC staff. In drawing up the highway needs estimate in Section IV, MTC acted independently of the Division of Highways; the transit needs estimate and the proposed transit program may have involved negotiations with transit operators, but do not appear to have involved any actual agreements with them.

At the same time, there were negotiations with implementing agencies and local governments - for instance, the identification of the "issues" in Section III-C was the subject of discussions with state and local transportation officials and there were negotiations with the Division of Highways concerning the relationship between the category system in Section III-C and the highway program. There were also efforts at co-optation during this period. The MTC Technical Advisory Committee was active in the planning process, and in a few cases may have influenced the contents of the Plan. The TAC was instrumental in

getting MTC to change the wording of a Section II policy dealing with the use of pricing mechanisms and parking restrictions to "reduce automobile usage in major urban areas" and may have been involved in the question of the financial significance of the categories in Section III-C. Nevertheless, the relationship between MTC and the TAC during this period was not a particularly close one. A few months after the adoption of the 1973 Plan, the TAC expressed dissatisfaction because it did not get to review staff documents before they went to the WPC. According to the WPC minutes, Bort "stated that TAC was set up as an advisory committee and not a committee to which [the] Commission must give an account of their actions."⁴⁴

Toward the end of the 1973 Plan development phase, several events occurred which set the stage for MTC's subsequent domain defense strategies. These were:

1. The failure to produce independent lists of project priorities and independent capital improvement programs in Section IV. These do not appear to have been conscious efforts to claim, but not exercise, these functions; rather, the staff work simply did not get done. Although English certainly felt that an independent highway program was not consistent with his superiors' political strategies, the time pressure and the chaotic situation within the staff were also factors in MTC's failure to set implementation priorities. The endorsement of the Division of Highways' highway program, however, did set a precedent for subsequent inaction by MTC and may have contributed to the Division's confidence that it would retain the initiative in these areas.

2. The staff initiative in Section V for the expansion and protection of MTC domain and the development of MTC's education and advocacy functions and the subsequent Commission rejection of this initiative. The staff version of Section V included proposals for (1) legislative or administrative action to expand MTC's domain in the area of land use planning; (2) control over the project development process through control of highway planning funds; (3) transit regulation and emergency operation of transit systems; and (4) resource allocation through establishment of an MTC-administered intermodal fund. The original version of Section V also suggested protection of the MTC priority-setting function through elimination or modification of the "State override" provision in MTC's enabling act and the development of staff capability to draft, evaluate, and support legislation. With the exception of the proposed intermodal fund, these suggestions were deleted by the Work Program Committee following a negative reaction to the staff version at the May 23, 1973 Commission meeting.
3. The survival (with some modifications) of the staff's Section V proposals to set up a Metropolitan Transit Federation and a Traffic Management Council and the addition of proposals for a seaport technical advisory committee and a Regional Airport System Committee. These proposed organizations formed the basis of MTC's subsequent co-optation strategy with respect to implementing agencies and local governments.

In the eighteen months following adoption of the 1973 Plan, MTC's domain defense strategies increasingly emphasized co-optation and negotiation. These strategies were particularly evident in the development of MTC's institutional relationships. In the case of the January, 1974 Report to the Director of Caltrans on relationships between the region and Caltrans, co-optation was employed: the report was reviewed by Caltrans District 4 and was sent to Sacramento as virtually a joint product by MTC and the District. This insured that the District would not try to rebut the report, but also resulted in a rather weak report which failed to deal with the more divisive issues in the relationship between MTC and the District.

The proposed Metropolitan Transit Federation and the Traffic Management Council (actually founded as the Metropolitan Transit Association and the Traffic Control Council) were conceived as structures to facilitate MTC co-optation of implementing agencies and local public works officials - in particular, to enlist their cooperation in the implementation of non-facility programs in Section III-D. In practice, the TCC and MTA seemed more interested in trying to influence MTC than in carrying out MTC-inspired programs. The Transit Association, in the form finally approved by the transit operators, was intended "[to serve] as an advocate for the position of the major transit operators in the Bay Area...and [to assure] that the plans, objectives, experience, and know-how" of the transit operators were reflected in the decisions of MTC, Caltrans, and the state legislature.⁴⁵ MTC's involvement with the TCC resulted in MTC's endorsement of a Transportation Control Plan that reflected the highway and public works officials' lack of enthusiasm for transportation control strategies

to improve air quality. The TCC was also the mechanism for working out the details of the method of allocating FAU funds; in this case, MTC was left with a minimal role in the allocation of the first inter-modal funds to become available to the region and was also induced to adopt a resolution regarding project reviews which it later had to repudiate. In the cases of both the Transit Association and the TCC, MTC's attempts to co-opt other agencies backfired to some extent.

Aside from these efforts to co-opt the local governments and implementing agencies, MTC also pursued contracting strategies aimed at establishing working relationships in less-controversial areas. These efforts resulted in a series of agreements with ABAG, Caltrans, and the environmental bureaucracy outlining the responsibilities of the various agencies in carrying out modeling efforts and special studies.

Although MTC's early project reviews did involve some negotiations with implementing agencies, they were essentially unilateral actions by MTC. In some cases, these actions were in defense of MTC's domain, but in several key cases, they involved the abandonment of domain. As time went by, and the expected "bullet-biting" confrontation with Caltrans over pipeline projects did not materialize, the suspicion began to grow that, no matter how jealously MTC might guard its formal power to review projects, it would never veto one if it had any real backing from its sponsor. Although the major MTC project review actions covered in the case studies could hardly be called perfunctory - that charge related to minor project reviews only - the early reviews of even major projects raised questions about the extent to which MTC intended to actively defend its project review and

priority-setting powers.

The first of the project-review actions covered in the case studies - that of the Dumbarton Bridge - was exceptional in several respects. In this case, the project was not really in MTC's jurisdiction, and the staff report and subsequent resolution placing the project in Category I represented MTC attempts to involve itself in the project review despite its lack of direct jurisdiction.* In this case, MTC did stick to its procedural requirements despite pressure from legislators and local officials, but ultimately endorsed the project.

In the Napa Bridge case, MTC also stuck by its procedural requirements (at least initially) in refusing to approve Category I status for the project outside the regular annual amendment process. In this case, however, MTC's avoidance of a full confrontation with Senator Collier raised important questions about MTC's willingness (or ability) to defend its project review powers. It seems unlikely that the Commission, even if left to itself, would have rejected the project; there was some feeling, however, that MTC might have delayed the project on the grounds that it lacked priority. Collier's intervention, and MTC's response to it, served to give the impression that the Commission had felt compelled to approve the project. If this were the case, then MTC had clearly established a point beyond which it would not go in defending its right to review projects.

* MTC had, of course, been invited by BDCD to comment on the project. MTC demotion of the project to Category II in June, 1973 and its subsequent restoration to Category I were justified by MTC as mere formalities (the categories being represented at this time as descriptive rather than evaluative). Nevertheless, proponents of the project suspected that such actions were attempts by MTC to insert itself into the dispute and that MTC's ultimate aim was to gain jurisdiction.

At the same time, MTC openly abandoned its claim to any real power over the priorities of highway projects. The MTC staff had initially let it be known that the priority of the Napa Bridge would be weighed against other proposed projects in the region. But in the February 27, 1974, Staff Report, this was declared to be impossible, on the grounds that "if the project is not approved, the region has no assurance of having the money programmed for either the North Bay or the nine counties."⁴⁶ This argument rested primarily on the contention that the funds programmed for the project were well above the Napa County minimum, so that the project was to be constructed with discretionary funds.* In effect, the staff report was abandoning any MTC claim to control over the expenditure of discretionary funds in the region, and thus, over the priorities of the more marginal highway projects. Moreover, MTC was acquiescing to a situation in which its priorities would have to closely conform to those of the Highway Commission (in practice, those of Caltrans, or of influential individuals such as Collier) since any mismatch between MTC priorities and Highway Commission priorities could cost the region discretionary funds. Perhaps even more important was the fact that (at least according to some MTC staff members), the Highway Commission has never really taken MTC's unique legal position into account. In failing to press the legal

* Actually, the county minimum (\$4 million per 4 year period for each county) would have restricted something less than 10 percent of District 4's 1974 program. In order for the discretionary funds to have been a relevant issue, it would have been necessary to demonstrate that the project was being constructed with funds in excess of the district minimum. In fact, there is no way to tell (officially, at least) which individual projects are marginal in particular budgetary periods, since neither Caltrans nor MTC publishes the priorities of projects within budgetary periods.

issues in the Napa Bridge case, MTC lost an opportunity to get the Highway Commission's attention and to clarify their relationship.

The I-580 case represented another situation in which MTC protected its formal jurisdiction over a project by carefully limiting the way in which it exercised its project review power. In this case, MTC believed that Caltrans would invoke the "overriding statewide interest" clause if there were any outright opposition to the project. The content and timing of MTC actions were designed to leave the impression of MTC intervention without actually jeopardizing the project. MTC intervened directly only after EPA and the State Air Resources Board had reluctantly approved the Environmental Impact Statement, and only after MTC had virtually assured USDOT's office of Environment, Safety, and Consumer Affairs that the project would be approved. Moreover, MTC's final action on the project was scheduled in such a way as to preclude the possibility that the project would come under EPA's then-proposed indirect sources regulations.

The MTC staff study in the I-580 case confined itself to the growth and air quality impacts (which were really moot points following EPA's decision not to press Caltrans on the growth-impact issue). The MTC staff report neglected the issue of the cost-effectiveness of the various alternatives and did not raise the issue of the continued appropriateness of the wide-median design in the light of what MTC knew of the proposed BART extension's environmental and economic implications. In this case, the refusal to set priorities for the rapid transit extensions (which would have almost certainly resulted in a low priority for the Livermore Valley extension) left MTC in a poor position to criticize the scale of the freeway project.

MTC's major planning and plan evaluation actions in the eighteen months following the adoption of the 1973 Plan included the Environmental Impact Report on the 1973 Plan and the 1974 revisions to the Plan. The Environmental Impact Report was largely a unilateral MTC action, and reflected much of the MTC technical staff's dissatisfaction with the 1973 Plan's conservative features. In declaring that certain broad strategies - such as deletion of most of the highway proposals from the Plan - were "politically infeasible," however, the EIR was suggesting that there were definite political limits to MTC's conceptual planning.

The 1974 revision of Section III appears to have involved far more negotiation with implementing agencies than the 1973 version; Section IV was apparently not the result of negotiated agreements with implementing agencies, but still fell short of being an independently-derived priority list.

The Development of Political Resources.

Chapter 2 suggested a number of ways in which an agency such as MTC could secure or develop political resources. These included:

1. Unilateral development of such resources as technical legitimacy or technical information through competent technical performance or information-gathering activities.
2. Incorporation of sources of supply of key resources within the agency's organization domain.
3. Development of alternative sources of supply for scarce resources.
4. Creation of interdependencies with organizations which control key resources.

Table 4 is a summary of MTC's organizational needs, the organizations which primarily supplied these needs, possible alternative sources of supply, and the bases of possible interdependencies between MTC and the primary sources.

MTC's basic strategy with respect to political resources was (1) to try to build technical legitimacy through successful performance of technical tasks; (2) to develop technical information through special studies, mathematical modeling efforts, and the like; and (3) to secure routine cooperation from other agencies by building interdependencies with them around routine tasks. MTC's two greatest sources of dependency, however, were its lack of political legitimacy and its economic insecurity. MTC was not able to develop much in the way of positive action to secure these resources. MTC leaders recognized that the organization's economic security depended upon its political legitimacy - particularly its acceptance by the legislature - but seemed to feel that its political legitimacy could best be built by inaction. This feeling stemmed from the belief that MTC was extremely vulnerable to hostile reactions by implementing agencies, local governments, and individual legislators, coupled with the belief that political legitimacy could be developed over time if the public and the legislature became accustomed to MTC's presence. Taggart and Jones, for instance, comment that:

MTC's senior staff is painfully aware that MTC is not an "established agency with a high level of public confidence." Both Watt and...Bay believe that MTC could "stub its toe badly, get egg on its face and see its authority cut back" by legislative action or administrative fiat.⁴⁷

One way for MTC to prevent hostile reactions was to "maintain a low profile." MTC Community Affairs Coordinator Meade Telfair, writing in

Need	Primary Sources	Possible Alternative Sources	Possible Interdependencies with Primary Sources
Economic Security	Legislature	USDOT Environmental Bureaucracy	Technical Information Technical Legitimacy
Political Legitimacy	Legislature Press Constituents Local Governments	USDOT Environmental Bureaucracy State Transportation Board Courts	Technical Information Technical Legitimacy
Routine Cooperation	Caltrans (Dist. 4) Transit Operators Local Governments ABAG	---	Economic Security Political Legitimacy Technical Legitimacy
Technical Information	Caltrans Transit Operators Local Governments ABAG	MTC	Economic Security Political Legitimacy Technical Legitimacy
Technical Legitimacy	Caltrans Transit Operators Local Governments	Academic Community USDOT Environmental Bureaucracy ABAG	Economic Security Political Legitimacy Technical Legitimacy

Table 4. MTC Organizational Needs and Sources of Dependency.

early 1974, stated that:

The Commission has maintained a relatively low profile since it is a new agency. Many city and county officials and planners as well as legislators are apprehensive about the powers of this new regional agency. Additionally, there are other regional agencies which have laws conflicting with those of MTC. The Commission has been trying to work out the problems that exist with all the agencies and jurisdictions involved.⁴⁸

Thus, MTC's strategies for developing its political resources were closely connected with its domain defense strategies: MTC would build its political resources through patient performance of useful but relatively non-controversial tasks and through creation of the relatively routine interdependencies provided by its co-optation and contracting strategies; it would not seek to use its priority-setting and project-review powers to create strong interdependencies nor would it actively seek alternative sources of political legitimacy and economic security.

To a large extent, MTC's political legitimacy and economic security depended on its relationship with the California Legislature. MTC leaders felt that this relationship was far from ideal. This feeling was based on (1) the legislature's failure to provide MTC with funding when it was first created; (2) the legislature's relative indifference to MTC-supported legislation; (3) the prevalence of special-purpose local legislation which infringed on MTC's formal domain (especially bills establishing high priorities for particular transportation projects); and (4) Senator Collier's threats to cut off MTC funding in connection with the Napa Bridge case. In addition to these specific problems, MTC leaders also felt threatened by sheer legislative indifference.

Despite MTC's extreme dependence on the legislature, and despite its leaders' dissatisfaction with this relationship, MTC did little to develop interdependencies with the legislature or to seek alternative sources of support. MTC never developed much capability for dealing with the legislature - no staff lobbyist was employed, and the Commission rejected proposals that the staff draft, analyse, and support legislation - and seems never to have had any clear strategy for making itself useful to the legislature as a whole or for neutralizing opposition in the legislature.

Opportunities for MTC to establish interdependencies with the legislature or to neutralize some legislative opposition by enlisting the support of Caltrans' Division of Transportation Planning and the new State Transportation Board were certainly present. Most of these potential interdependencies related to the role that MTC, as California's prototypical statutory regional transportation planning agency, could have played in the overall reorientation of California transportation institutions that was underway at the time. To some extent, the creation of MTC was part of a more general movement in California transportation planning that ultimately aimed at realigning both the funding and decisionmaking systems to move from the single-mode systems organized around state and local implementing agencies to a multimodal local-regional-state hierarchy of transportation planning agencies. This transition involved changes in three interrelated areas:

1. A realignment of the institutional structure, including creation of regional agencies and a multimodal state Department of Transportation.

2. A reassessment of the goals and substance of transportation plans at both the state and regional levels, which was to result in a California Transportation Plan and a set of regional transportation plans.
3. An adjustment of the funding system to accommodate the objectives of the state and regional transportation plans. These adjustments were seen as probably including a relaxation of the geographical and modal constraints in the existing system and a possible increase in the overall financial effort to accommodate an expanded mass transit system.

The process of accomplishing this transition was seen as an iterative one, but one which would for the most part proceed from reform of the institutional structure through reassessment of planning objectives to reform of the financial system. Unfortunately, it was not possible to coordinate legislative and administrative actions in such a way as to make the transition a smooth one. This was in part due to the fact that the proponents of the new system had not thought it through too well; but it was also a result of opposition by the more conservative elements of the legislature and the electorate, who were able to delay passage of some parts of the scheme and force compromises in the case of others.

The initial attempts to effect the transition came around 1970. At that time, MTC was created as a prototypical regional transportation agency. At about the same time, there was an abortive attempt to reform the financial system by amending Article 26 of the State Constitution to remove modal restrictions on the expenditure of the State Highway Fund. Also in 1970, there was a report by the Legislative Auditor

General recommending a change in the geographical allocation of the State Highway Fund from the existing county and district minimum system to one in which revenues would be allocated within regions on the basis of users' benefit-cost ratios.

Following the failure of the proposed Constitutional Amendment in 1970, the legislature passed SB 325 in 1971 as a compromise measure to establish state aid to mass transit systems. It also extended the concept of regional transportation agencies from the Bay Area to the entire state, although the other regional agencies were not given MTC's power over plan implementation; in many cases, these regional agencies are still dummy organizations. SB 325 was fairly conservative on the issue of geographical allocations, however: it employed a return-to-source mechanism on a county-by-county basis. Meanwhile, a bill (AB 505) had been drafted embodying the Auditor General's recommendations for reform of highway fund allocations; this bill almost passed in its original form, but was amended at the last minute to set up a Commission to study the Auditor General's proposals and other suggestions for financial reform.

The next year, before either MTC or the AB 505 Commission could really get underway, the legislature took the final step in the reform of the institutional structure. AB 69 created a California Department of Transportation and set it and the State Transportation Board to the task of developing a State Transportation Plan which would include regional plans prepared by the regional transportation agencies as well as a financial plan for the state as a whole. At the same time, the AB 505 Commission was retained, which created confusion at the state level over who was really supposed to be studying financial reform.

At the time MTC became operational, then, there was widespread uncertainty in the legislature and the state bureaucracy about the future of government activity in transportation in California. The ultimate organization of the new planning institutions was still undetermined, and the state was looking to the regional agencies for information and advice about how their functioning could be improved. Moreover, there was general dissatisfaction with the existing financial system, but no consensus as to how it should be reformed; the state was hoping that the regions would present it with a realistic picture of what they wanted to accomplish and how it could be financed. Of all the regional agencies, MTC was in by far the best position to establish itself as the leader and innovator in the new institutional system. As the staff of the Assembly Transportation Committee put it in October, 1973:

As California's only statutorily created transportation planning agency, MTC has the opportunity and power to lead transportation development in California; to serve as a model for other regional agencies; and to take an active and decisive role in solving major problems of our urban environment created by overdependence on the automobile.⁴⁹

MTC found it difficult to fulfill this role as leader and innovator in the new system for a number of reasons. These included:

1. In many cases, MTC leaders were as confused as the legislature or the state transportation bureaucracy. They did not have a clear idea of what MTC's part in the new institutional system should be, and to some extent, they seem to have preferred to not have too clear an idea, lest changing circumstances leave them in an untenable position. Bay, for instance, is quoted by Taggart and Jones as saying:

What MTC will become won't happen all at once; its bound to be evolutionary. It may start evolving in one direction and then get changed as a result of counter-pressures. Those pressures will come from the operating agencies, including cities and counties, most particularly, but also transit agencies and Caltrans. The pressure will also come from other regional planning agencies in California who look with some concern on the possible development of MTC's in their area.⁵⁰

Thus, MTC was seen as being shaped by, rather than shaping, the evolution of the new system. At the same time, there were areas in which MTC's planning experience had uncovered inconsistencies in the existing laws and institutional arrangements in which MTC's interests were fairly clear. These included the "pipeline problem," the relative planning roles of the regional agencies and the Caltrans districts, the effect of "discretionary" highway funds on priority-setting and programming, and the varying interpretations of the "overriding statewide interest" clauses in AB 363 and AB 69. Although MTC did mention the issues of Caltrans' planning role and the proposed systems of facilities of statewide significance in its January, 1974, Report to Caltrans, it deleted a stronger attack on the statewide interest clause from the draft of Section V and made no concerted attempt to call attention to the other issues. In other cases, MTC interests were not so clear. These included the whole question of the statewide funding system and that of the format and contents of the state and regional transportation plans. MTC leaders were aware of what they disliked about the existing funding system - that it was not multimodal and that allocation of funds within the region was not really controlled by MTC - but seem to have had

no real idea about how interregional allocations ought to be handled in a system in which multimodal funds would be allocated within regions by regional transportation agencies. As for the format and contents of transportation plans, MTC had had enough trouble in deciding the format and contents of its own plan; although MTC's experience might have been of value to Caltrans' Division of Transportation Planning and the State Transportation Board, MTC leaders seem to have felt that they had few answers to the state's problems. Another area in which there was genuine confusion was that of prospective funding sources. MTC had considered a number of sources in its plan, but had reached no real consensus on priorities among them, except that MTC's top priority would be to gain control of surplus Bay Toll revenues. A resolution setting priorities was eventually pushed through by Bort, but apparently had only half-hearted support from the rest of the Commission. Meanwhile, MTC undertook further study of the transit-finance proposals.

2. Leadership and innovation in the new institutional system would have jeopardized MTC's domain defense strategies. MTC's failure to make much of an issue of its problems in dealing with District 4 (the pipeline problem, the two agencies' relative planning roles, and so forth) was apparently linked to its desire to deal with District 4 through negotiations and to keep the exact relationship between the two organizations flexible. This desire for flexibility was clearly expressed in MTC's position on the "statewide significance" issue in the

January, 1974 Report to Caltrans.

3. MTC experienced a conflict between long-run and short-run political considerations. This conflict was particularly acute in the area of financial planning. If MTC wanted to contribute to any real reform of the California transportation finance system, it had to gain the trust of suspicious legislators. In order to do this, MTC's financial plan had to be comprehensive, concrete, consistent, and realistic. Instead, the financial plans MTC produced were vague. They contained inflated and (in 1973, at least) inconsistent needs estimates; they did not state what specific projects (if any) formed the basis of the needs estimates; they refused to say what MTC would do with discretionary funds should they become available; they did not list project priorities except as part of capital improvement programs which, in turn, were based on current funding; and they did not propose new funding sufficient to bridge the gap between existing funds and the estimated needs.* A good deal of this vagueness and exaggeration was related to short-run political strategies - MTC wanted the financial plan to remain vague, especially in 1973, in order to avoid potentially embarrassing commitments to projects. MTC was also trying to maximize its advantage within the existing system (or a new system modeled on it) by such devices as leaving questionable projects on capital improvement programs in order to "hold" the money and by

* They probably did propose enough new funding to cover projects the MTC staff considered really worthwhile.

inflating needs estimates - apparently on the theory that either future funds would be allocated among the regions on the basis of relative "needs" or that the legislature would take any needs estimate to be inflated, so that it would be better to have the legislature discount a large needs estimate than a small one. Such behavior by regional transportation agencies - MTC was not alone in pursuing strategies such as these - contributed to a feeling in Sacramento that financial plans produced by regional agencies were worthless; this, in turn, inhibited the process of financial reform.

4. MTC's rejection of legislative advocacy as a primary function left the Commission ill-equipped to deal with the legislature. The lack of lobbying capability and the lack of staff devoted exclusively to the drafting, evaluation, and support of legislation not only hampered MTC in seeking specific legislation but also inhibited more general communication with the legislature and the development of interdependencies. For instance, one major problem with MTC transit finance proposals seems to have been the Commission's lack of a sense of what the legislature might support.

USDOT and the environmental bureaucracy also represented potential sources of political legitimacy and economic security for MTC. USDOT had a general interest in encouraging regional transportation planning and UMTA, in particular, had played a key role in the establishment of the Commission. Also, it would appear that federal officials, like many state officials, regarded MTC as prototypical. Although there were differences within USDOT over the degree to which the

Department should support regional agencies, UMTA, at least, seems to have favored a stronger role for the Commission and could have been expected to back MTC had it sought one. Given the importance of USDOT certification actions and USDOT's final say on the eligibility of projects for federal funding, federal backing might have enabled MTC to counter pressures from the legislature and the implementing agencies. MTC's formative period was an ideal time for it to establish a close relationship with USDOT, since the confusion surrounding the establishment of Caltrans left the state in a poor position to resist an attempt to bypass it. MTC, however, carried on most of its contacts with USDOT through the Department's non-voting representative to the Commission, and tended to respond to certification requirements in a rather superficial manner.* MTC leaders, for their part, complained that USDOT's leadership faltered in 1973 and 1974 due to the Watergate scandal and USDOT's internal problems in integrating highway and transit policy.

When MTC started out, there was an expectation that it would be closely allied with the emerging environmental protection bureaucracy - in particular, with the Environmental Protection Agency, the State Air Resources Board, and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District. At that time, there was still considerable hope that federal air quality standards could be attained, and that MTC and the environmental

* For instance, two of UMTA's concerns at the time MTC was created were the lack of specificity in the Transit Development Program and the lack of an effective mechanism to coordinate transit operations. MTC devoted considerable effort to supplying numbers for the Transit Development Program, but displayed more concern for its relationship with the local transit operators than its relationship with UMTA in its cautious (and so far, ineffective) pursuit of transit coordination. Another MTC tendency which has resulted in criticism from USDOT has been the Commission's reluctance to develop a multimodal schedule of project priorities.

protection bureaucracy could develop a partnership in the implementation of air quality plans. MTC's first financial support had come from the State Air Resources Board in the form of a joint project for developing air quality models. Later, the Air Resources Board had commented that:

It appears probable that in addition to control measures to reduce emissions from individual vehicles, transportation measures such as alternative forms of transportation and reductions in motor vehicle usage will be necessary to meet and maintain the national standards. Actions to provide alternate forms of transportation normally must come from local elements of government and districts.⁵¹

The Board expressed the hope that:

...MTC can be encouraged to consider the achievement of the national ambient air quality standards as one of its objectives and to consider the air quality implications of the proposed transportation plan at the public hearings scheduled for May, 1973.⁵²

Also, a representative of the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District appeared at one of MTC's public meetings to suggest close cooperation between the two agencies.

In Section II of the 1973 Plan, MTC had strongly suggested that it would support federal air quality standards, even though it meant a reduction in automobile usage:

Of particular importance to the problem of air quality is the stipulation by State and Federal regulatory agencies that auto travel must be substantially reduced in order to meet the Federal Air Quality Standards by 1977....MTC is concerned that short-term actions taken to reduce auto usage be consistent with overall comprehensive planning and that such actions have long-term effects upon air quality. Thus, a significant transit orientation has been incorporated into the objectives and policies to guide development of the transportation system together with other important considerations which must be considered in the transportation/land-use planning process.⁵³

The Commission also adopted a policy stating:

All transportation program designs and plans shall be coordinated in cooperation with regulatory agencies to achieve present and future air and water quality standards.⁵⁴

The Commission retained this language in the face of the objection of one local government that:

This policy is acceptable only if the plans promulgated by regulating agencies are feasible to implement. The EPA Los Angeles Air Quality proposal is an example of one that isn't feasible.

Since the adoption of Section II, however, MTC has moved to dissociate itself from efforts to actually meet the standards of the Clean Air Act of 1970. Although there is cooperation between MTC and the environmental protection bureaucracy on technical matters (the modeling effort, for instance, continues) MTC has been careful to dissociate both its policy and political style from that of EPA. Bort, for instance, has been an outspoken critic of both EPA and the Clean Air Act, and Watt has expressed serious doubts about EPA's political style (see pages 376-77). In drawing up the TCP, MTC closely collaborated with known opponents of the Clean Air Act and essentially followed Caltrans' highly negative line on the subject of VMT reduction. The Commission itself ordered some of the negative language removed, but did nothing to change the thrust of the report - that the standards could not be met, and that reduction of auto usage (which had been favored in Section II) was an inappropriate means of attempting to meet them. (See pages 374-85). Also, MTC's timing of the I-580 decision was a deliberate attempt to prevent any EPA ruling on the project under the proposed indirect sources regulations (see page 403). In taking these actions, MTC staff members have hinted that they had the support (or even collaboration) of EPA (see Bay's statement,

page 384 , for instance). If so, this would mean that there is something of an alliance at the policy level between MTC and the environmental protection bureaucracy, but that this alliance is a negative one in terms of the policies which result from it: MTC may be helping to extricate EPA and the state and regional agencies from a political predicament by helping to lower public expectations. This may be a prudent approach for all concerned, but it is unlikely to increase the political and economic security of any of the agencies involved.

A final means of securing MTC's political legitimacy and economic security might have been the building up of a solid constituency centered around the citizens groups participating in its planning process. MTC did make some efforts in this direction, but they were too narrowly-based to succeed. As of early 1973, MTC leaders seem to have envisioned MTC as the potential leader of a coalition built around transit-funding advocacy. While this coalition, which would have included the transit operators and such citizens groups as the Sierra Club and the Bay Area Council, was primarily thought of as the means of achieving a particular substantive end, it might also have served the purpose of demonstrating public support for MTC and its Plan.

Prior to the 1973 planning phase, Watt and Lawrence D. Dahms of BART had written that:

...[P]olitical realities being what they are, MTC could not be expected to develop a multimodal transport plan without transit advocacy. MTC needs BART and other transit operating agencies to help develop support for the transit elements of its plan. A transit constituency needs to be formed and, indeed, is forming.⁵⁵

The failure of this transit constituency to emerge as a powerful force in the eighteen months following the adoption of the 1973 Plan was

largely due to a lack of unity among its prospective members. The transit operators were distrustful of MTC and slow to set up the proposed Metropolitan Transit Federation. The Sierra Club was more interested in opposing the highway program than in promoting an expansion of the transit program. The Bay Area Council was receptive to working with MTC on the transit-finance issue, but would do so only on its own terms. The Council formed a Transit Finance Task Force (partly at the behest of Commissioner Beckett, who wanted to take advantage of the Council's staff capability and hoped that the Council would help get the resulting proposals past the legislature) but insisted that its recommendations would be based on its own study. This created the possibility that the Council's recommendations would clash with those of an MTC staff task force, which was also studying transit finance. When the Council's study finally came out in September, 1975, it made the Council's support of increased transit funding contingent upon MTC's adoption of "policies directed toward more effective and efficient use of transit funds and resources."⁵⁶

Meanwhile, MTC did not explore other bases for building a political coalition around the regional-scale citizens groups and refused to make key concessions to them which might have increased their support. The Commission, for instance, rejected staff proposals in the original versions of Sections III-D, V, and VI to make the Commission elective and to establish a formal co-optation group (a "Citizen's Advisory Committee") - partly on the grounds that "...the Commission does not want to put themselves [sic] in the situation of having a citizens group demanding equal voting rights with the Commission,"⁵⁷

In more routine matters, MTC has been more active - and, in some cases, more successful - in developing political resources. MTC has tried to develop access to the Bay Area news media and to use this access to enhance its public image. MTC began by mounting a strong public relations effort, but this has tended to lag. For the most part, the Bay Area press has been indifferent to the Commission and something less than knowledgeable about the substantive issues of regional transportation planning. This has meant that reporting of MTC's activities has been sporadic, and that quite often the newspapers are merely running press releases. Coverage of the 1973 plan-making activities was fairly extensive (if not always very accurate), but as the Commission's novelty wore off and its agenda turned to more routine matters, coverage diminished. In addition to coverage by the major metropolitan newspapers of MTC's overall activity, there has been fairly intensive coverage of particular project decisions by the suburban press. MTC's use of the news media, however, has been constrained by its overall political strategy: the press is to be used as a means of building support for MTC and its proposals, but not as a weapon for attacking opponents. For instance, MTC did not attempt to use the news media to embarrass Senator Collier in the Napa Bridge case. Although the MTC Community Affairs Office refuses to comment on whether the story was deliberately suppressed, MTC certainly did not call attention to Collier's threats.

MTC has not experienced any great difficulty in obtaining technical information. It inherited (and thus controls) the BATSC data base, which is perhaps the most extensive set of transportation data for the Bay Area. Several other types of technical information commonly

used by MTC, such as census data, population forecasts, and the expected environmental impacts of projects, are in the public domain. In still other cases, MTC has commissioned special studies to develop data which did not exist. Information which MTC obtains directly from other agencies includes traffic data and land use data. Traffic data has been obtained from Caltrans and the local public works departments by co-optation through the TCC. Land use data has been supplied by ABAG; access to this information is implied by the contractual relationship between the two agencies and would probably be secured without contract through the mutual co-optation which exists between MTC and ABAG at both the staff and governing body levels. The only information MTC appears to have had any difficulty obtaining related to project programming. In one incident, the MTC staff had difficulty in obtaining the Division of Highways' proposed capital improvement program in the spring of 1973. MTC finally obtained the document, but only after Bay reminded the highway officials of MTC's legal responsibility for the highway program and threatened to draw up a unilateral MTC highway program. MTC apparently has never obtained the background information on project costs and project planning status that would be necessary to draw up an independent highway program, but it is not really set up to use such information and appears never to have sought it.

MTC leaders were certainly concerned about building MTC's technical legitimacy. Bay's statement at the March 23, 1973 staff meeting seems to imply that he thought the ability to produce "sound technical justification" for MTC's recommendations was central to MTC's credibility. For the most part, MTC found it impossible to produce this technical justification in the development of the 1973 Plan. Taggart

and Jones comment:

The technical staff on MTC's corridor teams functioned in a limbo-world between technical analysis and value judgment. The time available for analyzing options precluded rigorous evaluation or the independent development of technical data. Staff estimates of population growth, travel demand, network capacity, and environmental impact were largely conjecture. Time pressure deprived MTC's technical staff members of the ability to make coherent technical arguments that would support their disposition toward growth control and auto-use disincentives.⁵⁸

Perhaps more important even than the time pressure - which was indeed a key factor - was the fact that there were no accepted methods of analysis which could be applied to many of the problems which MTC faced. This was particularly true of the relationships among transportation development, land development, and air quality. So long as the MTC Executive Staff demanded "sound technical justification" for its recommendations, it could not take bold stands in the very areas which were the focus of the political debate. In this sense, the desire for technical legitimacy, and the feeling that MTC lacked it, definitely inhibited MTC's pursuit of the goals and policies enunciated in Section II.

MTC's pursuit of technical legitimacy, like its pursuit of political legitimacy, has been a quiet one. Although other agencies have on occasion attacked MTC's competence to perform certain functions,*

* One transit operator, for instance, commented:

What...is meant by the...sentence which states, "henceforth evaluation of transit system interfaces should be a continuing responsibility of MTC"? Does MTC really have the staff? Should MTC do all this work directly? Would it not be just as reasonable for MTC to create a management climate providing for interface coordination? I suggest that the latter possibility has greater merit, will be just as effective, if not more so, and will bring more brains to bear on the serious problem of system interface than could be brought to bear through a pure centralized planning technique, particularly when the centralized planners have no operating experience.

MTC has been reluctant to follow suit - at least in public. In some cases, such as the subregional planning connected with the Napa Bridge or the I-580 staff report, MTC has undertaken technical work that other agencies either could not or would not do. MTC has not seen fit to call much attention to this fact; rather, its pursuit of technical legitimacy has been one of carefully attempting to avoid mistakes - of concentrating on not "stubbing its toe badly" and not "getting egg on its face." Meanwhile, some MTC staff members see MTC's technical legitimacy as being tainted by excessive political caution. Taggart and Jones report criticism from staff members that:

1. Technical analysis is used to justify and legitimize pre-ordained political conclusions.
2. Technical analyses are sometimes sanitized with controversial elements softened or deleted before public presentation.
3. Inter-agency harmony is valued more than environmental analysis and technical integrity....⁵⁹

In sum, then, MTC has pursued technical legitimacy, but in the negative sense of trying to avoid mistakes rather than in the positive sense of technical self-promotion or attacks on the technical legitimacy of rivals. Meanwhile, even this search for technical competence has been constrained - at least in the opinion of some staff members - by an excessive desire to maintain the political peace. Also, MTC has been slow to seek alternative sources of technical legitimacy; for instance, it has maintained only very weak relationships with the Bay Area academic community and has not tried to develop support from this source for either its style of planning or the methods it has employed.

It would appear, then, that Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 are largely true. MTC's selection of domain defense strategies and its efforts to

increase its political resources were very much shaped by its leaders' perception of its existing political resources. MTC leaders did not perceive themselves to be in a position of strength vis-a-vis their political environment. They perceived themselves to be particularly weak in political and technical legitimacy and felt that MTC lacked economic security so long as a major portion of its operating funds were subject to appropriation by a legislature unconvinced of MTC's competence and legitimacy. They seemed to believe that many of the organizations with which they had to deal were potentially hostile, and that until this hostility could be overcome, MTC would have to maintain a "low profile." That low profile precluded defense of MTC's domain through confrontational tactics. MTC secured its domain through contracting and co-optation where it could, and either tacitly or openly abandoned it where it could not. The choice of negotiation with and co-optation of other organizations within the region as MTC's primary domain defense strategies, in turn, inhibited MTC's efforts to build up political resources. The co-optation and negotiation strategies could succeed only if MTC could gain the trust of the implementing agencies and local governments, and this could not be done unless MTC confined its attention to affairs within the region and was careful to mind its own business. MTC's contracting and co-optation gambits would almost certainly have been rejected out of hand by the Caltrans District, the transit operators, and the local governments of the region had it appeared that MTC preferred to deal directly (and independently) with Sacramento and Washington. Consequently, MTC could not go very far in establishing interdependencies with higher levels of government and in seeking alternative sources of political

legitimacy and economic security. By the same token, the implementing agencies' and local governments' economic dependence on MTC did not constitute much of a source of organizational power for MTC because MTC leaders felt that MTC lacked the political and economic security to employ such sanctions.

Thus, both propositions appear to be true. What is perhaps lacking in the model presented in Chapter 2 is a sense of the degree to which domain defense strategies and strategies for securing political resources are linked: active domain defense can take place only if an agency already possesses great political legitimacy and economic security; meanwhile, middle-range domain-defense strategies - the best a weak agency can hope to pursue - can succeed only if the agency refrains from directly seeking greater political legitimacy and economic security through development of alternatives and interdependencies. The agency that is forced to negotiate is already negotiating from weakness; yet if it wishes to negotiate, it must remain weak.

4. Risk Propensity.

Propositions 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 concern the risk propensity of organizational leaders. Proposition 5.4 holds that organizational leaders will show a greater propensity to take risks under conditions of technical and environmental turbulence and time pressure than under normal conditions. Proposition 5.5 suggests that cosmopolitan professionals, by virtue of their professional affiliations, will display considerable risk propensity and political aggressiveness. Proposition 5.6 holds that risk propensity and political aggressiveness will be inhibited in an agency if there is a mismatch between the personal

constituents of members of the agency's governing body and the agency's constituency.

Before testing these propositions, we must first try to determine the extent to which MTC actually took risks. In doing this, we must bear in mind that the acceptance and avoidance of risk is not a simple matter: an organization such as MTC faces many different kinds of risks and is more sensitive to some than to others, quite apart from any general propensity to accept or avoid "risks." Moreover, in determining whether a particular action (or pattern of action) was risk-accepting or risk-avoiding, we must consider the possibility that the element of risk was not a key consideration in the decision to take or avoid the action.

In MTC's case, any decision might have involved one or more of the following types of risk:

1. Political. Political risks would include the possibility that an action would:
 - a. provoke a hostile reaction from an implementing agency, local government, or legislator,
 - b. provoke a hostile reaction from the general public,
 - c. constitute a "bad bargain" in a contracting or co-optation situation - that is, involve an unnecessarily great concession of power in exchange for the cooperation of some actor,
 - d. lead to a loss of support by active constituents.
2. Technological. Technological risks for planning agencies such as MTC would include the possibility that:

- a. a particular technical analysis would be unconvincing due to use of an inappropriate method of analysis, a demonstrable error of analysis, or a lack of information.
 - b. a particular technical analysis would be convincing at the time it was made, but would be shown by subsequent events to be in error.
3. Managerial. Managerial risks would include the possibility that an action would lead to:
- a. a breakdown in the organization's internal lines of authority
 - b. a breakdown in an organization's internal communications and coordination
 - c. a loss of morale within the organization.
4. Environmental, Social, and Economic. For a planning agency, environmental, social and economic risks would include the possibility that approval of a proposal would lead to adverse environmental, social, or economic impacts; or conversely, that disapproval would lead to disruption of a beneficial situation - in particular, in the context of the MTC case, an adverse consequence of disapproving a proposal might be a loss of funds for the region.

It is obvious that these different types of risks entered into MTC's deliberations in different ways, and that some of them constituted more immediate risks than others. Viewed at the highest level of abstraction, every MTC decision was a decision to intervene, or not intervene, in an ongoing process of public action involving the provision of transportation service. In most cases, intervention posed the

risk of adverse political reaction or of funding losses, whereas non-intervention, in many cases, posed the risk of adverse environmental or social impacts or the wasteful use of resources. Seen in this context, all sides in the debate over MTC's Plan believed that MTC's proper response was to avoid risks: the Sierra Club wanted a moratorium on construction projects posing environmental risks; the Division of Highways wanted MTC to postpone decision-making about pipeline projects, largely because this posed the risk of funding losses; and the MTC leaders wanted to avoid (or postpone) politically-risky confrontations. In making decisions about which risks to accept and which to avoid, MTC leaders had to consider the extent to which these various risks could be brought to bear on MTC.

In determining the extent to which a particular risk can be brought to bear on an organization, it is necessary to consider the following:

1. To what extent would the organization itself suffer adverse consequences? This, in turn, depends on whether the risk involves consequences which would be directly adverse to the organization or consequences which would be indirectly adverse, in which the organization would not itself suffer the consequences, but would be blamed for them.
2. To what extent can the adverse condition be shown to be an effect of the organization's action?
3. To what extent does the organization share responsibility for the action?
4. How much time will elapse before the adverse consequences will occur?

In general, we would expect that organizations would be less sensitive to risks to the extent that those risks do not - directly or indirectly - have adverse consequences for them, and that, consequently, they would be less sensitive to potential risks in which causal connections between their actions and the possible consequences cannot be shown, responsibility is shared, or consequences will not make themselves felt in the near future. All of this would imply that, although it was a part of MTC's mission to concern itself with the social, environmental, and economic risks of transportation proposals, MTC should have been more sensitive to short-run political and financial risks than to these long-run risks in which causal relationships were hard to demonstrate, responsibility was shared, and the effects would not show up for a long time, if ever.

It seems fair to say that MTC's sensitivity to risks did follow this pattern. MTC certainly showed some concern for environmental, social, and economic impacts; this concern, however, was consistently tempered by MTC's awareness of political risks. Moreover, the political risks to which MTC seemed most sensitive were the risks of adverse reactions by other agencies, officials, or the general public: MTC seemed little concerned by the risk that it would lose the active support of its constituents or by the risk that the organizations with which it was establishing contracting and co-optation relationships would use these to take advantage of MTC. Also, on occasion, MTC leaders were more willing to risk loss of morale within the organization than confrontations with other agencies or public officials.

This is not to say that MTC never took political risks. Watt, for instance, insists that "I do not feel we have ever had to follow a

cautious course" and would characterize MTC's political style as "cautious aggressiveness," meaning that "one can act forthrightly without being mindless of the consequences...". As this statement might seem to indicate, MTC did things which upset other agencies, local governments, and even state legislators - but there were always limits to how far MTC would go in risking confrontations. Specific MTC actions which involved some risk, and the limits to the risks MTC was willing to accept on these occasions, include the following:

1. MTC put a heavy emphasis on mass transit in Section II of the 1973 Plan. This action offended the Division of Highways. MTC refused to revise the policies in Section II, but never really developed a connection between the policies and implementation of the Plan, either in the Plan itself or in project reviews.
2. In most cases, MTC refused to commit itself to individual highway projects in Section III-C. This action upset the Division of Highways. There was also concern at the time that low categorizations might jeopardize federal funds for some projects. At the same time, however, MTC was equally reluctant to commit itself against highway projects. Actions in early project reviews suggested that MTC would rarely reject projects if they had to be considered on an individual basis rather than as part of a regional system. Finally, in 1974, the whole category system was dropped from the Plan.
3. MTC proposed automobile disincentives in Section III-D of the 1973 Plan. This action was risky because it might have provoked an adverse reaction from the general public. These

proposals were allowed to remain in the Plan, but so far there have been no steps to implement them.

4. The MTC staff proposed priorities among rapid transit extensions in both 1973 and 1974. These actions were risky because the priorities suggested ran counter to those which State Senator Nedjedly of Contra Costa County was trying to get enacted as a special-district law. The setting of rapid transit priorities may also have upset BARTD and local interests in the affected communities. In both 1973 and 1974, the Work Program Committee refused to support the staff proposals.
5. MTC adopted a "highway needs estimate" in 1973 which was considerably at variance with the one that Caltrans District 4 wanted adopted. This action not only contributed to tensions between MTC and the District, but also posed some slight possibility of adversely affecting the region's position in state-wide fund allocations. The Commission reversed itself in 1974 and accepted the Caltrans estimate.
6. In the original version of Section V of the 1973 Plan, the MTC staff proposed that MTC be given regulatory powers over transit operations. This appears to have upset the transit operators and was deleted by the Commission.
7. In the original version of Section V of the 1973 Plan, the MTC staff also proposed an enlargement of MTC's formal domain to include land use planning functions and proposed establishment of staff capability to write, analyse and support legislation. These actions might have been seen by local governments, implementing agencies, and certain economic interests as evidence

of excessive ambition on MTC's part. These proposals were deleted by the Commission.

8. In June, 1973, MTC changed the status of the Dumbarton Bridge from Category I to Category II. This action upset State Senator Homdahl and several local governments. The Category change was permitted to stand temporarily; however, the whole action was virtually meaningless, since the bridge was not in MTC's jurisdiction. MTC's report to BCDC on the proposed bridge was not particularly negative, and Section IV of the MTC Plan noted that funds were programmed for the project. Eventually, the project was restored to Category I.
9. MTC proposed the Traffic Control Council and the Metropolitan Transit Association as organizations for the co-optation of Caltrans, local public works officials, and the transit operators. This action involved the risk that these organizations would dominate the co-optation organizations and try to use them to manipulate MTC. To a large extent, this did happen.
10. In the January, 1974, Report to the Director of Caltrans, MTC differed with Caltrans District 4's position on the interpretation of the statewide significance clauses of AB 363 and AB 69 and suggested that Caltrans should keep its planning and implementation roles separate, especially at the District level. This action might have upset District 4; however, the report was actually sent to the District for review before being sent to Sacramento, and some passages challenged by District officials were deleted. Also, some matters of conflict between MTC and the District were not mentioned in the report.

11. MTC tried to secure lead agency status for the allocation of FAU funds. This action was opposed by the region's local governments, who wanted lead agency status for themselves. Following a decision at the state level to give lead agency status to the counties, MTC delegated the task of working out arrangements between itself and the local governments to the TCC. MTC first accepted, and then had to modify, a TCC-written resolution restricting MTC review powers over FAU projects.
12. MTC accepted lead agency status for the Bay Area's Transportation Control Plan. This action was risky because a TCP which conformed to federal air quality standards would almost certainly have involved restrictions on the use of automobiles. Adoption of such a plan might have provoked an adverse reaction from Caltrans, local governments and economic interests, and the general public. Adoption of a plan which obviously did not conform to federal air quality standards would create the risk of rejection by EPA or else court action against the TCP. The plan adopted by MTC did not recommend stringent automobile restrictions. This course of action was apparently encouraged by the EPA regional office. The ultimate acceptability of the TCP has yet to be settled, pending possible amendment of the Clean Air Act.
13. MTC delayed approval of the Napa Bridge. This action offended State Senator Collier and some local officials; also, there was some risk that the region might lose the funding for the project if it were rejected. MTC eventually approved the project under pressure from Collier.

14. MTC imposed conditions on the design of I-580 in approving the project. Caltrans objected to some of these conditions. In this case, however, MTC had not actually tried to block the project and had not intervened in the lengthy struggle over the Environmental Impact Statement except to assure USDOT in August, 1974, that the project would be approved promptly if the EIS were released. The MTC staff did not raise the issue of the cost-effectiveness of the project nor the issue of the proper priority for the rapid transit project proposed in conjunction with the highway widening. MTC scheduled approval of the project to preclude its coming under EPA indirect sources regulations. The conditions adopted by the Grant Review and Allocations Committee and approved by the full Commission were closer to the original Caltrans design than was the design supported by the MTC staff and eventually accepted by Caltrans in its out-of-court settlement of the Sierra Club suit against the project.

Politically risky actions which MTC did not take included:

1. MTC never vetoed a major project.
2. MTC did not publish independently-determined list of project priorities.
3. MTC did not go to court to determine the limits of its formal powers. In particular, MTC did not seek clarification of the laws regarding discretionary funds, the county minima, or the "overriding statewide interest" clauses.

MTC's overall record during 1973 and 1974 suggests that MTC leaders were willing to take actions which involved some risk of confrontation

with implementing agencies, local officials, or legislators, but that they were not willing to take actions which threatened the vital interests of other agencies, nor to deliberately provoke confrontations and risk the consequences.

This general understanding of the types of risky actions MTC would take and the circumstances in which it would take them, however, is still insufficient to establish the degree to which its leaders displayed risk propensity. In the final analysis, risks are a subjective matter. MTC behavior appears to have been at least moderately risky if one accepts the perception of the MTC leaders that MTC lacked the political resources to prevail in confrontations. Since no confrontations occurred, it is impossible to test the truth of this assumption. The assumption itself could be taken as either a realistic assessment of MTC's political situation or as prima facie evidence of an ingrained tendency to magnify risks in order to excuse their avoidance. Certainly, there were differences of opinion among Commissioners, MTC staff members, and outside observers as to the reality of MTC's political weakness. Although there is little doubt that a hostile legislature could have made trouble for MTC, almost any serious attack on MTC could have been grounds for decertification of the region by USDOT. Whether USDOT would have backed MTC in the event of a showdown is another matter. Since the showdown never occurred, there is no way of saying objectively how much potential political power MTC had and, consequently, no really objective way of assessing the risks it took.

Moreover, MTC's reluctance to confront other agencies is an indication of risk-avoidance only if the decision to avoid confrontations was made on the basis of the risks involved. Although the perceived

risks were definitely a consideration, some MTC leaders have expressed the view that, quite apart from any risks to MTC's political survival, confrontational strategies were unnecessary and would perhaps have been counterproductive. The basis of this view is the belief that MTC poses no real threat to other transportation agencies in the region, but is rather viewed with suspicion only because it is new. In this view, MTC is a product of changes in society which the implementing agencies and local governments must eventually take into account. The implementing agencies and local governments are upset by the changes and sometimes resent MTC as their symbol, but if they are to survive, they must adjust to them, and MTC can help them to adjust. In this view, then, MTC, Caltrans, the transit operators, and the local governments have common interests which can provide the basis for the contracting and co-optation strategies favored by MTC; although these can eventually lead to a dominant role for MTC, in the meantime, the other agencies need to be reassured about MTC's intentions. This means that MTC must seek opportunities for constructive collaboration in its relationship with other transportation organizations and avoid confrontations. This, in turn, requires MTC to display great patience.

Taggart and Jones, for instance, quote Watt as saying:

If somebody wants to get things done too fast, nothing is going to happen. There's got to be time for everybody to sniff each other out. That's the institutional problem of how things get done....It doesn't do any good to arch our backs. We've got to put together a program that Tom Lammers will accept and gradually get District 4 into the bus business.⁶⁰

Moreover, some Commission and staff members believe that external circumstances will eventually eliminate potential sources of conflict. This is particularly true of controversial highway projects: whereas

Caltrans might resist MTC interference with pipeline projects if the highway program funding levels remained constant, the present financial crunch creates a situation in which MTC can work with Caltrans to make "cold, hard cuts" in the highway budget. Bort, for instance, has indicated that many controversial issues will work themselves out due to lack of funds.

Although Propositions 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 are couched in terms of the propensity to take risks in the general sense, they were meant to apply specifically to political risks; in particular, "high risk propensity" in these propositions is associated with active domain defense strategies and political aggressiveness. Since we have conceded that we have no way of measuring MTC's risk propensity in absolute terms (except to say that it was neither entirely lacking nor extremely high) we can test these propositions only in terms of relative risk-propensity and in terms of what we know about MTC's motivation in particular cases.

Proposition 5.4 holds that risk propensity should increase as uncertainty about goals and technologies increases and as time pressure increases. Alexander's arguments in favor of these suppositions were that under these conditions "few non-risky decision will seem to be available anyway" and that "the need for rapid decision may also inhibit a more considered appreciation of probabilities"⁶¹ - which, in turn, might lead to higher risk propensity.

Chapter 2 suggests that MTC's very existence was the result of "changing issue-perceptions, values, and technical requirements" and that the high risk-propensity which such an organization should display

early in its existence should decline as the political system (disturbed by the introduction of the new member) moves toward a steady state. This interpretation is consistent with the observation that the really important risks for an organization such as MTC are political risks: the primary element of uncertainty in political risks is the unpredictability of the reactions of other political actors; we should expect, then, that the process of stabilization in a political system disturbed by a new member would be largely one in which familiarity rendered the reactions of the old and new members mutually predictable. As the system matures, then, we should expect the overall level of political uncertainty - and hence, of unavoidable political risk - to decline.

Proposition 5.4, however, does not concern itself with this phenomenon of increasing political certainty, per se, nor with that of the decline of unavoidable political risk. Rather, the thrust of Alexander's argument is that decision makers in risk-filled environments become hardened to risks, so that they become less likely to choose low risk alternatives even when these are available.* We might just as well argue the opposite, of course - that as necessary risks increase, decision makers will be all the more eager to avoid unnecessary ones. Note that the point of Proposition 5.4 - and of Alexander's argument on which it is based - is not that leaders with high risk-

*The point about time pressure is merely an extension of this. Time pressure adds a second order of uncertainty - the decision maker is unable to develop a "considered appreciation of probabilities" and is hence not only uncertain but also uncertain of the extent to which he is uncertain.

propensities are better adapted to high-risk situations, nor that, over time, leaders with high risk-propensity will come to occupy positions involving chronic uncertainty, lesser mortals having either failed or succumbed to ulcers or high blood pressure. Rather, the point of Proposition 5.4 is that leaders either respond to uncertain environments by acting recklessly or that they develop (or learn) risk propensity under these circumstances.

Thus, if Proposition 5.4 is correct, and if it is true that political uncertainty declines as a political system moves toward a condition of stability, we should expect either (1) a continuous lessening of MTC's risk propensity over time or (2) a peak in MTC's risk propensity, as uncertainty and time pressures built to a head and MTC leaders learned to accept risk - the most likely period for such a peak being the latter part of the 1973 Plan development phase, the period, say, from mid-April to the end of June, 1973.

The MTC case provides little evidence that either Proposition 5.4 or its reverse - that risk propensity is decreased by uncertainty - is true. Although it is not possible to measure MTC's absolute risk propensity in any objective manner, there is little evidence to indicate that it varied with uncertainty or time pressure. Throughout the period covered by the case studies, MTC was willing to accept moderate levels of risk, but it never chose the most risky available alternatives. Moreover, its leaders consistently displayed the decision-making style Alexander calls that of the "incrementalist policymaker" rather than that of what he calls the "administrative entrepreneur."⁶²

If MTC's risk propensity did vary with uncertainty and time pressure, it seems more likely that uncertainty decreased MTC's risk

propensity than that it increased it. It is true that some of the more "risky" staff proposals for the 1973 Plan (such as the staff versions of Sections III-D and V) emerged during the period suspected as being the peak of MTC risk propensity, and that there was a decline over time of the expectation that MTC would "bite the bullet" in a confrontation with an implementing agency - as we should expect if MTC's risk propensity declined over time. These arguments may be rebutted, however, by the observation that Sections III-D and V were typical of the MTC staff faction that produced them, and got to the Commission relatively intact not because the MTC leaders had suddenly developed greater risk propensity, but because there was no time to revise them. The decline in the expectation that MTC would confront implementing agencies can, of course, be as well attributed to a decrease in erroneous conceptions about MTC's risk propensity as to any changes in that risk propensity itself.

Arguments for the proposition that uncertainty and time pressure decreased MTC's risk propensity are somewhat stronger. In the first place, the 1973 Plan's "flexibility" - surely the manifestation of a low-risk political strategy - was repeatedly attributed by MTC leaders to uncertainties about goals, causal relationships, funding mechanisms, institutional relationships, and the like. Moreover, it could be argued that the Commission's period of greatest caution coincided with the period of greatest uncertainty and time pressure - that late May, 1973, was the period in which the Commission was most prone to suppress controversial staff proposals.

These arguments, however, encounter difficulties of their own. The desire for flexibility in the Plan may have been motivated to some

extent by considerations of political risk - but it was also motivated by the professional and political philosophies of MTC leaders who were obsessed with having a "plan" that could be implemented and who, moreover, thought that a more definite plan would be dishonest - that there was no sense in spelling out detailed priorities ten years in advance when they knew that these would be meaningless beyond the first few years. Furthermore, the Commission's reaction to controversial staff proposals under the time pressure of May and June, 1973, could as well be attributed to either the difficulty in reaching an internal consensus under that kind of time pressure, since there was no time for Commissioners to air their personal doubts and think through their own uncertainties (quite apart from any external political risks) or to a reluctant decision to assert itself on the part of a Commission majority which (perhaps) did not really want a politically-active MTC.

Proposition 5.5 holds that "cosmopolitan professionals," by virtue of their professional affiliations, will display high risk propensity and political aggressiveness. This proposition is based on Wolfinger's arguments that "...the incentive structure in these professions emphasizes not jealous defense of routine but rather venturesome ambition," and that "...these officials have a vested interest in maximizing the programs for which they are responsible and therefore want to expand their own domains, if necessary by appealing to their specialized constituents in the local community."⁶³

The first argument is based on the observation that in "cosmopolitan" professions, personal success tends to be defined by fellow-professionals at the national level rather than by local political

officials; the second seems to be based on an assumption that all bureaucratic organizations have an ingrained tendency to build empires. If the proposition is correct, MTC staff members should have displayed higher risk propensity than the commissioners (most of whom are local officials) and this risk propensity should have been clearly related to their status as professionals.

In fact, it would be hard to argue that MTC's professionals, as a group, displayed appreciably greater risk propensity than the Commission itself. It is true that at certain key points - particularly in the latter stages of the development of the 1973 Plan - the Commission intervened to reject risky staff proposals. On the whole, however, there seems to have been a greater disparity in attitudes toward risk within the staff than between the top level of the staff and the Commission. At the level of responsible decisionmaking within the MTC staff, the MTC professionals were perhaps more in the "incrementalist" mold, and less in the mold of the "administrative entrepreneur" than were the leading commissioners.

It would appear that neither of Wolfinger's arguments is necessarily correct. The first, that the incentive structure of cosmopolitan professions encourages political aggressiveness, is far from universally true, although it may apply to some professions.*

Wolfinger's argument presupposes not only the professional's freedom from local political sanctions (and the professional's lack of a

* Wolfinger's statement was actually based on the behavior of professional administrators such as city managers. The argument here is not that no "cosmopolitan" professions display this incentive structure, but rather that, if they do, their cosmopolitan nature is not a sufficient condition.

tendency to adopt the values of local politicians) but also the existence of a climate of opinion within the profession which would support (or at least tolerate) such political aggressiveness. The argument must also presuppose that the professional's political aggressiveness would not be at the expense of his fellow professionals.

In the case of top MTC staff members, the only one of these conditions which was really met was that personal success depended (at least in part) on reputation in professional circles. The climate of opinion within the transportation planning profession, although changing rapidly in the early 1970's, was by no means conducive to political aggressiveness. It is only recently that the planning professions have come to accept overt political activity as legitimate behavior for their members. Among the planning professions, transportation planning, with its heavy orientation toward engineering, has hardly been in the forefront of the movement toward political activism. It is true that this situation was changing in the early 1970's and that younger MTC staff members, who had been socialized into the profession in the late 1960's and early 1970's, were far more comfortable with political activism than were older staff members. This, in part, accounts for the differences in attitudes toward political aggressiveness within the staff.

MTC professionals also found themselves in a position in which political aggressiveness would have led to conflicts not only with local political officials, but also with fellow-professionals working for implementing agencies, local public works departments, and other planning agencies. It is unlikely that MTC staff leaders could have engaged in much political aggression against these fellow-professionals

and not suffered professional repercussions. Consequently, one should not expect that the freedom from local political sanctions would have encouraged a "venturesome ambition" even had the professional ideology condoned it.

Finally, the attitudes of top MTC staff members were not always very different from those of the local political establishment. In particular, there was a desire to maximize the amount of outside funding spent on transportation development in the region - to get the "biggest bang for the regional buck," in the words of one staff member - and to get things done (or in Bay's words, "To make transportation happen"⁶⁴) and then to take credit for them - the classical pork-barrel approach to public works. To the extent that MTC professionals shared the value system of local politicians, they were subject to the same political logic; if the logic of local politics discourages bold action (as Wolfinger suggests) then MTC professionals would also be inhibited.

Wolfinger's second argument - that empire-building is a natural goal of bureaucratic organizations - seems to overlook the complexity of domain politics and the complexity of the roles played by top-level staff members in planning organizations. In the case of MTC staff members, there were at least three such professional roles, each played to some degree by each member of the senior staff:

1. The expert
2. The conflict manager
3. The organizational manager.

Since each of these roles implies a different orientation toward risk and political aggressiveness, we should expect that the behavior of

professionals would increase in complexity and ambiguity with increasing role-conflict. We should also expect that the empire-building tendencies of professionals, in their roles as organizational managers, would be tempered by conflicts among their roles.

Generally speaking, we should expect professionals in their roles as experts to be relatively indifferent to both empire-building and political risks. In this role - traditionally a favorite one for technical professionals - the professional prescribes for his client, society. Whether society follows the prescription is irrelevant (as is the question of whether society agrees with the prescription) - the professional has discharged his duty by merely speaking the truth. Although the "truth" is never value-free, but is rather a reflection of the professional's values, the professional does not see his activity as being political. Political risks are not so much accepted as ignored - which may, on occasion, result in highly risky actions.

In their roles as organizational managers, we should expect planning professionals to behave much as any other administrators. We should expect them to attempt to expand and defend their organizational domains and to try to maintain the internal stability of their organizations. In the process, we should expect them to show sensitivity to political risks. Whether their style should be risk-accepting or risk-avoiding might depend on any number of circumstances, including their personalities, the climate of professional opinion, and their precise political situations.

In their roles as conflict managers, we should expect planning professionals to display yet another approach to the subject of political risks and political aggressiveness. The role of a conflict

manager is to keep political controversy within manageable bounds and to channel it in creative directions. This requires a certain political delicacy - too much political aggressiveness can discredit the conflict manager in his role as a referee in the political conflict and may escalate conflict beyond manageable bounds; too little political aggressiveness can lead to his being ignored by other political actors. In their roles as conflict managers, then, we should expect professionals to evaluate political aggressiveness in terms of its effect of the management of conflicts among external actors rather than in terms of political risks to the organization - as an organizational manager would.

To some extent, the behavior of MTC staff members operating in a risky political environment can be explained in terms of these conflicting roles. Much of the "risk-propensity" of the MTC technical staff seemed to reflect the attitude of the "expert" in which risks were not so much accepted as ignored. These staff members felt that the Executive Staff would not "stand up for what it believed in" - as the professional expert should. Watt, in response to this criticism, expressed a belief in incremental political progress and an organizational manager's frustration with staff members who ignore political realities: "We've got to crawl before we can walk and walk before we run....If we try to go too high, we may get busted. I want to fight for the staff, but I also want realistic plans from them. I want to be criticized as to what is idealistic." But, Watt said, the younger MTC staff members haven't, as yet, been seasoned in the real world. Also, Watt said, a part of the problem is the conflict between planning and implementation - eventually, MTC must cut off planning short of

perfection and get things implemented.

Bay has also expressed disagreement with the concept of the planner as an omniscient expert, preferring, for his part, to emphasize the role of the conflict manager. Bay has said that engineering schools should teach engineers that the doctor-patient analogy (that is, the concept of the omniscient, scientific professional who prescribes for society) does not hold in transportation planning. The transportation planning process is basically political, Bay continued, and "there are a lot of engineers with ulcers" because they do not understand this. In terms of his conscious understanding of his role, Bay has come to believe that "engineers should better understand and work with the political process, providing sound technical information to policy makers including information on all consequences..., but not trying to supplant the policy-maker's judgment with our own,"⁶⁵ and to the concept that he says he was trying to convey at the March 23, 1973, staff meeting - that "our job is to highlight issues, not to bury them."

Role conflicts obscure the question of risk propensity among professionals not only by complicating their motives, but also by creating competing demands on their time. Routine work loads on staff members in managerial positions are often quite high, and involvement with politically-risky actions will normally involve extraordinary demands on the manager's time. MTC Assistant Director Wesley Wells, for instance, says that it is true that people in responsible staff positions tend to avoid conflict, but that one reason for this is that "making waves" creates more work and pressure for them.

It would appear, then, that there is no real evidence that the risk-propensity of MTC staff members was increased by their status as

"cosmopolitan professionals". If anything, professional roles and professional affiliations should decrease the propensity to make politically-risky decisions. Nevertheless, we should be cautious about concluding that the risk-propensity of cosmopolitan professionals is decreased by their professional status - the complexities of professional roles, motivations, and work situations are such that we should hesitate to attribute specific actions or patterns of action to simple risk-propensity.

Propositions 5.4 and 5.5 interpreted political aggressiveness and risk propensity as responses to uncertainty or to professional affiliations. Proposition 5.6 suggests another interpretation of an organization's willingness (or unwillingness) to undertake active domain defense. Proposition 5.6 holds that the tendency to take bold substantive stands and to undertake active domain defense is dependent on the relationship between an agency's constituency and the personal constituencies of members of its governing body. More specifically, Proposition 5.6 holds that a mismatch between the constituency of the agency as a whole and that of individual governing body members will inhibit political activism by creating conflicting loyalties within the governing body, or between the governing body and the staff. If Proposition 5.6 is true, we should expect the MTC staff to have favored active political strategies but the Commission to have rejected them because Commissioners, as individuals, did not want MTC to be a strong agency.

This line of reasoning certainly cannot be wholly rejected as an explanation for MTC's political behavior. Points in its favor include:

1. There was, indeed, a mismatch between MTC's constituency as an organization and the constituencies of individual members of the Commission. MTC's organizational constituency consisted mainly of regional-scale interest groups such as the Sierra Club, the League of Women Voters, and the Bay Area Council. MTC Commissioners, on the other hand, are appointed by local governments, and in most cases are themselves local elected officials. It is known that many of the local governments were opposed to the establishment of MTC, and it has been said by some MTC personnel that the Commission included members who had been opposed to its creation.
2. MTC staff members generally agree that only a few of the Commissioners were "regionally-minded." In the view of these staff members, the Commission needed to be "educated" to the virtues of regionalism. In general, the Commissioners who seemed to take the greatest interest in MTC, and to display the greatest loyalty to it, were those who were the least identified with local political establishments or who had already displayed interest in regional politics.
3. On at least one important occasion - the Napa Bridge case - a Commissioner encouraged legislative intervention in an MTC grant review action. This Commissioner was clearly putting local interest above MTC's interest in defending its domain.

It is at least conceivable that the Commission rejected staff proposals such as those in the original version of Section V, not because of any external political risks, but because the Commission majority thought that an ambitious MTC, with strong education and

advocacy capabilities, was contrary to their own interests. It is also quite conceivable that staff proposals implying active domain defense were inhibited because staff members thought they would be unacceptable to the Commission. Nevertheless, Proposition 5.6 is not a sufficient explanation for MTC's political behavior. In the first place, there seemed to be as much division over MTC's proper political course within the staff as between the Commission and the staff. More importantly, there were a number of instances in which (if the minutes can be taken literally) Commissioners were taken aback by staff inaction or else were urged by staff members to approve measures abandoning important areas of MTC's political domain. An example of the first sort of situation was the setting of project priorities in the 1973 Plan - it was the Commission that forced the inclusion of the list of priorities in Section III-C in June, over staff objections. Examples of the second type of situation include the abandonment of MTC's claim to power over discretionary highway funds in the Staff Report on the Napa Bridge and the original FAU resolution, which was supported by Bay when it came before the Commission.

B. Evolution of the Political Mechanism.

Chapter 2 presented several propositions concerning the evolution of political mechanisms. The basis of representation and method of selection of an agency's governing body were held to be non-evolutionary, but nevertheless significant, features of its political mechanism; the agency's internal organization and its political procedures were held to be evolutionary, with external political pressures, the requirements of internal management, and domain defense strategies affecting

their development.

Proposition 6.1 holds that:

If the agency's governing body is made up of representatives of subregional jurisdictions, there will be a tendency to avoid conflicts within the governing body by decomposing regional issues into subregional issues.

This proposition would apply to MTC, since most Commissioners represented the region's cities and counties. It would seem to be true, at least to the extent that MTC did indeed tend to decompose regional issues into subregional ones. Examples of such decomposition of regional scale issues include:

1. MTC's conceptual planning and project evaluation have been dealt with on a corridor-by-corridor basis rather than a regional basis. Although the corridors are not identical with the counties, which are the basic unit of representation for the Commission, most corridors involve no more than two or three counties and most counties are included in no more than two or three corridors. Taggart and Jones comment that:

The corridor-by-corridor incremental approach is more compatible with the political realities of the region [than is the comprehensive regional approach]. It reflects the jurisdictional and geographic competition within the region -- and among MTC commissioners themselves.⁶⁶

2. Existing funding systems, for the most part, bind MTC to subregional units in setting project priorities and allocating funds. The MTC highway program, which is listed on a corridor-by-corridor basis, is actually based on the Caltrans program, which is broken down by county. The transit program was developed on a somewhat more regional basis, but is still influenced by the county-by-county restrictions on the

allocation of SB 325 funds. FAU funds are also allocated on a county-by-county basis and are further restricted by a provision in the law requiring "fair and equitable" treatment of municipalities of more than 200,000 population. MTC has made no concerted effort to have these restrictions removed and has yet to set priorities on a regional basis, even in cases in which it did have authority to do so (for instance, the rapid transit extensions).

3. There was a tendency in grant review actions - particularly minor ones - for the commission to follow the wishes of the individual commissioners in whose district the project was located - an arrangement David Jones refers to as the "Commission's own version of Senatorial privilege."⁶⁷ Jones further comments that "small-scale facilities are approved if they have the imprimatur of the staff and the commissioners from the immediate jurisdiction."⁶⁸ The only notable instance in which the Commission departed from this informal rule that individual commissioners have the final say about projects in their districts was the Napa Bridge case; in this instance, there was considerable outside pressure on the Commission, but it would also appear that Trower was violating the premise underlying the "senatorial privilege" attitude, in that he was not supporting the position of the politically dominant element in Napa County.

Nevertheless, we should not attribute all of MTC's tendency to decompose issues to the makeup of the Commission. Although the structure of the plan was based on subregional units, there was a limit to

the extent to which individual project evaluations were influenced by individual commissioners. In Bay's revisions of Section III-C in both April and June, 1973, the wishes of individual Commissioners were balanced against other considerations - in some cases commissioners got what they wanted, but in others, they obviously did not.

Moreover, at least some MTC staff members would argue that an inductive style of planning - reasoning from particular project decisions through the intermediate level of corridor studies to general regional concepts - is the appropriate way to approach regional planning problems. In this view, MTC's decomposition of regional issues is not a permanent condition, but rather a necessary step in the intellectual process of producing a plan.

Proposition 6.2 holds that:

Where governing body selection procedures result in different constituencies for the agency as a whole and its individual governing body members, the agency will tend to avoid making decisions due to conflicts between staff and governing body members over its fundamental role.

This proposition amplifies Proposition 5.6, which holds that mismatches between individual and collective constituencies will inhibit bold substantive stands and active domain defense measures. Proposition 6.2 suggests why the mismatch in constituencies should inhibit political action: if there is a mismatch in constituencies, a stalemate over the agency's fundamental role should develop. Since the mismatch was clearly present in MTC's case, we should expect to find evidence of a clash between the Commission and the staff over the agency's mission.

Although there were certainly differences of opinion among staff and Commission members, it would probably be an exaggeration to say that these constituted a clash over the agency's fundamental role.

For the most part, clashes between the Commission and staff (or in many cases, between factions within the Commission and staff) concerned specific decisions. These disagreements did, indeed, form patterns (summed up by the feeling of staff members that Commissioners were not "regionally-minded" and that they were still tied to "the old way of doing things") which might imply that the underlying conflict concerned MTC's fundamental role. Nevertheless, these conflicts were rarely, if ever, seen as clashes over MTC's fundamental role, and even if they were, they rarely involved any simple staff-versus-commission confrontation. There was no unanimity within either the staff or the Commission as to what MTC was really supposed to be doing, nor any sharp break in opinion between the Commission and the staff. Rather, there was substantial agreement among the staff leaders and the more active commissioners that MTC's basic task was (in Bay's phrase) to "make transportation happen" - in particular, to promote the development and coordination of the region's mass transit system. Outside of this group of staff and Commission leaders, there were many shades of opinion, ranging from those of the most conservative commissioners to the most radical junior staff members. At no time, however, did polarization of opinion within the organization become as dramatic as the polarization between the Sierra Club and the Division of Highways over MTC's role. To some extent, it would appear that this lack of polarization was due to the fact that most staff and commission members really never thought through MTC's role - and this, in turn, seems to have been related to the feeling, expressed by Bay, that MTC's fundamental role in the Bay Area's transportation politics would emerge from the pressures and counterpressures exerted by other agencies,

Propositions 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 concern the evolution of the agency's internal structures and political procedures. Proposition 6.3 holds that:

Actors will attempt to influence decisions about political mechanisms so as to increase the effectiveness of their political resources.

Although no clear connection can be established between actors' resources, the political mechanisms in which they were employed, and MTC's decisions, it would appear that this proposition is true to the extent that external actors believed that certain features of MTC as a political mechanism would give them an advantage, and that these actors encouraged adoption of these features.

Political action aimed at altering MTC as a political mechanism had two main thrusts. The first involved attempts to secure more favorable amendment procedures. The Bay Area Council, for instance, noted the absence from the 1973 Draft Plan of procedures whereby non-governmental actors could initiate plan amendments, and urged MTC to adopt such procedures:

Section VI should include procedures that specify how citizens or other groups not representing transportation or public agencies may propose Plan amendments.⁶⁹

The second major thrust of political activity aimed at altering MTC as a political mechanism centered around the institutionalization of channels of access to MTC. The Sierra Club and the League of Women Voters attempted to get MTC to set up a permanent citizen advisory committee, which would have paralleled MTC proposals for formal co-optation groups for governmental actors, such as the Metropolitan Transit Federation and the Traffic Management Council (later called the Traffic Control Council). The Club and the League disagreed, however, on

whether the existing ABAG Citizens' Forum was an appropriate vehicle for formal liaison with MTC, with the League favoring the ABAG forum and the Sierra Club favoring an independent Citizens Advisory Committee.

More generally, the League of Women Voters expressed strong support for early and intense involvement of the public in the planning process.

Governmental agencies also tried to persuade MTC to set up coordination and co-optation groups in such a way as to enhance their access to the Commission (or to cut off access to others). Perhaps the most extreme position was that of Santa Clara County Public Works Director James Pott, who was opposed to direct contact between MTC and non-governmental actors. According to David Jones:

Direct relationships between citizens and regional government, [Pott] says, are disfunctional to an orderly hierarchical organization of public management tasks:

The "community interest" syndrome is getting everybody trying to deal directly with the citizen, which causes the system of government to break down.⁷⁰

Other governmental actors were more concerned with either securing formal channels of access to MTC or with increasing their influence in those proposed by MTC. The region's large cities - particularly San Jose and Oakland - complained that they had been left out of the process of developing the 1973 Plan and requested (in the words of a resolution proposed for adoption by the Oakland City Council) that:

...MTC...modify its present liaison group structure to permit more intensive participation of Oakland's staff and citizens and those of other large cities in reviewing and responding to plans and policies to be considered by MTC.⁷¹

Other examples of attempts of agencies to increase their advantage in MTC's co-optation groups would include the Division of Highways'

suggestion that the proposed Traffic Management Council "...should be basically an advisory organization only, leaving the implementation of its recommended programs to operating agencies,"⁷² the Division's request that it be included in the proposed Metropolitan Transit Federation, and (presumably) the reaction of the transit operators to the Transit Federation proposal in the original draft of Section V.

Propositions 6.4 and 6.5 hold that the ability of an organization to maintain particular types of political procedures is affected by the impact of these procedures on the organization's internal resources, lines of authority, and domain defense strategies. Specifically, these two propositions are:

- 6.4. The maintenance of open decision-making procedures being costly in terms of time, coordination, and internal communications, there will be a tendency to shift to closed decision-making procedures when other demands on these resources are at their greatest.
- 6.5. Whenever there are problems with maintenance of lines of authority or execution of domain defense strategies, there will be a tendency to shift from open decision-making procedures to closed ones.

If these propositions are true, we should expect to find a pattern in which MTC's political procedures became less open during periods of time pressure and chaotic conditions within the staff - such as the latter part of the 1973 Plan development phase - or during periods of critical negotiations or threatened confrontations with implementing agencies, local governments, or legislators.

In order to evaluate these propositions, we must assess the openness of MTC's political procedures. It may be helpful at this point to recall the definition of open political procedures presented in Chapter 2:

Open decision-making procedures conform to an ideal of democracy in which all participants act in relatively complete knowledge of cause-and-effect relationships and of one another's values. The ideal is that the decision maker is "responsible" - that is, that the individual or group making the decisions serves at the pleasure of the majority; that the decision maker acts with full knowledge of the positions of all actors; and that all actors trying to influence the decision maker act with full knowledge of the positions of all other actors. Specific means to these ends include such devices as formal citizen participation programs, decision making by responsible officials in open session, direct access to the staff, and careful adherence to rules of "due process" appropriate to the decision-making process at hand. To the degree that procedures are "closed", they depart from these ideals by blocking certain information flows and encouraging others.

The key points of this definition, then, are:

1. Politically responsible decision makers
2. Complete mutual knowledge of facts, causal relationships (to the extent they are known) and positions on the part of decision makers and all actors attempting to influence them.

Traditionally, open political procedures have not been employed in transportation planning - and MTC leaders were well aware of this. For example, David Jones writes that "Bay maintains that in too many instances policy choices have been usurped by technocrats, then sanitized of value content and finally fed back to rubber-stamp boards and commissions as optimum technical solutions."⁷³ In contrast to this style of decision-making, MTC has been consistently aware that the decisions it makes are basically political. It has maintained a policy of "trying to listen to everybody," and at least some MTC leaders believe that it has been successful in opening up the political procedures surrounding transportation planning. Watt, for instance, maintains that "it has been my feeling that one of MTC's initial successful efforts was in opening the transportation planning

process to the public."

Although there is no real cause to dispute the contention that MTC leaders never intended their political procedures to be anything but open, Watt's conclusion that MTC was successful in opening up the transportation planning process would be disputed by other observers - including many participants in MTC's plan-making activities. David Jones, for instance, writes that:

It is ironic...that MTC's relatively intense solicitation of public comment does not seem to have enhanced the public's confidence in transportation planning. In fact, it seems to have increased the number of citizen activists who doubt the integrity and good faith of the Commission.*⁷⁴

To some extent, this disagreement over MTC's effectiveness in opening up the planning process stems from a lack of agreement about the purposes of open political procedures. At this level, the difficulty is not so much the product of anything MTC did or did not do, but of conflicting outlooks which pervade the politics of planning. In particular, there is no general agreement about whether the political devices characteristic of open political processes are intended to increase the amount of information about public preferences available to planners (who then make their own decisions) or to provide for a sharing of power with some previously-excluded political groups. Further, even if it is agreed that these are devices for sharing power, there is a lack of agreement as to whether they are intended to increase the influence of local governments over regional-scale decisions or to increase the influence of "citizens" - in practice, of citizens groups organized on at least a regional scale.

* Jones' statement is based on a survey of citizens who attended the MTC public meetings in June, 1973.

The question of whether the devices of the open political process are intended to provide information to the planning agency or to provide for the sharing of power has consequences for both the types of information flow to be provided by the agency and the agency's response to information about public preferences. If the intention of the open political process is merely to increase the planning agency's knowledge of public preferences, then the agency needs to find out what the public wants, but does not have to inform the public of all considerations having a bearing on its decisions. If, on the other hand, the intention is to share power, the agency must make public all information having a bearing on its decisions. The difference in the agency's response to information about public preferences is illustrated by this quotation from David Jones:

The stated purpose of MTC's citizen participation program is to "encourage and provide an opportunity for citizens in the nine counties to express their concerns to the Commission." A collateral purpose is to "provide information to the public concerning MTC's activities." Deputy Director Paul Bay states the agency's perspective more clearly: "I submit the citizen's role is to have his say; that the agency's responsibility is to let him know what decisions will affect him, then listen to his concern, then decide."

In contrast, citizen participants expect Commissioners to listen, then respond.⁷⁵ [Emphasis in original]

MTC's tendency, then, has been to regard its citizen participation programs as devices for developing information about public preferences, but not necessarily as devices for sharing power with constituents. MTC will definitely listen to what citizens have to say; among its devices for listening are:

1. Encouragement of attendance at Commission and committee meetings.

2. Encouragement of statements by citizens at Commission and committee meetings.
3. Maintenance of a Citizen Opinion File recording written comments by citizens.
4. Creation of formal citizens' advisory groups for special projects (such as transit development projects) - but not the creation of a single Citizens' Advisory Committee for the region as a whole.
5. Sponsorship of public meetings and hearings, including at least four public meetings each year prior to the adoption of plan revisions, public meetings in communities affected by major proposals subject to MTC review, and meetings concerning topics of general interest (such as transportation for the handicapped, public water transportation, car pooling, recreational transportation, regional transportation marketing, and so forth).⁷⁶

MTC has also been quite free with technical information - although in some cases (such as the I-580 project review) it has failed to point out technical issues that might have escaped the attention of the public. MTC personnel will also sometimes provide political information - if asked - but MTC rarely takes the lead in disseminating any but the most obvious information about the political considerations that underlie its decisions. The MTC leaders, for the most part, also appear to consider the details of staff deliberations and negotiations with other agencies to be none of the public's business. As a result of this attitude, key information about the content of MTC decisions, the methods by which they were reached, and the considerations which

underlay them as sometimes either failed to reach the public, or has reached it in such a form as to embarrass MTC and increase suspicion of MTC's intentions. Specific examples of such incidents include:

1. The meetings in 1973 between MTC staff members and Division of Highways staff members concerning Section III-C were off the record; also, it would appear that there was correspondence concerning the categorizations that was not made public. The Sierra Club found out about the meetings and the correspondence, and made statements implying that the revisions in the table of issues resulted from collusion between MTC and the Division.
2. The text of Section IV in the 1973 Plan contains numerous statements implying a close relationship between Sections III and IV (see pages 260-65 for examples of such statements), whereas, in fact, staff members developing the two sections had little contact with one another during the period in which the two sections were being developed. Public statements by MTC staff members at the May 23 Commission meeting would seem to confirm the impression that the relationship between the two sections was being overstated. Nevertheless, the Sierra Club was, to some extent, aware of the real situation, declaring in its June 12, 1973 statement that "it is difficult to understand how the staff came to recommend the Section IV priorities and money allocations;" the Club went on to speculate that one reason was that "the various sections and portions of the plan were parceled out to different staff members or staff teams. Apparently, there was not enough time to coordinate the parts, reconcile inconsistencies and (particularly in Section VI

[sic - IV?]) to establish priorities that will cause reduction in automobile [usage]."77

3. None of the public groups seem to have been aware that the highway program in MTC's 1973 Plan was identical with the proposed program of the Division of Highways - although the Division recognized it as such and cautioned MTC that it had not yet been approved by the Highway Commission. In this case, the Sierra Club had some idea of what had happened, but appears to have lacked positive evidence of the identity of the program.
4. There was a general lack of awareness on the part of all the citizens groups of the changes made in Sections IV, V, and VI in late May, 1973 - or else an almost complete lack of awareness of their significance. There is no real evidence that the early drafts of these sections were unavailable at the time (but on the other hand, no evidence that some of them were, either). Whether the rejected staff proposals were not public knowledge, or whether they were simply overlooked in the rush to complete the Plan,* it would appear that some rather important decisions were made with minimal public awareness and input.

More generally, David Jones reports a continuing tendency to suppress the details of intra-staff debates. Jones comments that:

* In some cases, the interim drafts must have been in the hands of outside organizations, since they had been sent out as provisionally adopted. In other cases, documents were discussed at WPC meetings but may not have been picked up by outside observers.

...MTC's deliberations are almost invariably conducted in public with a minimum of prior rehearsal or telephone clearance.

The most significant exception is the tendency of MTC staff opinion to be represented as unanimous when it is frequently divided along disciplinary and ideological lines. In most instances, this division has not "gone public," with some resulting loss of information for both Commissioners and members of the public.⁷⁸

Elsewhere, Jones comments that:

Robust debate has occurred occasionally during MTC's planning process, but less and less frequently. Increasingly, the senior staff is anticipating technical proposals that would provoke conflicts and moderating them before they can offend Commission sensibilities -- classic behavior of line staff in most agencies....Recent efforts to anticipate sensitive issues and remove rough edges before presentation have limited embarrassment and controversy but at the cost of limiting the ability of the Commission to make responsible decisions after grappling with issues as the staff really sees them.⁷⁹

A second conflict involving the purposes of open political procedures may be summarized by the question, open to whom? Specifically, are these procedures devices for involving local governments in decisions at the state and regional level, or are they devices for bypassing unresponsive local governments? Confusion over this point is inherent in state and federal guidelines for transportation planning, which admonish planning agencies to be responsive to local communities, but then ignore the potential conflict between local governments and their citizens. Moreover, the planning guidelines are somewhat ambiguous about the status of implementing agencies in the planning process - does the power to make planning decisions continue to reside with the implementing agencies, with the planning agencies merely providing partial access for local governments and citizens, or do the implementing agencies find themselves as petitioners before the planning agency, along with the local governments and the citizens groups? If

the latter is to be the case, do the implementing agencies have some special status, or are they to be treated just like the other political actors?

In MTC's case, there was clearly a major conflict between the majority of the local governments and the regional-scale citizens groups. David Jones writes:

Local authorities frequently have aimed at securing approval for projects developed in the growth-minded, efficiency-conscious mood of the early 1960's. Thus, in developing its plan, MTC was confronted with laundry lists of local highway projects from local public works directors and county advisory committees at the same time that the same county's citizen organizations and many local officials were clamoring for "transit first and transit now." In such circumstances, MTC finds it difficult to respond to "community input." The community itself is advocating conflicting options.

For example, the highway approvals that have cost MTC the most in controversy and criticism -- the Napa Bridge, the Dumbarton Bridge, Route 1 in San Mateo County, Route 580 in Alameda County and Route 101 in Santa Clara County -- are precisely those projects with the highest ranking on the priority lists of county engineers and county development associations. For MTC, bottoms-up planning has become a case of "damned if you do and damned if you don't."⁸⁰

There is no question that MTC was more responsive to local governments than to regional-scale citizens groups - the Commission's basis of representation virtually guaranteed that it would be. This was not so much a question of who was to be heard as one of who was to be taken seriously. The clash between the local governments and the impact-oriented citizens groups was not only one of goals and interests, but also one of political styles. Commissioners, most of whom were local elected officials themselves, were often offended as much by the attitudes displayed by citizen group spokesmen as by the substance of their remarks. David Jones characterizes the conflict in style and personality as follows:

The conflict between the Commission and its most active constituents is a cameo performance of a larger conflict that is occurring throughout the Bay Region, but most intensely in rapidly suburbanizing areas. It is a conflict between men in the mold of most of the Commissioners -- doers, builders, and leaders in the old tradition -- and a newer urban leadership of consumers, environmentalists, and residentialists -- users, not "doers." The focus of this conflict is the issue of growth, or in the suburban argot, "the quality of life."⁸¹

The Commission tended to feel that the citizens groups were unrepresentative - as they were, by any objective criterion - and that their anti-automobile rhetoric was hypocritical. The Commission's relatively unstructured citizen participation program - MTC would not seek out public opinion, but would listen to whoever showed up - virtually assured that public hearings would be dominated by "professional citizens" - but when these people came to participate, the Commission rejected their testimony as being unrepresentative of the "real public." Meanwhile, however, the Commission had no formal means of finding out what the "real public" wanted.

An assessment of the openness of MTC's political procedures must take into account not only the confusion of purpose surrounding such procedures, but also the effects of domain defense strategies on them. In MTC's case, there was a real conflict between domain defense strategies - which required negotiation and cooperation with implementing agencies - and the requirement that issues should be debated and decided in public. David Jones reports that:

Technicians from other agencies are not accustomed to the fishbowl atmosphere and have discouraged the discussion of staff analyses before they have been reviewed (and perhaps sanitized) within the bureaucracy.⁸²

A notable instance of this attitude was the Technical Advisory Committee's demand - rejected by Bort - that MTC staff proposals be

reviewed by the TAC before they went to the Work Program Committee. Moreover, (as previously mentioned) the details of inter-staff negotiations and even written communications between implementing agencies and the MTC staff have rarely been made public. Meanwhile (in the name of openness) all communications from non-governmental sources, and most of those from elected officials, are placed in the Citizen Opinion File and made freely available to the public. This lack of symmetry in the treatment of government and non-governmental actors extends to the formation of co-optation groups: MTC has actively promoted co-optation groups involving implementing agencies and local public works departments but has avoided the creation of a single regional citizens advisory group, partly because it does not want to exclude other members of the public - and partly because the Commission fears that such an organization might try to gain power over MTC. The end result of MTC domain defense strategies is that (in the words of David Jones) "...MTC's cautious transactional model of planning makes it extremely difficult to introduce citizen involvement and input in settings in which most important decisions are actually reached: in the give and take between agency representatives."⁸³

Finally, analysis of the openness of MTC's political procedures must take into account the relationship between the intellectual and political aspects of planning. Although politics may be an irrational process in some respects, it presupposes some sort of a rational framework for decisions and some sort of orderly procedure for making them. In an open planning process, the plan itself is the framework, and the process of making decisions about the plan - both during its development and during its implementation - must be orderly enough to

allow intelligent discussion. MTC had great difficulty - particularly in 1973 - both in devising a rational framework for decisions and in maintaining orderly decision-making procedures.

The two problems were interrelated. In some ways, MTC's approach to the Plan was successful in producing issues which were readily understandable. David Jones, for instance, rates the MTC planning process high on visibility and understandability: "the issue-by-issue, corridor-by-corridor approach to systems planning has provided clearly visible and concrete issues for both citizens and local officials to react to."⁸⁴ The Plan's greatest weakness as a decision-making framework was its lack of unity - which was to some extent the price MTC paid for the visibility produced by the issue-oriented format. Still, this lack of unity might have been overcome: it was the failure of the category system to emerge as a device for unifying the 1973 Plan - as originally intended - that was really responsible for the fragmentation of the Plan; and this, in turn, resulted from vacillation about the meaning of the categories which (at least to some extent) had its origin in an inability to pace Work Program Committee deliberations and to coordinate them with staff actions in assigning the categories. These difficulties stemmed in part from a lack of time for WPC deliberations, and in part from a lack of control over the WPC agenda (the Committee may sometimes have concerned itself excessively with minor points) but also resulted from difficulty on the part of the MTC staff in conveying information and in structuring decisions - in other words, in asking the right questions of the right commissioners at the right time. Bay, for instance, in reacting to the suggestion that MTC decision-making "broke down" in the latter stages of the 1973 Plan

development process, asks "What decision-making procedures?" and goes on to declare that "the whole process was a continuous struggle to find more effective ways to communicate data to Commissioners and have Commission decisions made in a bite by bite, yet rational, process."

In summary, then, MTC's political procedures were in some ways quite open - but only up to a point. In terms of the definition of open political procedures offered in Chapter 2 - that decisions are to be made by politically-responsible decision makers in an atmosphere of complete mutual knowledge of facts, causal relationships, and positions - MTC fell short at the following points:

1. MTC was not "responsible" in the sense that it was not directly accountable to the electorate. The Commission rejected staff suggestions in the early versions of Sections III-D and V in 1973 that it seek to become an elective body.
2. MTC decisions were not always made by the Commission in open session. Detailed substantive decisions were in most cases proposed by the staff and ratified by the Commission. In many cases it is impossible to tell to what extent they reflected the Commission's real feelings and to what extent they reflected staff or even outside influence, since the details of instructions by the Commission or its committees were often not recorded.*

* Work Program Committee minutes are particularly lacking in detail. Moreover, there appear to have been many working sessions between Commissioners and staff in 1973 which were open to the public, but at which no minutes were kept. Finally, minutes have never been available (and presumably were not kept) for several crucial regular WPC meetings (for instance, those in June, 1973).

3. Decisions were rarely made in an atmosphere of complete mutual political knowledge. In most cases, the Commission itself seems to have been aware of all the relevant positions (with the exception of some staff positions) but outsiders were not privy to the details of either MTC staff deliberations or of negotiations between the staffs of MTC and other agencies.

Proposition 6.4 holds that political procedures will tend to shift from open to closed during periods of time pressure and difficulty in maintaining coordination and communication. In MTC's case, the most notable such period was that of the development of the initial Regional Transportation Plan in 1973. If Proposition 6.4 is correct, we should expect to find some sort of closure in MTC's political procedures during this period.

Time pressure was very definitely an acute problem during the development of the 1973 Plan. This time pressure manifested itself in three ways:

1. Increased work load for the Commission and its committees.
2. Increased staff work load.
3. Insufficient elapsed time between decisions to allow for the absorption of information and coordination of decisions.

Although all these problems were acute, that of the Commission's work load seems to have had the greatest impact on the openness of MTC's political procedures. The limited time available for Commission and committee deliberations, and the relative lack of control of committee agenda, necessarily limited the degree to which the Commission could participate in determining the contents of the plan. Nevertheless, the work load problem did not result in the Commission's total abdication

of responsibility for the plan's contents - as it might have. On the contrary, direct intervention by the full Commission and the Work Program and Grant Review Committees was most noticeable in the hasty, but extensive, modifications of the staff drafts of Sections IV, V, and VI in May, 1973. Time pressure and Commission work load probably did limit discussion of these sections and force most of the Commission action on them out of regular meetings and into poorly-recorded working sessions. The result was that, although these decisions did represent decision-making by the Commission (and not rubber-stamping of staff proposals) the issues they dealt with were poorly understood by the public.

MTC was quite aware at the time of the problems created by the Commission's work load. The original versions of Sections III-D and V proposed that MTC request the legislature to make Commission membership a full-time job with an appropriate salary. This suggestion, which was tied to the direct election of the Commission, was rejected by the Commission.

MTC also experienced very definite problems with coordination and communications within the staff during the development of the 1973 Plan. These problems involved not only the difficulty of bringing together the various streams of outside information being received by the staff, but also the coordination of simultaneous staff efforts.

Streams of information from outside the staff which had to be brought together in order to produce the plan included:

1. Instructions and suggestions from commissioners.
2. Input from the staffs of implementing agencies, other regional agencies, and local public works and planning departments.

3. Input from local elected officials (other than commissioners) and the "public."

By and large, instructions and suggestions from commissioners were communicated directly to top-level staff members, as were comments by top-level staff members of other organizations. Other channels of information existed between lower level MTC staff members and contacts in other agencies. Some of these consisted of routine liaison, and others consisted of unofficial ties between individuals in the different agencies. In February and March, there were also contacts between a group of middle-level MTC staff members and officials of the Division of Highways and the local planning and public works departments; it was through these contacts that the list of "issues" was refined and the initial concerns of these officials communicated to the MTC staff. Meanwhile, ABAG staff members were actually attached to the MTC corridor teams, and information and opinion from elected officials and the public was coming in through the Community Affairs Staff, the Commission, and through numerous discussions between community groups and various staff members. Although it is doubtful that any one individual was ever aware of all the information that was coming in, top-level staff members were probably in the best position to put together all the information streams.

The MTC staff's difficulties with coordination and communication extended to the coordination of simultaneous staff efforts. In particular, there was a lack of coordination between Sections III, IV, and V. Reasons for this lack of coordination included:

1. The lack of managerial structure and the lack of systematic means for exchanging information. Due to the delay in

recruiting the staff, MTC's managerial structure was being improvised at the same time the initial Plan was being written. Under such conditions channels of communication within the staff also had to be improvised.

2. Time pressure. Time pressure not only inhibited development of a managerial structure and both formal and informal communication within the staff, but also forced the simultaneous development of the various sections of the Plan and made it impossible to coordinate them through mutual adjustment.
3. Delay and vacillation in determining the meaning of the categories in Section III-C. The category system was seen by at least some MTC staff members as the principal device for unifying and coordinating the Plan. When the category system failed to emerge in this role, the logical connection between the various sections of the Plan (particularly that between Sections III and IV) also failed to develop.
4. In some cases, there was a deliberate policy of isolating particular staff members from certain types of information. In particular, it was Bay's policy that the corridor teams not have access to the Division of Highways' proposed capital improvement program on the grounds that whether or not a proposal was on District 4's proposed program should not affect its importance to the Plan. At one stage, at least, it was a very definite policy that The Plan (Section III) and The Program (Section IV) be kept separate.

The effects of time pressure and coordination problems on MTC's political procedures were:

1. To some extent, key substantive decisions had to be made by individual senior staff members because they were the only ones in a position to put together all the internal and external information streams, given the time pressures. Although there is no real evidence that this situation affected the substance of these decisions, it certainly detracted from the appearance of openness in MTC's political procedures. The prime example of this type of decision-making, and its result, was Bay's revision of the table of issues, which resulted in suspicion on the part of the Sierra Club that the revisions represented secret deals with the Division of Highways.
2. In other cases, the Commission (or the committees) did intervene by rejecting staff proposals which it (they) found unacceptable. In these cases, however, time pressure was such that much of the Commission action took place outside regular sessions, and the issues were not well understood by the public (and possibly the Commission).
3. Coordination problems definitely inhibited the development of a unified plan to which the public could respond. Also, the time pressure was such that completion of drafts of major portions of the plan did not occur until the deadline for Plan adoption was very near. This meant that the public had little time to react to the full Plan and the Commission even less time to react to public comments.

In conclusion, it would appear that Proposition 6.4 is only partly true. Time pressure and coordination and communication problems did not lead to any deliberate abandonment of open political procedures on

MTC's part, but did detract from their functioning.

Proposition 6.5 holds that when there are problems with domain defense strategies or maintenance of lines of authority within an organization, there will be a shift to less-open political procedures. In MTC's case, there might be some evidence to support such a proposition: both the complaints that MTC was suppressing dissenting staff opinions and the loss of confidence in the openness of MTC's political procedures seem to have arisen after the adoption of the 1973 Plan; furthermore, these charges seem to be related to MTC's domain defense strategies. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind Proposition 6.5 may not have been entirely correct.

In Chapter 2, Proposition 6.5 was justified by the arguments that (1) development of hierarchical structure and maintenance of a chain of command would decrease decision-making by the politically-responsible level of an agency and that (2) since public expression of opinions about particular subjects by organization members may be interpreted as assertions of domain, strict control over such expressions would have to be exercised in certain situations, which, in turn, would result in diminished knowledge about the bases for the organization's decisions.

The actual situation would seem to be a mirror-image of that postulated in Chapter 2. To the extent that MTC's domain defense strategies interfered with the openness of its political procedures, this interference was not due to MTC fears that expressions of staff opinions would be taken as domain claims, but rather to the reluctance of staff members of other organizations to carry out negotiations and co-optation activities in the open. To the extent that defense of

lines of authority interfered with MTC's openness, this was not due to the movement of decisions downward in a hierarchy (the hierarchy was slow to develop) but to the suppression of dissenting staff opinions as being subversive to the authority of either the commission or staff leaders. Indeed, top-level staff members seem to feel that that many of the complaints by lower-level staff members that their opinions never reached the Commission were due to the lack of a fully-articulated hierarchical structure which could have facilitated communication.

An important phenomenon which was not anticipated in Chapter 2 is the interaction between domain-defense strategies and the development of managerial structures and the potential effects of this interaction on the openness of political procedures. During the period covered by the case studies, MTC's strategies of negotiation and co-optation seem to have inhibited the development of MTC's organizational structure: top-ranking MTC staff members were so busy dealing with external affairs that they did not have time to concentrate on developing a managerial structure within the organization. Jones, Taggart, and Dorosin write that:

The uncertainty of the external institutional environment has also constrained the development of coherent management structure and planning procedure within MTC. The Commission's executive staff has been absorbed in the frenetic byplay of inter-agency diplomacy. Most Commission decisions have been reached in an atmosphere of crisis with an emphasis on "keeping our options open and our fences mended," "minimizing mistakes," and "not stubbing our toe too badly." This strategic emphasis on flexibility -- in both policy and procedure -- has made delegation within the staff difficult and systematic technical evaluation more difficult still.⁸⁵

Too much success in co-optation and contracting strategies, however, might well result in the movement of key decisions to the lower levels of parallel hierarchies in MTC and the implementing

agencies, with a resulting loss of openness in political procedures. There is very definitely a school of thought in the MTC staff that holds that MTC is ineffective because of the separation of planning and implementation functions. Those holding this opinion might well welcome the informal reunion of these functions through interagency agreements and co-optation structures. Some indication of how joint staff task forces might function is provided by the corridor teams, which had ABAG staff members attached, and the TCC, which produced the TCP by means of a joint MTC-Caltrans staff task force.

C. Political Influence in an Evolving Institutional System.

According to Chapter 2, we should expect that, over time, the substantive and institutional decisions of an organization such as MTC should reinforce one another and thus move it closer to the camp of either its constituents or its anticonstituents. We argued in Chapter 2 that if such a trend were to develop, it would be reinforced over time by the withdrawal of the disappointed faction from the agency's immediate political sphere. In the long run, we argued, the impact of a new agency on patterns of influence in an ongoing functional field would depend on its organizational effectiveness and the openness of its political procedures: open political procedures and organizational effectiveness should lead to influence by the agency's constituents; a lack of organizational effectiveness should leave anticonstituents in control of decision-making; and a combination of closed political procedures and organizational effectiveness should lead to an autonomous agency, whose decisions, while they might coincide with the positions of external actors, would not be the result of influence by these actors.

Three specific propositions concerning political influence in an evolving institutional system were advanced. Proposition 7.1 holds that:

If an agency's substantive and institutional decisions tend to reinforce one another over time, those actors whose orientations are counter to those of the agency will tend to withdraw or be excluded from the agency's political system; in extreme cases, they may be destroyed.

In MTC's case, this did happen to some extent. As it became apparent that MTC's substantive and institutional policies would be moderate (if not conservative), there was a tendency both to exclude the impact-oriented citizens groups (as the real focus of MTC political activity moved more and more toward co-optation and interagency negotiations) and for these groups to decrease their participation. There was no dramatic withdrawal from MTC's political arena by the environmental groups, but by mid-1974, they no longer professed to believe that they had the Commission's sympathy or that MTC's support was very important to them in their overall political strategy. Instead, they began to look to external events, such as the fuel shortage and the declining economy, and to such (supposedly) autonomous political actors as EPA and the courts to ease the pressure of urban expansion and increased travel demand on the environment. One manifestation of this new strategy was the Sierra Club's suit against the I-580 project.

Propositions 7.2 and 7.3 held that:

7.2. An agency's constituents can have real influence through it only if the agency is effective and its political procedures are open; nevertheless a lack of direct influence need not preclude the possibility that an effective, but closed, agency will serve the interests of its constituents.

- 7.3. Since the interests of an agency's anticonstituents can be achieved if the agency is rendered ineffective, anticonstituents are more apt to try to undermine the agency's effectiveness than to try to influence its substantive policy.

These propositions appear to be largely correct in MTC's case. MTC certainly did not live up to the expectations of the regional-scale citizens groups, and it certainly did not develop into an instrument which they could use to exert influence over transportation decisions in the Bay Area. Although there were definite limits to the openness of its political procedure, MTC was probably more open than effective. Although the constituents themselves seemed to believe that the makeup of the Commission was the chief barrier to their influence - that local officials simply were not willing to do anything drastic to reduce the environmental impacts of the transportation system - MTC also lacked sufficient effectiveness, in the sense that, within the context of its self-perceived political limits and the levels of risk its leaders were willing to accept, it simply was not able to do what its constituents wanted.

To some extent, this ineffectiveness was inherent and was due to the incompatibility between the MTC the citizens groups envisioned and the realities of an institutional system much larger than MTC. It was also due to the activities of MTC's anticonstituents. In some cases, implementing agencies, local officials, and members of the legislature made direct attacks on MTC's effectiveness; examples of such attacks include the legislative attacks (especially that in the Napa Bridge case), the efforts of the local governments to limit MTC's influence over the allocation of FAU funds, and the resistance of the Bay Area transit operators to compulsory coordination. More often, however,

anticonstituents merely exploited (and perhaps exaggerated) conflicts among MTC's aspirations in such a way as to pose insoluble dilemmas for MTC in exercising certain functions. The most notable example of this sort of situation was the Division of Highways/Caltrans organization's exploitation of the "pipeline problem" as a means of frustrating MTC's priority-setting and project approval powers. The pipeline problem really derived its debilitating effect on MTC's exercise of these functions from MTC's desire to see its "plan" implemented - even if this meant that the "plan" was only a compilation of pre-existing plans - and MTC's unwillingness to pass up state and federal funds for the region. Finally, MTC's actions throughout the period covered by the case studies were, to some extent, influenced by an ill-defined feeling that its anticonstituents were hostile and were capable of drastic reactions. With the exception of the Napa Bridge case, there were no open manifestations of this hostility; nevertheless, the feeling that MTC's very existence was threatened was pervasive and may well have been the result of private remarks by anticonstituents.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCHA. Conclusions.

The purpose of this research was to propose a model of political influence in regional transportation planning and to test it against the behavior of MTC during the period between its creation in September, 1970 and the end of 1974. Major conclusions of this study are:

1. Most of the conventional wisdom about planning politics relates to the making of individual decisions; this body of speculation, which centers around the effects of the characteristics of planning issues and decision makers, is difficult to apply to an isolated case study because of the limited sample of issues and the amount of personal judgment required in classifying issue-characteristics, decision-unit characteristics, and outcomes.
2. The behavior of organizations such as MTC can be better explained in terms of Thompsonian organization theory and certain extensions thereof developed in the organization-evolution model of Chapter 2. MTC's behavior can be fairly well understood in terms of the establishment and defense of an organizational domain and the evolution of an organization as a political mechanism.
3. MTC's behavior was most influenced by local governments and implementing agencies. In this, it was similar to regional

transportation planning efforts studied by Altshuler and Levin and Abend in the 1950's and 1960's. It is possible that local governments were of greater importance in MTC's effort than in earlier ones, but the closeness of the positions of the implementing agencies and local governments makes it difficult to judge their influence relative to one another. The influence of the implementing agencies and local governments on MTC was manifested not so much on an issue-by-issue basis as in MTC's failure to emerge as an agency with enough effectiveness to fulfill the role envisioned for it by the other major faction in its political environment - the regional-scale, impact-oriented citizens groups.

4. MTC's failure to emerge as a highly-effective, independent organization resulted from the following factors:

- a. The initial concept of the agency on the part of the California Legislature and the Federal Department of Transportation was unclear. MTC was not (and is not) very compatible with the overall state and federal system of transportation decision-making. To some extent MTC was viewed as an experiment in regional transportation planning; in practice, however, the conflicts and ambiguities in state and federal laws and guidelines served to hamper MTC rather than to provide MTC with the opportunity to serve as a catalyst for changing existing systems of transportation

decision-making.

- b. The basis of representation and method of selection of the Commission resulted in a governing body which was unlikely to favor independent action. The Commission majority represents the local governments, and the local governments are for the most part allied with the implementing agencies. The Commission majority has displayed little interest in a more-active MTC role and has on occasion rejected staff proposals which might have led to one.
- c. The professional affiliations of MTC staff leaders were not conducive to political aggressiveness. Overt political activity still bears something of a stigma among transportation planners; moreover, status as cosmopolitan professionals would not have protected MTC staff leaders from political retaliation because much of this aggressiveness would have been directed at fellow-professionals. Finally, the conflicting demands of staff leaders' roles as experts, organizational managers, and conflict managers may have inhibited political aggressiveness.
- d. The MTC leadership's assessment of its political position indicated that a more active role would be unrealistic. The leadership of both the Commission and the staff felt that MTC lacked the political legitimacy, technical legitimacy, and economic security to manipulate the dependencies of other organizations.

As a result, MTC adopted a strategy of defending its organizational domain by contracting and co-optation where possible and of either abandoning outright or claiming but failing to exercise other functions.

- e. MTC's choice of contracting and co-optation domain defense strategies limited its ability to develop political resources. MTC leaders seemed to feel that too-ambitious attempts to develop alternative sources for key organizational needs or interdependencies with those who supplied them would lead to hostile reactions which MTC could not counter due to the weakness of its existing political resources. Instead, MTC has attempted to build up political and technical legitimacy gradually, largely through attempts to avoid as many mistakes as possible.
- f. In both their domain defense strategies and their efforts to secure political resources, MTC leaders displayed moderate, but not high, levels of risk propensity. No satisfactory explanation for adoption of this level of risk propensity was found. Propositions linking risk propensity to uncertainty, time pressure, and professional status could not be accepted as adequate explanations.

- 5. The openness of MTC's political procedures was not sufficient to allow control of MTC by its natural constituency. Although there seems to be no reason to doubt that MTC tried

to maintain open political procedures, MTC did not always succeed in convincing non-governmental actors of its openness, and would seem to have stopped short of complete openness in the following respects:

- a. There was a conflict in political style between the Commission and the regional-scale citizens groups (particularly the Sierra Club) which contributed to mutual suspicion and resulted in a tendency on the Commission's part to not take the testimony of some groups seriously.
- b. Information concerning dissenting staff opinions, the details of staff deliberations, and details of inter-staff negotiations was often not disclosed.
- c. In 1973, in particular, time pressure greatly inhibited public participation and open decision-making by the Commission itself. Openness was decreased by the limited time available for Commission deliberations and by a lack of coherence in the Plan itself, which, in turn, was partially the result of difficulties in coordinating staff actions with one another and with the deliberations of the Commission and its committees.

B. Recommendations for Further Research.

Recommendations for further research include:

1. More case studies of political behavior in regional transportation planning should be undertaken to determine how

much variation in political behavior exists among transportation planning agencies and whether the model developed in this study can be extended to other cases. Potential research of particular interest includes:

- a. Comparison of the behavior of "reconstructed" regional transportation planning agencies (such as MTC or the one in Boston) with organizations such as the Tri-State Transportation Committee (New York metropolitan area) or the Chicago Area Transportation Study, which appear to have developed in a more evolutionary fashion.
 - b. Investigations of the effect of political organization on political behavior in regional transportation planning. This would involve comparisons among the common types of organizations doing regional transportation planning, including agencies established by interstate compact, statutory agencies, and councils of governments.
 - c. A continuing effort to monitor the development of the state-regional relationship in California transportation planning.
2. Research of a more theoretical and normative nature would also seem appropriate. In particular, there should be continuing efforts to discover viable political roles for planners; these efforts must take into account technical uncertainty, the role of organizational needs and depen-

dencies in planning politics, and the overall political environment of transportation planning. Also, there should be continuing research into the sorts of technical information and methods of analysis which would be of use in arriving at political decisions. At the moment, the frontiers of politically-relevant technical research in transportation engineering and planning would appear to involve the interrelationships among transportation, land use, and air quality. As political debate shifts, however, other topics may supersede these. There is a need for technical researchers to anticipate shifts in the political debate so that practicing transportation planners will not be left with last year's solutions to last year's problems.

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5. E.E. Trefethen, Jr., Chairman, Bay Area Council, to Joseph P. Bort, Chairman, MTC, June 5, 1973.

APPENDIX A

Sources of Information

The most important sources of information for this study were documentary. In most cases, these documentary sources have been cited in footnotes, although in a few cases, the identity of the source has been suppressed because the information was from sources not available for public attribution. In addition to the documentary sources, information was derived from notes and materials collected by David W. Jones, Jr., in connection with his study of MTC and a series of interviews with participants in MTC's planning process. Major sources of interview material included:

MTC Staff Members:

Paul C. Watt.....	Personal Interview, August 23, 1974
Paul Bay.....	Personal Interview, July 1, 1974 January 20, 1975
Richard Carll.....	Personal Interview, July 15, 1974 April 30, 1975
Walter Stoll.....	Personal Interview, July 15, 1974
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MTC Commissioners:

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Others:

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August 19, 1974

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August 14, 1974

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APPENDIX B

Comparison of Sierra Club Positions on Highway Issues with those of
MTC's April 11 and May 15, 1973 Versions of Section III-C.

Relationship of Sierra Club recommended category to MTC category	MTC highway issue categorizations	
	April 20 Version	May 15 Version
Higher	3	0
Same	17	2
Lower	17	34
No Sierra Club Recommendation	20	21

Sources: MTC categorizations from Staff Evaluation of Regional Transportation Issues (circa April 11, 1973) and the May 15 draft of Section III of the Regional Transportation Plan. Sierra Club Positions from NCRCC Statement, Appendix A, Novato Statement on Section III and Loma Prieta Chapter. Statement to Metropolitan Transportation Commission, June 18, 1973.

APPENDIX CMTC Non-Facility Programs Included in April 25, 1973 Draft of SectionIII-D of the Regional Transportation Plan

I. Coordination of Transit Systems

A. User-Oriented Coordination

1. Coordinated Scheduling and Routing
2. Coordinated Transit Information System
 - a. Information Delivery System
 - b. Marketing Research Element
3. Coordinated Fare and Transfer System
 - a. Fare and Transfer Coordination
 - b. Fare Collection Coordination

B. Operator-Oriented Coordination

1. Joint Capital Purchasing
2. Joint Maintenance
3. Regional Vehicle Pool

II. Low Capital-Intensive Transit System Improvements

- A. Terminal Redesign
- B. Bus Shelter Program
- C. Vehicle Redesign

III. Transportation Management Programs

- A. Low and Non-Capital Measures to Improve Highway Operations
 1. Ramp metering
 2. Surveillance of Traffic Conditions

3. Restriping to Eliminate Bottlenecks
4. Quicker Accident and Incident Removal
5. Improved Maintenance Practices

B. Programs to Make Transit Operate Better

1. Innovative Use of Street Capacity
2. Bus Signal Preemption
3. Transit Bypass Access at Metered Ramps
4. Exclusive Transit Lanes

C. Minimize Auto Interference With Other Modes

D. Consolidated/Coordinated Goods Movement

1. Land Use Controls
2. Pick-up and Delivery Study
3. Special Cargo Lanes
4. Restrictions of Truck Types
5. Goods Movement Data Collection
6. Extend Utility Service Operations

IV. TOPICS (Highway and Street Improvements)

A. Major Construction Improvements

B. Minor Construction Improvements

V. Alter Trip-Making Behavior

A. Incentives and Disincentives

1. Include Transit Cost in Public Event Tickets
2. Peak Hour Surcharge on Bridge Tolls
3. No-fare/Reduced Rate Transit Study
4. Penalize High-Powered Passenger Vehicles

- 5. Rider Education
- B. Reduce and Spread Peak Hour Traffic
 - 1. Staggered Work Hours Survey and Evaluation
 - 2. Car Pooling
- C. Provide New Modal Opportunity
 - 1. Local Bicycle Projects
 - 2. Develop Regional Bicycle Facilities Plan
 - 3. Off-Peak Small Vehicles for Delivery
- D. Public Policies to Reduce Employee Travel
- VI. Special Needs
 - A. Relate Transit Service Planning to Low-Mobility Group Needs
 - B. Subsidized Taxi and Public Service
 - C. Travel Stamp Program
 - D. Facility Redesign
 - 1. Terminal
 - 2. Vehicle
 - E. Demand-Responsive System Trial
- VII. Financial and Legal
 - A. Revised Compensation and Replacement Programs
 - 1. Compensation Level Increases
 - 2. Cover Parties Adversely Affected but Not Displaced
 - 3. Public Provision of Replacement Housing
 - B. Increase Public Benefits of Land Appreciation
 - 1. Tax 100% of Land Value Increase Due to Transportation
 - 2. Excess Condemnation

- C. Auto Taxation to Support Regional Transit System
 - 1. Intermodal Use of U.S., California Highway Trust Funds
 - 2. Increase Gasoline Taxation
 - 3. MTC Control Over Bridge Tolls, Allocation of Revenues
 - 4. Regional Parking Tax
- D. Elective M.T.C.
- E. Parking and Transit Requirements
 - 1. Require Transit for New Developments
 - 2. Remove Central-Area Parking Requirements

VIII. Transportation Planning Improvements

- A. Encourage Public Participation
 - 1. More Open Meetings
 - 2. Hold Special Public Hearings
 - 3. Develop or Participate in Citizen's Forum
 - 4. Develop Low-Mobility Advisory Commission
- B. Full Accounting of Costs and Benefits
 - 1. Cost and Benefits Distributive Statement Requirement
 - 2. Alter Orientation of Transit Planning
- C. Research Effects of Novel Transport Systems
- D. Establish Standards for Bicycle Facilities

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